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ABSTRACT
Apart from being Italo-centric, the vast majority of 
scholarly work on the short-lived period of Italian occupation 
of Ethiopia is mainly preoccupied with political events and 
particularly with their repercussions on international diploma­
cy. With the exception of a few pioneering studies, Italian rule 
and its impact on Ethiopia is given marginal importance.
The present thesis confines itself to one specific 
key area of Italian policy - land. Search for an outlet to 
settle Italy's excess population and deploy its surplus capital, 
had sustained Italian imperialist ambitions from the 19th 
century and justified the conquest of Ethiopia against quasi 
universal international opposition. With the conquest of 
Ethiopia, Italy claimed to have become one of the 'satisfied' 
nations.
Unlike the older Italian colonies that were described 
as a useless "collection of sand", Ethiopia, with its varying 
climate and fertile soil, was portrayed as an El Dorado where 
Italy's long-standing imperial aspirations could be effectively 
fulfilled. Yet impressive land colonization programmes, aiming 
at settling Italian colonists with a mission to transform, 
within a short time, the agricultural sector into "the granary 
of Italy" and the Ethiopian Empire into an extension of a Magna 
Italia, were an unmitigated failure. The building of the Empire 
proved extremely difficult, largely because realities on the 
ground had vastly hampered practical results.
Nevertheless, the attendant policies accelerated the 
process of change already set in motion and had a lasting effect 
on traditional Ethiopian social structure. Each chapter 
discusses key aspects of these policies, highlighting the forces 
contributing to the great contrast between their formulation and 
their actual achievement and, particularly in the conclusion, 
their impact on an independent Ethiopia.
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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Interest in the present research developed when I 
realized the gap left by the vast literature dealing with Ital­
ian colonialism in Ethiopia. While too much attention is paid 
to the episode of Italy’s aggression of Ethiopia and its impact 
on international diplomacy, Italy’s colonization per se is 
ignored or dismissed in a few perfunctory paragraphs. Honoura­
ble exceptions to this formidable body of literature are the 
recent works by Grassi and Goglia, Angelo del Boca and Alberto 
Sbacchi. Grassi and Goglia’s anthology has totally neglected the 
Ethiopian context nor do they incorporate, or even acknowledge 
the existence of, Ethiopian sources. Del Boca and Sbacchi are, 
in a way, pioneers on the working of Italian colonialism in 
Ethiopia and its impact on Ethiopian society. Although less 
Italo-centric, these studies, unlike the present research and 
notwithstanding their differences in interpretation and metho­
dology, engage themselves in a much wider issues of the Italian 
presence in Ethiopia and its impact on the Ethiopian society. 
In addition, their shortcomings are amply addressed in Ales­
sandro Triulzi’s review article*.
The present work aims to describe the workings of 
Italian colonialism in Ethiopia with the view to throwing addi­
tional light on the nature of European colonialism in Africa. 
Although its major focus is land, attempt is also made to 
explore a number of subsidiary issues.
Students of colonial history find many similarities 
between Italian colonialism and that of other colonial powers 
in the African soil. Like them, Italy was confronted with 
enormous practical problems: unprecedented resistance even from 
a supposedly docile population, general public apathy at home 
after initial enthusiasm, insufficient support from the 
metropolitan government and inadequate funds to carry out rapid
*. Alessandro Triulzi, "Italian Colonialism and Ethiopia", 
JAH, 23, (1982): 237-43; See also John Markakis , "Italian conquest 
and colonisation", ibidem. 28, (1987):168-9.
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developmental work. Yet, in some respects the Italian case also 
reveals interesting features that had little or no parallel with 
the experience of other colonial powers. Italy’s primary 
interest in colonies was to use them as a convenient receptacle 
for its surplus population and a source of primary goods to the 
mother country. Agriculture, as conducted by other European 
powers typically took the form of a large farm or ranch 
employing entirely African labour. The result was a relatively 
small European population and a restricted market for the local 
produce.
Italy’s state sponsored peasant settlement schemes 
aimed at transforming the Empire into a Magna Italia - an exten­
sion of the mother country. According to these plans, the peas­
ants would work their own farms with a minimum help from the 
indigenous population and become independent landowners who 
would form the backbone of an Italian society and transform the 
Empire into a profitable possession to the motherland. Although 
on a few occasions France and Portugal, and even Britain, had 
flirted with similar enterprise, as a rule this type of 
settlement policy was, if not essentially foreign, of secondary 
interest to them and other colonial powers in Africa. But such 
distinction should not be pushed too far. In expanding these 
facets of Italian colonialism, this thesis will elucidate how 
Italy’s plans, like the policy of any imperial power, was 
shaped, among many other things, by the physical nature of the 
landscape and the widely different responses of the local 
population. With this it is hoped to throw new insights onto 
comparative African colonial history. The reader, examining in 
detail how Italy attempted to build its Empire, can conclude for 
himself to what extent Italy’s imperialist ideas and practice 
were different from that of other European colonial powers.
The bulk of this research was conducted in Rome at 
Archivio Centrale di Stato and, under very difficult conditions, 
in the widely dispersed and badly organized historical archives 
of the Comitato Per La Documentazione del 1'Opera dell'Italia in
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Africat successor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1882- 
1912), the Ministry of Colonies (1912-1937) and the Ministry of 
Italian Africa (1937-43).
Anybody with research experience in Italy will be 
aware of its peculiar rewards and difficulties, and especially 
of the problems dealing with the documents of the Comitato. 
Consultation of some documents which may have been useful was 
denied for reasons unknown to the author. Although the use of 
other more relevant sources has made these documents redundant 
for the purpose of the present research, the author shares the 
views expressed elsewhere that the Ministry’s arbitrary approach 
and lack of clear guidance are harmful to serious scholarly 
research^. The Comitato's recent extensive publications of over 
forty volumes dealing with Italy’s work in Africa cannot fill 
this vacuum. Both the Comitato, which is a body mainly manned 
by "ex-colonial governors and state functionaries" and its 
works, which is largely subjective in approach and "celebratory 
in intention", cannot be taken as fully dependable historical
3sourcesJ.
The most important data was collected in the Archivio 
Documentario of Istituto Agronomico Per L* Oltremare [IAOJ in 
Florence* and the Fondazione Einaudi in Turin where access was 
gained to the documents of the then Minister of Finance, Conte 
Paolo Thaon Di Revel. But without the use of learned institu­
tions such as state and private libraries in Rome and Florence, 
who are the depositaries of current important periodicals, and 
the extensive reports and memoirs by the contemporary British
Triulzi, o p . c i t 237-8.
R. Rainero, introduction to Sbacchi, II colonialismo 
Italiano in Etiopia. 1936-1940. (Milano: Mursia, 1980).
*. Despite a written recommendation to the author by the 
Foreign Ministry "that the most fruitful research could be done 
at the IAO in Florence", the author was faced with a number of 
obstacles from the same authorities whose discordant voices 
helped only to frustrate his work.
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officials and their agents available at the Public Record 
Office, which throw important light in the workings and the 
difficulties of the Italian regime in Ethiopia, the research 
would have remained incomplete. Historians of Italian colonial­
ism may not fail to criticize the use particularly of the 
Italian periodicals and newspapers as they are regarded by many 
as simple propaganda literature of little or no historical 
value. It is true that most of their authors were men on the 
payroll of the Ministry of Propaganda who, along those employed 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Italian 
Africa, diligently published a plethora of articles throughout 
the occupation. Although these articles took a stereotyped 
course through platitude to beatitude, hailing the most tenuous 
progress as a prodigy of achievement, and giving to the plans 
all the quality of performances, they cannot simply be dismiss­
ed. Attentive reading with the understanding of the contemporary 
linguistic garb of the Fascist administration reveals that under 
these apparently propaganda material lies untapped wealth of 
information that was left out or dealt only cursorily by sour­
ces commonly regarded as authoritative.
Accessible Ethiopian sources are consulted and 
invaluable information was gained from those who were closely 
affected by the Italian land policy itself. In compliance with 
their wishes, the identity of the sources is not disclosed.
While stressing none of the persons is responsible 
for the opinions herein expressed, I have to admit that the 
research would not have been completed without the useful criti­
cism and technical advice, moral support, continuous encourage­
ment and daily inspiration of many people.
I wish to express my deep gratitude to Africa Educa­
tional Trust for sponsoring me and being close to me throughout 
the research period, and particularly during the troubled period 
of field work, providing financial and moral support. Without 
such generous help the study and its completion should have been 
unthinkable. AET’s generosity far exceeds my ability to repay
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it adequately. Thank you for your confidence in me and keep up 
the good work of supporting research and scholarship. I include 
in this thank Dr Anthony McAdam who encouraged me to apply and 
strongly supported my application.
I owe great debt to my supervisor Professor R. Gray 
for being a continuous inspiration, encouragement and patient 
listener. The completion of this research was due to his 
unfailing attention, indispensable assistance and advice.
Inestimable thanks are expressed to many Italians - 
friends, private individuals, government officials, public 
bodies, some of whom played a part in the colonization of Ethio­
pia - for their time, hospitality and knowledge. I wish par­
ticularly to thank the staff and the management of Biblioteca 
Nazionale in Rome and Florence and those of Istituto Italo- 
Africano.
In Florence a special debt is owed to the Director 
of IAO who allowed me free xeroxing facilities and, together 
with his indefatigable staff, made my stay in Florence pleasant 
according me all the help I needed; to Centro Internazionale 
Studenti for its succour to provide me a shelter over my head.
In Rome I wish to thank the Head of Servizio Storico 
E Documentazione of Archivio Storico of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Dr Enrico Serra, who graciously provided me important 
published materials and introduced me to a number of important 
individuals and institutions; the Superintendent of the archiv­
es, Ruffo di Scaletta, whose intervention facilitated access to 
the archives of IAO; Mario Gazzini, archivist for the Comitato; 
Dr Ludovica de Curten and her friendly staff of Archivio Centr- 
ale di Stato.
When approached many former colonial officers refused 
to be interviewed under a variety of pretext. But some were more 
than helpful. A particular gratitude is owed to Dr Attilio 
Scaglione and Pier Marcello Masotti, for their reminiscences 
about the settlers* life and voracious appetite to land; Gr. 
Ufficiale Mario Buschi, a former settler landowner at Holdtta
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and Bishoftu, who enlightened me in the difficulties of the 
colonial Italian State and the role played by some Italians in 
the post-independent Ethiopia; Professor Lanfranco Ricci, 
currently at Naples University, and Dr Salvatore Tedeschi who 
accorded me all the assistance possible in my contact with the 
officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Dr Giuseppe 
Rocchetti, former technician of Centro Sperimentale Agrario e 
Zootecnico of Bold, and Dr Rolando Guidotti, who was the regent 
for a short period of Nuovo Ispettorato Generale dell'Agri- 
coltura but whose contact with the Ethiopian agriculture went 
back to 1931 when he was commissioned to study Emperor Haile 
Sellassie’s model farm at firHr.
I am also indebted for their kind assistance in my 
relation with the same Ministry to Professors Loglia, Chancel­
lor of Accademia Nazionale Dei Lincei, and Giampaolo Calchi- 
Novati, the Director of IPALMO.
In Turin I am very grateful to the former journalist 
and versed writer on Italian colonialism, Angelo del Boca for 
putting me in touch with personalities who illuminated me in the 
workings of Italian land policy. Whenever in difficulty, I 
resorted to Professor Gian Carlo Stella. Delving into his rare 
and rich bibliographical collection in Ravenna, he wrote me full 
and informative letters elucidating important and obscure 
questions and despatched valuable extracts. I owe him a large 
tribute of gratitude.
Many other, friends and academics - some of whom I 
came to know in the course of the research and only a few of 
which are named - gave generously invaluable advice, documents, 
criticism and help of all kind which words fail to describe. In 
England the list includes Dr Muhammad Hassan, Mr Mulug^ta Dory, 
Dr Richard Hayward, Dr Richard Pankhurst, Angela Raven-Roberts, 
Dr Tenker Bonger. I am also deeply grateful to Dr Osvaldo 
Rainieri [Rome], Dr Alberto Sbacchi [USA], Dr Tekeste Negash 
[Sweden], Rev. Vincent Twomeysud [Ireland], and to the agronom­
ist and crop-physiologist, Mr Yaqob Edjamo [Ethiopia] from whose
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pedological knowledge I benefitted a great deal. I owe special 
thanks to Dr Maknun Gamaladin al-Ashami [London] for enthusias­
tically sharing his ideas and insightful comments on parts of 
the early drafts; Svein Ege [Norway], who gave me similar 
indispensable help and despatched a number of useful material 
at his own expense. I specially benefitted from his constructive 
stylistic criticism on the first two chapters. Dr Luigi Goglia 
of Rome University was on all occasions ready, and indeed 
anxious, to assist me. In addition to making my life in Italy 
comfortable and showering me with books, he provided valuable 
bibliographical insights that made research a lot easier; Dr 
Irma Taddia of Bologna University most kindly accorded me 
similar help. She also acquainted me with Italian agricultural 
policy in Eritrea, and put me in contact with specialists in 
Italian colonialism.
I must offer my heartfelt thanks to Dr Deborah Jane 
Birket who enthusiastically read the proofs. The rare combina­
tion of her eagle eyes, solicitude, critical scrutiny and sharp 
lance of a pen prevented some of the worst solecisms from slip­
ping into the text. While acknowledging her assistance, I must 
emphasize that she bears no responsibility for any grammatical 
inexactitude or obscure semantics where I failed to heed to her 
advice. On a more personal level, my debt of gratitude to her 
is heavy for her delightful, entertaining and delicious meals, 
moral support and encouragement.
Last and not least I wish to express my indebtedness 
to Iyanna, Manito and Pauline who were continuous sources of joy 
and inspiration.
The question of transcribing Ethiopian names is 
always a vexing one. My decision involved a compromise, that is, 
altering spellings which had little resemblance to linguistic 
reality, and retaining others on account of their familiarity.
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ABBREVIATIONS
AA Addis Ababa.
AAI Annali dell’Africa Italiana.
AC L ’Agricoltura Coloniale.
ACG Acting Consul General.
ACP [Directorate for] Civil and Political Affairs.
ACS Central State Archives [Archivio Centrale di Stato].
AE [Directorate for] Economic Affairs.
AI Italian Africa (Africa Italiana).
Am [Royal Governorate of] Amara.
AMAR Museo Africano Archives in [Istituto Italo Africano]
AOI Italian East Africa (Africa Orientale Italiana)
AP Parliamentary Papers [Atti Parlamentari].
As AsmMra.
AS Historical Archives [Archivio Storico] .
ATdR [Luigi Einaudi Foundation (Turin)] Archives of the Mini­
ster of Finance, Paolo Thaon di Revel.
B Box [£usta] .
BUCE Bollettino Ufficiale della Colonia Eritrea.
BUGA Bollettino Ufficiale del Governo dell’Amara.
BULMAI Bollettino Ufficiale di Legislazione del Ministero
dell’Africa Italiana.
CAG Jimma Agricultural Consortium.
CC Consulente Coloniale.
CD IAO Archives of Overseas Agricultural Institute [Istituto
Agronomico Per L ’Oltremare. Centro documentazione] .
CD House of Deputies [Camera dei Deputati] .
CE Corriere Eritreo.
CFA Fascist Farmers Union [Confederazione Fascista degli
Agricoltori] .
CFLA Fascist Agricultural Workers Union [Confederazione
Fascista dei Lavoratori del 1’Agricoltura] .
CFI Fascist Industrialists Union [Confederazione Fascista
degli Industriali].
CG Consul General.
Cl Corriere dell’Impero.
CL Colonization and Labour Office.
CM Corriere Mercantile.
Cotetio Ethiopian National Cotton Company [Compagnia Nazionale 
per il Cotone di Etiopia] .
CS Corriere della Sera.
DAF Directorate of Financial Affairs.
DD Diplomatic Documents [Documenti diplomatici].
DG General Directorate [Direttorato Generale].
DGov Decree of Governor/Governorate.
DIM Interministerial Decree [Decreto Interministeriale].
DM Ministerial Decree [Decreto Ministeriale].
DS Central Directorate [Direttorato Superiore].
E.C. Ethiopian Calendar.
ECAI Italian African Cotton Company [Ente per il Cotone
dell’Africa Italiana],
Eccles. Ecclesiastical usage.
ECPE "Puglia of Ethiopia" Colonization Agency.
ABBREVIATIONS
ECRE "Romagna of Ethiopia" Colonization Agency.
EDR Thesaurus De Rege Colonization Board.
El Espansion Imperiale.
EO Ethiopia Observer.
EOC Ethiopian Orthodox Church.
Er [Royal Governorate of] Eritrea,
f file [foglio].
FO Public Record Office.
G Governor/ate.
GAD Giornale di Agricoltura della Domenica.
GV Gazzetta di Venezia,
GG Governor/ship General.
GI II Giornale d*Italia.
Gm Jimma.
Gn Gondclr.
GP Gazzetta del Popolo.
GRA [Central State Archives] Marshal Graziani Files.
GS [Royal Governorate of] Gal la and Sidamo.
GU Giornale Ufficiale del Governo Generale dell'AOI,
GUGS Bolletino Officiale del Governo Generale dell* AOI e
Bollettino del Governo dello Scioa.
GURI Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno d*Italia,
GV Gazzetta di Venezia.
Hr [Royal Governorate of] H&r&r.
HSIU Haile Sellassie I University.
IA Agricultural Office [Ispettorato di Agricoltura] .
IACI Colonial Agricultural Institute [Istituto Agricolo
Coloniale Italiano].
IC L*Italia Coloniale.
ICAI Italian Cotton Enterprise Corporation [Society Anonima
Impresa Cotoniera Italiana].
ICI Italian Cotton Institute [Istituto Cotoniero Italiano].
IDC Institution of cotton district of.
IEA Italian East Africa.
IFPLAOI Fascist Inspectorate for Production and Labour
[Ispettorato Fascista di Produzione e Lavoro].
INFAIL Fascist National Institute for Insurance against
Industrial Accidents [Istituto Nazionale Fascista per 
1 *Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro],
INFPS Fascist National Institute For Social Security [Is­
tituto Nazionale Fascista per la Previdenza Sociale]. 
IGA General Inspectorate for Agriculture.
II Impero Italiano.
IOM L*Italia D*01tremare.
JAH Journal of African History.
JES Journal Of Ethiopian Studies.
Lit. Literally.
MAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
MAI Ministry of Italian Africa.
MC Ministry of Colonies.
MCP [Central State Archives] Ministry of Information Files
[Ministero della Cultura Popolare].
Mg Mogadishu.
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ABBREVIATIONS
Mil. Military usage.
Misc. Miscellaneous.
MTD Maria Theresa Thaler.
ONC Army Veterans Association National Agency [Opera
Nazionale di Combattenti] .
PI Popolo di Italia.
PNF [Central State Archives] National Fascist Party.
PR Popolo di Roma.
PS [Central State Archives] Ministry of Public Security.
PSSFA Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
R Royal.
RC 11 Resto del Carlino.
RD Royal Decree.
RDA Rivista di Diritto Agrario.
RDL Royal Decree Law.
REA I Rassegna Economica dell'Africa Italiana.
REC Rassegna Economica delle Colonie.
RIA Royal Agricultural Institutte [Regio Istituto Agronomi-
co] .
RISS Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali.
Rm Rome.
RSAI Rassegna Sociale dell'Africa Italiana.
Sc [Royal Governorate of] Sh&wa [Scioa].
SCCCE Eritrean Cotton Marketing Company [Society Per La 
tivazione Del Cotone Nella Colonia Eritrea].
I*-i0
S.I.A. SocietA Imprese Africane.
SIOM Italian Syndicate For Beyond MSr&b [Sindacato Italiano
d'Oltre Mareb] .
Sm [Royal Governorate of] Somalia.
SM General Staff.
SPDR [Central State Archives] Special Secretariat of 
[Segreteria Particolare del Duce].
Duce
Supl. Supplement.
UA Agricultural Office [Ufficio Agrario].
£. Lira.
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GLOSSARY
Eccles. Father. Reverend.
Father; ancestor.
Eccles. Title of a Bishop. The Head of the Ethio­
pian Orthodox Church.
Country, Village [Tegrefia].
Leader; eccles. Head of a DHbr.
Eccles. Upholsterer.
(Lit. Custodian of hour); eccles. Title of the 
Abbot of DMbrcl H&yeq.
Eccles. Church-keeper, Custodian.
Settle, Colonize.
First Settler, First Occupant, Original Father. 
(Lit. "tithe"); part of a tax on produce.
Washer; eccles. Cleaner of Church Utensils.
(Lit. "Indigenous or one with the father"); a 
local low level official who mediated between the 
people and the government.
B6t&-Kehnat (Lit. " the house of clergy"). Ecclesiastical 
order.
Bdta-M8ngest (Lit. " the House of Government"); royal househo­
ld; public domain.
Capo (Ital. lit. "Head, Chief"); title associated with
Mussolini; foreman.
Cat A narcotic widely grown in the south-eastern
regions.
Cegurafgottat See ShMna.
Ceqa Mud.
Ceqa Shum (Lit. "Chief mud"); a minor official appointed for
a fixed period from among the elders of rest- 
owning peasantry to act as intermediary between 
the government and the peasants of the area.
DMbr Eccles. Abbey or an Endowed Church.
DSbtMra Eccles. Learned but unordained cleric who acts as
chorister, poet, astrologer.
DSga Highland [2,400-4,600 m].
Dcihena Mardt Semi-fertile land.
Dajach See DMjazmach.
DSjazmach (Mil. lit. "Commander of the Gate"); a nobleman's
title equivalent to count.
Dawulla Weight measurement unit consisting of 20 qunna or
about 100 kg.
Duce (Ital. lit. "Leader"); title associated with Mus­
solini .
EcSgd Eccles. Title of the Head of DSbrS Libanos Gadam
who was also the administrative head of the EOC.
Ekkul Arash (Lit. "tiller of half"); share-cropping system
whereby the produce is divided in half between the 
parties.
Ente (pi. -ti) Ital. Agency, Corporation.
Abba
Abbat
AbunS
Addi 
AlMqa 
Antafi 
Aqabd Saat
Aqabit 
Aqanna 
Aqefii Abat 
Asrat 
Atabi 
Balabbat
GLOSSARY
Erbo Arash
Fitawurari
GBbBz
GBbbar
Gadam
Gan-gBb
Gasha
Geber
Ghebbi
Gult
Gult-gaz
Gundo
Hudad
Kahenat
MadBrya
Mad-b6t
MBggabi
MalBfeya 
MBmher 
MBr 
MBrdt
MBtefo mBrdt 
NBftafia
Negus 
QB1lad
Qds GBbBz 
Qol la 
Ras
Rest
Resta-gult 
SBmon mBrdt
Shana
Sisso Arash
(Lit. "tiller of a quarter"); share-cropping 
system where the produce is divided on a rate of 
one quarter.
(Mil. lit. "leader of the vanguard"); title 
equivalent to viscount.
Eccles. Administrator of a Church.
Tax-payer. Peasant, farmer.
Eccles. Monastery.
Land whose tax is allocated to the central govern­
ment .
A land unit of between 30-40 ha or one qSllad. 
Tax; part of land tax traditionally paid in kind 
for the gult-g8z [gult-holder].
Royal Court, Palace.
Land granted for a particular purpose or service; 
fief; benefice; administrative unit.
(Lit. "gult-ruler"); official holding gult rights 
over an estate; administrator.
Capacity measurement used mainly for honey [Gundo 
Mar] consisting of 60 bereld or [500x60 gm]. 
Public Domain; land temporarily set aside and 
worked by statute labour for the benefit of a 
governor.
Clergy.
Land allocated to state officials in lieu of sala­
ry.
See Gan-gBb.
(Lit. "one who administers; feeds"); quarter­
master; eccles. administrator of a g&dam.
Fertile; beautiful.
Teacher; eccles. head of a monastery.
See Gundo.
Land; soi1.
Unproductive land.
(Mil. lit. "Gun-carrier"); northern soldier-
settler in southern Ethiopia.
King.
Land measurement unit consisting of about 83.328 
sqm.
Eccles. A priest GBbBz.
Lowland [below 1,400 m] .
(Mil. lit. "Head"); a nobleman's title equivalent 
to duke.
Inherited land; use of such rights.
A hereditary gult.
(Eccles. lit. "Weekly land"); land burdened with 
the obligation to provide weekly mass.
Village or Communal land tenure system involving 
periodical distribution.
(Lit. "Tiller of one third"); share-cropping 
system where the produce is divided between the 
parties on a rate of one third.
GLOSSARY
Tdf
Tekklafia 
Wanna Abbat 
WBrrBganu 
WSynB-dBga 
YB-
An indigenous cereal widely grown in highland 
areas.
(Lit. "the one who is planted"); settler.
(Lit. "main father"); the first settler; ancestor. 
Royal herdsmen.
Midlands [1,400-2,400 m].
Preposition meaning "Of; belonging to"; e.g. "yB- 
sBmon mBrdt = land of sSmon; yB-bdtB mBngest = 
belonging to royal household, state.
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CHAPTER I
THE EVOLUTION OF ITALIAN COLONIAL POLICY
MISSIONARIES, ADVENTURERS AND COLONIZERS
The 1935-41 Italian occupation of Ethiopia is rooted 
in a long and turbulent history that began in the early ninete­
enth century when both countries were emerging as unified 
modern states. From this early period, Ethiopia was idealized 
as a place where Italian colonial aspirations, could be real­
ized. Ethiopia was thought to provide a demographic outlet for 
Italy’s surplus population and a valuable market from which 
Italian industry could draw raw materials and to which it could 
sell manufactured goods. These same ideas inspired and shaped 
the agricultural policies and practices of 1935-41 and were the 
driving force of the Italian colonialist movement which jus­
tified the conquest of Ethiopia in 1935, as much as it earlier 
did the occupation of Eritrea, Libya and Somalia. It was in 
these three colonies that the first major attempts were made to 
translate these ideas into action.
The forerunners of Italian colonialism in Ethiopia 
were the Italian Catholic missionaries who were competing with 
Islam and Protestantism for the last reserve of disposable 
souls. They were later followed by scholars, travellers, 
visionaries and by those discontented with the anti-imperialist 
stand of the newly formed Italian state*; there were speculators 
and arms dealers who looked for government subvention^. Fascist 
historians would address this heterogeneous group as "our 
colonial predecessors". In background and interest, this group 
resembled its counterparts in other European countries. As in
*. The position advocated by the anti-colonialist movement 
was expressed through phrases such as Politica rinunciataria 
(politics of resignation) or Politica delle mani pulite (clean 
hands) or piedi a casa (firm foot at home).
Angelo del Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa Orientale. vol. 
I: Dall’unitci alia marcia di Roma. (Rm-Bari: Editori “Laterza & 
Figli Spa, 1976), p.4.
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France and Germany, numerically it was tiny but politically 
voci ferous.
Among the Catholic missionaries, the Ligurian 
clergyman, Father Stella, of the Congregation of the Turin 
Mission^, played an important role. He considered colonies as 
centres of settlement and thought the Eritrean province, 
HBmasdn, where he thought Europeans would easily feel at home, 
was an ideal location. He painted an enticing portrait of the 
area as the most fertile and the richest in all Abyssinia, 
where "there is an unlimited quantity of land available belong­
ing to nobody, for their old owners have either emigrated or 
are dead"*. In his former mission station, Bogos, where he was 
once "a moral dictator and amphitryonic judge" of seventeen 
Bildn villages^, Stella set up, in 1867, the first Italian agri­
cultural colony on a 1,000 sqkm concession. It was situated 
1,200m above sea level and within six km from KMran, the main 
town and took the name of Colonia Italo-Africana di Sciottel, 
or Italo-African Shota1 Colon^ • According to the plan, the new 
immigrants were expected to assert themselves as incontestable 
masters of the land and develop it into a flourishing metropo—
In 1839, De Jacobis, a clergyman, and Montuori, a 
medical doctor, had joined the mission, but their arrival did not 
augur major changes.
*. AMAR, Misc. f4, Lettera di Padre Stella to Cavour, 3-3- 
1859; CDDD, XV, Libro Verde: Etiopia. (Rm: Tip. CD, 1890), doc.
7, pp.15-6; Romain Rainero, I nrimi tentativi di colonizzazione 
agricola e di pooolamento dell'Eritrea (1890-18951. (Milano: 
Marzorati, 1960), pp.38-9.
G. Lejean, Vovage aux deux Nils (1860-18641. (Paris: 
Hachette, 1865), p.154.
The new agricultural community consisted of capital 
investors, known as coloni capitalisti cooperatorit and manual 
workers. Though predominantly Italian, the group was a mixture 
of nationalities united by the prospects of easy gain. There were 
25 Italians, two Germans, one Spanish and one Hungarian. [Cfr. 
Del Boca, op.cit., pp.19-22]; MAE, L*Italia in Africa: Avvaloram- 
mento e colonizzazione. I, Tomo II, (Rm: Soc. Abete, 1970), p.33 
(hereafter cited as MAE, Avvaloramentol1.
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litan commercial enterprise under the Italian protectorate^. But 
infighting, a hostile climate, lack of Italian government 
support and capital took its toll and by 1870 nothing was left 
of the colony but ruins®.
If the plan failed in practice, the legacy of 
Stella’s vision of a colony as a centre of population settle­
ment lingered, sustained by geographical and exploration socie­
ties9 who were financed partly by the State and partly by public 
donations. In their effort to win the hearts and minds of the 
Italian public, the societies organized expeditions, widely 
publicized their cause in journals and public meetings*®. But 
their attempt to justify their ambitions, like other European 
expansionists, as a search for markets and raw materials, and 
as a civilizing mission in the Roman tradition, fell on deaf 
ears. Italy that had emerged as a single nation in 1861 was not
'. AMAR, loco cit.
®. Orazio Antinori, Viaggio fra i Bogos, (Rm: 1887), p.95.
9. Exploration and geographical societies mushroomed in 
most of Italy’s commercial cities. The most important were: 
SocietA Geografica Italiana of Florence (1867), whose first 
president Cristoforo Negri prompted the Italian missionaries in 
Ethiopia to promote metropolitan interests in the territory; 
SocietA di Esplorazioni Commerciali in Africa of Milan, which had 
on its executive board high ranking figures of Lombardian busi­
ness who played a crucial role in economic and political 
penetration of the Italian African colonies and later Ethiopia; 
Club Africano di Napoli which, founded in 1880, in the immediate 
aftermath of the occupation of Asab by Rubattino Navigation 
Company, transformed itself into SocietA Africana di Italia. Other 
societies worked in the same direction in most Italian commercial 
cities: SocietA Coloniale di Studi in Florence, Associazione di 
Geografia Commerciale in Bari, Comitato Per le Esplorazioni in 
Africa in Turin, SocietA D'Esplorazione of Genoa. [Cfr. Del Boca, 
op.cit., p.51-5; R. Ciasca, Storia coloniale dell’Italia contem- 
poranea. (Milano: Hoepli, 1940, p.35].
*®. Leading journals included Manfredo Camperio’s L'Esplor-r 
atore, "a journal of journey and commercial geography that has 
nothing to do with "abstract science""; L*Africa Italiana of the 
SocietA Africana d*Italia.
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only politically weak and divided but economically backward, 
and these arguments meant little.
However, Italy’s emigration problem made the issue 
of the demographic myth nationally emotive. Between 1861-1911 
the population grew from 25.7 million to 35.9 million, increas­
ing the density from 87 persons to 123 persons per sqkm. Geogr­
aphy offered little immediate solution to this growth; almost 
four fifths of the peninsula was mountainous. Economically, 
Italy was a poor country and industrialization, even in the 
north, was advancing slowly and extensive development took 
place only at the turn of the century. In what came to be known 
as Mezzo Giornof the Southern region, the social structure and 
land tenure systems further compounded the misery of the
peasantry. In these circumstances, emigration was the easiest 
solution, reaching the proportions of a major exodus by the 
turn of the century, with regional shifts and variations
according to economic tide. An upsurge in Southern emigration 
coincided with the world agricultural slump of the mid-1880s, 
while previously the bulk of emigrants came from the North^.
A tense intellectual battle gathered around the
emigration issue. Some felt it was a natural phenomenon of­
fering long term benefits: socially, emigration served as a
"safety valve" for domestic unrest, as the nation rid itself of 
discontented elements. Economically, the remittances from 
overseas were important in helping Italy’s foreign balance of 
payment. The opponents discounted both arguments as irrelevant. 
In their view remittances could not offset the economic losses
u. C. M. Cipolla, "Four centuries of Italian demographic 
development", Population in History, ed. D.V. Glass and D.E.C. 
Eversley, (Chicago: 1965), pp.576-87; C. Gini, "II fattore
demografico nella politica coloniale", AAI. 4 (settembre
1941):811; J. S. McDonald, "Italy’s rural social structure and 
emigration", Occidente. 22 (settembre-ottobre 1956):437-56; A. 
Capanna, "Economic problems and reconstruction in Italy", 
International Labor Review. 62 (June 1951):607-52; M. Rossi- 
Doria, "Land tenure system and class in southern Italy", American 
Historical Review. 64 (October 1958):46-53.
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of the investment in the upbringing and education of the emi­
grant, and dependence on other countries to dispose of social 
malcontents hurt national pride. The military saw emigration as 
a serious drain of manpower needed for national defence; the 
big landowners envisioned labour shortages and a rise in 
agricultural wages. Articles were published giving graphic 
descriptions of the wretched and hopeless plight of the emi­
grants in USA and South America. Episodes of outrageous treat­
ment of emigrants were widely publicize a».
The expeditions to Ethiopia highlight the close link 
between the trinity of politics, science and business. It is 
not possible in this context to recount the exploits of all the 
expeditions and their leaders. But mention should be made of 
"The Great Expedition" of 1875, led by the sexagenarian ari­
stocrat and military careerist Orazio Antinori and organized by 
Society Geografica Italiana. On a 95 ha plot granted by King 
Menilik at Lat-Marafeya, near his capital Ankob&r, the mission 
set up the first modern agricultural station which was recog­
nized by the International Association of Brussels and, until 
1897, served as a centre for the members of the Societii Geogra- 
fi ca13.
Antinori saw Lat-Marafeya as a springboard for 
effective Italian penetration of Abyssinia and expansion into 
the rich southern ’Gal la* provinces. Although he held his Shawan 
hosts in contempt, regarding them as morally devious, he
u. For an authoritative account on emigration see V. 
Briani, L*emigrazione italiana ieri e oggi. (Rm: 1957); A. A.
Castagno, "The Development of Expansionist Concept in Italy, 
1861-1896", (PhD: Columbia University, 1957), pp.737; F. Manzot- 
ti, La polemica sul1 *emigrazione nell’Italia unita fino alia 
prima guerra mondiale. (Milano: 1962); G. Dore, La democrazia
italiana e 1 *emigrazione in America. (Brescia: 1964).
13. Antinori’s death in 1882 was followed by a rapid 
management change. Until the station was closed at the eve of 
Adwa in 1895, Antinori was succeeded by Pietro Antonelli, the 
medical doctor Vincenzo Ragazzi, naturalist Leopaldo Traversi, 
and finally in 1894 by engineer Luigi Cappucci. [Cfr. MAE, 
Avvaloramento. p.334].
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sensibly proposed that the expansion of Italian peasant famil­
ies in ShSiwa could be achieved "by acclimatizing itself with 
the country, intermarrying with the natives, learning the lan­
guage"^. These liberal ideas were far in advance of the spirit 
of Fascism which forbade mixed race relationships and, by a 
complex body of discriminatory laws, upheld the racial status 
of the colonists.
The scientific missions came to a halt with Italy’s 
ignominious defeat at Adwa and even the Society Geografica was 
ordered to close its station. Although the expeditions resumed 
after Italo-Ethiopian relation improved in 1903, their efforts 
to develop a coscienza coloniale or "colonial consciousness" 
proved futile as the Italian public failed to cultivate a 
lasting taste for colonialism. The brief peaks of popular en­
thusiasm for the Libyan war in 1911 soon foundered on long 
troughs of apathy, hostility and indifference, as they did 
later in 1935 with the conquest of Ethiopia*3.
Nevertheless, the work of these expansionists offers 
a useful and stimulating insight into the psyche and precon­
ceptions of the colonial pioneers. But more significantly, it 
is a valuable contribution to the sparse knowledge of contem­
porary Ethiopia. However, as works written in an atmosphere 
polluted by aggressive colonial climate and prompted primarily 
by political, patriotic or idealistic motives, they are marred 
with tendentious judgements. Ethiopia is presented as a country 
with unlimited economic potential but inhabited by idle and 
immoral people indulging in abhorrent practices of slavery and 
oppression and administered by savage rulers***.
**. Traversi, Let MarefiA. (Milano: Alpes, 1931), pp.64-5.
*3. Claudio G. Segrfc, Fourth shore: Italian colonization
of Libva. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974), p.33; 
GRA 44/36-2, Furio Lantini to Petretti (Vice GGAOI), Rm 24-9- 
1937 (hereafter Lantini to Petretti).
*3. G. Bianchi, Alla terra dei Galla. (Milano: Treves,
1884), pp.158, 175, 181; L. Traversi, op.cit., pp.64-5.
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Most significantly, it was the findings of these 
missions which contributed to shape Italy's imperial policy 
towards Ethiopia. It was also largely on the claims made by 
these "pioneers" that Fascist Italy would try to carry out its 
task of Empire building and the programme of demographic 
colonization.
THE ROLE OF THE ITALIAN STATE
When assessing the attitude of the Italian State 
towards the Ethiopian enterprise there are three distinguish­
able stages: the first stage, 1861-1881; the second, 1882-1896; 
the third, 1897-1935. Before 1861 the material and intellectual 
resources of the court of the Sardinian kingdom were almost 
exclusively absorbed by more serious and pressing domestic and 
international problems.
The official policy in the period between 1861-1881 
was to encourage "commercial colonies" that "could offer Italy 
outlets for its industrial products and an opportunity to 
accomplish works of civilization"17. The early eighties in­
augurated a more active Italian colonial enterprise which in 
1882 unfolded in the decision by P.S. Mancini to purchase AsSb 
from the bankrupt Rubattino Navigation Company and his authori­
zation to occupy Meswa. After the Berlin Conference (1884-5), 
Italy’s hitherto cautious colonial diplomacy became bold. The 
scramble for Africa coincided with the beginning of mass south­
ern emigration upon which hinged the appeal of the new policy. 
Demographic arguments were evoked to validate the occupation of 
Meswa, in addition to strategic considerations. As Mancini 
said, the occupation was part of an indispensable programme to 
direct migration "into hospitable lands under the Italian flag
17. J. L. Miege, L* Imperialismo coloniale italiano dal 1870 
ai giorni nostri. (Milano: 1976), pp.16-9; E. de Leone, "Le prime 
ricerche di una colonia e la esplorazione geografica politica ed 
economica", L’ltalia in Africa. II, (Rm: 1955):2.
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rather than letting it be dispersed on the face of the earth"1®. 
For the visionary Crispi, Ethiopia was one such land whose vast 
cultivable areas "will offer an outlet in the near future to 
that overflowing Italian fecundity which now goes to other 
civilized countries... [and] is lost to the motherland"1^.
But both Mancini and Crispi failed to rally the 
public behind their expansionist programmes, and their policy 
lacked a strong sense of conviction. Mancini resigned following 
the Dogald debacle in 1887, when the Ethiopian General, Has 
Alula, put to rout the entire Italian expeditionary force. 
Crispi's government was also forced out of office after the 
Italians suffered a humiliating defeat at the battle of Adwa 
in March 1896.
With the Adwa defeat the ambitious plan of demogra­
phic settlement was laid to one side until resurrected by 
Fascism. Adwa also marked a historical watershed between 
aggressive imperialism that strived for the imposition of 
direct European political control and peaceful economic pene­
tration resolved to operate within the restrictive social and 
political parameters of an independent African State. Thus ter­
ritorial ambition was replaced with competition to economic 
prominence with concessions as its centrepiece. Through conces­
sions Italy aimed at institutionalizing Rome’s economic suprem­
acy over a large part of Ethiopia and transforming the Solomon­
ic Empire into an economic dependency and then, when the first 
favourable occasion arose, into a protectorate.
Broadly speaking there were three types of conces­
sions: mining, agriculture and commerce. Italy’s attempt to
outbid Great Britain and France in these three fields proved 
disastrous. The concessions as an instrument to political pene—
1®. P. S. Mancini, Discorsi Pari amentari . vol. VIII, pp. 162- 
90 cited by Del Boca, op.cit., p.182..
F. Crispi, Scritti e discorsi politici (1848-18901. 
(Torino-Rm, n.d.), p.738.
-8-
CHAPTER I EVOLUTION OF ITALIAN COLONIAL POLICY
tration had the backing of the state but not of capital7®. The 
companies on whom the government relied lacked the spirit of 
entrepreneurship, adequate capital and necessary skills. 
Appalled by the heavy expenditure and far-reaching respon­
sibilities that these initiatives entailed, the business class 
expected the Italian government to bear the costs.
The conduct of Societii Per La Coltivazione del Cotone 
Nella Colonia Eritrea (SCCCE), a company engaged, since 1904, 
in cotton farming in Eritrea, is a case in point. When asked by 
the Italian government to despatch its agent to Addis Ababa 
(AA) for the negotiation of an important concession, SCCCE took 
the narrow view of the paramount interest of its shareholders71, 
making the despatch conditional upon the government’s financial 
support:
If, in fact, His Excellency, for the 
benefit of all and to oppose the requests 
made by other foreigners, likes to make 
use of us to obtain the due protection of 
the Italian interest, we are disposed to 
do whatever His Excellency likes to tell 
us, provided the expenses, well known to 
us and to you and which are to be met in 
AA, are sustained by the government77.
The Italian government was appalled by the conduct of the
business class but it had neither the will nor the resources to
invest in the ventures73.
7®. ASMAI 51/1, Presidente SIOM to MAE, Milano 18-5-1905.
71. At that time SCCCE was experiencing financial crisis 
because of continuous unprofitability of cotton. Ibid., SCCCE to 
MAE, Milano 17-7-1908; 27-7-1908.
77. Ibidem, Gino Lavelli De Capitani (Consigliere della 
SCCCE) to Marchese Salvago Raggi, As 6-5-1909.
73. Ibidem; SCCCE to MAE, 17-7-1908; MAE to Legazione AA,
Rm 27-5-1909; SIOM to MAE, Milano 31-7-1908; Marchese Salvago
Raggi to MAE, As 3-8-1908. For the Fascist period see Luigi 
Federzoni, Venti anni di azione coloniale. (Milano: Mondadori,
1926), p.63; idem, Africa Orientale: II posto al sole. (Bologna:
Zanichelli, 1936), pp.153-4;156-9.
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The policy of economic penetration was part of 
Italy's overall strategy of destabilization of Ethiopia and was 
backed up, particularly after the first decade of the 20th 
century, with the so called "politics of attraction", or 
"politica periferica", aimed at winning the goodwill of Ethio­
pian population, especially those in the frontiers of their two 
colonies, Eritrea and Somalia. Italy attempted to advance this 
partly by distribution of largesse to local chiefs, and partly 
by establishing schools, clinics and commercial agencies in key 
Ethiopian towns as means of information gathering, espionage 
and political infiltration7*.
These plans failed in their objectives but the 
legacy lingered, to be inherited by fascist Italy. Fascism 
added little new. The difference was only mainly of style and 
degree. Fascist Italy lacked the cautious diplomacy that 
characterized liberal Italy in its confrontation with great 
powers, and, after an uncertain start, its policy of destabili­
zation of Ethiopia became increasingly aggressive.
Although their policies towards Ethiopia had receiv­
ed a series of set-backs, in their colonies the Italians did 
not fail to put some of their main colonial agricultural 
policies into practice. In formulating these policies, be it in 
Libya, Somalia or Ethiopia, Eritrea was often the classic point 
of reference73.
7*. Del Boca, op.cit., pp.838-9.
73. Segr6, op.cit.; R. Hess. Italian colonialism in Somalia.
(University of Chicago Press: Chicago & London, 1966); Irma
Taddia, L’Eritrea - Colonia. 1890-1952. (Milano: Franco Angeli, 
1986); S.F. Nadel, "Land tenure on the Eritrean plateau", Africa. 
XVI, 1-2 (1946):l-22; 99-109; R. Pankhurst, "Italian settlement 
policy in Eritrea and its repercussions," Boston University 
Papers on African History. I,(Boston: Boston University Press, 
1964), pp.121-56.
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ERITREA AS A MODEL COLONY:
"CAPITALIST" FARMING VERSUS "DEMOGRAPHIC" SETTLEMENT
Later nicknamed La Colonia Primogenita (first born 
colony), Eritrea was planned as a model self-sufficient agri­
cultural colony where Italy’s imperial aspirations could be
realized. It was to serve as a centre of settlement and source
of raw material. Demographic colonization aimed to direct to 
the colony the agricultural workforce emigrating overseas 
whereas capitalist colonization was tied up with the deployment 
of surplus private capital. The controversy over these two 
schemes, which later dominated Italy’s erratic colonization
programme in Libya and Ethiopia, plagued also Eritrea’s agri­
cultural development.
A. DEMOGRAPHIC COLONIZATION
Demographic settlement is associated with Leopaldo 
Franchetti who, in June 1890, was put in charge of Italian 
colonization in Eritrea, and subsequently became the head of 
the Settlement Office, or Ufficio Per la Colonizzazione^K 
Franchetti seemed to possess the skill and experience that the 
programme required77. He belonged to the school of thought which 
considered colonies an outlet for a surplus population7® and
7®. Rainero, op.cit., pp. 32 ,62 ,149-51,159-62 . For a Fran­
chetti ’s more detailed biography, see Leopoldo Franchetti, 
Mezzogiorno e Colonie. (Firenze: 1950), written as introduction 
to his major works by his collaborator and student Umberto 
Zanotti-Bianco.
77. He was a philanthropist and expert on the agricultural 
and social problems of rural south Italy, and co-author with 
Sidney Sonnino of a celebrated report on the agricultural condi­
tions in Sicily. He also edited, together with Sonnino, the 
Rassegna Settimanale, a journal concerned with social and 
agricultural problems [Cfr. Rainero, op.cit., p.32].
7®. This view he, as an energetic propagandist, expounded 
in the Chamber of Deputies, in journals, such as the Nuova 
Antologia and his own pamphlet L*Italia e la sua Colonia Africana
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wanted to make Eritrea the show-piece of his ideas. He main­
tained that, in contrast to the desolate port of Meswa, the 
Eritrean highlands, with their cool and healthy climate, their 
altitude ranging from 1,400 to 2,300 m, and their sparse 
population, offered an ideal place for European settlement.
Franchetti opposed capitalist colonization based on 
privately financed large estates; this, he believed, would 
leave most of the country undeveloped and degenerate into land 
speculation and latifundism - a rural phenomenon with which he 
was familiar in his studies of southern Italy. His proposed 
peasant or "demographic" colonization envisaged small family­
sized concessions, supported, if necessary, by the state7®. In 
his view, peasant settlements would create a large, stable and 
productive rural population that would defend the colony 
militarily and soon make itself economically self-sufficient. 
Private initiative, he argued, would confine the Italian 
presence to the military at great expense to the nation, and 
reduce the colony to an unproductive desert where "a little 
wealth would flourish on public misery"3®.
But Franchetti’s plan was met with serious opposi­
tion. Crispi himself, unconvinced by the exclusion of private 
capital, regarded it as a noble but fanciful vision31. A Royal 
Commission of Enquiry, set up in 1891 to investigate into 
allegations of colonial maladministration, strongly disagreed 
with him37. Although the Commission shared Franchetti’s con-
[Cfr. L. Franchetti, "L’Italia e la sua colonia Africana", Nuova
Antologia. (Rm: 1891), pp.493, 498-509].
7®. L. Franchetti, "L’avvenire della nostra colonia", Nuova
Antologia. (aprile 1895), pp.614,622-3.
3®. Ibidem, pp.622-3; Rainero, op.cit., pp.72-3,125.
31. Rainero, op.cit., p.58.
37. Ibidem, p. 85; Relazione generale della R. Commissione 
d ’Inchiesta sulla colonia Eritrea. (Rm: 1891), pp.178, 186,189; 
Pankhurst (1964), op.cit.:127].
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elusion on the colony’s potential as "an outlet for Italy’s 
partial emigration" and eventual financial self-sufficiency, 
describing it as a "virgin and fertile land" awaiting Italian 
labour, it also asserted in no uncertain terms that both 
private capitalist farming and state sponsored peasant colon­
ization were complementary and interdependent, and neither 
could stand or progress without the other33.
Notwithstanding the controversy, in the latter part 
of 1890 Franchetti opened an agricultural experimental station 
just outside Asmara. No fewer than 96 different types of seeds 
were sown. In the following year two additional stations were 
established; one in AkhalM Guzay at the Gura’e district and the 
other at Godofalassi, in SSrayd. Satisfactory results in all 
these cases suggested the practicality of white settlement, 
even though at later stages the methods he used as well as the 
results obtained and the procedures in the selection of the 
area were strongly contested3*.
Colonization began at the end of 1893 when ten Lom­
bard, Sicilian and Venetian families settled in stone houses 
built in advance at Addi-Wugri, a few miles from GodofSlassi35. 
Another five families followed shortly afterwards3®. Seeing "the
. Rainero, op.cit., pp.83,85-6.
3*. [E. Cagnassi] , I nostri errori: Tredici anni in
Eritrea. (Milano: 1898), pp.133-5 (hereafter I nostri errori); 
about the experiments themselves see B. Melli, La colonia 
Eritrea. (Parma: 1900), pp.52-3,73-4.
33. The families consisted of 29 men, 15 women and 17 
children. Of these 7 families were Lombards (Magentino), 2
Sicilians (Pedara) and 1 Venetian (Frioli). [Cfr. Rainero, 
op.cit., p.123; Del Boca, op.cit., p.517].
3®. Similar efforts of settling the landless peasantry was 
made by others. One was promoted by Association for Aid of 
Catholic Missionaries, or Associazione Per Soccorrere I Mis— 
sionari Cattolici, of Senator Alessandro Rossi and the Apostolic 
Prefecture of Eritrea who, in early January 1896, brought in 128 
strong 16 Venetian families [Cfr. Del Boca, p. 615].
-13-
CHAPTER I EVOLUTION OF ITALIAN COLONIAL POLICY
promised land" the peasants were impressed37. Each family was 
given 20-25 ha of land, agricultural tools, cattle, and provi­
sions necessary to tide them over until the next crop3®. The 
families were expected to repay these, estimated in £.4,000 
loan, over five years at 3% interest. Provided that they cul­
tivated the land uninterruptedly during these years with their 
own means, they were promised ownership3®.
In his report of April 1894 to Parliament, Fran­
chetti asserted that demographic colonization was firmly rooted 
in highland Eritrean soils and expressed his strong belief that 
the country would absorb within a few years a large proportion 
of Italian emigrants*®. But contrary to official expectations, 
there was no great wave of immigration. By the end of 1896 a 
total of 32 families were settled. By early 1898 all of them 
had left but one*1. When in 1904 a member of Commission of Ag­
ricultural Labourers from Romagna sent to investigate settle­
ment possibilities, ascended the slopes, he indignantly ex­
claimed - "Romagna shall never come here"*7.
What went wrong with this attempt to establish an 
emigrants' paradise in Africa? Life was arduous, wages low,
37. Looking at the land, the families cheered and kissed it 
and sang their country songs. The following year, the settlement 
was officially inaugurated taking the name of Umberto I.
3®. The animals consisted of 8 oxen, 10 chicken, and a pig.
3®. Ibidem, p.517.
*®. Franchetti seems to have put Italian immigration on an 
average at about 143,000 persons per year. On the basis of this 
estimate more than 5,720,000 individuals would have settled in 
Eritrea just in a span of two generations or over a 40 year 
period. In both accounts his assessment was flawed. The scale of
Italian exodus grew rapidly. During the four year period of 
between 1887-1891, 717,000 Italians settled abroad. Although in 
the subsequent 15 years this figure had trebled, the number of 
settlers in Eritrea remained insignificant [Cfr. Ibidem, p.479].
*7. Ibidem, p.753; Taddia, op.cit., p. 218.
*7. F. Coletti, Del 1 * immigrazione italiana. II, (Rm: 1911), 
p.137.
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communication difficult, and there was no easy access to market 
to sell goods. Most settlers were harassed by hail storms,
locusts and the lingering rinderpest that decimated livestock*3.
Mistakes in planning and poor selection of farmers
compounded the problem. In some cases shortage of supplies was 
acute. Some of the peasants were factory workers from Milan 
with no experience in farming, old persons too inflexible to 
change their life-style, and families from rival regions in 
Italy.
The policy was further frustrated by continuous
opposition by successive Eritrean governors. Both Barattieri 
and his predecessor, General Gandolfi, undermined Franchetti. 
General Barattieri was explicit in his determination to fight 
proletarian colonization "with all available means ... con­
vinced once and for all that the system cannot be maintained as 
an official policy at the expense of the state"**. His decision 
to start his own colonization programme within the framework of 
the Commission’s recommendation granting land only to those 
peasants or capitalists who had adequate capital and technical 
skill, led, in February 1895, to the resignation of Franchetti. 
Barattieri immediately seized the opportunity to abolish the 
Office of Colonization, personally assuming charge of the 
colonization programme. One of the stations was then suppress­
ed. Franchetti vigorously protested to the MAE against the 
"works of disorganization and destruction of his colonization 
efforts". He was given a polite rebuff, clearly demonstrating 
that Rome had torpedoed his plans and opted for Barattieri*3.
The move marked the end of the myth of Eritrea as 
settlement colony and the triumphal assertion of capitalist 
colonization. With Franchetti*s resignation, the state subsidy
*3. I nostri errori, pp. 134-6. 
**. Rainero, op.cit., p.127.
*3. Ibidem, p.232.
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to attract the colonists was cut off. The prospective settler 
family was invited to spend about £.2,500 or more with a very 
uncertain future ahead. On this an anonymous critic commented:
What farmer in Italy possessing such a 
sum would like to emigrate? And if he 
did, would he wish to risk his life and
savings in a country where the results
of European farming are still unknown?
Would he not prefer to go elsewhere?^
But the coup de grace came with the Bahta Hagos 
uprising. The events leading to it were symptomatic of the
basic incompatibility of interests between the colonizers and
the colonized. The point at issue was Italy’s confused and mis­
guided land policy. Land was appropriated for colonization 
following the guidelines set out by the Royal Commission which 
recommended that settlement be directed towards better state 
lands, demanding that land legislation should be enacted with 
the ultimate goal being
to facilitate the colonization and agri­
cultural progress, in other words, the 
easy transfer of lands into the hands of 
the Italians, and, among the Italians, of 
those who could best cultivate it^.
This policy aimed at a gradual erosion of the traditional land 
system to serve the settlers’ interest. As a result, in order 
to "remove a great obstacle to colonization", private property 
among indigenes was encouraged at the expense of prevailing 
communal or village ownership, as the latter hindered the sale 
of long term concessions because of the need to secure un­
animous consensus from the community^.
. Pankhurst (1964):150.
Relazione generate, op.cit., pp.178-86.
Omodeo Peglion et al., La colonia Eritrea: condizioni 
e nroblemi. (Rm: 1913), p.16; Pankhurst (1964):131.
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The Commission’s recommendations on land policy did 
not reflect Eritrean customary law nor Italian civil code. It 
stressed that existing land laws and rights tended to be 
"incompatible with a rapid increase of agricultural and scien­
tific colonization" and should therefore be dispensed with. It 
rejected the doctrinaire dogmatism that respected "all local 
laws and customs relating to land" as much as the rigid ap­
plication of the Italian civil code. For the creation of state 
lands arguments were concocted on views based on extensive 
number of examples from, and incorrect interpretations of, 
Ethiopian traditional law. The policy rested on three major 
assumptions: firstly, ownership of land in Ethiopia was tradi­
tionally vested in the sovereign who could allocate it or 
appropriate at will; secondly, the state lands were not owned 
by their cultivators and those abandoning their lands forfeited 
to the state all rights of tenure; thirdly, that the needs of 
the Italian immigrants and the progress of agriculture being 
paramount, warranted the placing of vast estates at their 
disposal^.
These assumptions were an outcome of gross misinter­
pretation of traditional legal systems and a self-serving 
distortion of facts. Undue emphasis on the sovereign’s right 
failed to balance equally important claims by actual land­
owners. The Commission deliberately failed to see the cir­
cumstances in which lands were abandoned. Natural and political 
disasters had often been the cause for population dislocation. 
Land seemed plentiful only because the Eritrean highlanders had 
temporarily abandoned the area after a series of local wars, 
and the great famine and epidemics (1888-92). To the Commission 
such areas constituted "abandoned lands" irrespective of 
whether the owners might still be alive. But once the situation
Relazione generale. p.156; Pankhurst (1964):128-9.
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improved, the villages were reoccupied and the Eritreans 
resumed their cultivation, clashing with the colonists5®.
Franchetti was alarmed by what he called "disorderly 
extension of native cultivations" which threatened the success 
of his initiative and, in his report of 1893-4, demanded Cri­
spi’s "swift, economical and efficacious action" to stop the 
arbitrary occupation by 'natives’ of "lands reserved by the 
government for Italian colonization"^. Crispi acted accordingly 
and ordered General Barattieri
to watch that native colonization should 
not bar the way for our domestic coloni­
zation nor that exaggerated scruples 
deter us from transforming into public 
domain lands which are effectively aban­
doned, res nulliust to the mercy of the 
first occupant53.
As a result, the expropriation of prime agricultural 
lands forged ahead. Out of Eritrea’s estimated total productive 
land of 648,938 ha, by the end of 1893, 19,020 ha were made
state domain. In 1894 alone Barattieri added 280,039 ha. By the 
end of 1895, the total figure had risen to 412,892 ha - almost 
two thirds of the productive land.
Expropriation was carried out amid mounting discon­
tent and simmering rebellion53. It was resented particularly by 
the Christians, and in December 1894 led to the revolt of a 
catholic convert and most trusted Italian agent, Dajach Bahta
50. This was the conclusion reached by Society Italiana per
il Progresso delle Scienze, a study mission, which looked into
the Eritrean Highland popular uprising, in 1913. [Cfr. Peglion 
et al. , op.cit., pp. 16,17n, 47-9. The same point will be emp­
hasized by Agnese, the Director of Colonial Affairs in the MAE, 
at a congress organized by ICI in 1911, Cfr. ICI, Atti del II 
Congresso degli Italiani all’Estero. II, 1(1911):482-3.
53. L. Franchetti, AP CD, Appendice alia relazione annuale 
sulla colonia Eritrea. 28-4-1894. (Rm: 1894), p.17.
53. F. Crispi, La Prima Guerra d*Africa. (Milano: Treves, 
1914), p.273.
53. Rainero, op.cit., pp.197-202.
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Hagos, the governor of AkhSl& Guzay5*. The insurrection spilt 
over into Ethiopia, culminating a year later in the Italo- 
Ethiopian war in which the Italians suffered a humiliating 
defeat at the battle of Adwa in March 189655. The victory caused 
havoc amongst the settlers and "nearly all the Italians im­
mediately ran away to the coast". From there all except one 
repatriated to Italy5**.
Per se the Bahta Hagos*s revolt was an insignificant 
localized episode in the otherwise sporadic highland Eritrean 
resistance to Italian rule. It had none of the elements of a 
mass movement attributed by some Eritreanists5^. It was swiftly 
crushed and easily contained, and the cause of revolt came into 
clear perspective only at a later stage5®. What gave significan­
ce to the revolt was its Ethiopian dimension. Not only it did 
take place at a time when Italo-Ethiopian relations were at 
their lowest ebb but it also helped to precipitate the Adwa
M . His epigram "from the bite of the black snake one 
recovers, but the bite of the white snake is fatal", which he 
used as a rallying ground, epitomized the deep ill-feeling 
towards the settlers. Cfr. Tekeste Negash, No medicine for the 
bite of a white snake: Notes on nationalism and resistance in 
Eritrea. 1890-1940. (Uppsala: University of Uppsala, 1986),
pp.37-45.
55. Ibid., pp.43-4; idem, Italian colonialism in Eritrea. 
1882-1941. (Uppsala: 1987), pp.33-5; Marcus, op.cit., p.154-8;
G.F.H. Berkley, The campaign of Adowa and the rise of Menelik. 
(London: 1935), pp.62-4.
55. Segrfc, op.cit., p.15.
5\ Tekeste Negash considers it as a mass movement but the 
evidence does not prove that it was so. See Tekeste Negash, 
Notes. pp.43-5; Italian colonialism, pp.124-5.
5®. Although few allusions were made to the land alienation 
as the cause of the rebellion, until the study of Alberto Pollera 
the motives were not clearly explained. [Cfr. Ernesto Ardemani, 
Tre pagine gloriose nella storia mi 1itare-civile-religiosa della 
colonia Eritrea. (Rm: 1901), p.90. Alberto Pollera, II regime
della propriety terriera in Etiopia e nella colonia Eritrea. (Rm 
1913), p.67.
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debacle. Adwa, however, was not fought over Italy's misguided 
land policy in Eritrea but over Ethiopia's fate as an indepen­
dent Black African state. But its results had an immediate and 
long-lasting effect not only on Italian policy in Eritrea but 
also elsewhere: Adwa remained a constant reminder of Italy’s 
crushing defeat by a Black power, and the Bahta Hagos's revolt 
would be used by dissenting voices at later dates to counter 
both settlers’ voracious appetite for land and adventurous 
state land policies.
The civilian governments that replaced the military 
regime in the immediate aftermath of Adwa rejected the idea of 
Eritrea as a settlement colony and abrogated most of the 
decrees relating to public domains^. Most of the land appropri­
ated by the government for demographic settlement was restored 
to its original owners60.
B. CAPITALIST FARMING
The resignation of Franchetti marked the triumphal 
assertion of a capitalist form of colonization based on market 
forces and involving only those who were technically and finan­
cially fit, or colonizzazione libera. The decree of April 1895 
excluded from settlement those who did not possess the start up 
capital estimated at £.2,500-3,500 .
Following the three traditional Ethiopian agricul­
tural classifications of land - the lowlands, or qolla (below 
1,400m), the midlands, or wSynS dSga (1,400-2,400m), and high-
59. The Land Act of 1906 (RD 31-1-1909, no.378) declared 
that the existing land rights of the Eritreans would be respect­
ed. That of 1926 (RD.7-2-1926, no. 269), excluded any concession 
of land to the settlers in the highland areas.
60. Pankhurst (1964): 153; Del Boca, op.cit., p.837.
61. Rainero, op.cit., pp.216-9.
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lands, or daga (2,400-4,600m6)? - the Italians promoted a par­
ticular form of colonization. The trend reflected general 
Italian agricultural policy and had its justification in 
climate and demography. The densely populated highlands - both 
daga and wayna daga - had a healthy climate and a complex and 
well advanced agricultural system. They were reserved for small 
scale and medium sized farms devoted in wSynS dMga, to cereal 
farming, and in dSga to cattle breeding and pasture. Small scale 
farms of 20-30 ha were given to those who had a start up 
capital of £.50 per ha. The concessionaire was expected to set 
up his residence inside the farm. Medium-sized farms were 30- 
300 ha and were granted to the farmers with a minimum of £.100 
per ha. The scarcely populated, agriculturally less advanced 
and reputedly unhealthy lowlands were the realm of large 
concessions which, using Eritrean labour and Italian technical 
expertise and capital, engaged in cash crop farming. The farms 
consisted of between 300-10,000 ha6^.
All three types of concessions were granted on lease 
which, with the exception of large scale farms, could even­
tually be turned into ownership. The key feature of the conces­
sions was their mutual interdependence. According to the 
Italian plan, within Eritrea, the highland concessions had, as 
their priority, to feed the settler population first and then 
export the surplus; the lowland concessionaires, whose target 
was cash crop for export, were to rely on the highlands for 
their subsistence. But the revenue from their export was 
expected to finance the highland concessions. In the wider 
context of the metropolis, the highland concessions had as
w. The three climatic zones reflected different type of 
flora grown in them and approximately corresponded to the Mexican 
classification of tierra friaf tierra tempiada, tierra caliente.
60. Taddia, op.cit., pp.221-2.
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their ultimate objective the absorption of metropolitan emigra­
tion and the lowlands its surplus capital6**.
To attract the capital, the state offered cheap land 
and tax advantages. In return, the concessionaire had to 
develop the land or face revocation. The model of development 
required the use of advanced technology. The concessionaire had 
to man the farms personally and no renting or share-cropping 
was permitted. By setting these conditions, the colonial 
authorities aimed to retain control over the land and dis­
courage speculators and colonists without suitable agricultural 
experience6**.
Initially the government remained committed to the 
notion of a "populating" colonization and laid great emphasis 
on the small and medium investor in the highlands. But, con­
trary to the government’s expectations, the concessions proved 
to be uneconomical and the areas politically sensitive. The 
majority of concessionaires possessed neither the will, skills 
nor capital, and, with a few exceptions, the technology they 
used was identical to that of the local farmers. The differen­
ce was that settlers monopolized the best lands and benefitted 
from state aid. Yet most of the concessionaires found leasing 
their concessions to the Eritreans, i.e. the same people whose 
lands were expropriated to give to the settlers, much more 
lucrative than working them personally. Even though the govern­
ment intervened vigorously in 1907 repatriating most of the 
absentee landlords, this practice persisted, with virtually all 
the farmers leasing their concessions to the Eritrean peasants 
for a share of between one third and a quarter of the crop66.
The poor productivity, particularly of the small 
concessions, and the sad realization that Eritrea no longer
M. Ibid., p.231.
6^. Ibid., p.222; Rainero, op.cit., pp.216-9.
66. Taddia, op.cit., p.237; Renzo Serolis Salis, L * Or- 
dinamento Fondiario Eritreo. (Padova: 1932), p.91.
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constituted the emigrants’ haven, led in 1926 to a major reas­
sessment and subsequent policy shift towards medium-sized and 
large scale farming69. At the same time, however dimly, the 
government became aware of the necessity of modernizing tradi­
tional Eritrean agriculture. Until then any such attempts were 
opposed by the concessionaires and the authorities who feared 
competition for land and markets. In 1930s, Eritreans were 
eligible for government aid. But this initiative remained no 
more than a timid gesture involving a few specific cases. To 
provide substantial aid to the peasantry would mean allowing 
them to produce more, threatening the colonists continually. 
Wary of any possible disruption both in production and the 
political situation, the metropolitan government maintained a 
policy of minimum interference in Eritrean economic and social 
organization66.
The policy shift away from the small farmer to 
medium and large farms failed to attract rich investors. 
Settler concessions remained static from 1907 to 1931 when 
economic depression left a number of large scale farms bank­
rupt69. With their concessions starved of capital and themselves 
lacking entrepreneurship, the concessionaries were ready to 
give up farming whenever a better opportunity presented itself. 
Thus during the Italo-Ethiopian War many concessions were
CD IAO 1965, UA Er, Attivitfc agricola in Eritrea dal 
1923 al 1931; 2004, A. Maugini, Avvaloramento agario dell’Eritrea 
e della Somalia, 1940; "La valorizzazione agricola della colonia 
Eritrea", REC, XIX, 3-4, (marzo-aprile 1931):365-79. I. Baldrati, 
"Lo sviluppo del 1’agricoltura in Eritrea nei cinquanta anni di 
occupazione italiana", REC, VII, 1 (1933):43-53.
66. The Eritreans sold their labour for low wages to supple­
ment their income and pay their taxes which was a major source 
of government revenue. [Cfr. Tekeste Negash (1986), pp.22-36]. 
However, the number of Eritreans employed in agricultural sector 
was modest. In 1937, of 1.915 total workforce employed in 124
farms, there were 22 Italians and 1,842 Eritreans - 1,119
permanent and 722 casual [Cfr. Taddia, op.cit., p.252].
69. See Table I.
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abandoned as their owners found the war economy much more 
lucrative; others joined the government administration which 
was badly in need of labour7**.
I: LAND CONCESSION AREAS IN ERITREA (in ha)
OWNERSHIP
TYPE
ZONE 1907 1930 1932 1939
HIGHLAND 6,483 1,251 1,251 329
CONCESSION
LOWLAND 4,569 4,159 359 1,287
HIGHLAND = — 4,654 4,654 4,150
OWNERSHIP
LOWLAND = = 67 67 282
TOTAL 11,052 10,131 6,331 6,048
Source:- Irma Taddia, op.cit., pp. 236, 237.
One of the discouraging factors was the harsh 
fluctuating Eritrean climate7*. In freak years, the farmers 
had to contract unbearable debts against which the government 
offered no protection. From 1927-32 locusts destroyed the 
harvest for five consecutive years. In 1927 wheat production 
slumped from 60,000 ql to 5,000 ql within one year, and other 
cereals were almost totally destroyed7^.
The vagary of climate was partly responsible for 
lack of an advocacy for a monoculture, one of the most 
remarkable features of Eritrean settler agriculture. The 
Italians had prided themselves in quoting this as proof that
70. Taddia, op.cit. pp.235,238; Segr6, op.cit., p.15.
7*. A. Maugini, Flora ed economia agraria degli indigeni. 
(Rm: MC, 1931), pp.116-7.
77. I. Baldrati, Mostra delle attivitfr economiche della
colonia Eritrea. (As: Stab. Tip. Coloniale Fioretti, 1932), p.15.
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Italian colonialism was not exploitative and that their 
colonial policies were geared towards the development of a 
colony's internal economic needs. But the truth was monocul­
ture demanded greater financial commitment at the initial 
stages and a stable labour market, and Eritrea offered ne­
ither. With a meagre state subsidy, large scale production was 
unaffordable. Labour was volatile and the concessionaires 
often had to make recourse to overseas markets7^.
After the Adwa defeat, the government, perhaps wary 
of any possible political backlash, adopted the posture of 
"hanging on" rather than really developing the colony. Out of 
its skeleton budget, expenditure in agriculture amounted to 
less than 1%, while defense and administration swallowed the 
rest7'.
TABLE II. ITALIAN COLONIES' NINE YEAR BUDGET (in million £.)
COLONY R E V E N U E  EXPENDITURE
INTERNAL STATE ADMINISTRATION DEFENCE 
SUBSIDY
Libya 1,087 3,189 1,753 3,380
Somalia 319 439 1,034 168
Eritrea 261 246 782 155
Source:- Irma Taddia, op.cit., p. 306.
However, within the constraints imposed upon it, 
the colonial administration financed and managed developmen-
7^. Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa Orientate: La conouis- 
ta del 1 *Imnero. vol. II, (Bari: Ed. Laterza, 1979), p.32; Taddia, 
op.cit., pp.312,321.
7'. See Table II. This rate should be compared with that 
of Libya where government subsidy amounted to between 12-26%. 
Cfr. P. Lombardi, "La colonizzazione agraria in Libia durante il 
periodo del fascismo", paper presented to Seminario sulla Libia: 
Storia e Revoluzione. Rm, 27-29 gennaio 1981, cited by Taddia, 
op.cit., p.307.
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tal infrastructures that it considered to be conducive to 
agricultural development. Perhaps the most significant was the 
building of a rail and road network which could be used as 
much for the rapid deployment of the colonial army as ex­
ploitation of the peripheral areas. Between 1900 and 1930, up 
to £.100,000,000 had been invested in this sector.
TABLE III: TASANAY COTTON FARM. AREAS UNDER CULTIVATION (Ha)
AS STATE FARM AS PRIVATE FARM
YEAR COTTON YEAR COTTON
1925-6 700 1932-3 1,230
1926-7 1,500 1933-4 1,480
1927-8 1 ,000 1934-6 2,147
1928-9 1,200 1936-7 * *
1929-30 1,600 1937-8 * *
** No figures available
Source:- Piccioli, La Nuova Italia D ’Oltremare,
Milano: 1933), vol. 1, cited by Irma Tad­
dia, op.cit., p.323; CD IAO 1245, M. Gubel- 
lini, Un triennio di osservazioni econom- 
iche nell’azienda agraria della SIA a Tes- 
senei, 1936.
Another important undertaking was the exclusion of 
non-Italian capital. This was one of the unique features of 
Italian colonialism. But this protectionist policy left the 
colony hostage to an indifferent and weak metropolitan capi­
tal, thus hindering the exploitation of agricultural resour­
ces. Unlike other Italian colonies, particularly Libya, 
Eritrea had no agricultural credit facilities. Government 
intervention in the lowland concessions was sporadic, while 
in the highlands it was conspicuous only by its absence. In 
1930s steps were taken to set up credit institutions but they
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were no more than token gestures, either too narrowly restri­
cted to particular groups and crops or totally inadequate75.
One exception was Tasanay, near the Sudanese bor­
der, where in 1923 the state intervened with massive invest­
ment on a cotton farm pioneered by SCCCE, which had fallen 
into bankruptcy after 10 difficult years. A dam was built on 
Gash river with a potential to irrigate up to 16,000 ha7**. 
After a vain attempt to involve Italian capital, the govern­
ment had little option but to run it as a state farm. Named 
Azienda Agricola Statale di Tessenei, it was predominantly 
run using share-cropping system with Africans, similar to the 
Gezira cotton scheme77. The state provided small irrigated 
plots of between 1-4 ha, ploughed mechanically and ready for 
sowing. It distributed seeds and cash advances at three fixed 
intervals - sowing, weeding, and harvest. It provided health 
care and assisted in the building of dwellings. The company 
insisted that the peasant raised food crops on half of his 
land and a cash crop of cotton on the other half. The peasant
. The assistance was predominantly given to cultivators 
of coffee on the eastern slope (pendici orientale) and cotton. 
For a more detailed discussion on credit institutions and their 
limitations see Taddia, op.cit. pp.284-90.
76. The initiative is associated with Governor Gasparini, 
who, like De Vecchi and Luigi di Savoia, then engaged in Somalia 
in building two similar projects - Genale State Farm (Azienda 
Agraria Governativa di Genale) and Vi 1lagio Duca d r Abruzzi 
(Vi 1labruzzi) - wanted to leave his personal imprint. Like these 
two schemes, Tasanay farm was motivated more by the Fascists' 
quest for prestige and glory than economic considerations. On the 
two schemes cfr. G. Scassellati-Sforzolini, La Societfr Agricola 
Italo-Somala in Somalia. (Firenze: IACI, 1926); Del Boca (1979), 
pp.80-6; (1984), pp.214-6; Hess, op.cit., pp.163-6.
77. For Gezira scheme see A. Gaittskell, Gezira: a storv of 
development in the Sudan. (London: Faber & Faber, 1959); A. W. 
Abdel Rahim, "An economic history of the Gezira Scheme 1900- 
1956", (PhD: University of Manchester, 1968); Tony Barnet, "The 
Gezira Scheme: production of cotton and the reproduction of
underdevelopment", in Ivar Oxaal and al., ed. , Bevond the 
sociology of development. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), 
pp.183-207.
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did all the manual work from sowing to harvest until the 
cotton was deposited in the company's store. In exchange he 
received a daily ration for his maintenance. At harvest, 
cereal crops were partitioned equally between the company and 
the peasant, while the peasant's share of cotton was purchased 
by the farm78. Described by some as "a cathedral in the 
desert", the enterprise was a disappointment and exposed the 
failure of state entrepreneurship in Eritrea7^. Out of a 
planned 16,000 ha, the state was able to develop less than
3.000 ha. Rather than an economic miracle, TasSnMy’s name 
remained associated in the popular mind with the death toll 
by malaria that decimated the labour force8**.
As an outlet for emigration, the colony was a dis­
appointment. Between 1890 and 1905 an estimated total of over
3.500.000 Italians emigrated8*. And yet the Italian population 
in Eritrea totalled only 3,949. In 1931, it had increased to
/l}. A similar method was followed in Somalia [Cfr. Hess,
op.cit., pp.164-5].
7^. See Table III. This is how one visitor describes: "In
Italy there is much talk of TMsclncLy scheme. Magnificent photo­
graphs show us dams and canals: no doubt these are wonderful 
works even from a panoramic point of view. But, after seeing the 
pictures, one has to look at the balance book. Within 1930, 
Tasanay farm will need another £.3,000,000 to repair the damages 
incurred during these 20 months. So, to cultivate 3,000 ha of 
land a total of between £.35-36,000,000 is needed", R. Martinel-
1 i, Sud. Rapporto di un viaggio in Eritrea e in Etiopia.
(Firenze: Vallecchi 1930), pp.256-7. The damages were caused by
flooding of the river between 1927-8. This colossal figure was 
three times more than the colony's ordinary revenue. The
concession went from one crisis to another. In 1926 and 1928, an
attack by Helio Thrips Indicus halved the crop. Then at the end
of 1928, the world cotton price slump left it badly debt-ridden 
[Cfr. Del Boca (1979), p.34; Taddia, op.cit., p.328.
8**. Giannino Marescalchi, Eritrea. (Milano: Bietti, 1935), 
p.124.
8*. Del Boca, op.cit., p.479; Segre' almost trebles this 
figure [p.14].
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4,182 and to over 46,000 at the end of 193983. In 1913, out of 
1,617 adult male Italians in the colony, only 62 classified 
themselves as agriculturalists, as against 834 in the mil­
itary, 349 in industry and 219 in commerce. In 1939 the 
farming population totalled 112, of which 98 were owner farm­
ers. With the slow decline of the area under cultivation, the 
dream of Eritrea as a small farmers’ paradise also evaporated.
In 1907, 29,553 ha were set aside for colonization. By 1913, 
the total area under cultivation consisted of 1,146 ha, 
increased to 6,048 ha in 193983.
Agricultural self-sufficiency also remained un­
tenable. Eritrea was only a model colony in supplying colonial 
soldiers to aid Italy’s imperial expansion and consolidation in 
Somalia, Libya and Ethiopia8**. Although the illusion of trans­
forming Eritrea into the white man’s paradise lingered on even
82. See Table IV; VII Censimento generate della ponolazio- 
ne, 21-4-1931, Rm 1935, p.34; Pankhurst (1964):135-6.
83. Peglion et al., op.cit., pp.6-7; Pankhurst (1964) : 15 5; 
Taddia, op.cit., p.237. Other Italian colonies fared better. In 
1939, in Somalia, where only capitalist colonization was 
practised, out of 64,936 ha of land under concession, 33,604 were 
cultivated. According to 1933 statistics, there were 115 conces­
sionaires. Of these, SAIS owned 25,000 ha at Villabruzzi, the 100 
concessionaires of Azienda Agraria Governativa at Genale had 
20,142 ha and 14 private farms 15,483 ha. SAIS had developed
10.000 ha, reserving the rest for pasture, and the Genale State 
Farm 18,000 and the 14 farmers about 10% of the total area [Cfr. 
Hess, op.cit., pp. 163-6]. In Libya, where both settlement 
schemes and capitalist enterprise operated, in 1937 there were 
840 farms, 384 still in concession and 411 owned outright. Out 
of 364,723 ha of land under concession, in 1940, 222,386 ha were 
cultivated. During this same period, 8,782 agricultural families 
were settled, numbering 29,876 individuals [Cfr. Ernesto Massi, 
"Economia dell’AI", RISS, XLVIII, XI (Maggio 1940):429-33; Segr- 
e’, op.cit., pp.97-100].
8\ Eritrea assumed this role in 1912, reaching its climax 
with the invasion of Ethiopia towards which the colony supplied
60.000 soldiers. The invasion drastically altered the demogra­
phic map of Eritrea [See Table IV].
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after the conquest of Ethiopia83, the colony became neither the 
privileged field of financial magnates nor the ideal destina­
tion for a prospective Italian emigrant.
TABLE IV:- ERITREA AS DEMOGRAPHIC OUTLET IN 1940
PLACE MALE FEMALE TOTAL
ADDI KUALA 121 29 150
ADDI QAYEH 59 22 81
ADDI WUGRI 499 104 603
AQUIRDAT 175 25 200
ASMARA - - 30,000
ASAB 1,492 89 1,581
DAQAMEHARA 5439 905 6,344
GHINDAE 122 33 155
KARAN 400 202 602
MESWA 5633 304 5,937
SAGANAYETI 598 107 705
TOTAL 14,538 1,820 46,358
Source:- "II Popolo Italiano ha creato col suo sangue 
1 *Impero e lo feconda col suo lavoro", II Popolo 
Fascita(Salerno). 25-2-1939; "Quanti Connazionali 
Vivono ne 11 * Impero" , GI_, 25-2-1939.
Contrary to early optimistic forecasts, settlement 
possibilities in Italy’s African colonies remained patently 
untenable. And contrary to expectations, and despite a con­
siderable expenditure of finance and effort, the colonies were 
more of a liability than economic asset to the mother country. 
Yet such a history of continuous failure did not cause Italy 
to alter its colonial aspirations, nor did it deflect from 
targeting Ethiopia as a place where such aspirations could be 
fulfilled. To achieve this, Ethiopia had to be peacefully
182. The latest attempts at colonization by Governor De Feo was 
opposed by Graziani [Cfr. GRA 43/34-22, Graziani to Lessona, AA 
2-11-1937; Lessona to Graziani, Rm 4-11-1937].
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subdued. This had become a remote possibility, particularly 
under Haile Sellassie. The policies of subversion, which inten­
sified from 1929, and peaceful economic penetration proved 
unworkable. Refusing to acknowledge that the era of colonial 
conquests had passed, Italy embarked, under the slogan of 
"expand or explode", on conquering Ethiopia88.
Renzo de Felice, Mussolini il Puce : Gli anni del
consenso (1926-361. (Torino: Einaudi, 1974), p.374; "Fame
coloniale", Echi e Commenti. 25-1-1931.
CHAPTER II
ETHIOPIAN LAND TENURE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT BEFORE 1935
The main justification for Italy’s ambition to 
dominate Ethiopia rested on the proposition that traditional 
Ethiopian society was incapable of achieving economic progress 
by itself. Full scale reform was necessary and this could only 
take place if Italy assumed responsibility for the transforma­
tion. Severe criticism was directed against what was known as 
gabbar system. Interpreted as a mechanism by which the ruling 
class appropriated the surplus of the peasant’s produce, gabbar 
system had always been an emotive issue. Both progressive Ethio­
pian opinion and foreign writers had alleged an appalling ex­
ploitation through the gabbar by parasitic landlords and church 
officials, providing Italy with material to exploit*.
The gMbbar must be looked at in the perspective of 
the country’s land tenure system. Politically, Ethiopia may be 
a nation. But from a sociological, ethnico-cultural, and geogra­
phical point of view it is a conglomerate of societies produc­
ing highly differentiated forms of land ownership and utiliz­
ation. Land tenure not only varies from one ethnic group to 
another, but within each group, from place to place.
A distinction can be made between the land tenure 
systems in the north and those in the south. The north is the 
heartland of ancient Abyssinia which, with the help of European 
mi 1itary hardware, imposed its ’political model* on the southern 
areas.
*. ASMAE 2/1, Paterno’ to MAE, AA 20-6-1931 where he 
describes the Ethiopians as "inherently corrupt, decadent and 
reactionary, steeped in slavery and feudalism"; G.C. Baravelli, 
The last stronghold of slavery: What Abvssinia is. (Rm: Soc. Ed. 
di Novissima, XIII), p.41 where he reports the statement of the 
wife of the British ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lady Simon, 
in support of the need of foreign intervention to establish a new 
state in Ethiopia.
CHAPTER II ETHIOPIAN LAND TENURE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
NORTHERN LAND TENURE PATTERNS
Ancient Abyssinia refers to the geographical regions 
comprising the north and north central highlands of modern 
Ethiopia - the Eritrean plateau, BSg^mder, Gojjam, parts of 
Tegray, ShSwa and Wallo. Ethnically, it is inhabited by two major 
groups, the Amharas and the Tegreans, who belonged to the 
Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC) and, since the establishment of 
the modern Empire State in the last quarter of the 19th century, 
remained economically and politically dominant. Land provided 
the social and economic basis for public administration and 
national defence. State employees, both civilian and military, 
were granted land in lieu of salary. Socially, land was the 
most valued asset, conferring status, endowing membership of 
social organizations and giving access to political office. An 
Amharic proverb says: "To be landless is to be subhuman"2. All 
those who did not own land, such as merchants, artisans and 
religious minorities were excluded from political life. Concern 
for land possession and rights were jealously defended and 
backed by physical force3.
2. Cfr. Mesfin Wolde Mariam, at the introduction to "Some 
Aspects of Land Ownership in Ethiopia", paper presented to 
Seminar of Ethiopian Studies, HSIU, 1965; idem, Rural vulnerabil­
ity to famine in Ethiopia. (London: Intermediate Technology 
Publications, 1986), pp.76-7.
3. This discussion is based on a vast literature indicated 
in the bibliography. The major studies are: Gebre-Wold Engda
Worq, "Ethiopia*s traditional system of land tenure and taxation, 
EOt V, 4 (1962): 302-9; Mahtama Sellass£ Wcild& MasqSl, ZekrM
nMgar. (AA: 1942 EC [1950]); Idem, "The land system of Ethiopia", 
EO, I, 9 (October 1957):283-301; A. Hoben, Land Tenure among the 
Amhara of Ethiopia: The dynamics of cognatic descent. (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1973); F. Bauer, "Land, 
leadership and legitimacy among the Inderta Tigray of Ethiopia", 
(PhD Thesis, University of Rochester, 1972); S. F. Nadel, 
op.cit.; M. M. Moreno, "II regime terriero abissino nel GS", 
REA 1. 25, 10 (ottobre 1937):1496-1508; E. Brotto, II regime del le 
terre nel Governo del Harar. (AA: Serv. Tip. GGAOI 1939).
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The variety of functions and services attached to 
land gave rise to an elaborate system of land tenure and tribute 
deeply rooted in tradition and sanctioned by biblical myth^. 
There were two basic forms of land ownership, based on two 
fundamental principles distinct in theory but often overlapping 
in concrete situations. The first principle was of eminent 
domain under which the state owned all the land and distributed 
it as it pleased. This generated gult tenures3. Coexisting with 
the dominion right was the principle of first occupancy which 
gave rise to rest tenures. From these tenures a variety of land­
holdings evolved, broadly classified as church, private, govern­
ment, and kinship or communal.
Under rest, the "land of a parent was divided equally 
among all his or her biological children without regard to 
seniority or sex"8. In addition to actual ownership of land, it 
also gave the right to claim a share of land by tracing kinship 
through either parent to a recognized and often fictitious 
original occupant or founding father7. With few exceptions 
descent was ambilineal and traceable over a number of genera­
tions, allowing one to obtain plots scattered over a wide area.
*. R. Pankhurst, State and land in Ethiopian society. (AA: 
HSIUP, 1966), p.55; Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia: From autocracy to
revolution. (London: Review of African Political Economy 1975), 
p. 21; A. D ’Abbadie, Douze ans de seiour dans la Haute-Ethiopie(A- 
bvssinie). (Paris: 1868), pp.101, 130; Hoben (1973), op.cit.,
pp.82-5; M. Perham, The government of Ethiopia. (London: Faber 
and Faber 1969), p.281.
3. The technical language used refers mainly to Amharic 
unless stated otherwise. The etymology does not necessarily cor­
respond to Tegrefia.
8. A. Hoben, "The role of ambilineal descent groups in
Gojjam Amhara social organization", (PhD thesis: UC, Berkley,
1963), p.43.
7. In Tegrena the point of reference is enda, a group of
families claiming to have descended from a single ancestor. The 
most important element in the claim is biological descent from 
either parent. Thus, children born out of wedlock (deqala) suffer 
no disability and have equal claims.
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The success of a claim hinged upon a number of factors, such as 
the claimant’s political skill and ability to influence the 
elders in charge of allocation and the local judges, his social 
standing in the community, his financial capability to prolong 
litigation, the availability of land on the area of his claim 
and the importance of the claimant8.
Technically, rest referred not to right of ownership but 
usage - utendi et abutendi - within the restrictions imposed 
by the collective interest of the kinship group in whom was 
vested the reversionary right^. Rest could be enjoyed for life, 
leased and, at death, passed on to siblings. But it could not 
be sold, mortgaged or forfeited through absence and the dictum 
"rest bashi amatu labalabdtu"*8 seems to reinforce this common 
belief. Rest lands were subordinate to state’s paramountcy 
which, under the principle of eminent domain, could confiscate 
in case of rebellion or inherit in the absence of successor. 
However, such a principle was rarely invoked**. Rest made chances for social
8. John Markakis, "Review of land tenure among the Amhara 
of Ethiopia: The dynamics of cognatic descent by Allan Hoben", 
JMAH. XII, 2 (1974):341-2.
P. Schwab, "Rebellion in Ethiopia", East Africa Journal.
6, 11 (November 1969):29.
*®. "Rest returns to its owner even after a thousand years".
**. Indeed people talk of rest as a "fundamental" and 
"sacred" possession and the proverb - "as land is fixed by 
nature and cannot be moved, equally the rest—holder cannot be 
moved from rest" - clearly denotes that rest provided almost 
absolute security to its holder. This is contrary to absolute 
power of the state, reported in western travellers’ account, 
such as Lobo’s: "The King’s authority is so unlimited that no
man can in this country be called with Justice Proprietor of 
anything, nor doth any man when he Sows his Field knows that he 
shall Reap it", [Lobo A., A vovage to Abvssinia. (trans. by Mr. 
Le Grand), 1735, p. 263] and more recently Douchesne Fournet 
mission according to whom the "authority of the Emperor is 
unlimited... The people are his and his empire is his proper­
ty" [J. Douchesne-Fournet, Mission en Ethiopie (1901-31. I, 
(Paris: 1908-9), p.261.]. This view seems to derive from a
mistaken or literary interpretation of popular proverb "the land 
belongs to the king". As a group of Eritrean elders expressed,
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mobility greater and assured security of tenure. As it allowed 
access to land to all freeborn Abyssinians, it minimized land­
lessness and tenancy.
Where it existed in the north, tenancy was associat­
ed only with either submerged caste groups, religious minorit­
ies - commonly considered as ’foreigners’ - or young restanas who 
sought more land*2. The status of the landlord and the tenant 
were not necessarily equal, but the tenancy was seen as a joint 
venture by two or more people who combined their resources of 
land, oxen, labour and seed for mutual advantage. Each shared 
the output in proportion to their input. The contract was 
entered by a landlord who had more land than he could work or 
who, for some reason (old age, ill health, lack of plough-oxen) , 
was incapable of working. If the tenant was a ’foreigner’, he 
first had to make sure that no one among his relations or fellow 
villagers was interested in the work.
Among the considerable number of tenancy systems, 
the most widespread were erbo arash, sisso Srash and yS-ekkul
rather than "a juridical concept" the statement intends to 
"affirm that the earth belongs to the king in the same way as the 
heavens belong to God. We allude to this statement when we wish 
to enhance the power of the state, but do not thereby intend to 
refer to the ownership of the fields. [It]...refers only to that 
kind of command relating to the imposition of taxation on land 
and prevention of power abuse and violence. But no-one can take 
away our lands; the state awards rank, office and gulti, and can 
take them away, but it cannot deprive us of our lands except in 
case of confiscation resulting from such crimes as we may 
commit"[C. C. Rossini, Princioi di diritto consuetudinario 
del 1’Eritrea . (Rm: 1916), pp.115-6.
*2. Abyssinian culture equated craftsmen with outcasts and 
manual labour done for others with low status. As the Tegrena 
proverb - "aslamay addi [awdi] yabellu, sHmay andi yabellu (as 
the sky has no pillars, the Muslim has no land [threshing floor] 
- the Muslims were the largest religious group excluded from rest 
ownership in the Christian areas. Emperor Yohannes IV’s attempt 
at their forceful conversion to Christianity opened access to 
rest for many Muslims, several of whom were described as maalti 
krestiyan ISyti as lam (christians by day but muslims by night) 
[Cfr. R. Perini, Di qufr del Mardb. (Firenze: 1905), p.344.
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arash, respectively translated as "tiller of one fourth", 
"tiller of one third", "tiller of one and half". The form 
adopted was largely determined by the degree of fertility of 
the land and the quantity of labour required. For this purpose, 
the land was usually divided into four categories: matefo mardt, 
man a mardt, dahena mardt and malafeya mardt - "arid land", 
"semi-arid land", "fertile land", "very fertile land"*3.
In all three tenancies, the cultivator either resided 
inside the plot - in which case he became cisaha - or lived some­
where else carrying out the work as tamaj or mofar zamach. In erbo 
arash, the landlord, in addition to grazing land (maqomeya) to be 
used as pasture for his cattle by the cultivator, provided him 
with reclaimed land. The cultivator contributed plough animals, 
agricultural implements, seeds and labour. At harvest, as in all 
three forms, land tax or asrat valued at one tenth of production, 
was levied. One fourth of the remainder was allocated to the 
landlord, while the tenant retained the rest plus the straw and 
the chaff, with a right to graze his cattle on stubble. Sisso 
arash, the most widespread, was identical to erbo arash except 
that the landlord was paid one third of the remainder.
Ya-ekkul arash varied according to the type and scale 
of input provided by the parties. The landlord, in addition to 
reclaimed land, provided a plough with one or two oxen and with 
part or all of the seed. The produce was divided equally on a 
50-50 basis. Unlike the other two rental forms, in ya-ekkul arash 
often no grazing land, or maqomeya was provided and the tenants 
owning cattle had to make separate rental arrangements often 
with the same landlord. The benefit was that the tenant was not 
obliged to provide services tied to the grazing land, such as 
making available his labour to the landlord five days per year.
1 . CD IAO Sc 3025, T. Moreschini, Principali contratti
agrari indigeni dello Scioa: Relazione presentata al VII Congres-
so Internazionale sul1 *agricoltura tropicale, (AA: 1939), pp.3- 
4; J. Cohen and D. Weintraub, Land and peasants in imperial 
Ethiopia: The social background to revolution. (The Netherlands: 
Van Gorcum & Co., BV-Assen 1975), p.53.
-37-
CHAPTER II ETHIOPIAN LAND TENURE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
But to maintain good relations with the landowner, the tenant 
provided supplementary services, assisting him in house-work at 
family celebrations, house repairs and providing him with eggs 
and chicken. The assistance was usually reciprocated*8. Normally 
the landlord gave burnous or other garments to the tenant’s 
family. When the tenancy was between an ordinary man and a man 
with authority and power, the tenant often became one of the 
landowner’s retinue, visiting him frequently with gifts, 
escorting him on journeys and to church services. When such 
extra economic relationship became paramount, the landlord’s 
share tended to be less than the customary amount. For the 
honour and support he provided to the landlord, the tenant 
received help in court litigation, political protection and an 
occasional gift*5.
An important variation of rest is village tenure, 
known as shana, ddssa, cigurafgottet, These were restricted to 
the Eritrean highlands, particularly Hamas6n and AkhalS Guzay 
and part of Tegray Province. Under this tenure, land was col­
lectively owned by the village and eligibility was based on 
residence rather than descent. Need to accommodate new members 
and correct inequality and fragmentation necessitated distribu­
tion, often by lot, each 5 or 25 years, with each member of the 
village entitled to an equal share of the land*8.
The rest-holders, known as the restSfias, were proud 
of their system and the laws regulating it. But close examina­
tion reveals rest*s in-built flaws: it encouraged innumerable
*8. Cohen and Weintraub, op.cit., pp.50-5. Cfr. CD IAO Sc 
3025, p.9; Hoben, op.cit., 1973, p.138.
*5. Such combination of servitude and tenancy normally
occurs when the landowner was a gult-holder [Cfr. Hoben (1963), 
p.182; Nadel, op.cit., 1:17].
*8. Bauer, op.cit.; Cohen and Weintraub, op.cit., pp.33-4; 
Ambaye Zekarias, Land tenure in Eritrea. (AA:1966). But the most 
authoritative research is by the anthropologist Dr Nadel who 
worked in the Eritrean highland under the British military 
administration. Cfr. Nadel, op.cit., 1:11—5.
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claims and counterclaims that led to long-drawn and costly court 
disputes and made ownership insecure as a successful claimant 
could take it away at any time. Village tenure attempted to 
eliminate the grave injustices embodied in rest, but periodic 
redistributions aggravated insecurity and tended to minimize the 
incentive for proper care of the land. Constant division and 
subdivision in rest fostered excessive fragmentation and diminu­
tion of plots. Restahas clung to all their privileges. Even under 
village ownership, they maintained narrow and rigid economic and 
political privileges. The village chiefs, known as ceqa—shums, 
were elected only from their ranks. As a result, a large section 
of the population was permanently excluded from political life 
and kept in a state of dependence and economic insecurity17. 
Attempts to reform were restricted to particular areas18.
Owing to the gradual imposition of gult over rest, 
the two systems had been always lived in a state of tension, 
actual or potential. Etymological ly gult simply means "grant"19, 
but popular opinion put the gult holder into a distinct powerful 
class. In fact, gult indicated a territorial unit of administra­
tion where the state renounced part or all of its fiscal rights 
in favour of a gult ruler28. Gult was also a major mechanism of 
surplus appropriation - labour and produce - and also the only
*'. Nadel, op.cit., 2:108; Dessalegn Rahmato, Agrarian 
reform in Ethiopia. (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African 
Studies, 1984), pp.18-9; Perham, op.cit., pp.291-2; Cohen and 
Weintraub, op.cit., pp.47-50.
18. The most important intrusions were the edicts attribut­
ed to Emperor Yohannes IV and his General, Ras Alula, who sanc­
tioned legal ownership tantamount to rest after forty year’s 
undisputed occupancy. According to Nadel his edict "crystallized 
in a period of considerable immigrations and military coloniza­
tion" enabled many landless ’foreign' squatters to buy their 
entry into the "jealously guarded ranks" of the restanas [Nadel, 
op.cit,:11,18].
19. From the Ge’ez word gwollatS (to donate), gult indicates 
"an officially sanctioned reward".
28. Pankhurst (1966), p. 29.
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way whereby a large estate could be accumulated. The gult-holder 
was a lord but not a landowner except in his own personal hudad
- state land attached to his office. He was not involved in the 
process of production. Peasants owning the land produced what 
they liked and in whatever way they liked; the gxil t-holder only 
dispatched his agents at harvest time to collect his dues21.
Gult rights were granted by the state to its 
favourites, unsalaried local government officials, religious 
institutions, local gentry and others. With such grants it 
secured support and loyalty from politically influential groups 
or rewarded meritorious servants while it discouraged opposition 
by threats of dispossession. Theoretically, gult was not heredi­
tary, but in practice many gults transmogrified into some kind 
of rest, giving rise to a hybrid form known as resta—gult. But 
the state retained the ultimate right to modify, upgrade, abo­
lish, or transfer the original grant. Gult estates were 
classified according to the status of the grantee, the specific 
services attached and the time length imposed. The broadest 
distinction was between that destined for religious dispensation
- bdta—kehenat - and secular administration - bdta—mangest. The best 
known gult of the religious institutions was samon; its secular 
counterpart was hudad.
Hudad land became available as uncultivated land, 
lands confiscated for tax evasion, high treason or rebellion.
The hudad allocated for public administrators, civil servants 
and military personnel in lieu of salary became madarya or resta— 
gult, depending on whether it was temporary or permanent22; those 
providing supplies for the Imperial court were known, as gan—
21. The gult—holder or his agents visit the crop three times 
- harvest, piling and threshing - after notified by the peasant. 
Cfr. Mahtama Sellass^ Walda Masqal [1950], pp.333-44 where he 
gives detailed regulations sanctioned by the decree of Teqemt 
7, 1914 EC.
22. G.W.B. Huntingford, The land charters of northern 
Ethiopia. (AA: 1965); Taddesse Tamrat, Church and state in 
Ethiopia 1270-1527. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1972), pp.100-3.
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gab (brewery), mad—bdt (kitchen) and wara—ganu (stud-breeder) and 
were directly administered by central government23.
What did gult actually entail to its holder? Two 
clearly distinct but overlapping rights were involved. For 
taxation purposes, the landowning class can be divided into 
gabbar - who were rest-holders on ground of descent - and tekklena 
(settler) - who obtained their land through the goodwill of the 
state2*1. All land was burdened with two forms of taxes: a srat
(tithe) - a form of land tax - and geber25 - a form of rate. 
A’sraf was paid to the central government, in one tenth of 
produce per gasha. The bulk of geber was paid in labour. Both 
gabbar and tekklaha paid the same amount of a srat, but how they 
fulfilled their geber differed substantially.
For the gabbar, geber was mainly in statute labour 
with a small payment in kind, varying according to locality: 
regions renowned for a particular type of produce, such as 
honey, white tdf, or horses had their taxes commuted with one 
of these items. Others had a fixed annual payment in gamata (salt
23. R. Pankhurst, Economic history of Ethiopia (1800-1935). 
(AA: HSIUP, 1968), p.148.
2*1. Tekklaha commonly refers to military, as virtually all 
gult-holders were originally either military-men or linked to 
some form of military service. Analysis of ownership reveals 
that the holders included: fusiliers, artillerymen, avanguar-
dists, quartermasters, spear and gun-powder manufacturers, 
drummers, makers and transporters of the Imperial tent, baggage 
transporters, muleteers, cavalrymen and horse-breeders, game 
animal suppliers, foragers, prison-wardens, tailors, kitchen- 
gardeners, postmen, land surveyors. The services were to be 
provided both in peace and war time. These lands were originally 
given on temporary basis but through the course of time most of 
them took a permanent character and have all the features of 
rest. Here the term tekklaha is used to indicate all category of 
people who obtained their land in the form of gult rather than 
descent.
25. In Amharic geber is a generic form and means "banquet, 
tax" and does not specifically relate to this second form of tax. 
But like asrat, the term geber is Ge’ez - so not Amharic - and 
means "work, labour", thus specifically denoting the nature of 
the taxation.
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bar). The statute labour, normally one day in every three 
reserved for the gabbar, involved assistance in construction of 
fortifications, buildings and storage bins and maintenance of 
major trails as well as the cultivation of hudad for the benefit 
of political appointees or the Imperial court. In monetary 
terms, the total tax (asrat and geber) amounted almost to one 
fifth of the produce28.
The geber of the tekklaha was commuted with a specific 
service attached to the land, either religious or secular, and 
was comparatively less onerous than that paid on gabbar land. As 
the obligations were on land rather than person, the holder 
lacking the specific skill attached to the land had the duty 
either to relinquish the land or make arrangements with someone 
to furnish it. If, for example, a woman inheriteda piece of land 
which had to supply soldiers or clergymen, it was her duty to 
raise and equip them27.
At the lowest administrative level, the gult-holder, 
whether religious or secular, was almost the sole link between 
the provincial government and the local ghbbar. He administered 
justice and settled local disputes, subject to appeal to higher 
authority. He was also responsible for maintenance of civil 
order, communication of government decrees, organization of 
statute labour and the collection of asrat and geber. He made 
proclamations concerning public work. He also ensured that the
28. For example, on a revenue of 100 dawulla produce of one 
gasha land, which is 400MTD, the total tax consisted in 82MTD or 
20.50% of the total produce. This was composed of:
ASRAT MTD 12.00+
GEBER:
1 gundo mar MTD 12.00+
3 dawulla cereal MTD 12.00+
Corve’ labour MTD 18.00+
Total MTD 82.00
[Cfr. CD IAO 794, Centurione P. Ciocca, Elementi di dirit- 
to fondiario e tributario nello Scioa, n.d., pp.65-74. For 
other regional variations see Pankhurst (1968), pp.511-9.
27. The normal practice was to hire against payment or rent 
part of the land to a third party who had the skill.
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gabbar provided government officials and guests in transit with 
food, drink and lodging as might be required. In his work he was 
assisted by the village chief, ceqa-shum, who was elected 
annually by and from among the local landowning class. If he was 
a provincial governor he appointed all the functionaries under 
him and conferred military titles up to the rank below his own. 
In return, he was expected to maintain a personal army and 
provide military assistance to the central government whenever 
required28.
The most important benefit accruing to the gult- 
holder was the geber of the gabbar under his jurisdiction which 
he used in the way he deemed fit for the common good. He was 
normally exempt from geber on his own personal hudaS9 which he 
administered often aided by his representative, wakil38. He mtgA£ 
also be allowed to keep market and court fees for himself. 
Hudad, however, consisted of unsettled land and, unless there 
were peasants to cultivate it, was worthless. However, an 
entrepreneurial gult-holder might exploit it in a number of 
ways: using statute labour of the gabbar, or under some form of 
rental arrangement or leasing it for an extended period. In 
exceptional cases, when particularly it was a resta-gult, it was 
sold or settled with landless who became his gabbar. This latter 
often was much more profitable as the gult-holder - transformed
. D. Donham and Wendy James, ed. , The southern marches 
of <mp»r>nl (Cambridge: CUP, 1986), p.9; CD IAO 794, p.29;
Nadel, op.cit.:4; Hoben (1973), pp.77-8.
29. Gul t-holder s paid asrat on their personal gult but not 
necessarily geber. Their service was accounted for the latter. 
Those exempted from asrat, made a token payment which had largely 
symbolic significance.
38. Hoben, op.cit., p.77. It should be emphasized that the 
right of the gult-gazi [gult-ruler] included land only if the 
land was given to him as hudad, or as a source of personal 
subsistence or resta-gult in which case he had the power to evict 
and repossess his land. Rest-holder could be evicted only for 
failure to pay tax. In this case the land was given to a better 
candidate promising to ensure the future revenue.
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into a landlord - in addition to proceeds from sale, secured a 
life-time income in the form of geber or asrat or botfi .
In each village a portion of land amounting to a 
maximum of one third of the total land area was set aside for 
the purpose of church service. The nomenclature of these lands 
varied from place to place, but the most common term samon mardt 
indicated a wide variety of lands. The broadest distinction was 
between land allotted as endowment fund and personnel emolument. 
The first referred to lands reserved for the church as an 
institution. It was administered by a gdbaz (church administrat­
or) who allocated part to his dependents - four person per gasha 
- and leased or rented the rest, with the revenue supporting the 
poor32. The second group were allocated to individuals who 
exploited it as they liked33.
il. Sale was rare and, depending on the nature of the land, 
it had to be approved by the state. The gu 1t-holder*s right to
dsrat and geber, if his land entailed him to it, remained unaf­
fected by eventual transaction. Theoretically, those owning such 
land became the gdbbar of the gult-holder for their taxes were 
paid to him. This process largely took place in the south where 
massive sale of gult lands gave rise to ydmdlkdRa gdbbar or 
gdbbar of the mdlkdfia.
32. Under this group came the lands known as: yd-tabot (the 
Holy Arch), yd-qurban (Eucharist).
33. This land is normally divided in three categories:
I. Ya—samonaha mardt [land reserved to the weekly mass 
celebrant priests and deacons - normally five per week] 
included:
1. ya—qdssenna (priesthood).
2. ya—diqunna (diaconate).
3. ya—haymanota—abdw [dnbabi] ([reader]of Book of our 
Fathers).
II. Ya—dabtdra mardt. [land belonging to the church musical 
group]:
1. yd—ddbtara (musician),
2. yd—somd—<teggua( Lenten music).
3. yd—saatat Qudmi (horologer).
4. yd—zdyndgges (Psalm reader).
III. Church wardens:
1. yd—dntafi (upholsterer).
2. ya—dtabi or yd—walway (washer/cleaner).
3. yd-dqabit (keeper).
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Gult grants are largely associated with the two 
higher institutions, gadam (monastery), and dabr (abbe^1) . Unlike 
other categories of grants, which could be temporary and 
revocable, church gults were, at least in theory, permanent and 
irrevocable, because the church is a legal person that cannot 
die and, as Fetha Nagast rules, "what goes into the church shall 
not come out of it", for "what has been given to God cannot be 
taken away"35. The overall administration of dabr land was in the 
hands of alaqa who normally bore a special title that was unique 
to each dabr. Gadam land was under the magg'kbi .
4. ya-dawway (bell-ringer).
5. ya-guazguaz (person in charge of covering church floor 
with dry grass).
6. ya-qarafi (wood-cutter). It seems appropriate to put in 
this same category lands reserved for some purposeful animals 
such as ya-demmat mardt (cat). The owners of these lands either 
worked them personally or rented or leased them but they were 
not allowed to sell, mortgage or exchange them in other ways.
38. In gadam and dabr institutions, the ecclesiastical 
population is much larger than the gatar church and so the amount 
of land and the variation of their nomenclature. For more 
detailed information on the three church institutions - gatar, 
dabr and gadam - see Haile M. Larebo, "The EOC", in Pedro Ramet 
(ed.), Eastern Christianity and politics in the twentieth 
century, vol. 1, (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1988), 
pp.381-3; Idem, "The EOC and politics in the twentieth century", 
Northeast African Studies, vol. 9, 3(1987):1-15.
35. Fetha Nagast is a traditional civil and religious code. See 
Fetha Nagast [Law of Kings], trans. by Paulos Tzadua, AA: HSIU 
(mimeographed), p.498; Berhanou Abebe, op.cit., p.140. Ownership 
had been often unclear and source of continuous dispute between 
the cultivators who consider themselves as restahas and the church 
who regards them simply as share-croppers [Cfr. G. Villari, "I 
’gultf’ della regione di Axum". REAI. 26, 9 (Settembre 1938):1434- 
6] .
38. The practical distribution of the gadam land between the 
monks varied depending on whether the gadam is coenobitic (ya- 
andennat) , or idiorrhtmic (ya—qurrit). Detailed studies on church 
lands are few, making description and analysis difficult. Al­
though limited to a specific area, the following are the most 
important: CD IAO 791; Villari, op.cit.:1430-1444; Dagne Haile 
Gabriel, "The gebzenna charter, 1894", JES. IX, 2 (1972):67-80.
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TABLE V:- BISHOFTU'S EOC POPULATION ANS REVENUES IN 1930S.
R E V E N U E S
L A N D H O L D E R  S T A T E
CEREAL CEREAL
A1EA 10. OP 10. OF um DAV0LLA Q 0IIA V00D CASH DAV0LLA Q QUA CASH
CHURCHES CLERGY LAID1 LOAD («TD) (KID)
AQAQI 13 160 134,75 227 109 777 27 8 . 65.00
ADDA 13 160 122,50 187 167 1,213 65 111 12 139.00
CHAFFADARSA 8 98 64,25 80 53 506 28 11 - 56.00
KOGGIO 18 233 180,50 316 91 1,676 162 15 - 220.00
BALCI AO 515 653,75 225 222 1,963 88 152 36 866.00
ZUQUALA* * 875 182 182,00 671 20 78 30 802 10 3,022.00
TOTAL w 1,348 1,137.75 1,100 662 6,009 380 1,099 58 6,768.50
* The list does not include gult lands. The largest holder was 
Zuquala* GSdam. The two churches of the GSdam - St. Abbd and 
WSmbarS Maryam seem to have about 746 gasha between them.
** The figure includes the two churches of the Zuquala* GMdam 
where about 800 individuals lived37.
Source: CD IAO 791, Commissariato di G. di Bishoftti, La Chiesa
Etiopica nel R. Commissariato di Bishoftti, Moggio 31- 
12-938.
Church lands were meant to support the church's ac­
tivities, its clergy and those who provided various liturgical 
and related services. Depending on their status, they were ex­
ploited in the same manner as an ordinary gult or rest with the 
church acting in much the same way as a secular gult-holder or 
kinship group. Church land, however, was more attractive, for
37. With the decree of GG 18-6-1937 no. 79276 and 8-8-1938 
no.118321/A-3-B/6 the Italian government set to 200 the maximum 
number allowed to live in the two churches of Zuquala gSdam. As 
part of the financial settlement, the abbot was acknowledged as 
a gult-holder. He was allocated an annuity of £.13,041 while the 
gSdam received £.24,000 per annum.
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the holders owed their geber to the church which was judged as 
less onerous3®.
THE FORMATION OF SOUTHERN TENURES
The prevalent characteristic of the southern 
Ethiopian land tenure system was widespread private ownership. 
Its emergence was inextricably linked with Abyssinian expansion 
during the last quarter of the 19th century. The conventional 
view was that the invaders expropriated land indiscriminately. 
But the state was careful not to disturb the vernacular 
structure partly because it had neither the administrative 
manpower to govern these vast areas nor the technical and 
material resources to exploit them; and partly because of the 
cultural heterogeneity of the conquered peoples and the need to 
stifle opposition from the traditional authorities. Certainly 
serious abuses and brutalities took place. It was also true that 
the state claimed all conquered lands as its own, but practical 
assertion of this claim depended upon the level of resistance 
to conquest, the degree of cultivation of the area and the 
productivity of the land, as well as climatic conditions3^.
Conquest was brutal where the local leaders fought 
the new invaders. The leaders and their followers were killed, 
deported or sold as slaves, their land confiscated and declared 
state property. But the masses were left in their land which the 
state aimed to exploit by imposing what has been called the 
Abyssinian model of administration. This chiefly consisted in
3®. The geber consisted in construction and repair of the 
church building, supply of fire-wood and some fees payable in 
cash or kind.
3^. Both Enrico Brotto, adviser to the HSrar governorate 
during the occupation, and Martino Mario Moreno, an official of 
the MAI, reject the view of massive and arbitrary expropriation. 
Brotto did his field research in Harar, Arsi and Bal£, and Moreno 
in the GGS. Their view is supported by a number of other writers. 
This belies Italian propaganda which capitalized on this issue.
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massive re-orientation of the existing economic and political 
relations by introducing gult grants and maintaining such a 
system by force. Where suitable for colonization, land was 
divided into two categories: inhabited land already under
cultivation, ya—gabbar mardt, and underdeveloped areas, ya— 
saqala mardt. The latter comprised land confiscated from the 
resistance leaders, rebels and those who fell into political 
disgrace, and pasture or forest which, in the perception of the 
Abyssinians, was considered as under-populated and under­
util ized^0.
In inhabited areas gult grants involved reducing the 
local population, some of whom had previously lived in rela­
tively unstratified societies, into tribute paying peasants, or 
gabbar. As in the north, the gabbar system affected neither the 
original status of, nor the existing transactions in, land 
ownership; it only demanded the transfer of tributes due to the 
central administration to the gult-holders, who mainly were the 
settler soldiers. Having developed a roster of tribute payers, 
a number of lesser gabbars were regrouped together to form a full 
gMbbay* - normally four per gasha. In uncultivated areas the land 
was measured by either qallad or "by eye" and organized in gasha 
and classified as fertile, semi-fertile or poor. Then a number 
of full gabbar or gasha lands or both were allocated in lieu of 
salary to a wide range of people and institutions on the basis 
of their merit, rank, social status or importance^: northern
For a detailed account of the consequences of conquest 
Cfr. Donham and James, op.cit.; Charles W. McClellan, "Reaction 
to Ethiopian expansionism: The case of Darassa, 1895-1935", (PhD: 
Michigan State University, 1978).
A full gabbar was one able to pay the full amount of tax 
laid on a gasha.
^. As in the north, the lands took a variety of names 
depending on the status of the grantee, the purpose they were 
meant to serve and the fiscal obligation laid upon them. Thus 
lands given to the State officials in lieu of their salary were 
known as madMrya and as such the grant was a temporary one; church 
institutions and the leading clergymen took land in the form of
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officials who came to administer the areas*13; ecclesiastical 
institutions who were given the task of expanding the Christian 
religion; the local chiefs who were incorporated into the new 
polity as the low level functionaries developing local govern­
ment system. These were invested with a new title of balabbat 
and fulfilled a role similar to that of the northern ceqa- 
shum**. Surplus gasha lands were either given gratis or sold for 
a ridiculously low price as an incentive to private developers, 
including central and provincial elites, loyal to the crown, and 
peasants moving from the north under demographic pressure**3.
Those areas which showed little or no resistance to 
Abyssinian expansion were left with their independent status, 
albeit surrounded by imperial agents who acted as spies. As a 
price for their administrative, financial and military autonomy, 
they paid a fixed tribute to upkeep the royal court, madbdt. 
There were six provinces, all of them fairly commercialized with 
five of them located in the west near the gold rich tributaries 
of the Abbay river. But over time, tributes became heavier, and 
with increasing centralization their autonomy was undermined to 
the extent that at the time of the Italian occupation, only the
samon or samon gult. For more detailed information on the variety 
of land nomenclatures see Joanna Mante1-Niecko, The role of land 
tenure in the system of Ethiopian imperial government in modern 
times. (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego 1980);
Cohen and Weintraub, op.cit., pp.36-47.
*3. Ras and Dajach took thousands of gabbars; Fitawurari 300 
and qahazmach 150; the soldiers according to their seniority, 10,
15 and 20. The state fixed the number and the balabbat allocated 
the land and the people.
**. John Markakis, Ethiopia. Anatomy of a traditional 
politv. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp.115-6; Cohen and
Weintraub, op.cit., pp.35-6,38; Donham and James, op.cit., p.39.
*3. Cohen and Weintraub, op.cit., pp.35-6.
-49-
CHAPTER II ETHIOPIAN LAND TENURE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
rulers of Naqamti, Bdni Shangul and Ausa remained more or less 
in their independent original relationship with the centre**3.
Central control remained equally tenuous in the 
lowland areas inhabited by hunters, pastoralists and shifting 
cultivators. In these areas, gMbbar system was never instituted 
partly because the population was much harder to control and 
partly because the land was not suitable for colonization by 
highland agriculturalists. Initial extraction consisted in 
periodical raids for both cattle and slaves by the nearby set­
tlers. But with the increasing assertion of the central govern­
ment and shortfall of the commodities, the raids gradually 
regularized into tax collection, particularly when local leaders 
were brought into the realm of central administration. With the 
establishment of balabbat a fixed rate was imposed on cattle**7.
DEVELOPMENTS UP TO 1935
At least theoretically, the situation of the 
peasantry in the north and south was identical. And in both 
areas land was more than a simple commodity exchangeable in a 
market economy: it had multiple attributes that reflected the
composition of social and political organizations. The relation 
between land and man bonded men together in political units. Ri­
ghts over land use and ownership rather than being absolute or 
exclusive, were often multiple and overlapping. Not all people 
held these lands rights. There were three distinct strata in
*3. Donham and James, op.cit., pp. 37-8,51-68; for other 
studies Cfr. Herbert S. Lewis, A Gal la monarchy: Jimma Abba
Gifar. Ethiopia. 1830-1932. (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press 1965); Peter P. Garretson, "Shaykh Hamdan Abu Shok(1898-
1938) and the Administration of Guba", in Joseph Tubiana, ed., 
Modern Ethiopia from the accession of Menelik II to the present. 
(Rotterdam: A.A.Balkema 1980); Maknun Gamaledin Ashami, "The
political economy of the Afar region of Ethiopia: A dynamic
periphery", (PhD: University of Cambridge, 1985).
*7. Donham and James, op.cit., pp. 42 ,148-71, 219-45 .
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society: the landed, landless and slaves. Slaves were widely
used for domestic purposes especially in the houses of the rich, 
but much less in agriculture; the landless were linked to land 
through a variety of share-cropping systems. Among the landed, 
the most important classes were gabbar and tekkldria both support­
ing the Ethiopian state in a way that involved mutual respon­
sibilities: provisioning and labour services on one hand,
administrative, judicial and military obligations on the other. 
The elaborate systems of land tenure and taxation with all their 
provincial variations represented the different means by which 
the state ultimately appropriated or rewarded services. But the 
backbone of the economy was gMbbar, as it was his labour that 
materially sustained the state apparatus^.
Despite the inferior social position, it is wrong 
to equate the gMbbar with slaves or serfs. He was not legally 
bound to the gult-holder as, for example, the slave was. The 
gSbbar owned his lands but, unlike the serfs, he could leave and 
set up homestead elsewhere. It was a fluid term and refers to 
no distinct social class. A study conducted at Balci in Bishof- 
tu indicated that the Emperor Haile Sellassie himself was one 
of the gHbbars of the church of Somsa Madh8n6-alSm at Nac Dengay 
where he held a land burdened with gMbbar associated services. 
As tribute was based upon land and not person, anybody could be 
a gabbar as long as satisfactory arrangements were made to 
provide the services^.
Considering the regime's decentralized structure and 
the absence of a money economy, and taking full account of the 
material and manpower resources at its disposal, the gabbar 
system efficiently financed local government and remitted 
residual revenue to the central treasury. The state was able to 
administer a vast country without resorting to loans from 
European powers or 'international finance’ at a time when tech­
Perham, op.cit., p.278.
Ibid.; Markakis (1974), pp.341-2; CD IAO 791, p.97.
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nologically more advanced African and Asian countries had been 
occupied or reduced to satellites of a foreign country under the 
pretext of avoiding bankruptcy. But it did so at the expense 
of the gabbar themseIves who gained little or no material benefit 
from the taxes they paid3®. But this need not be dramatized into 
describing the system as ruthlessly exploitative or barbaric.
Like any taxpayer, the gabbar owed dues to the central 
government or his representative, in kind and labour. The 
relationship between the gabbar and the gult-holder tended to be 
patrimonial - personal in nature and diffuse in content, varying 
according to the character and disposition of individual gult- 
holder. In a country where the central authority was remote, 
the politics often fluid and in situations where the gabbar 
happened to be in a weak position, this gave opportunity to an 
unscrupulous gult-holder for arbitrary extortion. But despite 
the wide scope of his authority, a gult-holder could not afford 
to consistently antagonize his gMbbar who, at least in theory, 
could always leave and set up homestead elsewhere or, if he was 
daring, appeal to central government31.
In the popular mind, the evils of gSbbar were largely 
associated with the landlessness and harsh treatment experienc­
ed by southern peasantry. But no governmental decree existed 
that made their situation different from that of the northern 
peasantry, nor were the rest guarantees that existed in the 
north eliminated in the south. The gabbar system functioned 
differently in the south because of a combination of cultural 
differences and the inroads of modernization. Northern peasant-
3®. ASMAI 54/21 (1914-28), Informazioni commerciali: Finanze 
Etiopiche, n.d; Harold G. Marcus, Haile Sellassie I: The
formative years (1892-19361. (Berkley: UC Press, 1987), p.41..
31. Perham, op.cit., p. 279; Hoben (1973), p.79; Donham and 
James, op.cit., pp.185-6.
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ry, though well aware of the inadequacies of the system52, prided 
itself as part and parcel of its organization. But not so for 
the recently conquered south where its imposition was seen as 
an unwarranted intrusion in land that had been freely enjoyed. 
The brutal force used in the process helped only to highlight 
its alien character. In the north gdbbar and gult-holder belonged 
to the same ethnic group, shared the same religion and were 
often united by kinship ties. In the south, the northern 
settlers interpreted their military superiority culturally and 
viewed their position in terms of a ’civilizing mission’. The 
northern peasantry, through its long exposure, had developed an 
appropriate defence mechanism to resist the insatiable exactions 
of the rapacious gult-holder. The southerners lacked such 
valuable experience; the language barrier only worsened this53.
The relatively rapid advance of protocapitalist 
agriculture in the south helped only to increasingly exacerbate 
the condition of the gdbbar. In the north, political turmoil, 
severe soil erosion and poor communication kept the region 
agriculturally static. Improved communications, and in par­
ticular the AA-Djibouti railway revolutionized the fertile 
southern countryside. The metamorphosis had made the south by 
the late 1920s into the Ethiopian government's "large colony 
of exploitation - meant in the most rigorous sense of the 
term"5*1. The developments witnessed the rise of coffee as the 
area’s prime agricultural resource, the flourishing of new
The following verse reveals the awareness of the 
peasantry of the exploitative nature of the system:
If land tax we must pay,
So must the monkey,
For is it not the same land,
That it scratches with its hand.
Quoted by Mesfin Wolde Mariam (1986), p.25; A. Hoben (1973), 
op.cit., p.81.
53. Donham and James, op.cit., p.8;
5**. E. Cerulli, Le popolazioni ed i capi dell'Etiopia sud- 
occidentale", in ASMAI 54/34-137, Zoli to MAE, Rm 8-1-1927.
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commercial towns competing with or in the place of the old 
military garrisons, and rapid transformation of land into a 
marketable commodity. As speculation on land intensified, 
undeveloped areas were put under cultivation. In Arsi, for 
example, the gult-holders sold their hudads as rest to both 
Amharas and Oromos who were squeezed out by commercial develop­
ments in AA and became the gabbar of the gult-holders. Identic­
al trends were in operation in Harar55.
These developments had a drastic effect on the 
southern gabbar in two ways. The settler increasingly saw him 
as a resource to be exploited for his own benefit and made 
constant and heavy demands on his labour^. With increasing 
monopolization of his labour by the gult-holder, the gabbar 
devoted less and less time to the care and cultivation of his 
own plots and the state lost desperately needed revenue. 
Ultimately, several were forced to sell their land and turned 
into share-croppers. In Arsi, as grazing land became scarce the 
collapse of the traditional pastoral economy had the effect of 
forcibly transforming the one time cattle herdsmen into tenant 
cultivators^.
The changing role of the settler at the periphery 
was matched with the growing assertion of authority at the 
centre. In the early 1930s, the process was complete. The 
progressive Tafari had made hollow Italy’s peripheral policy 
which, by bribing the provincial leaders with money and the 
masses with schools, hospitals and clinics while pretending to
M . Brotto, op.cit., pp.58-60, 95—7;101; Moreno, op.cit.,
pp.1504;1506-8.
Somehow the plight of the southern peasant may not be 
different from that of Ankobar, most eloquently talked by Asba 
Haylu. The article captures the human dimension by its moving and 
graphic description on the conditions of the gabbar. Berhanenna 
Salam, 21-7-1927, reproduced at length in English by Addis Hiwet, 
op.cit., pp.71-3.
Brotto, op.cit., pp.92-7.
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maintain friendly relation with the regime in AA, aimed to 
subvert AA’s efforts at centralization^. According to one 
Italian official, Emperor Haile Sellassie’s modernization policy 
was impressive and bound "to lead Ethiopia through a phase of 
rapid evolution to form a country different from the traditional 
Abyssinia to which we have up to now been accustomed"^.
Haile Sellassie was of the view that the gult system 
had outlived its usefulness and progressively eroded the gult- 
holders power and institutions on which the latter depended for 
its support. His agrarian reforms, set in motion while he was 
still regent, aimed to boost revenues for the central treasury. 
But to carry out his objectives, he had to contend with gult- 
holders’ greed for land and labour. His immediate victims became 
those economically-minded provincial lords whose contribution
. Politica periferica counted much on the rebellion of 
the two scions of old aristocratic families who were opposed to 
Tafari’s reforms: Empress Zawditu’s husband, Ras Gugsa Wole of
Bagemder, who belittled the western educated Young Ethiopians who 
run the government; Ras Haylu of Gojjam, an acutely business- 
minded and arrogant snob who publicly scorned them as "people 
from nothing who were only simple stablemen during Menilik’s 
time". But it was great disappointment. Gugsa’s revolt was the 
nadir of the policy but it was easily crushed. Ras Haylu’s 
rebellion was skilfully preempted; and the half million bullets 
rushed by the Italian adventurer Franchetti were too late to be 
of any help to him after his arrest. Contrary to their expect­
ation, there was no massive upheaval of Gojjamese who felt rather 
relieved by his arrest as they hated his penny-pinching ways. 
[Cfr. ASMAE 3/1-1, Raimondo Franchetti, Situazione Etiopica dopo 
1’incoronazione del Negus, AA dicembre 1930; 7/1-7, Scamacca to 
R. MAE, AA 2[i1 legible]-11-1932; Marcus, op.cit., pp.92-5;120; 
ASMAE 7/1-5, Spese politiche (1924-33) contains accounts of money 
spent on the Ethiopian notables and spies.
59. ASMAI 54/31-124, Lessona to ministro, Rm 27-7-1931. The 
Italians were not anyhow refrained by such reality. The call was 
rather to strengthen the policy. Hence the Eritrean Governor 
Astuto wrote: "If the policy of Tafari since 1917 was to
transform [Ethiopia] from a feudal to a modern state, the 
peripheral policy should aim to obstruct this policy by fomenting 
- with all precautions required to avoid our game being publicly 
exposed - the ego of these chiefs encouraging them to passive or 
active resistance" ASMAE 2/4, Astuto to ministro, As 29-7-1931.
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to the centre was not generous and who made gabbar life un­
bearable. Not surprisingly, he used the complaints of the gabhar 
as a pretext to eliminate the landlords^.
Towards the end of 1920s, taxation was rationalized 
by the introduction of receipts, making the provincial lords 
accountable for any loss of taxes. If a reasonable number of 
peasants complained about arbitrary treatment, the offending 
governor was called to AA. This was a prelude to much greater 
reforms initiated by Tafari, to the satisfaction of the peasan­
try, when he was still a young and ambitious governor of Harar^. 
More fundamental changes took place in 1930s, with the introduc­
tion of a standardized system of land measurement and survey by 
an independent body, tax incentives to develop the uncultivated 
areas and a curb on land speculation. The most important was the 
decree of September 1934 which, in its attempt to stamp out the 
abuses of the g'u/t-owners , encouraged tax payment in cash rather 
than in kind and labour, and drastically curtailed personal 
services. Owing to inadequate manpower and finance, the 
application of most of these measures proved slow and costly. 
Moreover, while they were welcomed in most of the south, in the 
traditional north they were invariably resisted^.
Attempts to educate the peasantry using modern 
methods of cultivation were not successful. In 1931, the 
Emperor’s proposal to exploit the country’s agriculture with 
the formation of joint Italo-Ethiopian venture did not material­
ize. The Emperor wanted to set up farms similar to his £rar
. The case of Dajach Balcha Abba Nafso, one of Menilik’s 
ablest commanders and the hero of Adwa, and that of Ras Haylu 
was a typical example [Cfr. Haile Sellassie I, Mv life and 
Ethiopia’s progress, 1892-1937. trans. & ed. Edward Ullendorff,
(London: OUP, 1976), p.151-2, 204-5; Marcus, op.cit., p.120.
Ibidem, pp. 38-41, 73.
In part of Harar they were most effectively applied. 
Mahtama Sellass^ Walda Masqal (1950), pp.128-30,138-41; idem
(1957), pp.296-7; Ciocca, op.cit., p.91-5; Brotto, op.cit., pp. 
55-6, 58-61.
-56-
CHAPTER II ETHIOPIAN LAND TENURE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
Farm, one of the several model farms established since the 
jZsCLftyjekc&dej of the twentieth century by the Ethiopian and 
foreign concessionaires^. Consisting of 1,000 ha, firar farm was 
established in 1925 and run by an Italian adventurer Pastorel- 
li who, by 1931, had developed about 100 ha6*.
When approached by the Ethiopian government the 
Italian authorities were put in a predicament. The scheme was 
acknowledged "as a useful instrument to penetrate the country 
economically and politically". But as the difficulties of 
finding Italian capital or willing settlers were insurmountable, 
the authorities clung to their strategy of peripheral politics65. 
As one official pointed out, for Italy’s policy of destabiliza­
tion, agricultural collaboration with the Emperor will not be 
a good investment, as are schools and clinics which,
apart from being an end in themselves, 
will be used one day when a definite 
settlement with Abyssinia comes (and 
which I believe is quite imminent) as 
bargaining chip for our specific legi­
timate interest66.
65. Pankhurst (1968), pp. 208-9.
6*. Dissatisfied with his employer and instigated by Fascist 
agents, Pastorelli contacted Mussolini urging his intervention 
and played some influence in the resurgence of idea of peasant 
settlement in Italy. He wrote embellished letters, describing 
Ethiopia's agricultural potential as enormous. In a letter to his 
cousin, Di Vittorio presented to Mussolini, he particularly 
pointed out that Ethiopia "is the country where Italy should 
concentrate its energies for its compelling needs of demographic 
expansion and that our Duce should devise the most appropriate 
means for our people and capital to find here an immediate and 
vast field of action" Pastorelli to Di Vittorio, Dirfe Daoua 30- 
11-1932, in ASMAE 8/4-1, Di Vittorio Angelo to Benito Mussolini: 
Brevi cenni illustrativi sull’opera colonizzatrice svolta da 
Pastorelli Arcangelo, Rm 24-7-1934.
65. ASMAE 2/2, Paterno’ to MAE, AA 4-4-1931; Ibidem, Grandi 
to RMC, Rm 14-4-1931; De Bono to MAE, Rm 23-4-1931.
66. Ibidem, Guariglia to RMC, Rm 24-4-1931.
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CHAPTER III
THE CONTOURS OF LAND POLICY
THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Italy’s land policy developed within the framework 
of the colonial administration - a cumbersome, under-manned, and 
under-financed machine with tangled lines of authority. Over­
lapping military and civilian jurisdiction and influence wielded 
by the government and Nationalist Fascist Party officials, who 
played a far greater role in Ethiopia than in Italy, left the 
administration in a parlous stated
The Italian administration was based on the theory 
that colonies were an extension of the Motherland to be 
populated by Italian settlers and exploited by Italian capital. 
The objective was to transform the colony into a region of Magna 
Italia. The chief architect of this policy in Ethiopia was the 
first Minister of Colonies, Lessona. The policy was charac­
terized by excessive centralization and the exclusion of foreign 
capital, and failed to enlist the co-operation of the subject 
population. These factors contributed to the failure of Italy’s 
ambitious programme of agricultural development.
In order to conquer Ethiopia, the total dismemberment 
of the existing administrative structure of the Empire was 
necessary. Everything was hurriedly reorganized ex-novo cutting 
across religious and ethnic divisions. The most outstanding 
feature was the total disappearance of Ethiopia as a geographi­
cal unit, the name surviving only in the king’s subsidiary title 
of Emperor of Ethiopia. The frontiers were dismantled and the 
Ethiopian Empire was merged with two former colonies - Eritrea 
and Somalia - to form an Italian East Africa (IEA) or Africa 
Orientale Italiana (AOI). This was divided into six semi- 
autonomous governorates which "behaved as if they were more or 
less five States unwillingly joined together by a capital mini­
l. F0371/22021/J1224/40/1, CG Bird to Lambert, AA 12-2-1938 
(hereafter Bird to Lambert, AA 12-2-1938); Del Boca, Gli italiani 
in Africa Orientale: La caduta del 1 *impero. vol. Ill, (Bari: Ed. 
Laterza, 1982), pp.137-58; D. Fossa, "L'intervento del Partito 
nel governo de11’impero", REAI. 20, 3 (marzo 1939):255-62; P. M. 
Masotti, Ricordi d ’Etiopia di un funzionario coloniale. (Milano: 
Pan Ed., 1981), p.A8.
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state"^. Of these, Ethiopia proper consisted of four territories 
- Shawa in the centre, Amara in the north, Gal la and Sidama (GS) 
in the west and Harar in the east with their capitals AA, 
Gondar, Jimma and HSrar respectively. The two governorates of 
Eritrea and Somalia were expanded by adding the present province 
of Tegray to the first and the Ogaden to the second. Each gover- 
norate was then divided into a dozen districts known as 
Commissariato and these in turn into a varying number of sub­
districts or Residenza. The districts and sub-districts never 
had a definite shape and their number and boundaries fluc­
tuated3 .
Each governorate was administered by a governor who 
resided in the respective capital and was subject, theoretically 
at least, to the Governor General (GG) in AA who bore the title 
of the Viceroy of the King of Italy and Emperor of Italian 
Africa. The Viceroy took his instructions from the Ministry of 
Colonies (MC), lately changed into Ministry of Italian Africa 
or Ministero dell'Africa Italiana (MAI)*. Each governor was 
assisted by an Executive Council, a Secretariat, a gamut of 
technical and administrative departments staffed by officers 
drawn from the MAI or loaned by other ministries in Rome. At the 
head of each district there was a commissioner (commissario) and 
at that of sub-district an officer or residente. Most of the 
commissioners and sub-district officers were ex-army officials. 
Many of them had no administrative skill and their colonial ex­
perience had been largely gained commanding ’native’ troops. 
Attempts to replace them with civilian staff was hampered by 
shortage of applicants, for whose recruitment the Ministry 
relied on newspaper advertisements. Within the Empire, these 
posts were treasured, for they held sway in administrative, 
judicial and political matters within their areas. The admini-
1. ATdR 24/108, Relazione viaggio AOI, Rm 1937, p.2.
3. F. Quaranta, Ethiopia; An empire in the making. (London: 
P. S. King & Son Ltd., 1939), pp.1-5.
*. Ibid., p.l. The Ministry itself was subject to constant 
reshuff1es.
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stration, however, was demanding covering a vast territory, 
further exacerbated by language barriers which often required 
the employment of three or four interpreters'*.
An inevitable corollary of Italy’s colonial policy 
was the exclusion of the subject population from all forms of 
power-sharing. This was no different from in other Italian 
colonies. In the Ethiopian case, there was a brief flirtation 
with ’indirect rule’ under the governorship of General Badoglio, 
using leading chiefs as "intermediary organs" and "giving some 
concessions to the old order"**. Badoglio’s approach rested on an 
ideology associated with elements of the old colonial school, 
dubbed indigenophiles. This view contradicted the Fascist style 
of government which judged any power-sharing with the feudal 
lords as unacceptable. Mussolini imposed direct rule from Rome, 
epitomized by Lessona in his motto "no power sharing with the 
Rases"^. This alienated many traditional leaders who had col­
laborated during the conquest with the hope of gaining wider 
territorial control and a share of the power lost under Emperor 
Haile Sellassie. Instead they found themselves stripped 
overnight of the little power and privilege they had. The 
salaries and titles given for their collaboration did not 
satisfy them®.
As the chief architect of the policy, Lessona made 
it clear that the aim of his ’native’ policy or pol itica
**. Abysmal performance by the colonial officers led to the 
formation of the Fascist Academy for AI (Accademia Fascista 
dell'AI) where university graduates selected for a colonial 
career were expected to attend a two year specialised course 
[Cfr. Ibid., p.4; Masotti, op.cit., pp.49-50,55-6,160].
**. R. Pankhurst, "Economic verdict on the Italian occupa­
tion of Ethiopia (1936-41)", EO, V, 4 (1971):72 (hereafter
"Economic verdict").
GRA 45/41-4, Lessona to GGAOI, Rm 5-8-1936, p.l 
(hereafter Lessona to GGAOI); Lessona, Memorie. (Rm: 1958),
p.296.
®. GRA 40/33-14, Regente Governo Redini to DSAPGG, As 14- 
6-1937; ibdim., Lessona to Graziani, Bengasi 14-3-1937; Alberto 
Sbacchi, Ethiopia under Mussolini. (London: Zed Books, 1985),
pp.129-40; Pankhurst, op.cit.:81.
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indigena was to subordinate the indigenous population’s 
interests to metropolitan politics. He did not see as neces­
sarily incompatible with humanitarian objectives that Italy 
claimed towards its Ethiopian subjects as a "civilizing 
nation"9. The policy culminated in racial laws that set out 
rigid rules of separate development^. Wherever Italy had 
effective control, particularly in urban and settlement areas, 
these laws were rigidly applied. The policy entailed massive 
forced removal of Ethiopians from their residences to new 
quarters. A form of apartheid was in the making, with the 
settlers and the Ethiopians living in geographically distinct 
quarters, each of them with their own social amenities and 
exclusive way of life11. They were forbidden to have any social 
contact with each other. In large urban centres Ethiopian 
ghettos developed which Europeans needed a permit to enter. 
Plans to restrict the education of Ethiopians to elementary 
level and exclude them from skill training were underway. Most 
of the pre-war educational establishments and health facilities 
were already devoted to exclusive use by the Italians. During 
the occupation the Ethiopians had unprecedented employment 
opportunities, but they were relegated to the most demeaning 
jobs and explicitly excluded from participation in any sector 
of the economy where they might compete with Italians12.
Lessona, op.cit., p.298. In an interview with the author 
on 24-5-1984, Lessona still claimed: "We went there to improve
the life of these poor people [quel la gente povera] but things 
did not go as planned. As you can see they are still suffering". 
[He was referring to the 1984 Ethiopian famine].
10. CD IAO misc. 1038, Alberto Pollera, Europei e indigeni 
nella valorizzazione e ne11’economia dell’impero, As 7-10-1938, 
pp.2-5.
11. Alfio Berretta, Con Amedeo D ’Aosta in API in pace e in 
guerra. (Milano: Casa ed. Ceschina, 1958), p.139.
12. F0371/23376/J574/41/1, CG Bird to Principal Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs (PSSFA), AA 2-1-1939. For a more 
detailed discussion see R. Pankhurst, "Fascist racial policies 
in Ethiopia 1922-1941, EO, XII, (1969):270-86; RSAI. (May 
1948):478; Universality Fascista, (novembre 1937):7 ; Davide Fossa, 
"Sane norme economiche e morali per i cittadini dell’impero", AC, 
26-1-1939.
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The ruthless imposition of these rules led to a 
protracted guerrilla war that sapped the settlers’ moral and 
material resources and led to constant reshuffling of the ad­
ministrative machine. The ’pacification’ programme demanded an 
extensive road network. The Italians, setting great store by the 
Imperial Roman dictum that roads are the basis of a military 
control and prosperity, within twenty four months of their 
conquest completed no less than 2,000 miles of fully metalled 
and tar-treated roads at an average cost of <£12,000 a mile and 
employing an Italian workforce which at the peak period stood 
as high as 60,000 men. As a result, provinces were brought 
closer to each other than ever before, greatly undermining the 
power of the unruly provincial elites. But the roads ate up a 
disproportionate amount of the budget and led the Empire into 
near bankruptcy. Financial stringency demanded the slowing down 
of work and the expensive European labour force was gradually 
replaced by the local Ethiopian labour. By May 1939 the former 
was reduced to 12,000, while the latter had reached 52,000^.
Nor were military objectives that justified the 
construction of these roads achieved. In the governorates of 
Harar and GS, organized armed resistance came to an end with the 
capture and subsequent execution of Ras Dasta in February 1937. 
But passive resistance continued in a variety of forms. In the 
traditional Abyssinian heartland, such as Amara and Shawa, 
Italian control was confined to areas close to highways and 
major towns. In the rest of the countryside, including other 
minor urban centres, the rebels had a firm foothold^.
This situation aggravated the difficulties caused by 
what was virtually a permanent war economy forced as a result 
of sanctions' and the immense cost of conquest and led to high
1J. [During this same time the African labour had reached 
52,000]. Cfr. Quaranta, op.cit., pp.74-93.
14. F0371/22021/J1321/40/1, Sir M. Lampson to PSSFA, Cairo
21-3-1938; ibidem, J1221/40/1, Mr Starling to Mr Campbell, London 
25-3-1938; Masotti, op.cit., pp.38,40,42. Additional information 
on resistance given in Bibliography: see Dams£ WSlda Amanu^l,
Garima Taf&rra, KMbbada TasSmma, R. Pankhurst (1970), Salome 
Gabre Egziabher.
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inflation, chronic problems in balance of payments and a 
reduction of commercial contacts with the outside world. The 
rigid measures of autarky increased taxation and created a 
serious shortage of imported goods. The beleaguered economy only 
benefitted the arms dealers who made fat profits, while business 
suffered severely from rigid trade restrictions16. Trade was 
worsened by soaring transport costs and expulsion of well- 
established foreign firms. An acute shortage of foreign CUC^cnci 
prevented efficient use of the Djibouti-AA railway, and the 
diversion of trade to roads only spiralled the costs16.
As in Eritrea, in Ethiopia absence of foreign com­
petition and monopolistic rights gave the new Italian businesses 
a protected market. But owing to their severe lack of real 
information of and contact with the country, most trade dried 
up or was reduced to a fraction of its former level. Trade was 
further disrupted by forced replacement of MTD with Italian 
currency and the requisition of agricultural produce from the 
Ethiopians below market price. Except in flourishing black 
market export of lira, the policy was a dismal failure1^.
DEBATE OVER STRATEGIES.
The series of pre-occupation expeditions and studies 
had equipped the colonial administration with considerable 
knowledge of Ethiopia’s agricultural environment and productive 
potential. In the highlands of Eritrea, the land tenure system 
and use was almost identical to that of Ethiopia. Yet sur­
prisingly, despite their long contact with the area, the Ital­
ians claimed that, to their great dismay, their knowledge of
15. F0371/22020/J657/40/1, CG Bird to Mr Lambert, AA 14-1- 
1938; Pankhurst (1971):76-7.
16. FO371/23380/J1776/296/1, CG Stonehewer Bird to Viscount 
Halifax, AA 1-4-1939.
R. Pankhurst, "A chapter in Ethiopia’s commercial 
history: Developments during the Fascist occupation 1936-41",
XIV, EO, (1971):47-67 (hereafter Pankhurst, "A chapter"); Idem 
( 1971):74-5; F0371/24635/J5/5/1, CG Gibbs to Viscount Halifax, 
AA 27-11-1939.
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Ethiopia at the time of the occupation was "fragmentary and 
unre1i a b l e .
Technical and agricultural experts followed in the 
footsteps of military conquest. Data were collected concerning 
climatic conditions, natural environment, ploughing methods, 
terracing and cultivation systems, seeds and implements, as well 
as market conditions, aided by photographic materials, for the 
Agricultural Department (Direzione dei Servizi Agrari) in the 
MC. Their reports urged caution against the prevailing en­
thusiasm for mass settlement^.
But those who captured the popular imagination were 
the hand-picked journalists, uniting the nation - north and 
south, Catholics and Protestants (Waldensians), liberals and 
republicans, socialists and nationalists - in the cause of 
co n q u e s t ^ .  The poet, Vittorio Emanuele Bravetta eulogized:
People of ours 
emigrate no more 
to suffer;
The colon’s labour feat 
will make Ethiopia flourish.
The nSgarit roars no more 
Hurrah, Emperor-King!
Fight whomever wills
the land usurp
that is already Roman^1.
18. AA. VV. , La costruzione dell’impero, AAI. Ill, I 
(Milano: Mondadori, 1940), p.947.
CD IAO AOI 1923, Promemoria per il Sign. Direttore 
Generale dell’AOI circa lo studio del problema fondiario ai fini 
della formazione di terreni per uso agricolo, Rm 1-7-1936. In a 
footnote to the document A. Maugini, after having read the 
agricultural technicians* report, urges the Minister of Colonies 
(Lessona) "to put a bit of cold water on the ardour of agricul­
tural colonization". A. Di Crollalanza, "La valorizzazione 
agricola dell’impero", REAI. 25, 4 (1937):491 (hereafter Di
Crollalanza, "La valorizzazione").
20. Del Boca (1982), III, pp.8-9; MCP 18bis/261, Servizio 
radiofonico speciale per 1*Impero, Rm 24-11-1938.
2*. Virgiglio Savona, Michele Straniero, Canti dell’Italia 
Fascista (Milano: Garzanti, 1979, pp.261-2; Del Boca, op.cit., 
pp.9-10.
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Once again Ethiopia was portrayed as the key solution to Italy’s 
long, agonizing and humiliating emigration problem, and as a 
fruitful field for Italian labour.
Such an optimistic view was shared and vigorously 
argued by the regime’s intellectuals who maintained that the 
agricultural possibilities of the Empire were almost inexhaust­
ible, contrasting it with the conditions of the other colonies
97now described as no more than "a collection of deserts" . Et­
hiopia was depicted as an El Dorado, an earthly paradise waiting 
to be exploited by Italian labour and technology, in order to 
make this wealth available to the civilized world .
This propaganda momentarily succeeded in making large 
scale settlement extremely popular in Italy, where unemployment 
and poor living conditions made the prospect of a better life 
very grim indeed. Those foreign newspapers, sceptical about 
those optimistic assertions that became part of Fascist 
orthodoxy, were discredited and labelled malicious propaganda; 
Italians, who failed to subscribe to the El Dorado myth, were 
regarded as unpatriotic. Once the war was over, economic, 
political and strategic factors made large-scale settlement seem 
even more plausible. Apart from providing the settlers with 
employment opportunities, the presence of a large Italian 
population in the Empire was thought to enable the colony to 
become self-sufficient economically and offer the Motherland a 
protected market2*1.
The urgency of settlement was further dictated by the 
geographical distance separating the Empire from the Motherland 
and the hostile colonial powers surrounding it. The settlers 
were thought to fulfil a function like that of the Siberian
11. L. Cipriani, Un assurdo etnico: L ’Impero etiopico
(Firenze: 1935), p.324; B. Pace, L ’Impero e la collaborazione
internazionale in Africa. (Rm: 1938), p.37.
23. Lessona, op.cit., pp.353-5; Cipriani, op.cit., p.323.
2**. R. Trevisani, "Originalita nelle direttive e nei metodi 
di colonizzazione fascista", REAI. XXVI, (1938):538; Carlo 
Giglio, La colonizzazione demografica dell’impero. (Rm: Ed. REAI, 
1939), p.12; L. Diel, Behold our new Empire - Mussolini. (London:
1939), pp.68-9.
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Cossacks in Tsarist Russia, both as a ready army to defend the
Empire and, in case of need, the motherland, as well as a
"centre of radiation of Fascist and Italian civilization in
Africa"^. The military factor remained an overriding argument
of the pro-sett 1ement lobby2**. At a later stage, D. Fossa, the
Fascist Party Inspector in IEA, described how:
If it is the plough which traces the 
furrow it will be the sword which must 
defend it. The workers are soldiers and 
the soldiers workers. Legionaries are 
those who conquered the Empire, legionar­
ies will be those who with their toil
97will render it fertile .
Peasant settlement was the most archaic and expen­
sive form of imperialism and yet the Fascist authors were at 
pains to contrast it with earlier types of colonization at­
tempted by other powers, particularly the British, and to
emphasize its uniqueness, based on the supposed fecundity of 
the Italian race. Their arguments, based on a few platitudes 
and generalizations, were remarkable for their pomposity rather 
than factual accuracy. Thus Nicolb Castellino claimed that the 
Italians had in their favour,
... all the conditions which other colon­
izing peoples lacked or lack: the numbers 
which were missing to the enterprise of 
the Portuguese, the youth which cannot 
fortify British imperialism; the dignity
of race so often forgotten by the Spanish
Giglio, op.cit., p.12; Trevisani, op.cit., p.583; J. 
Kulmer, "The return of Haile Sellassie", The Contemporary Review 
, CLIX, (1941):291.
26. Giglio, op.cit., 12; Terruzzi, "L’economia dell’ AI nel 
secondo Anno dell’ Impero, REAI. XXVI, (1938):366; G. De 
Michelis, "La valorizzazione agricola dell’impero", REAI. XXVI,
1 (1938):6.
2'. MCP 236, Guerriero, Capitale e lavoro nell’Impero
italiano in Etiopia; D. Fossa, Lavoro italiano nell’Impero. 
(Milano: 1938), pp.484-6; IFPLAOI, Tre anni di attivita. (AA:
1940), pp.164-6.
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conquistadors and now abandoned and
00
disowned by the French40.
Italian colonialists boasted that with their unique 
colonization techniques, they eschewed the plunder and ex­
ploitation that was so characteristic of the traditional 
"industrial capitalist colonization" whereby a relatively small 
number of Europeans mercilessly exploited an indigenous popula­
tion and squandered the colony’s resources. A respectable 
academic stated,
We cannot allow ourselves the luxury of 
’doing it the English way*, that is to 
live and get rich at the expense of 
others. We must take to our Empire our 
own peasants, our own workers, our own 
artisans, which up to now wander around 
and are dispersed throughout the world^.
And another commented:
Our imperialism differs profoundly from 
the English in an essential point: we
have the demographic possibilities which 
the English do not have^.
The Italians worried, however, that an influx of 
lower class Italians might damage their prestige and dominance, 
as Italians and as Europeans, over subject Ethiopians^. The 
"industrial-capitalist" colonization tried to avoid this by
. N. Castellino, "II problema del meticciato", Nuova 
Antologia. CCCXCIX, (1938):394; cfr. C. Poggio, Pol itica 
economica imperiale con particolare riguardo all* AOI. (Hr:
1939), pp.35-8; A. da Marsanich, "Per l’autonomia economica dell* 
Impero", REAI. XXVI, (1938):849-50; Marco Pomilio, "I problemi 
attuali dell’impero nel pensiero di Attilio Terruzzi", Autarchia 
A1imentare. (augusto 1938):7; also in L *A1imentazione Italiana. 
(13-31 agosto 1938).
29. G. Gennari, "La colonizzazione agraria di popolamento 
ne11’economia corporativa dell’ Impero: Osservazioni di un
legionaro", I Georgofi1i. VI, II(1936):511; idem. "L*agricoltura 
nell’ AOI", REAI. XXV, (1937):1916.
Giglio, op.cit., p.9.
31. The Italians were aware that in the pre-occupation 
period the Ethiopians had a very low opinion of the Italians. 
Cfr. R. Pankhurst, "Italian and "native" labour during the 
Italian Fascist occupation of Ethiopia, 1935-41", Ghana Social 
Service Journal. 2, 2 (1972):56.
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employing a relatively small number of Europeans in managerial 
positions while the indigenous population did the heavy work. 
The most universally held view was that in the case of Italian 
colonialism, the "prestige of the white race" would be main­
tained by educating the workers in an imperialist mentality and 
employing a vigorous policy of racial segregation. The point of 
reference were ’native’ reserves in Kenya and South Africa3^. 
Such a device, combined with the "prodigies of civilization 
that the white man introduces through the construction of 
roads, aqueducts, schools, buildings and all forms of gigantic 
works", would keep the prestige of the white man undiminished'*'*
Settlement was conceived in the most grandiose 
terms. Soon after his victorious entry into AA, Marshal Bado­
glio declared that the figure of one million settlers within a 
year "was not an exaggeration"3*. Another Fascist official 
talked glibly of 6,250,000 souls, consisting of 1,250,000 heads 
of families, who would be settled on 50,000 plots, each plot 
consisting of 1,000 ha. This was all to take place within the 
early part of the occupation33. Although by the end of 1939 it 
was clear these claims were unrealistic, Party officials and 
some journalists continued to perpetuate the illusion36.
Opinions were divided over the policy to be followed 
in transforming Ethiopia into a settlement colony. The MC, led 
by Lessona, argued for state-sponsored colonization. Lessona 
was a man with rich colonial experience. Once an enthusiastic
Giglio, op.cit., p.10; Gennari (1936):508; Lessona, 
op.cit., p.298.
33. Gennari (1937): 1916; C. Poggiali, Albori dell’impero: 
L ’Etiopia come 6 e come sar£. (Milano: 1938), pp.517-20.
3*. GP, 30-6-1936; Del Boca (1982), p.199.
33. CD IAO AOI 1778, C. Poggio, Rilievi e proposte per la 
pronta colonizzazione dell’impero", pp.13-4. Later he had reduced 
this figure to 1,562,500 agricultural settlers. See C. Poggio, 
"Colonizzazione capitalistica e demografica nell’ AOI", II- 
lustrazione Coloniale. dicembre 1939.
36. Dottrina Fascista. (January 1939) :97.
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student of colonial problems, before he became Minister he 
served as Under-Secretary to the Colonies (1929-1936). During 
this period he was credited with spearheading a campaign that 
accelerated colonization under state direction at the expense 
of individual enterprise. His policy in Ethiopia owed much to 
his Libyan experience. Yet his main objective was to make of 
the IEAn Empire a model colony where the shortcomings of Libyan 
colonization could be eliminated and experiments pursued on a 
wider scale.
Lessona envisaged four distinctive forms of coloni­
zation corresponding to four categories of lands.
1. National demographic colonization implemented by 
state-run colonization agencies. The peasants would settle in 
legions of militia and function as military garrisons. After a 
given period, the land under cultivation would become the 
property of the peasant.
2. Small settlements where small and medium-sized 
estates would be worked by Italian farmers who had modest 
initial capital and know-how.
3. Industrial colonization where estates, impractical 
for demographic settlement, would be given to competent Fascist 
confederations which would work under the supervision of the 
MC and local government.
4. ’Native* settlements would include estates under 
Ethiopian ownership. In view of both improving and increasing 
local production and elevating the life style so Italian goods 
would be purchased, the Ethiopians would cultivate these lands 
with the government providing them with technical expertise, 
including high-yield seeds and advanced agricultural tools3^.
Lessona stressed demographic colonization, pointing 
out its importance and uniqueness. Demographic settlement had 
its precedents in American colonization, and aspects had also 
been practised by the French and the British in their coloni-
. Lessona to GGAOI, p.8; Lessona, op.cit., pp.303-4; R. 
Pankhurst, "A page of Ethiopian history: Italian settlement plans 
during the Fascist occupation of 1936-41", XIII, 2 EO, (1970):145 
(hereafter Pankhurst, "Italian settlement").
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es38. But Lessona rejected any comparison to the Italian scheme, 
including that of French in Algeria which was traditionally 
seen by many Italians as a model38. Indeed, Lessona*s programme 
had certain distinctive aspects: settlements were regional in 
character, whereby people of the same province in Italy popu­
lated an area which reproduced the atmosphere of the region 
from which they sprang. According to Lessona, this was devised 
with two functions in mind: it would rouse the ego of the
provinces to compete with each other to provide initial capital 
expenses for agricultural development; secondly, it was hoped 
that it would facilitate group solidarity'8.
However, there was nothing new in Lessona*s advocacy 
for state intervention. Many before him had favoured state-run 
colonization agencies as the best means of providing the 
financial and technical resources that private entrepreneurs 
usually lacked. However, sceptics pointed out that forty years 
previously Franchetti had pursued unsuccessfully an identical 
scheme in Eritrea'3. Lessona retorted that Franchetti* s plans 
had only one flaw: they had not been carried out energetical­
ly'3. Like Franchetti, Lessona was unsympathetic to private 
initiative, knowing from his Libyan experience that it would 
lead to land speculation and the formation of latifundia. But 
Lessona was inconsistent. Even though he continued to maintain 
that the best lands be kept for demographic settlement, it was
J. A typical example was the Tennessee Valley Authority, 
the French settlement scheme in Algeria. Cfr. A.F. Robertson, 
People and the state: An anthropology of planned development. 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1984), pp.14-5;107-8; 130-1.
38. According to Lessona the Fascist corporative state was 
not comparable to others. A. Lessona, "L*agricoltura 
tripolitana", in Scritti E Discorsi Coloniali. (Milano: 1935), 
p.130.
'8. Lessona, op.cit., pp.283-4.
'3. See Chap. I, pp. 11-20.
'3. A. Lessona, "Lo stato Fascista e l*economia coloniale", 
in Scritti E Discorsi Coloniali. op.cit., pp.49-50.
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capitalist initiative that gained paramountcy, nor were the
41settlements he encouraged exclusively regional .
State-supervised colonization was the brain-child of 
Armando Maugini, a man with much agricultural experience and 
knowledge. As an agricultural officer in Cyrenaica during World 
War I and as organizer of the colony*s technical services, he 
had gained a rare insight into the problems of settlement 
schemes, later becoming the major architect of Libyan coloniza­
tion. He was a convert to the cause of state-funded and direct­
ed projects of land settlement, which he had opposed until 1932 
when he was called upon to develop plans for the mass coloni­
zation of Cyrenaica. Initially, he offered qualified support; 
but when he realized that it was a politically motivated 
enterprise, he upheld it wholeheartedly, arguing strongly for 
the creation of a special corporation that would promote demo­
graphic goals rather than a reliance on private colonization". 
During the Ethiopian conquest, Maugini became chief technical 
adviser to the MC as well as Director of the latituto Agronomi— 
co Coloniale (Institute of Colonial Agriculture) in Florence'5, 
a leading institution for the study of tropical agriculture and 
the training centre for agricultural technicians.
Maugini believed that the Italian presence would 
make itself felt in Ethiopia within a very brief period provid­
ed that there was good will and appropriate technology. But he 
maintained that colonization had to be centrally planned and 
preceded by proper study. In his view demographic goals could 
be economically implemented by para-statal organizations with 
financial and technical resources - thus not exacting undue 
sacrifice from central government".
'3. CD IAO AOI 1936, Ministro to GG, Rm 2-6-1937; IA to GG, 
Rm 23-6-1937.
". Segr6, op.cit., p.96.'
'5. Presently is known as Istituto Agronomi co per 1 ’Oltre— 
mare - Overseas Agricultural Institute.
". ATdR 24/100, Relazione Prof. Maugini sul viaggio 
compiuto al seguito di S.E. Tassinari, gennaio-febbraio 1937,
p. 16.
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Maugini distinguished between areas where work 
should start immediately and those requiring long-term develop­
ment. But in this he was neither clear nor consistent. On the 
one hand, he argued that the programmes be started immediately, 
although with a limited range and clear objectives. On the 
other, he called for common sense and caution. He stressed that 
demographic colonization, even in its most economically ideal 
conditions, was a very costly affair, requiring solid finan­
cial, administrative and technical organization'7. He pinpointed 
the existence of large estates with excellent conditions for 
demographic colonization in many of the areas he visited; yet 
he claimed that, despite their healthy climate and enormous 
agricultural potential, their location did not qualify them as 
areas of immediate activity. Ethiopian competition, absence of 
adequate infrastructure and poor markets made other areas 
unattractive. Maugini believed that, unless there was a guaran­
tee of prosperity to offset the sacrifices of colonization, it 
would not be easy to persuade any prospective peasant settlers 
to move to Ethiopia'8.
In dealing with Ethiopian peasant farming, Maugini 
maintained that this needed progressive improvement. According 
to him, improved life standard of the Ethiopian masses would 
increase their purchasing power of Italian manufactured goods, 
whilst increased cereal, particularly wheat, production would 
contribute to the Empire's agricultural self-sufficiency. In 
his view, the improvement could be carried out in two stages; 
the first would involve the expansion of existing agricultural 
produce, using intensive methods and the construction of silos 
for storage; the second would be to introduce cash crop agri­
culture or the expansion of existing crops, so that the colony 
could supply the raw materials needed by the motherland and 
earn itself foreign currency. He urged the government to use
'7. Ibid. , p . 15.
'8. Ibid. , p . 14.
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intensive propaganda and create the necessary incentives, 
especially by purchasing the produce".
Like Lessona, Maugini was unsympathetic to private 
agricultural enterprise58. He stressed, with the exception of a 
few experimental cases, that this be channelled into areas 
economically ready for capital investment (close to urban 
centres), as any attempt to direct it into remote zones, no 
matter how great their economic potential, would encounter 
insurmountable difficulties53.
Although not as loud as those of advocates for 
state-sponsored mass settlements, the dissenting voices were 
considerably strong and were primarily expressed by Tassinari, 
the Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Agriculture. Tassinari 
had travelled extensively in Ethiopia in the company of Maugini 
and two other officials. As declared in his report, Tassinari 
went under instructions from the Duce to "take note of all and 
everything: agriculture, economy, society, military and ethno­
logy; report all of this to me in absolute truth53".
Like Maugini, Tassinari stressed that colonization 
should be a gradual process, but unlike him, advanced the idea 
that the major task of implementation should be left to "priva­
te initiative" which "must be guided, directed and controlled 
by the state in line with the Fascist norms of life", while 
the government should provide the basic economic infrastruc­
ture. His view was that capitalistic colonization could create 
a number of conditions that would facilitate progressive 
Italian settlement, including a demographic one53.
". Ibid., pp.18-9.
58. Ibid., pp.17-8; "L*agricoltura nelle colonie. Esperi-
enze e nuovi doveri", AC, XXX, 11 (1936):417.
51. ATdR 24/100, pp. 16-7.
53. CD I AO AOI 1990, G. Tassinari, "Relazione al Duce del
viaggio compiuto attraverso i territori del 1 *Impero", Rm 23-3-
1937, p.l.
53. Ibid., pp.7-9,15..
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The main reason determining Tassinari*s position was
economic. He estimated that the initial cost of settling a
familyi even in ideal economic conditions, would be enormous:
one thousand families would need an expenditure of £.50,000,000,
ten thousand families £.500,000,000 and so on. In addition to
this, demographic settlement would demand roads, hospitals,
schools and churches, so that the life-style of the settler
would not become ’debased* to the level of that of the Ethio- 
54pians .
Tassinari*s decision to publish a section of his
data in the country’s leading newspaper, Corriere della Sera,
contradicting the MC& view and claiming that it corresponded to
Mussolini's thought, worsened the already delicate relationship
between himself and Lessona^. Yet Tassinari*s conclusion was
sustained by a Commission of members of the Fascist Farmers
Association, Confederazione Fascista degli Agricoltori (CFA),
despatched by Lessona himself with the
task of reporting in detail the impres­
sions and considerations gained during 
their journey of an economic, financial, 
technical and social character that could 
have a bearing on agricultural coloniza­
tion as well as native farming56.
After having thoroughly discussed the crucial problem of 
availability of colonizable land and the enormous economic cost 
necessary for demographic colonization, the Commission con­
cluded that the
tides of colonization and the activities 
of the nationals should be limited to 
those forms and entities that can develop 
by themselves, let us say, by virtue of 
their own energy, by their own direct 
initiative, whether encouraged or given 
all possible assistance or not, but
56. Ibid. , pp. 7-8.
55. Lessona (1958), p.285.
56. ATdR 24/103, "Relazione di una missione di agricoltori 
in AOI, 5 marzo-9 aprile 1937", (Firenze: IACI, 1937), p.5.
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stimulated bv a healthy concept of 
economic profit.
They were even more emphatic in suggesting that the 
best means to achieve the goal of agrarian development of the 
Empire more rapidly and economically, was by employing the 
local population. Dealing with demographic colonization, they 
stressed the fact that the country was not suited to a massive 
influx of colonists, as the basic economic infrastructures 
favourable to the purpose were virtually non-existent. They 
warned the colonial administration to move cautiously. Accord­
ing to the report, in this manner valuable experience could be 
gained and mistakes corrected as they arose5®.
With these and other similar recommendations the MC 
was uncertain how to proceed. Its early enthusiasm for demogra­
phic colonization soon dampened, and attempts were made to 
defer its execution. When this was voiced, the advocates of an 
immediate transfer of masses of peasants felt outraged and 
accused the authorities of betrayal. Giuseppe Pironti di Campa- 
gna’s statement was not an isolated feeling:
Any policy that tends to limit and hinder 
the emigration of nationals towards the 
colonial territories frustrates the basic 
reasons of the foundation (of the Em­
pire) , betrays its defence, and is ag­
ainst ’the interests of the Empire*.
Indeed, the very fact of delaying the 
flow of migration waves towards the 
colonies, after so many sacrifices have 
been made, is an absurdity contrary to 
our national cause and aversion to our 
interest that was established with the 
proclamation of the Empire59.
Towards the beginning of 1937, the controversy 
between the two factions became so acute that Lessona, blamed 
by the supporters of both capitalist as well as demographic
57. Ibid. , p. 45 .
5®. Ibid..
59. Giuseppe Pironti di Campagna, La difesa dell’impero. 
(Rm: Libreria Editrice Cattolica Internazionale, 1937), p.66.
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colonization for trying to thwart every initiative, was forced
to defend his position in parliament:
I would like to assert solemnly in front 
of you, honourable comrades, that the 
demographic colonization of IEA is and 
remains one of the fundamental objectives 
of the Fascist government. Certain gro­
ups have given themselves to doubt, stat­
ing that the implementation of the pro­
gramme is neither easy nor practical. The 
government does not hide the difficulties 
as it did not fail to curb the enthusias­
ms. This is a part that, though unpleas­
ant, we have assumed willingly knowing 
that problems of such magnitude do not 
admit magical solutions but it is essen­
tial that they should be seriously stud­
ied and worked out. If, on the one hand,
I feel compelled to curb, after all the 
justified impatience of many comrades and 
important entrepreneurial classes, on the 
other hand, I have also to declare firmly 
that, should we abandon the decision of 
settling a large mass of Italian workers, 
we will frustrate one of the central 
pillars of the Ethiopian enterprise, so 
solemnly and repeatedly proclaimed by the 
Duce in his honourable speeches to the 
Italian people6®.
Attempting to reconcile the political goals of 
colonization with the realities of the Ethiopian environment 
and Italy's financial resources, towards the end of March 1937 
Lessona enlisted the cooperation of the Agricultural Council. 
This was one of the supreme bodies created by Lessona himself 
to coordinate economic activities in the colonies with those of 
metropolitan Italy. Its role can be described as the Minister's 
own 'mini-cabinet *6*.
The Council, known as Consulta di Agricolturat in­
cluded men with considerable experience in colonial agricul­
ture, almost all of them advocates of colonial expansion. Their 
conclusions would hold considerable weight with the policy 
makers. A Special Commission was set up to study Lessona*s
®®. A. Lessona, AI nel I® anno dell'Impero, (Rm: Edizioni 
REAI 1937), p.11.
Lessona (1958), p.286.
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programme in detail, in which most of the interests already 
operating or intending to operate in Ethiopia were represented. 
The two major Fascist farming associations, Confederazione 
Fascista dei Lavoratori del 1'Agricoltura [CFLA] and CFAt were 
represented by Dr Dal lari and Ing. Romadoro. There was Mazzoc- 
chi-Alemanni Nallo, Inspector of the ONC; Conte Livio Gaetani, 
National Secretary of the Sindacato Nazionale Fascista Tecnici 
Agricoli (Agricultural Technicians National Union), an or­
ganization involved in establishing the Empire's agricultural 
services; Rienzi, Chief Secretary of Consiglio Tecnico-Cor- 
porativo of the MC. Maugini was the Commission's chairman and 
Dr Pirro its secretary65.
The Commission rejected the views held by advocates 
of immediate mass peasant transfer into Africa as simplistic. 
A strategy of gradual colonization was also dismissed as 
cowardly. But the Commission failed to give clear guidelines on 
how to proceed and its conflicting views are recorded in the 
minutes of meetings held between April-July 1937. The outcome 
of these deliberations was an endorsement of Lessona*s ideas, 
which continued to mould Italian colonial land policy even 
after he was demoted from his ministerial position65.
Despite differences amongst the members in par­
ticular policies to be adopted, especially relating to the 
degree of State intervention, the Commission reached consensus 
on the main objective of Italian agricultural activity. It 
summed up the objective in three points:-
65. CD IAO AOI 1775, Processo verbale della Commissione di 
Competenza Per L’Agricoltura. Seduta, 7-4-1937, Rm 12-4-1937, p.l 
(hereafter cited as CD IAO 1775, Seduta). Most of the material 
on the background of the personalities was provided by Prof. Gian 
Carlo Stella under the title "Qualche nota su organizzazioni 
agricole Fasciste", Ravenna 3-8-1985.
65. CD IAO AOI 1776, Relazione della Consulta per 1'Agricol­
tura a Ministro per Africa Orientale sui problemi relativi 
al1 *avvaloramento agrario dell'Impero, Rm 23-9-1938, pp.3-4 
(hereafter CD IAO AOI 1776, Relazione). The report is published 
under "L’avvaloramento agrario del1'Impero", in REAI, (ottobre 
1937), pp.1561-1575 (hereafter Consulta, "L*avvaloramento").
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0
a. To seek urgently and in the most complete manner 
self-sufficiency in food-stuffs, whereby the Empire would
become independent from external supply.
b. To create centres of settlement and employment 
opportunities for Italian rural populations.
c. To secure low cost raw materials for the Italian 
economy and, in the long run, create a new economy in the 
Empire, bent towards capturing neighbouring foreign markets^.
Yet the question remained as to how these goals 
would be achieved. In this regard, the Commission only repeated 
the well-worn options of demographic colonization, capitalistic 
colonization and ‘native* cultivations. A number of inter­
mediary forms were excluded, and the mutual relationship and 
influence between these forms were not considered. The Commis­
sion itself made these limitations abundantly clear^.
The Commission regarded the transplantation of 
Italian peasants and their way of life as the best means of 
guaranteeing Italian sovereignty, civilizing the indigenous 
population and developing the colonial economy. It was of the 
conviction that, if earlier mistakes were corrected, the scheme 
had a good chance of success. The Commission urged the govern­
ment to create a few, trust-worthy and efficient para-statal 
organizations, enti di colonizzazione (colonization agencies), 
whose chief purpose would be to transform into small indepen­
dent landowners the landless and unemployed families who 
migrated from Italy. The agencies were envisaged as effective 
institutional tools, useful in eradicating many of the problems 
encountered by earlier planned settlements and offset the 
financial burden that weighed heavily on government. According 
to the plan, the enti di colonizzazione, directed and con­
trolled by the state, were to provide the settlers with techni-
0 . CD IAO AOI 1776, Relazione, p.l; Consulta,
"L *avvaloramento":1561.
CD IAO 1775, Relazione, p.2; Consulta, "L’avvaloramen- 
to":1561-2.
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cal and financial assistance66.
Another central theme in the Commission's recom­
mendations was that, unlike in Libya where environmental and 
other exigencies demanded a special approach, in IEA the idea 
of profit must be the guiding principle. It stressed the 
important role that private commercial farming had to play, 
particularly in the production of raw materials. The Commission 
urged the government to give this form of business interest 
maximum freedom of action and not to saddle the prospective 
concessionaires with obligations to settle or employ immigrant 
families as had been the case in Libya67.
While the Commission carefully considered settler 
farming, only vague and fleeting interest was paid to indigeno­
us agriculture. Of eleven meetings held, four were dedicated to 
demographic and capitalistic colonization, one for the examina­
tion of the relationship between these two, and only one dealt 
with 'native farming*. The Commission maintained that indigeno­
us farming should be subordinate to the interest of settler 
agriculture and opposed its modernization, particularly where 
it could compete with settler agriculture or where there was 
need of cheap labour66.
The Commission based its investigations on the 
premise that agricultural transformation was an outcome of 
partnership between the state and enterprising individuals or 
agencies. Limited state intervention was justified on the 
grounds of the political and social goals of colonization. Thus 
it proposed as incumbent upon the government to be responsible 
for roads, law and order, economic and civic organizations, 
market discipline, long-term credits, the selection of set­
tlers, the allocation of land and African labour. The Commis­
sion stressed that colonization would remain purely academic 
unless the government took immediate action to create vast
66. Consulta, "L*avvaloramento" : 1563-7.
67. Ibidem: 1568-71.
66. Ibidem: 1575; CD IAO 1775, Seduta, 15-7-1937; Relazione, 
pp.2,42.
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crown or domainial® lands and carry out a land survey of the 
country76.
LIMITS AND NATURE OF LAND POLICY
In his report to the MC on his fact-finding mission
immediately after the conquest into the main areas controlled
by the Italian army, Maugini confirmed the great agricultural
potential of the Empire:
The optimistic impressions of my first 
journey to the new territory are rein­
forced more than ever. At last, we have 
colonies that will guarantee positive 
results in the economic sector as well71.
However, he considered lack of sufficient vacant land as the 
single major handicap for Italy’s ambitious programme of 
colonization. Maugini*s solution to the land problem was in— 
demaniamento - transforming into domainial lands the estates 
belonging to the ex-Emperor or rebels, or those confiscated 
from the Ethiopians, and the church76. This was in line with the 
general practice followed by the Italians in other colonies. 
But Maugini vacillated, for in his view any attempt to es­
tablish domainial lands was fraught with serious difficulties:
Domainial lands, in order to be dispos­
able for colonization, should be freed 
from their life — long share-croppers, 
which raises a delicate problem that is 
not only economic, but above all politi­
cal and social. Thus domainial lands or 
land that has been confiscated is not 
necessarily to be equated with land dis­
posable for colonization76.
67. The thesis uses "domainial land", "crown land", "state
land" or "public domain" interchangeably to indicate land 
belonging to the state.
76. CD IAO AOI 1776, Relazione, pp.4,6; Consulta,
"L *avvaloramento":1562-3.
71. ATdR 24/100, p.2.
76. Ibid. , p. 12 .
76. Ibid. .
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Maugini was alluding to the expropriation in Eritrea 
by Barattieri, the main factor behind Dajach Bahta Hagos's 1893 
uprising that had brought to an abrupt halt Italy's early 
colonization attempts. Maugini alerted Lessona to base his land 
policies on sound knowledge of indigenous agrarian activities 
and customs7'.
Indeed, the creation of domainial lands proved long 
and arduous. The task was given to Caroselli, an expert in 
colonial issues and Governor of Somalia (1938-41). He was to 
explore the best method "that will rapidly and with the Fascist 
spirit, but in consonance with the current political situation, 
allow the creation of domainial land"75.
To give the study an authoritative voice, Caroselli 
worked out a plan for a Five Man Commission established by RD 
and working directly under the MAI. The Commission included 
eminent personalities with wide colonial experience such as 
Massimo Colucci, Vallilio Erennio, Giangastone Bolla and 
Arnando Bertola. All of them were well-established jurists. 
Colucci and Erennio were Supreme Court magistrates. Bolla and 
Bertola were university professors. Colucci, who became the 
President of the Commission, worked out a meticulous programme, 
involving at least six months field-work in various parts of 
the colony, to collect the necessary economic and legal data on 
land institutions as well as the extent of Ethiopian owner­
ship76. The RD instructed the Commission to study land ownership 
and devise strategies necessary for the organization and 
operation of agriculture related services77.
Before it even began, the programme was threatened 
by one crisis after the other. The Ministry of Justice was not
7'. Ibid. , p.13.
75. ASMAI Africa VI-11, Missione studi API. Ministro to 
Colucci, Rm, n.d.
76. Ibidem, Massimo Colucci to De Rubeis, Schema di studi 
sul regime fondiario in AOI, Firenze 28-9-1937.
77. RD 3-6-1938, no. 965, Istituzione di una commissione per 
studi fondiari nell'AOI, GU, 16-7-1938, no. 160; "Land tenure 
in AI", The Times. 19-7-1938.
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prepared to release its officials. For the Ministry of Finance, 
the plan was too ambitious and costly, and ought to be stopped. 
The behaviour of these ministries exacerbated already tense 
relations with MAI whose officials were stunned by "the incom­
prehension and obstructionism of all sorts" coming from "the 
ignorant and short-sighted bureaucrats"76.
As some members of the Commission were reluctant to 
be posted as permanent employees in the colony, the MAI felt 
that it was left with no alternative but to fight. With the 
decree of 3 June 1938, it looked as though the programme was 
rescued from oblivion and heading for success. Yet the expecta­
tions of many were irreparably frustrated by its lugubrious 
proceedings. Although to maintain a fagade of accomplishment, 
the Commission published its findings in 1940, the truth was 
the mission was a total disaster. Owing to another turbulent 
year, the Commission was able to go to the colony only in early 
August 1939. Each member of the Commission was assigned a 
particular field of research. Within a week of its arrival, the 
Commission was shaken by the abrupt departure of Bolla whose 
task was "The Comparative Study Of Systems Of Agricultural 
Concessions In IEA". Bolla claimed that the state of emergency 
declared by Italy on 15 August had made the position of the 
Commission untenable. But for Colucci, who dismissed Bolla's 
behaviour as "cowardly and selfish" and his work as a useless 
medley of "legalistic data" lacking originality, such a con­
clusion was reckless. The clash of personalities between the 
two men served only to frustrate the work79.
Further set-backs arose, provoked by the unstable 
military situation which severely limited the activity of the 
Commission, the difficulty in finding interpreters and the 
local authorities' lack of co-operation. The Commission was
76. ASMAI Africa VI-11, De Rubeis to Colucci, Rm 30-9-1938.
79. ASMAI, Colucci to Bolla, AA Ottobre 1939; Colucci to
DGCLMAI, Hr 15-11-1939; Massimo Colucci to GGAA, DSC (n.d.).
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forced to cut short its programme and return home after a
Of)
troubled four month stay .
As an attempt to provide a coherent land policy for 
the colonial administration, the Commission’s findings were 
open to many criticisms. The survey of Ethiopian land tenure 
was based on inconclusive data from extremely restricted areas 
under Italian control. Ideally, study of land tenure demands a 
long and painstakingly careful examination of legal institu­
tions, familiarity with the languages and cultures of each 
region, the presence of a sizeable personnel knowledgeable on 
the area, and substantial financial resources. The Commission 
had very few of these requirements.
Even though the restoration of the Abyssinian 
monarchy made them useless, the findings were illuminating. The 
Commission, rather than launching a new policy, codified 
existing practices, providing the state with a legal framework 
to pursue its policy of land alienation from the Ethiopians®1.
Since the occupation, such a policy was based on 
political expediency. Military tactics were combined with 
economic pressure, and the lands of rebel and exiled leaders 
were confiscated along with those of the royal family. These 
same measures had formed the pillar of Italian agricultural 
policy in Libya, Eritrea and Somalia, where they were conceived 
as a means for asserting Italy’s sovereignty as successor to 
the vanquished State®6. It was thought that there was no other 
more conspicuous and efficient way of manifesting such sovere—
BU. Ibidem, II 1 ibro fondiario nel 1 * ordinamento della 
properieta* mobiliare dell’API, p.l; MAE, Avva1oramento. p.351; 
"La valorizzazione Agraria e la colonizzazione", in AAI. II, III 
(Rm: Casa Ed. A. Mondadori, 1939), pp.197-8 (hereafter cited as 
MAE, La valorizzazione) ; Sbacchi (1975), p.406. Almost identical 
problem was faced by the local officials who attempted to 
complete the work started by the Commission. Cfr. ASMAI, loco 
cit., Brotto to Colucci, Gm 18-2-1940; Dalle 26-3-1940.
61. Ibidem, Colucci, schema, pp.1-2,5; MAE, La valoriz­
zazione , p .197.
®6. Cfr. For Eritrea see above p.; Segr£, op.cit., pp.49- 
54; Macksmith, op.cit., pp.38-9; Hess, op.cit., pp.112.
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ignty than punishing those implicated in challenging Italy’s 
authority either with armed resistance or by means of propagan­
da abroad.
As a general rule, this category of land was added 
to the public domain. But a somewhat different interpretation 
was, at least initially, given to sequestrated lands. Part of 
these lands belonged people under arrest or executed,
to active rebels or exiles against whom no measures of confi­
scation were declared, or to people assumed to be absent, i.e. 
away from their normal abode and whose whereabouts could not be 
traced63. The official view was that this group of land was not 
part of the public domain and the state, who administered them, 
was considered only a care-taker. The revenue from them was set 
aside, subtracting only what was needed for the upkeep of 
dependants and administrative costs6'. But such a practice was 
rather an exception, and sequestration almost always led to 
confiscation, or compensation in kind or cash, or both, and 
involved no restitution of the original land.
Eager to amass land for colonization, the government 
also claimed as domainial any land which could be made so 
without political and social complications. This included land 
on which tax was owed, where Ethiopians were least able to 
prove their right, uncultivated land, or land the government 
thought had not been cultivated efficiently or was in excess of 
the need of the local population65. The practices were sanc­
tioned, claiming they were more humanitarian than the brutal 
spoliation allegedly adopted by the British in their colonies 
or the French in Algeria66.
BJ. MAE, La valorizzazione, pp. 189-96; CD IA AOI 1847,
GHrDCL, Verbale della terza riunione del Comitato di Coloniz­
zazione, n.d., pp.3-4.
6'. MAE, La valorizzazione, p. 189; CD IAO, 1847, p.3;
Brotto, op.cit., pp.113-4.
65. ASMAI Africa VI-11, Mussolini to GGHrGmGnAsMg, Rm 19-
5-1936? [1938].
66. Le Colonie. 9-4-1940; MAE, La valorizzazione, pp.185- 
96; Macksmith, op.cit., p.109; Guglielmo Nasi, "L’opera del 1 * Ita­
lia in Etiopia", Italia E Africa. (Rm: n.d), p.18; Ernesto Massi,
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Confiscation began in November 1935 when the lands 
of some leading northern nobility were declared state domain. 
Soon lands belonging to the royal family, the exiled leaders as 
well as resistance fighters in HarSr, GS and ShSwa were also 
confiscated67. As the case of AchSfSr stands to show, sometimes 
the entire region was subjected to these measures whenever 
loyalty was questionable66. Few confiscations were preceded by 
a proper study of the status of the land69.
Even though we have no accurate information on their 
quantity and quality, it appears these were prime lands. In 
some areas, they amounted to thousands of hectares. In Lake 
Tana it was reportedly to be 1,000,000 ha. In AchSf&r and 
Wagerat, lands confiscated from the population for their 
alleged sympathy with the patriotic leader Babile totalled
180,000 ha96. In H&rMr, by the end of 1937, 80,000 ha and in a 
GS subdistrict, DarMsa alone, 49,655 ha were made domainial91.
op.cit.,:448.
67. DGG 30-7-1936, no. 135: Confisca beni del suddito
coloniale blattenghietA Herui. GU. II/8 [supl.], 26-4-1938; 15- 
10-1937, no. 738: Confisca beni dei sudditi indigeni, GU, 11/22, 
16-11-1937 where the land of 61 people was confiscated; 25-10- 
1937, no. 751: Confisca beni di sudditi indigeni, GU, 11/23, 1- 
12-1937 which affected the land of 47 people; no. 752: Confisca 
beni di sudditi indigeni, GU which implicated 70 people; Brotto, 
op.cit., pp.107-12.
66. DGov 9-2-1938, no. 72412 AA.FF: Indemaniamento del ter- 
ritorio dell'Uogherfc (zona di Dabatl. BUGA. III/2-3, febbraio- 
marzo 1938; DGov 17-3-1938, no. 53303 AA.FF: Indemaniamento
dell’Uogherfc (zona Amba Ghiorghisl. Ibidem; DGov 5-6-1937, no. 
46144: Indemaniamento del territorio dell'Acefer, Ibidem. III/4, 
16-4-1938; DGov 8-6-1937, no. 46204: Indemaniamento dei territori 
del GinfrancherA, Uorchemder, GianorA, Tseghede*, Gusauam. ibidem.
69. Brotto, op.cit., p.46
90. UAGr, "L'Acefer", AC, XXXII, 2 (1938) :56.
91. Sbacchi (1975), pp. 396-9; Brotto, op.cit., pp.112-3; 
GRA 44/36-1, A. Ricagno to GG DSAE, Assegnazione di terreni 
demaniali, AA 18-5-1937, where the list of confiscated lands in 
AA area are given with the name of their respective owners and 
the areas involved; IC., 15-9-1938; Guido Guidi, Nel territorio 
dei GS. Rilievi ed aspetti politici, sociali, economici. La 
Residenza dei Darasa, Rm 1938, quoted by Del Boca (1981), p.198.
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Although there was plenty of land, as Maugini also 
rightly pointed out, it was not vacant but densely populated 
and intensely cultivated. A bulk of it could not be profitably 
commercially farmed: although fertile, it consisted of frag­
mented small plots often intersected by other privately owned 
lands which the Italians pledged to honour. But protection of 
Ethiopian interests and development of settler agriculture 
remained difficult to reconcile, and the Italians had to make 
recourse to a number of devices. The following chapters will 
tackle the nature and limitations of these and their repercus­
sions on Italy’s overall strategy of Empire building.
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MILITARY SETTLEMENT: OPERA NAZIONALE COMBATTENTI [ONC]
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS
Military settlement was part of the demographic
colonization scheme. While later regional settlement schemes
focused on a particular province of Italy, military settlement
was nation-wide, aiming to settle landless peasants from all
over Italy. The experiment began while the military operation
of the Ethiopian campaign was still underway and before the
Agricultural Council came into existence. Much of the Council’s
opinion was influenced by this initiative. Contrary to later
claims, the scheme did not come about as part of a broad and
conscious vision, but was born of economic and strategic crisis.
Contrary to optimistic forecasts that the Empire
would become a granary for Italy, it swallowed most of the
metropolitan’s food exports. In the second half of 1936, Italy
supplied the Empire with 75,000 tons of wheat at a cost of
£.43,000,000. The prospects for 1937 were no better. Even though
in 1936 the Empire imported 45% of all Italian exports, the
situation was by no means beneficial to Italy as it did not
bring in foreign currency and meant the loss of foreign markets.
While the Empire absorbed the metropolitan's product, it gave
little in return1.
It was against this critical situation that on 21
October 1936 Lessona, while visiting AA, cabled to the president
of the ONC, Di Crollalanza, to establish two agricultural
stations, HolHtta and Bishoftu:
I have examined the question of agricul­
tural colonization of the governorship of 
AA territory. A number of government 
lands have been verified with a total 
area amounting to several thousands of 
hectares and others will be verified in 
the near future. In line with our conver­
sation, I count on the intervention of 
the ONC to translate into action the 
programme of the Capo. In the two centres
Sbacchi (1975), p.360.
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of HolStta and Bishoftu, I will give you 
vast plots of land to immediately start 
developmental work through locally mobil­
ized peasant militia in Africa. I request 
you to look to an immediate despatch of 
personnel with authorization to act at 
once to begin the work in agreement with 
the local government. Indeed, all this is 
a matter of extreme urgency and so I 
appeal to your immediate personal atten­
tion^.
The choice of ONC as the first colonization agen­
cy, i.e. the use of soldiers as settler farmers, was well-calcu­
lated. ONC was a veterans association which did reclamation and 
colonization work throughout Italy, including the much publici­
zed Pontine Marshes, south of Rome, and had a successful record 
in Libya. As an established agency - ONC had capital and 
technical expertise— »t v*oU.ld pose little financial burden on the 
government's already strained budget and could start the 
colonization programme immediately3.
The unsettled political situation made reliance on 
ONC for the initial phase of demographic colonization even more 
important, while also dictating use of the military. The 
decision by the political authorities to confine settlements 
within gendarmerie posts, or praesidia, established by the 
military authorities indicates the gravity of the situation*. 
As appears from Ciano's notes in December 1937, even someone 
like Italo Balbo, one of the founders of Fascism and Governor 
of Libya, whose name was linked with demographic colonization 
of Libya because of the mass migration of Ventimilet - the
. Di Crollalanza, "Relazione sui programmi di coloniz­
zazione demografica nell'impero da parte del 1*ONC". REAI. 26, 5 
(maggio 1938):739 (henceforth: Di Crollalanza, "Relazione").
3. ATdR 24/100, p. 15
*. CD IAO AOI 1936, Graziani to GAsGnHrGmMg-GGSM-GAA, AA 8- 
4-1937 (hereafter Graziani to GGAOI); Kulmer J.," The return of 
Haile Sellassie", The Contemporary Review. CLIX (1949):291.
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twenty thousand colonists that he had transported in a single 
mass convoy in October 19395 - used to advise "certain people 
not to go to Abyssinia because of conditions of grave insecuri­
ty in the country"8. In the light of this, the settlement of the 
ex-servicemen in the proximity of AA was seen as a useful means 
to prevent popular insurgency in the region that displayed the 
"most resistance to Italian rule"^. The area would form a 
formidable military outpost, providing a fence for AA. The 
settler community, in case of emergency, could become soldiers. 
In the long term, it was through these groups that the cohesion 
of the ShMwan Christian AmhHras would be broken and their 
strength weakened.
The scheme had its economic advantages too: with the 
settlement of demobilized soldiers, already in Ethiopia, the 
enormous economic cost of bringing agricultural families from 
Italy could be spared. It was Mussolini's belief that out of 
almost 500,000 Italian soldiers in Ethiopia, at least 400,000 
of them were farmers8. It was said that these could be lured by 
land concessions and economic incentives. The decree of Decem­
ber 19, 1936 tried to do just that^.
The two farms at Bishoftu and Holatta were model 
farms owned by Emperor Haile Sellassie, producing cereals, milk 
and its by-products, chicken, tobacco and grapes in amounts
5. Segr6, op.cit., pp.102-11.
8. G. Ciano, Ciano Diarv.1937-1938. (London: 1938), p.103.
7. Poison Newman, The New Abvssinia. (London: 1938), p.103.
8. Sbacchi (1975), p.353.
\ Legge 10-6-1937, no. 1029: Conversione in legge del RD 
19-12-1936, no.2467, che conferisce un diritto di preferenza 
nella concessione dell terre dell'AOI a coloro che hanno ivi 
partecipato alle operazioni militari in qualitA di combattenti, 
GU, 11/15, 1-8-1937; GURI. 10-7-1937.
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sufficient to meet most of the capital's needs*®. In an inter­
view towards the end of 1936, Lessona made it clear that he 
wanted to make the two stations part of a large scale plan of 
white settlement based on the employment of Ethiopian labour, 
to include the best part of ShMwa province around AA. As a 
result, the Empire's capital
will be surrounded from all sides by an 
area which will be intensively cultivated 
and densely populated by Italians. In
fact, what we aim at in this particularly 
favoured zone is the formation of small 
Italian agricultural owners. The Duce has 
said that the Fascist Empire will be the 
Empire of the people and indeed, this
order of the Capo will be applied to this 
form of colonization**.
The two localities, even though not endowed with the 
agricultural potential the Fascist propaganda machinery at­
tributed to them, offered an ideal climate and topography for 
European settlement. Bishoftu farm was located 50 km south-east 
of AA, close to the Djibouti railway, the capital's main outlet 
to the sea, and was flanked by the imperial highway to Moggio. 
HolMtta, 40 km from AA, was situated on the main road running 
westward to Naq&mt6 and, during Haile Sellassie's regime, was a
military training centre*8. Bishoftu was 1,800-1,900 m and
Holatta 2,200-2,400 m above sea level, and their soils were 
volcanic in origin and eminently argillaceous, with modest 
productive potential*8.
1U. Adrien Zervos, L'Empire d'Ethiopie. (Imprimerie de
1'ecole professionelle des Fre'res: Alessandria: 1936), pp.130-1; 
Poggiali, op.cit., ppil98-200.
**. IOM, 20-12-1936, p. 19.
*8. See Figure II.
*8. CD IAO AOI 1338, Vincenzo Manusia, Relazione sui
risultati ottenuti nel campo di orientamento agrario di Biscioftii 
nel 1938; Di Crollalanza, "Relazione":739.
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In addition, the presence at Holhtta of a mixed 
population of Amhara and the largely tenant Oromo was thought 
to be an advantage, as it would prevent concerted local opposi­
tion. The location of the two farms close to AA assured their 
products easy access to the largest and the most lucrative 
market of the Empire as well as to luxury goods, spare parts 
for machinery and rapid military assistance**. The favourable 
topography and climate compensated for poor fertility, making 
the two places ideal for the first experiment in demographic 
colonization "in a complete form, with relative speed, minimum 
expenditure, with minor risks and greater advantages"*8.
Di Crollalanza and Mazzocchi Alemanni worked out 
plans of settlement that won the consensus of both the GG and 
the MC, and met with Mussolini's approval and encouragement. 
The scheme envisaged an initial settlement of 100 families in 
each of the two farms, on 10,000 ha each - later upgraded to
12,000 ha. These were to be provided by the GG before June 
1937, the beginning of the big rains. In such a way, the agency 
would be in a position to make full use of the land. At the end 
of the big rains, towards mid-September, ONC would begin to 
build the first 200 colonists' houses, 100 on each farm. The 
plan was to settle 1,000 families on each farm within a period 
of four to five years in 50,000-60,000 ha.
LAND PROBLEM
On the 2 November 1936, Di Crollalanza despatched 
the first batch of agricultural experts. In compliance with 
Lessona's recommendations, they were three directors, of whom
MAE, La valorizzazione, pp. 268-9; CI_, 22-2-1939; 
Quaranta, op.cit., p.VII; Newman, op.cit., p.103.
*8. Di Crollalanza, "La Valorizzazione" :492.
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one was the chief, an engineer, an administrator, four foremen, 
and two land surveyors^.
Lessona did not specify the area to be granted to 
ONC and little was known about its legal status except that it 
was state land. Although Di Crollalanza later claimed he had 
been promised 50,000 ha, Lessona agreed to grant immediately
1,000 ha at HolStta and 500 ha at Bishoftu; no details were 
given about where and when additional lands promised "within a 
short period" would be made available17.
It was generally believed that in the two areas 
there were ca.25,000-27,000 ha available for immediate coloni­
zation1®. Bishoftu was believed to have 12,000-15,000 ha, much 
irrigated by the rivers of W3d<icha, BH131a or those of neigh­
bouring lakes. Holatta was assumed to have several thousands of 
hectares of fairly fertile undulating plains, well-watered by 
two rainy seasons, the big rains between July-August, and the 
small rains in April-May. Considerable use could also be made 
of the nearby Holatta River which, despite its meagre flow, 
offered multiple possibilities for irrigation1^.
Of the several thousand hectares promised, only a 
few hundred were made available at Holatta where a hurriedly 
selected 120 century of demobilized militia of Sabaudia Divisi­
on were accommodated by the 6G as salaried workers at £.20 a 
day. The ONC officialdom had reservations about the merits of 
the scheme, yet accepted it reluctantly and with few modifica­
16. Idem, "Relazione" :738.
17. Del Boca, op. cit., Ill, p.202; CD IAO AOI 1936, Di 
Crollalanza to MAI, 13-5-1939 (henceforth CD IAO 1936, Di 
Crollalanza to MAI).
18. Pankhurst, "Italian settlement" : 148-9.
19. Di Crollalanza, "Relazione" :739-40.
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tions70. Contrary to the agreement, the GG continued to procra­
stinate in the handing over of Bishoftu farm. But most frustra­
ting of all was the fact that necessary equipment for initial 
work of the land was lacking and 20 tractors were lying idle 
for three months at Djibouti port. As a result, the expertise 
of the agency’s staff already in place, and the militia work—  
force was under-utilized. The situation so heavily strained the 
agency’s budget that at the end of the contract, it ended up 
paying half a million in salary alone71.
The situation worried Mussolini who, for his own 
propaganda purpose, wanted to transform the land confiscated 
from fugitive Emperor Haile Sellassie into model farms. Di 
Crollalanza left for AA to speed things up, arriving in January 
1937 with the inspector of the Pontine Marshes, Nello Mazzocchi 
Alemanni77. Even though Di Crollalanza succeeded in setting up 
part of the Bishoftu farm, his views on the whole were not 
encouraging. As appears from his report to Mussolini, the two 
areas, as most parts of the Empire, far from being "the earthly 
paradise that the unwarranted optimism of the amateurs, the 
colourful descriptions of the impressionist journalism, the 
oversight of some pseudo-technicians and the uncritical infor­
7®. £.20 settlement was reached after the discontent of the
settlers with the early mobility allowance payment of £.5 per
day. Ibidem:739; Di Crollalanza, "L*avvaloramento agricolo 
dell’impero: Esperienze e realizzazioni dell’ONC", REAI. 27,11
(novembre 1939):1198 (henceforth: Di Crollalanza, "Avvalora­
mento"); CD IAO AOI 1839, Promemoria per S.E. il Capo del governo
sul1’attivitA colonizzatrice dell’ONC in AOI, 7-7-1938, p.2; 
Poggiali, op.cit., p.219.
71. CD IAO AOI 1839, p. 2; the military authorities provided 
board. Cfr. Di Crollalanza, "Avvaloramento":1198.
77. Del Boca, op.cit., Ill, p.201. With him there was also 
Ing. Ugo Tedaro, the Head of Reclamation Service [Cfr. ATdR 
24/124, "Promemoria per S.E.il Capo del Governo", gennaio 1938,
p. 1] .
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mation of a few returners portrayed or hinted"22, were of 
limited productivity. They were also occupied by a considerable 
number of Ethiopian farmers who cultivated the land to which 
they had usufructuary right. The State land itself was composed 
of small plots and scattered amidst non-state lands. Confisca­
tion of these lands seemed a politically sensitive issue as 
most of their inhabitants were Oromos, an ethnic group assumed 
to be largely sympathetic to the Italian conquest. As a result, 
the government seemed to have little choice but to respect the 
rights of the existing owners^.
Although the Italians took over the two farms within 
a relatively short time of the fall of the AA regime, they 
claimed that most of the equipment was lying waste and in a 
state of neglect. Dwellings and shelters at HolStta made of 
ceqa (mud), which formed the imperial gebbi, royal summer 
residence, were taken over by Italian military authorities. At 
Bishoftu, farms were destroyed except the storage, millstones 
and a number of small rectangular huts used for animals. Even 
though the farms had been productive in the past, Di Crollalan­
za claimed no land improvement had been carried out22.
Early enthusiasm for utilizing these lands was soon 
replaced by cautious realism and uncertainty. Di Crollalanza 
joined the rank of those who came to be known as "procras­
tinators"^. Following Tassinari, he urged the colonial ad­
ministration "to call a halt on several undesirable projects" 
and advised it to take a "cautious and piecemeal approach to
22. Di Crollalanza, "La valorizzazione":489;
"Relazione":740.
2*. Idem, "Relazione":740.
25. Ibidem: 739.
26. CD IAO AOI 1839, p.3; Di Crollalanza, "Avvalora­
mento" : 713.
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each developmental initiative", including demographic coloniza­
tion^7 .
TABLE VI:- LAND ALLOCATION AT HOLATTA FARM (ha)
Arable Land 2060
Pasture 943
Garden 16
Fallow 1646
Unproductive 301
Scrubs & Wood 4
Vineyard 4
Water 335
Buildings and Road 652
TOTAL 5861
Source:- MAE, "La valorizzazione", p.265; "L'ONC per 
1 *avvaloramento agricolo del 1 *Etiopia", Le 
Colonie. 6-7-1940.
This shift in outlook also tempered Di Crollalan-
za’s attitude towards ONC's settlement programme. Like any
other demographic colonization, he wanted it to proceed
"gradually and with a realistic sense of timing"7®. In his
view, the limited agricultural knowledge of the country and
the numerous practical problems, combined with the agency's
own restricted technical and financial resources, provided no
other option. Yet reflecting Mussolini's plan, he wanted to
ensure the ONC's activities
should not serve merely as a laboratory 
test, but inherent in their plan such 
pioneer farms must supply the govern­
ment, by their scale, organization and 
economy, not with theoretical or even 
scientific models, but with elements of 
concrete study and judgement that would 
serve to regulate the conduct of subse­
quent demographic colonization29.
27. CD IAO AOI 1839, p. 2.
2®. ATdR 24/124, p. 3 
79. CD IAO AOI 1839, p. 3.
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Land remained one of the chief constraining factors 
on ONC as the government failed to provide sufficient land as 
promised in the initial agreement. Of the first 12,000 ha 
promised before the beginning of the big rains of 1937, only
3.000 ha were made available. About three quarters of these 
uncultivable; part was rocky, and part marshy, needing inten­
sive reclamation work. A year later, the whole concession 
amounted to 3,316 ha, 1,516 at the Holatta farm; of this, 
only 495 ha were granted under formal agreement. Of the rema­
ining 1,800 ha at Bishoftu farm, 900 ha were uncultivable30.
As ONC’s frustration increased and its financial
resources became stretched, Di Crollalanza made a strong 
protest to the MAI urging the handing over of the remaining 
land. He also made a passionate personal appeal to Mussolini 
for his direct intervention31. But as a result, only 5,000 ha 
were secured at HolMtta and an additional 700 ha at Bishoftu, 
registering a total of 6,600 ha - 7,400 ha short of that 
promised32. Later on, 500 ha were added to the HolStta farm.
In 1940, the total holding of this farm had the composition
given in Table VI.
Bishoftu farm was even more modest, consisting of only
2.000 ha. By 1939, the government, out of an estimated budget 
of £.6,000,000 needed for the work, had allocated £.3,500,000 
towards the reclamation of ca.15,000 ha. The Wadacha river 
was diverted for parts of its course to a new concrete
bed, but only 1,800 ha, or just over a tenth of the land, was 
recovered. Thus, out of 24,000 ha initially to be handed over 
to the ONC towards the end of May 1937, by the end of 1940 ONC 
had secured c.7,500 ha, and this was due to Di Crollalanza’s
Ibidem, pp. 3,8; Di Crollalanza to MAI, p. 3; ATdR 
24/124, pp.2-3; Di Crollalanza, "Relazione":747.
32. Di Crollalanza to MAI, p.4; ATdR 24/124, p. 13.
32. CD IAO AOI 1839, p.8.
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strenuous struggle with the colonial authorities and petitions 
to Mussolini33.
The expansion of the farms followed a scheme deve­
loped by Mazzocchi Alemanni. In his attempt to make each farm 
an unbroken unit and free large areas of land needed for 
settlement, Alemanni had worked out an ingenuous method believ­
ed to meet the needs of both settlers and Ethiopians. It was 
known as accorpamento per permute - annexation through a system 
of exchange. According to the scheme, Ethiopians were offered 
land at the government’s disposal in another part of the 
country in exchange for their land adjoining a tract of govern­
ment land pinpointed for colonization39.
It was thought this system would enable the forma­
tion of large unbroken domainial lands on which settlement 
could begin. Whenever possible, exchange would involve respect 
for the principle of fair compensation. Differences in value 
were to be offset by the concession of larger plots, the award 
of special prizes, or by carrying out work such as digging 
wells, drinking troughs, or assistance in the building of 
dwellings. Only the landlords were to be displaced; the te­
nants, as a rule, would remain unaffected and continue to farm 
within the settler’s agricultural enterprise, forming an 
integral part of each farm.
With this programme the settlers* farms could be an 
organic whole. Fragmentation into small units scattered amid 
Ethiopian farms was thought not only uneconomic but also to 
have serious repercussion on the prestige of the white man33. 
Under the scheme, the Ethiopian would assist the colonist, his
33. CD IAO AOI 1839, p. 11, ATdR 24/124, p. 13.
39. ATdR 24/124, p.3; Di Crollalanza, "Relazione" :740.
33. Di Crollalanza, "Relazione" :741; Maurizio Montefoschi,
"I centri agricoli di OlettA e BiscioftA: Successo di un esperi-
mento", IC, maggio 1939 (hereafter "I centri agricoli).
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new landlord who, although alien, was taken for granted as
being more beneficial to the Ethiopian because of his assumed
racial superiority. Ethiopian assistance involved both working
on the settler's farm and looking after his livestock3**. As a
result, the Ethiopian farmer would remain attached to the land
and become a stable element in the population. The political
advantages of such stability for peaceful Italian penetration
into the country were obvious37. Mazzocchi Alemanni explained:
The most important element in the execu­
tion of exchanges lies in the fact that 
the Ethiopian population is not removed 
from the area; while the owner is trans­
ferred onto the new land given to him in 
exchange, the peasant, instead, remains 
on the original land. This responds to 
the already mentioned economic contingen­
cies of associating in a number of ways, 
but essentially, more or less, through 
customary forms of share-cropping, the 
Ethiopian labour (farmers and shepherds) 
to the metropolitan farm. In fact, the 
political significance of such a policy, 
whereby, for example, 50 owners are 
transferred while 2,000 peasants remained 
in the place, are obvious, for the Ethio­
pian population only in this manner,
i.e., by remaining in their abode and in 
their day to-day activities, can con­
tribute to the metropolitan's work of 
developing the country and, while ensur­
ing themselves a better life, become the 
most peaceful auxiliaries for the pene­
tration of our civilizing activity3®.
36. F0371/22021/J2512/40/1, Lord Perth to PSSFA, Rome 24-
6-1938; ATdR 24/124, op.cit., pp.9-10.
37. Perth to PSSFA, Rm 24-6-1938; Di Crollalanza, "Relazi­
one" : 742.
3®. A. N. Mazzocchi, "Orientamenti nel la valorizzazione 
demografica dell’Impero: Prime realizzazioni dell'ONC", AC.
XXXII, 4 (aprile 1938):166 (hereafter Mazzocchi Alemanni, 
"Orientamenti").
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FIGURE II:- ONC SETTLEMENT CENTRES
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FIGURE III:- ONC SETTLEMENT SCHEME.
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As a whole the scheme looked more optimistic than 
rational and its implementation seemed deceptively easy. But 
the planners gave little or no importance to the social and 
political vagaries which became a source of considerable 
frustration. In fact, no matter how determined the technical 
experts were, the practical difficulties on the ground made 
their task a difficult one.
Exchange of land, though easy in theory and simple 
in formulation, proved to be an arduous task. Despite a number 
of enticements attached to it, several hundred Ethiopian 
farmers were unwilling to relinquish their land or work for new 
masters. Technical experts, apprehensive of the political 
repercussions of land alienation, proceeded in a scrupulously 
logical fashion. At a preliminary meeting in the presence of 
political authorities, the local Land Survey Committee, es­
tablished in June 1938, would explain the government’s guideli­
nes to the Ethiopians. The Committee included a representative 
of either the agricultural department or the government office, 
with the district chief and the village chief. Afterwards, the 
Ethiopian was shown the land put at his disposal, allowing him 
certain choice among land available; effort was made to ensure 
that the new land was agriculturally equal to, if not better 
than, the one to be exchanged. When this was impossible, the 
authorities increased proportionally the size of the land. 
After a formal acceptance by the Ethiopian, a Committee of 
Elders defined the boundaries of the land. The transfer normal­
ly took place after the harvest period in order to allow the 
Ethiopian to prepare the new land for sowing before the big 
rains. The Ethiopian was allowed to take with him whatever 
mobile property he had, such as fences or tukul. The government 
normally paid £.80-100 towards rehousing, a prima facie value 
established by special Committee after an on-the-spot-inspecti-
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on. The trees were also paid for with a proviso that they 
should not be removed®9.
The transferee was settled in areas considered to 
be of no relevance for future metropolitan colonization, far 
removed from the motorway or important communication networks. 
Cases where these arrangements were met with the transferee’s 
approval were not uncommon. But he did so reportedly for fear 
of possible further displacement, a not unusual occurrence. Yet 
many others refused such arrangements, often under the pretext 
of the government's inability to control the area and guarantee 
safety. The transferee occupied the new land under identical 
rights, ownership or otherwise, that he had held over the 
previous land. With such a plan, the authorities avoided to 
impair future decisions by the Land Survey Commission iJtofh was 
expected to make a definite pronouncement on the legal status 
of the Ethiopian's claims to the land*®.
Resistance to relocation took a variety of forms. 
Sometimes delay tactics were used to frustrate the actual 
transfer; the Ethiopians either went ahead with sowing the land 
to be evacuated so the authorities were faced with a fait 
accompli, or protested to the central authority. There were 
cases when he repeatedly failed to turn up for an appointment 
on the date fixed and, later on with a great show of sincerity, 
apologised on the grounds of his inability to remember it. No 
practical remedy could be found except, as one technical 
officer noticed, "a remarkable dose of patience"*1.
Other times it was the chief, who had previously 
accepted with seemingly great enthusiasm, who secretly connived
JV. Moreschini Tullio, "II problems della disponibi 1 ita’ 
delle terre per la colonizzazione nello Scioa", I Georgofili. 
VII, 7 (1941):l08-9.
*®. Ibidem.
*}. Ibidem: 109.
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with the transferee. This was often the case when the trans­
feree went to settle in an area that fell outside the jurisdic­
tion of the chief. But with the generous pecuniary reward upon 
each successful operation, many chiefs co-operated*2.
The situation was easier when dealing with tenants, 
claiming no ownership or usufructuary rights. They were given 
the choice of either following their former landlord, provided 
that he consented, or accepting new arrangements made by the 
Italian authorities. A number of tenants followed their former 
landlords; nevertheless, the agency made sure that a consider­
able number of them remained in place. This was dictated by 
political considerations and the economic advantages to the 
settlement. There was fear that massive displacement would 
alienate the peasantry to the point of open warfare, and the 
agency's success depended on the availability of sufficient 
manpower*®. In the face of such political and economic impera­
tives, the general tendency was to employ most of the tenants 
on their original homeland in such a way that, through a 
home-grown metayer system, they were tied to the ONC's farms 
as share-croppers, with only one difference: the white colonist 
supplanted the Ethiopian landlord. So, at the boundary of each 
colonist's farm there were usually two or three Ethiopian 
families to supply him with labour.
The relationship with the settler’s farm took one 
of three forms. Whenever surplus land was available, the Ethio­
pian family was provided with a plot estimated to be sufficient 
enough to supply him with basic foodstuffs and grazing land. As 
the new landowner, the colonist received one third of the 
produce from this land and as employer, he engaged his labour 
by paying him a salary at the market rate**. In the second form,
*2. Ibidem.
*®. Ibidem: 109-10.
**. CD I AO, AO I 1839, p. 17.
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instead of giving a certain percentage of his product, the 
Ethiopian agreed to supply the colonist 'X' days of labour 
during various periods of the year for a salary considerably 
inferior to the market rate. Both the dates and the salary 
were to be fixed in advance. Under the third form, the col­
onist engaged, under a contract of an annual salary, payable 
partly in cash and partly in kind, the labour of the Ethio­
pian family who was normally allowed to make use of a small 
piece of land, usually located at the outskirts of the farm. 
Under this arrangement, the Ethiopian normally worked at 
least 200 days a year, 8 hours a day, for a monthly salary of 
£.150. Of this £.100 was paid in kind assessed at the local 
market rate and £.50 in cash. This same arrangement applied to 
other members of the Ethiopian’s family in case the colonist 
decided to employ them. The only exception was that children 
under 16 and women were paid half rate^.
Of the three forms, the third was the most widesp­
read, particularly at Holatta Farm. The plots at the disposal
of the Ethiopians had a maximum size of ha and normally of
modest productivity. Emphasis was laid on the condition that 
the Ethiopian should cultivate it using only traditional 
methods. Such a device, combined with the limited fertility 
of the Ethiopian’s land, guaranteed a profit margin to the 
colonist. Otherwise, it was argued, the latter, new to the 
environment, unfamiliar with local farming and using costly 
modern machinery, could not survive competition from the 
Ethiopian. Underlying this assumption was that the Ethiopian, 
unlike the settler peasant, could produce cheaply and had a
. Ibidem; Di Crollalanza, "Avvaloramento":1206-7. As 
regards salary payment and labour problem see Chap. VI, pp.250-GQ.
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life style of limited requirements*8. The Ethiopian could not 
own at any one time more than 4 cattle and 8 sheep and any 
numerical changes either by way of birth, purchase, death or 
sale were to be reported for approval by ONC*^ .
The process of land exchange, impossibly slow and 
complex under the best of conditions, was further compounded 
by conflicts between political directives and technical impera­
tives of colonization. This was specially true under the rule 
of Duke of Aosta who resolved to introduce a sense of direction 
into the almost chaotic programme of colonization and respect 
Ethiopian land rights, threatening the entire demographic 
colonization scheme*8. The Duke maintained that land alienation 
should not be enacted "through rough and reckless measures that 
are always unwelcome by the Ethiopians, but through the slow 
work of persuasion". In his view, land could not be alienated 
without prior study of tenure systems and the feasibility of 
colonization itself*9. Accordingly, the local authorities were 
urged to proceed with caution and at a gradual pace88.
The Duke of Aosta's policy reflected the 
recommendations of two economic experts, G.Cusmano and Roberto
*8. [Carlo Giglio], "Rapporti della colonizzazione demogra- 
fica con la colonizzazione capitalistica e 1 *agricoltura 
indigena", REAI. 26, 10, (ottobre 1938):1564 (henceforth: 
"Rapporti").
*7. Di Crollalanza, "L*Avvaloramento":1207. Moreschini,
op.cit.:110.
*8. N. Villa Santa and al . , Amedeo Duca D'Aosta. (Rm: 1954), 
p.238.
*9. "Land grants presume ascertaining of land rights. If
we do not create a public domain, we cannot weigh up either the 
true political implications or the relative importance of 
concessions; we have to give the Ethiopians the certainty that 
the lands acknowledged as their properties will be strictly 
cultivated by themselves" [Ibidem, p.212; CD IAO AOI 1936, Amedeo 
D'Aosta to MAI, 5-1-1938 (henceforth: Amedeo to MAI)].
50. Sbacchi (1975), p. 351.
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Corvo, authorized by the Viceroy himself. In their secret 
report of April 1938, they made clear that the country was not 
suited for a massive influx of Italian peasants. In their view, 
at the early phase of colonization, private enterprise and 
capital should be encouraged as the dominant mode of develop­
ment. In order to avoid the opening of the Empire's resources 
to land speculators, the report urged that colonization be 
restricted to undisputed public domain lands and be strictly 
controlled by the State through a central co-ordinating body. 
The experts equally rejected the existing system of land 
transactions. Their report pointed out that expropriation, even 
with extensive compensation, would transform the best peasan­
try, mostly the Oromo, into a multitude of have-nots, who would 
subsequently swell the resistance movement^.
The DukeyAosta's unsympathetic stand on demographic 
colonization brought ONC's activities to a standstill. Land 
exchange and alienation at both farms, particularly at Bishof- 
tu, stopped, with serious implications for work in progress83. 
Only after Mussolini's intervention, ONC was allowed to operate 
in other areas83. But the practical steps were taken only in 
February 1940 when ONC's activities were extended to Guani, in 
DSnkal; WMnqi,in the Upper Awash River basin, and MMrSquo, in 
Guragh6 region8*. The three areas were selected on the basis 
that they possessed most of the prerequisites for demographic 
colonization in terms of climate, communication network and
83. ATdR 24/128, Cusmano G. & Roberto Corvo, AA, 1-4-1938, 
pp.8-9.
83. CD IAO AOI 1839, p.7; Villa and al . , op.cit., p.232. 
According to Scaglione the Duke of Aosta was reluctant to give 
land to any agency, including ONC until the economic outcome of 
each developmental strategies were clear.
83. CD IAO AOI 1936, Sottosegretario di Stato Terruzzi to
GGAOI, Rm 26-4-1938.
8*. Villa and al., op.cit., p.232; Quaranta, op.cit., p.48.
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topography, and were reported to have extensive "promising 
lands"88. But the decision came too late, and the plan remained 
on the drawing board. Only at WSnqi, ONC had succeeded to sow 
2,300 ha out of 7,500 ha obtained towards the end of 1938.
As the exchange of land scheme proved unworkable, 
ONC, like most of Italian enterprises, capitalist as well as 
demographic, made ample use of metayer system to farm lands 
that their Ethiopian claimants were unable to cultivate. These 
lands fell under what came to be known as zones of influence 
which entitled the Italian titular of the adjoining land to 
cultivate them jointly with Ethiopian claimants88.
Like the exchange system, the objective of zone of 
influence was to concentrate the best land in the hands of 
Italian settler at the expense of Ethiopian landowner and 
guarantee the settler cheap Ethiopian labour. Theoretically, 
all colonial policies were intended to foster these goals, and 
the Italians were not an exception. But they differed in their 
pride, in their mission to "civilize" the Ethiopians and their 
persistent claims for their system's unique concern for humani­
tarian values. But owing to discontent caused by the abuse of 
the zone of influence by settlers, the system was suppressed. 
Many Ethiopians questioned the Italians' true intentions and 
viewed the scheme as a stratagem for robbing them of their land 
under the pretext of cultivating it temporarily. Some were 
reluctant even to consider the deal. Even those who had ini­
tially accepted had second thoughts. Some refused to sow and 
others, instead of sowing, ate the seed. In other instances, 
the chiefs in charge of seed distribution failed to deliver. In 
this chief Mammo TadMcha of Bishoftu excelled. The cooperation
55. Quaranta, op.cit., p.48
88. CD IAO AOI 1930, Graziani to DSACP and al. , "Incremento 
culture alimentari", AA, 11-5-1937; Promemoria Per il Vice Re, 
n.d.; AOI 1837, P. Bono, "Memoranda sulla situazione degli 
agricoltori italiani in Etiopia", 19-2-1941.
-110-
CHAPTER IV MILITARY SETTLEMENT: ONC
that was gained rested on bribery and other forms of allure­
ment^ .
FARM ORGANIZATION AND SETTLEMENT PROGRAMMES
ONC's settlement programme aimed to avoid the 
fragmentation and dispersion of the farms, secure the condi­
tions of safety, make little demands on technical organization, 
and safeguard racial prestige5®. Scattered homesteads as at 
Pontine Marshes were rejected as those in a country " so new 
and so far from the motherland” were considered a safety 
hazard. Concentrated villages were also discarded as this would 
necessitate a relatively long journey to and from the farm59. 
Instead homesteads of as many as eight adjoining holdings were 
grouped together as spokes of a wheel, triangular in shape5®. 
Near the apex of each eight triangles were placed the individu­
al farmhouses. This arrangement, reminiscent of the Roman agri 
vectigales^ , enabled the sharing of a bakery and wells located 
at the centre and reconciled economy and security: within a 
radius of a couple of hundred yards lived about forty, armed, 
able-bodied farmers, large enough to offer mutual assistance, 
and protection5^. The houses, situated inside their plots, were 
grouped around a vast central courtyard, easily transformable
37. Sbacchi , op.cit., p.368.
5®. "I centri agricoli”.
59. Perth to PSSFA, Rm 24-6-1938; ATdR 24/124, p. 10; Di
Crollalanza, "Avvaloramento":1198; MAE, La valorizzazione,
pp.263-4.
50. Cfr. Figure III.
51. F0371, Perth; Quaranta, op.cit., p.44; MAE, La va­
lorizzazione, p.264; Di Crollalanza, "Relazione”:743.
Di Crollalanza, "Avvaloramento”:1200.
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into a fort in case of emergency53. This system also removed the 
need to build an extensive inter-farm communication network59.
Each farm measured 50-60 ha, an area larger than the 
average holding in Italy. A number of reasons determined this 
size: whereas in Italy cultivation was intensive in character, 
it was expected that, initially, a more extensive system would 
show the quickest returns in Africa. In Italy the peasant, 
helped by members of his family, normally did all the work on 
his holding; in Ethiopia, the employment of Ethiopian labour 
would enable a larger area to be farmed. Furthermore, the 
colonist had to save sufficient money to transfer the land into 
his ownership. Other considerations included: the increase of 
the settler's own family, which, in the course of time, would 
demand the splitting of the farm between the heirs of original 
settlers; limited productivity of the land; and the tendency of 
tropical land to rapidly decline in fertility. Thus, ample 
precautions were taken for future exigencies55.
Each farm was divided into three parts55: in the
immediate vicinity of each farm house a small patch was reserv­
ed for vegetables and fruits intended for the settler’s daily 
consumption; here he could plant fruit trees and vines. At the 
periphery of the farm there were c.20 ha destined for forages 
and cattle grazing. The arable land, amounting to 35—40 ha was 
located in the centre, where diverse crops could be cultivated 
with the assistance of Ethiopian labour. The Ethiopians* 
residences were situated on the outskirts of the farm, at 1J$—2 
km from the house of the settler - distant enough to keep the
53. MAE, La valorizzazione , pp. 263-4.
59. Di Crollalanza, "Relazione":741-2.
55. "I centri agricoli"; MAE, La valorizzazione, p. 264. 
55. See Figure III, B.
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two races apart, yet close enough to control the Ethiopian and 
promote economic interaction5^.
The farmhouse itself was planned and built in such 
a way as to promote the prestige and decorum of the white man 
in Africa. Even though most of the hitherto discussed schemes 
were within the framework laid down by the Agricultural Coun­
cil, in its housing programme ONC, like some of the other 
agencies, followed slightly different criteria. The Agricul­
tural Council had debated whether to build temporary or per­
manent dwellings. Its conclusions were mixed. On the one hand, 
it emphasized the advantages of low-cost housing in that it 
saved resources which could be allocated to transplanting a 
large number of unemployed families. But it equally made clear 
that if their quality were inferior to that which the peasants 
had at home, they might fail in luring them to Ethiopia. On the 
other hand, it argued that the "the elevated cost of rural 
constructions could, by itself alone, be seriously detrimental 
to demographic colonization, compromising from the start its 
happy deve1opment".
The Agricultural Council left it to the policy-ma­
kers whether to opt for a few families with comfortable and 
expensive houses or the maximum possible number of peasants in 
more modest dwellings. Yet its own views were quite clear: it 
recommended that "complete, perfect solutions should be avoided 
and transitory measures adopted"55. ONC followed the middle 
ground: it built permanent houses capable of extension. The
underlying assumption was that economy houses decreased total
5^. Quaranta, op.cit., p.44; Di Crol lalanza, "Relazione" : 743 .
5®. Consulta, "L*Avvaloramento": 1565; CD IAO AOI 1776,
Relazione, p.14. For the actual debate see Seduta, Rm 5-5-1937,
pp.1-2.
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cost of reclamation, thus enabling the peasant to pay off his 
debts and save for extension59.
Concern for economy dictated maximum use of local 
materials, the rational utilization of space, and the provision 
of basic furniture. Yet in line with the Agricultural Council’s 
advice, racial prestige demanded that the dwellings excelled 
the Ethiopians’ homes in comfort, design and architectural 
beauty. The settler’s house was a bungalow 13m long and 3.40m 
high. At HolStta, where basalt was abundant, stone was used; at 
Bishoftu, bricks and mud. It had a plain tiled roof of Italian 
design so that the farmer would feel at home. One colonial
writer claimed that the sight of each roof gave "the visitor an 
impression of a bit of Italy transported as if by magic to this 
distant part of the world". The interior consisted of two 
bedrooms
equipped with a few simple pieces of 
furniture, and of a large, comfortable 
lounge-kitchen in the centre. Access is 
gained through a kind of veranda formed 
by an overhanging roof and a niche sunk 
into the facade, which is coated with
white rough-cast.. A wooden gate and a 
fence of pleasing appearance accentuate 
the rustic note9®.
A foreign journalist admiringly but mistakenly described it "as
a solid-stone built bungalow" with "large windows looking out
on a really beautiful countryside with mountains and lakes like
those in the Alps"93.
Each of the houses was intended to accommodate a
family of up to six and to offer all the comfort and the simple
69. [Carlo Giglio] , " Di alcuni problemi della coloniz­
zazione demografica", REAI. 26, 12 (dicembre 1938):1875-6
(hereafter "Di alcuni problemi"; Di Crollalanza, "Avvalora­
mento" :1200-1.
9®. Quaranta, op.cit., p.47.
93. Diel, op.cit., p.184.
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amenities to which the Italian peasants were accustomed^. The 
family shared, with the rest of the farm members: water from 
wells, normally 30-60m deep, pumped up by a motor; a grain 
mill; three or four communal ovens, and a store-house^. All the 
houses were provided with a zariba, a shelter built to local 
design, to keep farm animals, agricultural tools and machinery.
The cost of each house at Bishoftu was £.38,000 and the estimate 
for Holatta was £. 31,000-£. 35,000 or £.10,000 a room. The agency 
personnel’s houses had an additional three rooms and an extra 
toilet with water being supplied from a tank inside the house 
itself. There were also some differences in finishing touches 
and use of materials on the understanding that, because of 
their managerial status, they had greater needs than those of 
the average settler. It was meant to provide them with the 
minimum comfort that their position entailed and offset the 
sacrifices imposed upon them as a result of their residence in 
a still largely unknown land. The total cost of each of these 
houses was £.109,000 at Holatta, and £.115,000 at the Bishoftu 
farm^.
According to the plan, groups of farms were to be 
joined together into aziende, or co-operatives, built with a 
State budget, where institutions that catered for the larger 
cultural and social needs of the farm were set up. These rural 
centres, or villaggio nazionalef were to include facilities, 
such as shops, the agency’s administrative headquarters,
"Di alcuni p r o b l e m i 47; Quaranta, op.cit., p.47. 
Pankhurst, "Italian settlement":149; Quaranta, op.cit.,
p.43.
Di Crollalanza, "Relazione":747-8,750-2,757—9; "Di 
alcuni problemi":1876.
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government offices, Fascist headquarters, church, school, 
cinema, clinic, post-office and store-house^.
Settlement programme was a joint undertaking between 
the state, ONC and the colonists and its purpose was to bring 
the farms to the economic autarky so that the colonist’s plot 
could be productive in the shortest possible time. The ONC was 
to provide expertise and financial help so the settler could, 
to use ONC’s own much cherished phrase, "pass into the respon­
sibility and dignity of a small landowner"76. The details of 
such a transition were regulated by a contract between the 
State, the agency and the settler, as well as the Ethiopian 
peasants.
Under the contract, the State provided the land tax 
free, developed the basic infrastructures of communication net­
work, public amenities and rudimentary social services. It was 
also the State’s duty to select the prospective settlers in 
co-operation with the ONC and look after the transportation of 
f ami 1 ies77.
ONC drew up the development plans and implemented 
them; reclaimed the land and allotted it to the families; built 
houses, and provided agricultural implements, seeds, livestock, 
as well as direction and supervision, technical advice and the 
necessary capital; catered for material and moral needs of the 
colonists and recruited Ethiopian labour76. ONC planned to 
regain all or a substantial part of its investment between 5-7 
years. It was hoped that, thanks to the amount of land in his 
possession, the agency’s support and the unfailing assistance
76. Idem, "Relazione":745,749; "Avvaloramento":57; "I centr 
agricoli"; Quaranta, op.cit., p.43; Berretta, op.cit., pp.258-9
76. "I centri agricoli"; CD IAO AOI 1839, pp. 14-5.
77. Di Crollalanza, "Relazione" : 745; CD IAO AOI 1839, p. 11
7®. Di Crollalanza, "Relazione" :749; "Avvaloramento" : 1205
6; Quaranta, op.cit., p.42.
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of the Ethiopian with his cheap and experienced labour, the 
settler would repay his debts within the targeted period79.
The contracts that regulated the relationship of the 
colonist and the agency, as approved by the government 
authorities, consisted of four parts:
1. An initial transformation period in which the agency, 
assisted by the settler, did the preliminary work to develop 
the farm. During this year-long period, the agency would clear, 
drain and plough the land, enclose the fields, provide the 
plots with communication networks and, immediately before the 
rains, begin sowing operations. Contrary to other demographic 
colonization agencies, ONC, frustrated with the early settlers 
who, as we have seen, were waged, had a programme to give the 
farmer his estate upon his arrival, thus elevating him from the 
very start to the status of a colonizer rather than keeping him 
as a share-cropper. This, of course, was a device to attach the 
prospective settler to his farm, a fact that Di Crollalanza 
himself openly acknowledged66.
2. A secondary phase in which the farm would begin to 
produce a yield. At this stage, the settler, provided with the 
necessary equipment and an adequate loan, would take over the 
farm and Ethiopian labour to help him reap the first harvest 
while the building work of his house was underway; his status 
would become that of manager and director of his farm, although 
under the direct control and with the assistance of the agency 
which fixed the cultivation methods, norms of husbandry and 
care of animals, and marketed surplus products. The change in
79. CD IAO AOI 1839, p.14; Di Crollalanza, "Relazione":749. 
ONC considered a period of between six and seven years as 
sufficient to transform a peasant into a landowner [Cfr. "Av­
valoramento" :1205-6; Quaranta, op.cit., p.42].
66. CD IAO AOI 1936, ONC Azienda AO: Disciplinare prov- 
visorio per i rapporti fra l’O.N.C. ed i colonizzatori naziona- 
li, AA 10-6-1938, p.l ( henceforth: "Disciplinare"); 1839, p.14; 
Di Crollalanza, "Relazione":745; "Avvaloramento":1205.
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the settler's social status was not purely nominal; it distin­
guished his position from that of the Ethiopian, whose economic 
life, as an employee of the former, would remain tightly
dependent upon that of the farm-owner.
3. With his house built and harvest time at an end, the
settler would be joined by his family.
4. At the advanced stage, the farm’s production would 
be regularized, while the family would live on the provision 
that it had secured from the preceding year’s harvest.
The colonist would now enter the phase of redemption 
whereby, now working a productive farm, he made long term 
arrangements with the ONC for a gradual repayment of the total 
cost of his farm^. In the meantime, he continued to benefit 
from the agency’s technical and financial assistance. ONC 
registered his payments as credits in the account book, or 
1ibretto colonico. The booklet also included a cumulative
annual balance which would establish the moment when he could 
become an independent landowner, and a list of his livestoc k«.
PROBLEM OF SELECTION
The shortage of prospective settlers and the low 
quality of those remaining in the Empire was disturbing. As 
appears from a British consular report, among those who saw the 
country few were keen to remain. Out of the fifty Italian offi­
cers, prisoners and others interviewed, only one was reported 
to have wished to settle. Of another fifty, not even one wished
81. Disciplinare, pp.1,3; CD IAO AOI 1839, p.15; Di 
Crollalanza, "Relazione":749; "Avvaloramento":1205-6.
Disciplinare, p.3; CD IAO AOI 1839, p.15; Di Crollalan­
za, "Avvaloramento":1206; Mazzocchi, "Orientamenti":24-5.
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to stay. The same report suggested that a similar attitude had 
been reported by other foreigners®3.
Yet there was no dearth of applications, particular­
ly in the early years. At the end of 1936, out of 500,000 
soldiers claimed to be present in Ethiopia, 13,881 were report­
ed to have decided to remain in the Empire. In 1937, a further 
1,525 added their names. Of these only a few were judged 
suitable and accepted®*.
But the selection of the colonists proved arduous. 
In line with the Agricultural Council’s recommendation, reflec­
ting Fascist political thinking, families rather than indivi­
duals were to be recruited to ensure stability. A good war 
record was important, particularly in the Abyssinian Campaign. 
Other factors considered were the size, composition and health 
of the family; their attitude and morality, especially towards 
the Ethiopians whom they were going to ’civilize’; and their 
occupational background and experience®3. Yet political dis­
loyalty, to the same degree as mischievous behaviour towards 
the Ethiopians, constituted a sufficient ground for the dismis­
sal of a colonist and, ultimately, the dissolution of the 
contract. The same effect had circumstances that affected the 
working efficiency of the colonist’s family and compromised the 
prospects of land redemption; indiscipline towards the ONC's 
staff, quarrelsome and immoral behaviour as well as criminal 
conviction®®.
ONC’s task was not only to transform the recruits 
into small independent landowners but also instill in them
®3. F0371/20167/J56/45/1, Gibbs to PSSFA, AA 21-6-1936.
®*. Sbacchi , op.cit., p.354.
®3. CD IAO 1775, Seduta, 5-6-1937, p.3; ibidem, Relazione, 
p. 12; Disciplinare, p.2; Consulta, "L’Avvaloramento":1564; Di 
Crollalanza, "Relazione":744; "Avvaloramento":1205.
®®. Disciplinare, p.5; Di Crollalanza, "Avvaloramento":1206.
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certain mental habits such as self-discipline, thrift and
independence, that were essential for the success of the social
and political goals of colonization. Di Crollalanza stated:
In allotment of farms absolute priority 
will be given to families of colonists 
who have been fighters in East Africa 
and, among them, to those deserving it 
and having proper skills, a large family, 
enterprising spirit, and will-power to
win, with labour and adaptation to ini­
tial hardships, the ownership of land 
that will be granted to them, only in so 
far they prove themselves to be worthy of 
it87.
Despite the ONC’s claim to rigorous selection
procedures, in reality most of its recruits did not live up to 
expectations. From the start of its operation up to the end of 
1940, ONC recruited a total of 300 colonists. Of these only 93 
stayed88. Of 120-150 (figures vary) initial recruits, only 60 
persevered until the end. ONC eschewed responsibility for such 
a modest performance blaming the military authorities of the 
time for their poor method of selection. Yet of another c.150 
settlers, whom ONC claimed to have recruited "with special 
care", less than half remained.
Reports suggest that many recruits claimed to be 
farmers to escape military service and showed little or no 
interest in continuing agricultural pursuits once settled, 
attempting to enter the more rewarding field of commerce8^. 
Cases of expulsion for dishonest behaviour towards Ethiopians 
as well as fraud were not rare, and some settlers were con­
87. Di Crollalanza, "La Valorizzazione" :494.
88. CD IAO AOI 1839, p.14; Di Crollalanza, "Relazi­
one" :739,744; "Avvaloramento":1198; Villa and al., op.cit., 
p.230.
8^. Villa and al. , ibidem.
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tinuously in and out of the prison-cell9®. After a probationary 
period of about four months, ONC expelled those unable to 
transform themselves into colonizers. These included individu­
als lacking strong commitment, technical skill, and above all, 
the tendency to save money and passion for field work9^.
Di Crollalanza also sadly realized that a substan­
tial number of early recruits were attracted by the salary and 
did not intend to become life-long farmers. His repeated attack 
on the salary system seems to illustrate how strong the wage 
mentality was among the settlers. Echoing the dominant thinking 
of most Italian colonial advocates, Di Crollalanza maintained 
that for Italy, poor of capital but rich of manpower,Mtsalary 
system was costly. Its subsequent abolition caused many to 
leave93.
ONC's recruitment method and the slow pace of its 
work excluded many ex-soldiers and members of the workers 
militia, centurie lavoratori. This situation forced the govern­
ment to devise other ways to accomodate the growing number of 
applicants of this group93.
u^. Sbacchi, op.cit., p.422. Sbacchi provides extensive 
archival reference to which the present author was denied access.
91. CD IAO AOI 1839, p.14; Villa and al . , op.cit., p.230;
Di Crollalanza, "Relazione":744.
93. CD IAO AOI 1839, p.14; Di Crollalanza, "Relazione": 744; 
Mazzocchi Alemanni, " Orientamenti":24.
93. One of such initiatives was the creation of La Prima 
Centuria Agricola di Precolonizzazione in Gudar and M&kanisa, 
near AA, aimed at settling destitute peasant militia. The 
initiative, manned by the Agricultural Offices which provided 
it with inputs and management, gave mixed results. The plan was 
to develop, by the end of 1940, 43 farms [12-14 ha each] in 650 
ha at M&kanisa and 149 [10 ha each] in 1,800 ha at Gudar.
Eventually, 24 farms were developed at MSkanisa and 45 at Gudcir, 
at an average cost of £.26,000 per farm [Cfr. Cl, 10-10-1939; 
GP, 19-6-1939; Villa and al., op.cit., pp.233-5.
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ACHIEVEMENTS AND LIMITATIONS
ONC claimed that the delay in land allocation had 
serious repercussions on the rest of its activities, most 
importantly on cultivation and housing programmes. However, 
since the early days, ONC had cultivated those lands it did 
possess. Yet the task proved difficult because of ONC's skill 
shortage, scarce agricultural machinery and the relatively high 
cost of Ethiopian labour.
Both Holatta and Bishoftu farms were dominantly 
vertisol and its management remained one of ONC’s key problems. 
Vertisol is rich of organic matters and has high water-holding 
capacity. Owing to the residual moisture, vegetation was 
luxuriant even during harsh summer seasons, giving the impres­
sion even to a sophisticated observer of extremely fertile 
soil. Such appearances are deceptive, for black soil to be 
productive requires advanced managerial skills. In winter it 
has the disadvantage of water-logging which suffocates crop 
growth and development. In summer it not only shrinks but also 
cracks which leads to root pruning that eventually reduces the 
yield. Modern technology had overcome these shortcomings by 
skilful soil management techniques such as proper drainage 
using cumber-beds, Broad-Bed Furrows (BBF) and fertilizer 
application. Over the centuries the Ethiopian farmers had 
intuitively adjusted sowing dates to rainfall patterns. The 
commonly used method was late sowing and drainage. In the 
absence of comprehensive scientific studies of the local eco­
system to guide ONC's work, the Ethiopians’ farming methods 
could have been an alternative option. But having scornfully 
dismissed them as 'primitive', ONC initially followed a proced­
ure of trial and error which in most cases proved disastrous9^.
9*. CD IAO AOI 1329, A. Ciccarone, Relazione sulla missione 
di Ambo; 1337, Vasco Gatti, Attivit& del campo di orientamento 
di 01ett& nel 1937, marzo 1938; 1338, Benigno Fagotti, ONC 
azienda agraria di Bisciofth, Relazione dell'anno agrario 1937.
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However, constant crop failure made late sowing an
inevitable option. But, because of poor forecasting large areas
had to be farmed within a short period, forcing ONC to rely on 
drainage ditch and minimum tillage just to cover the seeds and 
plough in the grass. As water-logged soil made mechanical 
farming impractical, time consuming and costly, this method too 
was abandoned^.
The war-like situation withheld the release of 
tractors originally promised to ONC by the army. Broken-down 
tractors were reportedly abundant, but lack of spare parts made 
their repair difficult. The Italian tractors were not strong 
enough for tropical agriculture and ploughing virgin land^.
Lack of foreign currency made purchase of foreign 
tractors unaffordable. Although by 1939 ONC had 4 Italian
tractors of modest capacity, 40 Hanomag and 5 Caterpillar,
Ethiopian elders narrate an interesting case related to ONC’s 
farm at Bishoftu. When the first crop was sown during the big 
rains in July the harvest totally failed. Then ONC was forced 
to consult local notables. QMfiazmach ZMrr&fu, a chief renown for 
his wit and jokes, was approached. Z&rrafu was reluctant to air 
his view claiming that he was in no position to give any adequate 
advice to them as their knowledge far exceeds his own. But when 
ONC insisted, he told them that in the future they should sow not 
in July but in June, i.e. when the big rains begin. Subsequently 
over 1,000 Ethiopians were requisitioned to farm parts of the 
land that was unsuitable for tractor use by their own oxen while 
the Italians ploughed the outer stretches by tractors. The crop 
failed to grow and when the Italians reproached him for his 
incorrect information, QaRazma ch ZSrrafu ’ s answer was swift: "You 
should have known it better. Is it on my advice that you came all 
the way from Italy and occupied Ethiopia? Why do you use me as 
an excuse for the crop failure? If God has allowed too much rain 
what can I do about it? The best course to take would be to try 
it again next time but changing the date" [Information gained 
talking to one elder of the area].
Other settler farms also were confronted with similar 
problems. Cfr. CD IAO 1921, Fuzzi, Relazione del Presidente, 11- 
1-1940, pp.8-10.
CD IAO AOI 1800, Promemoria Per il Prof. Maugini; 
Carburanti agricoli in A.O.I, n.d. [31-12-1939], pp.2-3.
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because of scarcity of fuel and shortage of spare parts, they 
were not used efficiently9^. In 1938 the price for agricultural 
fuel in Italy was £.0,81 per kg, while in Ethiopia it was £.2,77 
per kg. ONC threatened to increase the price of foodstuffs 
unless the government took immediate action to lower fuel 
prices. Di Crollalanza himself brought to the attention of 
Mussolini the implications of such action to his policy of 
autarky and requested the Duce* s urgent intervention98. In July 
1938 a formula acceptable to both the farmers and the oil 
companies was sanctioned by the government99. Yet a stringent 
budget led ONC to use gas and coal instead of diesel fuel. This 
had its drawbacks, as only a few engines could be converted. 
ONC’s attempts at converting its German Hanomag tractors at 
HolStta Farm were only successful with 6 out of 24. The high 
altitude also made the tractors function at half capacity*®®.
Oxen seemed to offer better prospects and ONC made 
use of ox-power whenever possible. But since the Italian 
occupation the price of oxen had risen seven-fold and the 
Ethiopians were reluctant to sell their precious cattle*®*. 
However, ox-power, though advisable for normal ploughing of 
already broken land, was no substitute for tractors when 
farming virgin land and demanded a large supply of Ethiopian 
labour. As Di Crollalanza soon found out, the Ethiopian work—
97. Ibidem, pp. 1-3.
98. CD IAO AOI 1839, p. 19.
99. DGG 22-8-1938, no.1026: Approvazione per la esecuzione 
del DGG 23-7-1938, no.828, relativo ai prezzi dei carburanti 
agricoli, GU, III, 17 [Supl.], 6-9-1938, pp.609-13.
*®®. Sbacchi, op.cit., pp.375-6.
*®*. CD IAO AOI 1839, p. 18; Di Crollalanza, "Avvaloram­
ento" :1203.
-124-
CHAPTER IV MILITARY SETTLEMENT: ONC
force did not prove either sufficiently cheap nor abundant, 
particularly at peak periods*®3.
Cultivation proved hard, particularly at Bishoftu
Farm. Except for 200 ha ploughed in earlier years, Bishoftu
land was covered with acacia stumps cut by local people without
removing the roots. An abundance of couch-grass often demanded
two or three ploughing!. With only a short time left before the
rains, the work was carried out late into the night, using
electric light. In this way, 2,700 ha were ploughed and 2,050
ha of these were harrowed; 1,179 ha were sown, 947 ha by the
settlers and 237 ha by Ethiopians on the metayer system. Sowing
did not start until late July and, following the failure of
seeds to arrive from Kenya and Italy, using local grains. As
shown in Table VII emphasis was on diversification of crops.
Implicit in such a strategy was as much to produce locally for
domestic consumption as to minimize risk and gain useful 
103experience100.
Mechanical threshing took place in early December 
1937 amid growing jubilation and publicity, with a sample being 
despatched to the Duce. In the following years the pattern of 
cultivation did not change, except for the introduction of 
experimental crops and the diminishing size of the area under 
cultivation. From 1938 low-yielding Ethiopian wheat was replac­
ed with fast-growing and presumed rust-resistant Italian wheat, 
mentana and quaderna; and in 1939, experiments with oilseeds 
and castor oil were underway*®**. Yet despite its alleged superior 
qualities, Italian wheat’s results were poor. Soon it was 
realized that compared with Ethiopian wheat, it was vulnerable
CD IAO 1839, p.8; Di Crollalanza, "Relazione":743 
"Avvaloramento":1199,1207.
*03. ATdR 24/124, p.8; CD IAO AOI 1338, (Manusio); Mazzocch 
Alemanni,"Orientamenti":22; "Di alcuni problemi":1877; Di Crol
lalanza, "Relazione":750; "Avvaloramento":1202.
*®<l. Pankhurst, op.cit., p. 149; Sbacchi, op.cit., p.373.
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to pucinia graminis, locally known as wag - a microscopic 
parasite which lived and fed on the plant tissue, arresting the 
plant’s growth and reducing the crop’s productive potential. 
Wag brought disastrous damages in 1938-1940. In 1940 the 
pathogene’s damage to the Italian agricultural enterprise was 
so massive that the year was declared the "year of wheat 
rust"105.
Despite encouraging reports of crop yields of 30.70 
ql per ha in 1937, from Di Crol lalanza ’ s secret notes it 
appears the crop was below expectations. Depending on the area, 
the average did not exceed more than 4 and 5 ql . per ha. Di 
Crollalanza put the blame on the delay in sowing and the low 
quality of the grain used, which was provided by the military 
authorities100. In 1938, 2,500 ha were reclaimed, 1,935 ha
ploughed and only 450 ha sown with an average crop yield of 4 
ql per ha. The situation slightly improved in 1939, ostensibly 
with extensive use of Kenyan Wheat, which in a few cases proved 
to be both a high yield and rust-resistant crop. Where success­
ful, the average yield almost doubled rising to 7 ql per ha107.
1U3. CD IAO 606, Antonio Ciccarone, La coltivazione del 
frumento nell'AOI ed il problema delle ruggini, 1941; AOI 1329, 
Idem, Relazione sulla missione nel territorio di Ambo; 1221, E. 
Castellani, Ruggine e granicoltura nel1’Africa tropicale montana, 
8-3-1942.
10°. CD IAO AOI 1337 (Fagotti); 1338, Campo sperimentale di 
Biscioftii presso ONC 1937-38; 1839, p.5;
107. CD IAO Sc 1801, pp. 15-6. Kenyan Wheat was a home-grown 
variety known as Kenya NB1 and 500, Trial in 1938 at 625 ha of 
land gave a mixed result with average yield of 13,04 ql. per ha, 
with a maximum of 25,20 ql per ha and a minimum of 5,7 ql per 
ha. The difference in yield depended on a number of factors, 
among them the period of sowing, the altitude, and condition of 
the land. But the experiment was too limited to warrant it to 
be the best variety. Despite this fact, ONC, tempted by its 
resistance to rust, decided to grow exclusively this variety at 
its Holatta farm in 1940. On the other hand, a motley variety 
of indigenous wheat was tried in very small plots. Some of them 
gave much higher results than the Kenya variety. In case of S. 463 
Ethiopia variety the highest yield was 42 ql per ha and 32 ql per
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However, as the rising transport costs had made modern fer­
tilizers uneconomical, improved yield was not expected for a 
long time. As a result, ONC was forced to use manure instead. 
By the end of 1939, it had about 2,000 livestock, mainly ox and 
a few sheep, yet the manure they provided was far from adequate 
to meet the agency's needs100.
By 1939, reclamation work was underway diverting 
part of the WadScha river to a new bed made of reinforced 
concrete. The government had allocated £.6,000,000. But the work 
had only a limited success as, by 1940, only some 1,800 ha, or 
just over a tenth of the 15,000 ha available, were recovered, 
with a cost amounting to £.3,500,000 approximately. In 1939, the 
pattern of cultivation was as previous years, except for the 
additional production of oil-seeds and experiments in castor 
oil»9.
Things proceeded relatively smoothly at Holatta 
farm, as the topography of the land simplified draining opera­
tions, while the presence of the Holatta river eased irriga­
tion. As a result, Holatta farm, was more advanced, although by 
no means extensive110. In 1939, for example, out of 5,400 ha 
provided by the colonial administration, some 2,157 ha were 
sown - over 1,105 ha by Italian settlers, using 24 tractors, 
and 1,052 ha by Ethiopians operating on the metayer basis. Each 
settler was assisted by two Ethiopian families, and the pattern 
of cultivation in principle was identical to that at Bishoftu.
ha for S106 Ib.454. And yet efforts made towards the promotion
of these crops were modest.
10°. Di Crollalanza, flL'Avvaloramento" : 1202 ,1204 ; According
to Berretta there were 1,400 oxen and 400 sheep [Berretta,
op.cit., p.259].
109. ATdR 24/124, p.5; MAE, La valorizzazione, p.269; 
Pankhurst, "Italian settlement":149.
110. See Tables VI and VII.
-127-
CHAPTER IV MILITARY SETTLEMENT: ONC
TABLE VII:- TYPE OF CROPS SOWN AT ONC'S FARMS
CROP
BISHOFTU FARM 
[1937]
AREAS SOWN (Ha) 
DIRECT METAYER
HOLATTA FARM 
[1939]
AREAS SOWN 
DIRECT METAYER
WHEAT 642 76 549a 112b
CHICKPEAS 182 66 --- ---
TEF 105 32 12 305
BEANS AND PEAS — 37 354 396
BARLEY — — 111 153
VEGETABLES 10 16 — —
OATS — — 33 7
LINSEED — — 12 46
LENTILS — — 10 23
MEDICINAL PLANTS — — 9 —
NUG — — 6 3
MAIZE 4 5 1 —
MIXED HERBS 2 — — —
EXPERIMENTAL 2 — — —
DURRAH — — — 7
LUPIN — — 4 —
COLZA OIL SEED — — 4 —
TOTAL 937 232 1, 105 1, 15
a. 485 ha of Kenya and 64 Ethiopian.
b. 78 ha of Kenya and 34 Ethiopian •
Source:- AOI 1839, p.9; MAE, La valorizzazione, p
Fossa. Lavoro Italiano. o d .c i t ., pp.472-:
Pankhurst , "Italian settlement":148,150.
To offset expenditure and compensate for damages re­
sulting from delays in land assignment, in early 1938 ONC 
received exclusive rights to fish Bishoftu Lake and exploit the 
nearby forest at Holatta. These two concessions soon proved a 
source of considerable revenue. Pike and trout, introduced from 
Italy into the Lake, soon found their way to AA market. A
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saw-mill, set up at Holatta, provided both the settlement and 
the city with wood***.
Yet ONC*s achievements were negligible, as the 
figures for houses built and the colonists settled show. ONC, 
anxious to make economic housing a reality, resorted to a number 
of contractual schemes which met with limited success. Experi­
ment with piece-work contracts using mason veterans, individual 
farmers and professional contractors all foundered. Private 
companies soon discovered that building materials were scarce, 
technical experts and supervisory personnel rare, and their 
financial resources inadequate. Appalled by the immensity of the 
task and the small and uncertain prospect of profits, the 
companies invested only a fraction of their capital*12.
The Fagiuoli Company, which won the first contract, 
was a typical example. Out of £.1,000,000 it claimed to have 
invested in the contract, only £.200,000 was transferred onto 
site. The effect was to hold up salary payments, alienating the 
workers and thus causing a shortage in the work-force. As a
result, the dwellings were not completed by the date agreed,
June 1938. The contract was taken over by Romanola Construction 
Company, which made no real progress and was forced to give 
up113.
The project was not completed until 1940, two years 
behind schedule. Even then, out of the planned 600 houses, less 
than 100 were built. Of these at the end of 1940, 84 were at 
Holatta and 16 at Bishoftu, some still incomplete. Only 93 
families were settled***. Many of the. were low quality and
unhygienic, in contrast to ONC’s promise to provide its
m . Di Crollalanza, "Relazione":748; Quaranta, op.cit., 
p.43; "I centri agricoli".
**2. Sbacchi, op.cit., p.425.
**3. Ibidem, p.426.
***. Villa and al., op.cit., pp.230-1.
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colonists with economic, decent houses. After a heavy rain, 
complaints arose over the use of the local material, cega, and 
the undue economy made on cement. A number of walls collapsed, 
serious cracks appeared, and houses without ventilation were 
blackened by smoke. Lack of washing and toilet facilities caused 
considerable discomfort**3.
Such a picture contrasted with the carnival atmo­
sphere that had accompanied the departure of the colonists’ 
families from Italy. The first group of 56 families**6 sailed 
from Brindisi 20 February 1939 in the steamship Italia and 
arrived in AA on 4 March. An enthusiastic reception awaited 
them. Led by the ONC director, the column was led through the 
streets of AA lined with cheering crowds, to the workers’ 
militia camp, where they were met by the inspector of Partito 
Nazionale Fascista (PNF), the Supreme Command of the Militia, 
Government officials and church notables. Soon they were accom­
modated in the main hall, duly decorated for the occasion, 
entertained by the Viceroy, (who had earlier personally 
inspected their new homes), and fed on a lavish dinner served 
by members of the Fascist Women’s Organization. Then the convoy 
proceeded to their respective farms where the family heads were 
waiting**2.
The press was silent on the reception that awaited 
the second group, while giving a detailed account of their 
colourful and spectacular departure from Italy. 28 families, 
left in 1 May 1939 on the steamship Urania. This 95-strong group 
was made up almost entirely of women and children; 3 under the 
age of 3; 22 between 3 and 12, while the remaining 31 were 12
1 . Del Boca, op.cit., Ill, pp.204-5; Sbacchi, op.cit., 
p.427.
**6. They consisted of 79 men, 86 women and 72 children.
*17. GI_, 8-3-1939; 1L, 15-3-1939; II Messagero. 7-3-1939.
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and above^®. Their departure was also organized by Commissariato 
Per Le Migrazioni E La Colonizzazione Interne E Nell *Impero with 
the assistance of other government officials. For the send-off 
the Segretario Federale dei Fasci di Combattimento, who 
personally inspected the assistance given to the departees, the 
Head of the ONC’s press office, the senior health inspector, and 
the Head of the Department of Colonization from the Commission 
for Migration were present. These vied with officials of the 
Opera Maternita* E Infanzia, with the administrators and workers 
of the Fascist Women Organization, and Rural Housewives to 
lavish every care on the departees*^.
The festive atmosphere was believed to make less
acute the anxieties the colonists might feel at leaving home.
Everything was arranged to make the families feel important. 
When the steamship approached the port, the departees, some of 
them in the uniform of the Fascist organization to which they 
belonged, left the Casa del Hietitore (House of the Harvester), 
and walked through the streets of the city amidst chants and 
cheers of the well-wisher crowd. The local Fascio were much in 
view, with representation from all the organizations directly 
or indirectly involved in the Empire. Standing on the quay, 
carrying banners and streamers, they chanted slogans to the Duce 
and praised the Fascist regime, as local clergy blessed the 
steamship on its voyage to Meswa^®.
The new land seemed to present an opportunity to 
realize a dream. With the benevolent and paternal help of ONC,
farms had been prepared for them, complete with a house; all
supplies and facilities they needed for their new life were 
being furnished: tools, seeds, livestock and machinery, finance 
and technical advice. Most important of all, there was the
11B. Cl, 16-5-1939.
II Messagero. 2-5-1939 
Ibidem.
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promise that with patience and diligence the prize of land and 
independence could be theirs. Yet for many the "promised land" 
had its imperfections. ONC’s houses were not spacious enough to 
accommodate even an average Italian family. Up to 14 had to be 
crammed into a house which had only two small rooms and a 
kitchen which was also used as an entrance hall. In some cases, 
the situation was so bad that the MAI had to intervene directly 
requesting their enlargement, only to be rebuffed by ONC’s 
president. Di Crollalanza argued that ONC had neither anti­
cipated a presence of families larger than 5 people nor had the 
resources to build additional rooms. Yet the question resurfaced 
during epidemics of conjunctivitis and scabies. At Bishoftu, 
some houses were built close to a bog, where malarial mosquitos 
bred, and many fell victim. Some farms lacked drinking water, 
and only after a strong protest from the authorities was ONC 
forced to install a purifier^.
ONC’s settlement programme, when brought to a halt 
by war in 1941, was not promising. In both farms, there were 
only about 93 families, a fraction of what ONC had anticipated.
Of these, 81 were at Hol&tta and 12 at Bishoftu, in all number­
ing about 400 people^. Not all of these matched the ideal: four 
were young bachelors, 11 married only immediately after their 
arrival and of these six of them by proxy, there being no adult
females nearby. ONC had employed 53 artisans and 25 technici- 
123ans"J.
The cost of such settlement was high. ONC had 
increased its budget from £.250,000,000 to £.400,000,000. It had
121. Del Boca, op.cit., Ill, pp.204-5; Sbacchi, op.cit., 
p.426.
*22. Sources on the number of families actually settled are 
not unanimous. Some only 56 families and others 81 families, all 
of them at Holatta Farm [Cfr. "I centri agricoli"; CI_, 20-6-
1939]; Berretta, op.cit., p.259.
I23. Cl, 16-5-1939; 20-6-1939.
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claimed to have spent about £.55,000,000, with an average yearly 
investment of £.15,000,000; of this £.25,000,000 was spent on 
public works, such as housing, and inter-farm communication. 
Each hectare was brought into production at an estimated cost 
of £.1,000-2,000 - an average cost of £.98,200-£.109,560 per farm, 
not including the expense of transporting families and develop­
ing the social and economic infrastructure of the area and the 
land cost^*.
TABLE VIII:- ONC FARMER'S IN CREDIT
NUMBER OF FARMS AMOUNT IN CREDIT (£.)
3 5,000 - 10,000
13 11,000
9 11,000 - 15,000
5 15,000 - 20,000
1 25,000
3 25,000 - 30,000
3 30,000 and Over
Source:- Sbacchi (1975), op.cit., p.452.
The ONC colonists enjoyed a privileged status. They 
were given their farms on credit and were considered owners. 
They paid no interest as it was paid by the AA government. Such 
favourable conditions enabled a number of peasants to establish 
some credit towards the payment of their farms. Of these, one 
family at least entirely discharged its debts; another ten were 
on the verge of being assigned land ownership. As demonstrated 
in Table VIII, another 37 had made considerable progress towards 
this same end^. Yet they did so chiefly aided by their easy
^ . "Notiziario agricolo commerciale", AC, XXXII, 2, 
(febbraio 1938):90; Sbacchi, op.cit., pp.443,446.
Sbacchi, op.cit., p.452.
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access to the AA market where a very high price was fetched for 
their crops, and the availability of cheap Ethiopian labour. 
Their activities provided the Italian newspapers with many 
interesting photographs illustrating their sacrifices and 
hard-work as pioneers in developing virgin Ethiopian soil. But 
their meagre contribution to the army’s food supply did not 
greatly reduce imports from Italy1^ .
The ONC only realized a minute proportion of what it 
once hoped to achieve. With it the dream of creating a steady 
independent yeoman peasantry failed. At conceptual level, the 
scheme seemed perfect and a few doubted its plausibility. But 
a number of factors militated to make the plan more of a compli­
cated nightmare than a reality, thus frustrating the fruition 
of ONC’s well-planned settlement dream. Most of them were of the 
Italians own making. Of course, the very short period that IEA 
lasted will not warrant one to make a conclusive judgement. And 
yet there were strong forces at work that would have thwarted 
the materialization of the plan. The government’s decision in 
1938 to embark on other settlement projects that would cater for 
the needs of the destitute army veterans and peasants militia 
was largely symptomatic of its awareness and dismay with the 
inadequacies of ONC's performance.
. E. Weise, "Ethiopia Now", Harper’s Magazine. CXV 
(1937):415-6; New Times And Ethiopia News. 24-3-1945.
CHAPTER V
DEMOGRAPHIC COLONIZATION: REGIONAL SETTLEMENTS
HISTORICAL SKETCH
Another scheme through which the Fascist regime 
attempted to develop a stable white population in its East 
African Empire was regional settlement. As we saw in Chapter 
III, this was the brain child of Lessona. With a few exceptions, 
it won wide support among the Italian elite, and from the outset 
Mussolini himself showed great enthusiasm. As its central 
objective, the programme sought to populate specific zones in 
Ethiopia with colonists from the more densely inhabited 
provinces of Italy, region by region, reproducing the atmosphere 
of the mother country from which they sprang. The new regions 
of the Empire would mirror those of the mother country which 
bore the same name*.
This scheme not only endorsed the Italian claims to 
the uniqueness of their colonization techniques, but also held 
certain features that seemed to guarantee its feasibility: the 
settlement of those with common habits and traditions in a 
region identical in topography and climate to their Italian home 
would foster social cohesion; and conflicts with regional roots 
would be avoided. In the long term, a stable link would be 
maintained between the metropolis and the Empire through a 
continuous flow of ideas and men between the regions2.
K FO 371/22020/J368/40/1, Lord Perth to Anthony Eden, Rm 
22-1-1938; A. Maugini, "Primi orizzonti della valorizzazione 
agricola", Autarchia Alimentare. (June 1938):19 (henceforth 
"Primi Orizzonti"); Enrico Cerulli, "La colonizzazione del 
Harar", AAI. VI, 1 (1943):71; CD IAO 1921, Incartamenti e
relazioni varie relativi all 'Ente di Colonizzazione ’Romagna 
di Etiopia’(ECRE) 1944, P.8; Marco Pomilio, "Problemi e realta’ 
dell’ Impero nel pensiero di Attilio Terruzzi", Autarchia 
A1imentare. (ottobre 1938):39; Giuseppe Pini, ""La terra 
ricchezza dell’Impero: Romagna d ’Etiopia", L’Azione Coloniale.
22-6-1939; Lessona (1958), pp.283-4.
. Lessona (1958), p.284; G. Pistolese, "Problemi dell 
’Impero", EX, Luglio 1938.
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High on the list of benefits the regime hoped to reap 
from the programme of regional settlement was national and 
international publicity. The Fascist press played up the scheme 
as a new chapter in the methodology of Empire building. As the 
Rome correspondent of the Sunday Times reported with its "con­
stant discussion" and * * press-agenting* ’ , popular interest in 
the Empire appeared overwhelming3.
But approval of the scheme was by no means univer­
sal. Initially weak and scattered, dissension increasingly 
gathered momentum and by 1939 was strong enough to challenge the 
entire concept of regional settlement openly in Parliament. As 
appears in the notes of the meeting held on 24 October 1939 by 
the IEA Affairs Legislation Committee of the House of the Fa­
scists' Second Corporations, the opposition's view was that 
regional settlements, in the long term, tended to be nationally 
divisive and racially degenerating. Accordingly, regional 
groupings would foster endogamy which, in the opposition’s view, 
militated against Fascist racial doctrine. Effects from a 
language point of view were considered to be even more damag­
ing. With regional settlements local dialects would flourish at 
the expense of a national language. As a result, national 
integration would be impaired and communication between 
different groups become difficult: different regional groups, 
when dealing with each other, would find Amharic the best means 
of common expression. In view of such a dreadful prospect, the 
opposition, with considerable sympathy from the rest of the 
House, called for a policy review, urging regional settlements 
to be replaced by nationwide groupings as in Libya4. Notwith­
standing considerable sympathy, the opposition was not able to 
reverse the situation.
. Sunday Times. 23-1-1938.
4. CD IAO 1921, Meregazzi to MAI: modificazioni al DL 6- 
12-1937, no.2300, sulla costituzione dell’ECRE.
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International reaction to the government’s publicity 
was mixed. Some journalists with Fascist sympathies were en­
thusiastic. In her admiration for the plan, Diel seemed to echo 
the sentiment shared by most: it was "the first time in the
history of Empire building" that such "far-reaching methods" had 
been employed which "in favourable circumstances ... enable 
hundreds of thousands of Italians, notably small farmers, to 
make their homes in IEA"^ . Other parties were more cautious, 
among them the British Foreign Office. One official remarked 
that the scheme was "an interesting experiment" but emphasized 
the practical difficulties militating against its success, 
noting that "the lot of the pioneers will remain far from 
easy"®.
Despite its enthusiasm for the scheme, in practice 
the government’s behaviour was characterized by much publicity 
and little action. To the annoyance of its supporters and 
despite strong pressure, the government failed to outline how 
regional settlement would be translated into practice, not 
encouraging mass settlements other than that of ONC^ . Obstacles 
such as proof of financial and technical fitness discouraged 
many potential applicants. State support was refused for 
destitute emigrants on the grounds of financial stringency®. A 
set of provisos meant to preserve economic order and stability
. Diel, op.cit., p.70
®. Perth to Eden, Rm 22-1-1938.
CD IA0 1936, Lessona to GG, Rm 10-3-1937; Graziani to 
GGAOI, AA 8—A—1937.
®. CD IAO 1854, Lessona to GGAOI, Direttive sui problemi 
della colonizzazione agricola e del 1’agricoltura indigena, Rm 
29-5-1937, p.4; MAI to GGAsGnGmHrMg, Rm 9-5-1937 (hereafter MAI 
to GGAOI, Rm 9-5-1937).
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in the colony forbade land transactions0 and angered many 
willing settlers10.
Practical steps towards the formation of the much- 
awaited and much-publicized regional agencies proceeded at slow 
pace as internal squabbles handicapped the work of the Agricul­
tural Council and, only towards the end of June 1937, was 
discussion on the matter at an advanced stage11. The deadlock 
ended on 13 August with the announcement of the formation of 
three regional colonization agencies, with rough details of 
their areas of operation.
Each agency was promoted by a prominent Fascist 
personality: Ente di Colonizzazione Romagna di Etiopia, or
Romagna Colonization Agency of Ethiopia, was Mussolini's. Having 
welcomed from the onset the regional idea, Mussolini wanted 
people from Romagna, his own native province, to be the first 
settlers. So Fossa, a person in his confidence, was given orders 
to make preparations for the dispatch of colonists1^. Ente di 
Colonizzazione Puglia di Ethiopia (ECPE) was the brain-child of 
the Secretary of National Fascist Party, the Apulian Achille 
Starace who distinguished himself as a leader of Colonna Celere, 
a black shirt militia legendary for its exploits during the
. DGG 4-10-1936, no.95: Norme che evitano nell'attuale
periodo di sviluppo industriale e commerciale dei territori 
dell'AOI ingiustificati accapparramenti di terreni, GU, 11/20, 
16-10-1937.
10. The decree was unbanned within a month [Cfr. DGG 13-11- 
1937, no.805: Abrogazione dell’art. 1 del DGG 4-10-1937, no.95, 
riflettente le norme intese ad evitare ingiustificati accappar- 
ramenti di terreno, GU, 11/23, 1-12-1937] to be re-imposed, a few 
month later, in a modified form [DGG 3-3-1938, no.155: Abrogazio­
ne dei decreti vicereali no.95 del 4-10-1937, no.805 del 13-11- 
1937, ed emanazione di nuove norme disciplinanti la materia delle 
alienazioni dei terreni, sia a scopo agricolo che a scopo 
edilizio, GU, 111/10, 16-5-1938].
n. CD IAO 1936, IA to GG, Rm 22-6-1937; The Times. 20-10-
1937.
CD IAO 1936, Lessona to GG, Rm 13-8-1937.
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Italo-Ethiopian war13. Ente di Colonizzazione Veneto di Etiopia 
(ECVE) was presided over by Bergamese aristocrat, Giacomo Suardo 
(1883-1947), a man with a colourful political background and 
then vice president of the Upper House, II Senate^1*. Other 
agencies never went beyond the planning stage13.
With the Royal Decree of December 1937, whose 
enactment was delayed largely due to sluggish bureaucracy and 
interdepartmental fighting over finance, the agencies gained 
legal status. In addition to defining operational areas, the 
Decree allocated resources and set out programmes for each 
agency. ECRE's sphere of activity was the governorship of Amara 
and the region of Wag&ra was allotted as its specific field of 
operation. ECPE was given the governorship of H^rSr and its site 
of settlement was the C&rcar highlands. ECVE, whose activity 
never went further than the planning stage, was allocated the
. Ibidem; Starace's exploits is described in his book "La 
marcia su Gondar della Colonna Celere e le successive operazioni 
nell* Etiopia occidentale. (Milano: Mondadori 1936).
Lessona to GG, Rm 13-8-1937.
13. Ibidem; other planned agencies of regional or national 
character included: "Ente di Colonizzazione Sicilia d*Etiopia", 
financed by Banco di Napoli [Cfr. "II finanziamento degli enti 
di colonizzazione demografica in AOI", REAI. 27, 2, (Febbraio
1939):155]; "Ente di Colonizzazione Piemonte d ’Etiopia" and 
"..Liguria d'Etiopia" ["Problemi del 1 * Impero", EI_» (Luglio 
1938)]; "Aosta d'Etiopia" and "Marche d'Etiopia" fL *Azione 
Coloniale. 28-3-1940; Impero E Autarchia. 9-5-1940]. But 
practical steps were taken only towards the Italian Overseas 
Colonization Agency or, "Ente di Colonizzazione degli Italiani 
all'Estero". Even though the agency gained its legal status, 
practically no progress was made with exception of transfer of 
about 100 workers who remained at May Habar, in Eritrea [Cfr. 
Legge 25-8-1940, no. 1415, GU, 23-10-1940, no. 249; GUGS. V/48, 
27-11-1940; Agenzia Le Colonie. 9-7-1940; L'Azione Coloniale.
12-8-1940; CD I AO 1916; CE, 2-12-1939; PI, 4-1-1940; GV, 9-1- 
1940; Regime Fascista. 24-10-1940; Rivista dellle Colonie. agosto
1940] .
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governorship of the GS, but without any defined site of 
settlement1®.
The chief purpose of each agency was to settle in the 
shortest possible time a maximum possible number of colonial 
families as small farm owners'1. The initial target was 1,000 
families within a period of six years1®. The official view was 
that within a few years the colonists, with state support and 
favourable economic conditions, would be strong enough to 
counterbalance the local population and make the Empire Italian 
in fact as well as in law.
On the domestic front, the political authorities used 
the settlement programme as a safety valve to eliminate 
unemployment and quell political discontent. Since 1927, rural 
unemployment in Italy had been rapidly increasing. A down turn 
coincided with the mobilization for the Ethiopian campaign. 
During the winters of 1931-1935, between ten and fifteen per 
cent of the agricultural workforce was unemployed, a figure 
above that of industrial workers10. It was in the regions where 
the companies recruited their settlers, that there was a high 
rate of peasant unemployment and braccianti, day/seasonal 
labourers. These traditionally had been centres of social 
discontent and radical politics.
*®. CD IAO 1921, Decreti costitutivi degli enti di coloniz­
zazione Puglia, Romagna, Veneto d’Etiopia; See the same in:- 
GURI. 25-1-1938; "Atti e Documenti", REA1. 26, 2 (Febbraio
1938):249-57:- "no.2300: Costituzione di ECRE":249-51; "no.2314: 
Costituzione di ECVE":252-4; "no.2325: Costituzione di ECPE":255-
7 (henceforth, Atti e Documenti
DIM 18-4-1939: Approvazione dello statuto dell’ECPE:- 
GURI. 27-4-1939; REAI. XXVII, 6 (giugno 1939):769-74; GU, 111/22,
16-4-1939 (hereafter DIM 18-4-1939: Approvazione); DM 10-1-1941: 
Approvazione dello statuto dell’ECVE, GURI. 7-5-1941 (hereafter 
DM 10-1-1941: Approvazione).
10. Maugini , "Primi Ori zzonti " : 19 ; The Times. 18-1-1938.
10. Segr&, op.cit., p.82.
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A notable example was the region of Veneto. Accord­
ing to a report by the local party official to the Secretary of 
the National Party in Rome, in 1937 the conditions in the region 
were explosive with incidents involving "singing of subversive 
songs". By 1939, crowds of unemployed peasants and workers were 
reported to be hanging around government buildings and Party 
offices "with an impatience and restlessness that cannot be 
further ignored"20. Not surprisingly, Veneto had been one of the 
largest suppliers of colonists for the settlement programme in 
Libya. In 1938, 57% of the settler families and in 1939, 62% 
were immigrants from that region21. "Tens of thousands of 
peasants and workers" were thought to be eager to migrate to the 
Empire from this same region22.
SETTLEMENT AREAS: PHYSICAL LANDSCAPE
The Fascist propaganda claimed that demographic 
colonization was carefully directed from above and regulated in 
the smallest detail23. The settlement zones were chosen for their 
healthy climate, high yield, and proximity to markets and major 
communication centres2*1. With its rolling countryside and a 
salubrious climate likened to that of May in Italy, WMgMra, the 
ECRE*s settlement area, appeared to perfectly meet these 
requirements. As defined in RDL of 6-12-1937, the boundaries of
*u. PNF Bll, Situazione politica delle provincie, (Padova 
1928-1942); B26 (Treviso).
21. Segr&, op.cit., pp.140-1 where he gives the statistical 
data of emigration to Libya from each region.
22. PNF Bll, Situazione Politica.
23. Sunday Times. 23-1-1938.
20. CD IAO 1936, Ministro to GG, Rm 4-6-1937; [Carlo
Giglio], "Importanza del1’ambiente fisico-agrologico-economico 
nella colonizzazione demografica", REAI. 27, 1, (gennaio
1939):29-38 (hereafter "Importanza").
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Wagara were marked to the north by the eastern and western high
plateau of the Sem6n province, to the east by the regions of
Balas6 and to the west by the westerly slopes of the great Bara
valley and the plains of Kosoyy£, the sub-district of Amba Ghi-
yorghis. It consisted of an area of 80 km long and 25 km wide25.
Its rich and black soil was compared by Almagia to the wheat
lands of Russia25; it had plenty of water, rainfall averaging
1,200-1,300 mm a year, and excellent communication via the
Gondar-Asmara road, then being asphalted. Though timber was
scarce, there were numerous wild pine trees, while lime was
available in the valley of Bara, west of Dabat, an important
market on the road. It was ideal for the cultivation of both
grain and vegetables, and crop failures were almost unknown.
Moreover, there was good pasturage and cattle, goats, donkeys,
horses, mules and sheep were in abundance. The highlands were
well-suited for the rearing of long-haired sheep, and the
lowlands for cultivation of cotton, rice, peanuts and coffee.
The existence of wild grapevines suggested that vineyards could
be established in warmer, more sheltered places. It was also
pointed out that such spots were favourable for mulberry trees,
and hence for raising silkworms, while the abundant rainfall
afforded possibilities of hydro-electric development in the
Sem6n area22. The Head of Amara government agricultural service,
Mario Pavirani, summed up:
The advantages deriving from such initia­
tive (demographic settlement) should be 
regarded as of a supreme importance, and, 
thus, of immense benefit for the function 
and influence in the Empire of the colony 
of the Amara. WagSra on account of its
25. RDL 6-12-1937, no. 2300: Costituzione dell’ECRE, GURI . 
no. 19, 25-1-1938; CD IAO 1806, Mario Pavirani, Uogher&, aprile 
1937; GAm DAF Commissione Indemaniamenti, Accertamenti di terreni 
demaniali: rilievi di campagna eseguiti nel1'UogherA, Gn 14-12- 
1937.
26. Fossa (1938), p.503.
27. Fossa (1938), pp.504-6; MAE, La val ori zzazione, p.294.
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happy location would become a reservoir 
of resources and foodstuff products of 
absolute importance to all future pro- 
bl ems20.
Wagara was estimated to have approximately 200,000 
ha of colonizable lands. ECRE was to make use of between 
50,000-60,000 ha for the settlement of 1,000 Italian peasant 
families with an almost equal number of Ethiopians as labour 
reserve2^. Wagara was not chosen in a casual fashion. As Giusep­
pe Pini, the Head of the Supreme Council for the Public Work 
Division30, pointed out Wagara had a number of characteristics 
in common with Italy’s province of Romagna gently undulating 
land and vast horizons3*. Most of the construction workers on 
the Gondar-Asmara motorway were from Romagna, and the remarkab­
ly good state of their health suggested that the climate suited 
peasants from the region32.
The land for settlement by the ECPE, the CMrcar 
highlands consisted of two types: to the east there was a
broken country with an average altitude of about 2,200 m and a
2B. CD IA0 AOI 1806, p.7.
20. CD IAO 1921, Programma d’azione per il primo anno 
d*attivit&, 7-1-1938 (henceforth: Fuzzi, Programma 1938); Pini, 
op.cit..
30. Sezione del Consiglio Superiore dei Lavori Publici.
3*. Pini , op. cit. .
32. Ibidem. The original plan was to begin settlement in 
the nearby AchafMr region where it was thought that about 180,000 
ha of state land with excellent agricultural potential was 
available. AchafcLr was a guerrilla stronghold, and as punishment 
the entire region was declared public domain. In addition to 
being malaria infested, the area was unsuitable for crop cultiva­
tion, with poor communications and difficult access to market. 
Owing to these factors the plan was dropped. [DGov 5-6-1937, no. 
46144: loco.cit; CD IAO Ex AOI 600, Relazione sul1’attivitA
svolta dalla sezione della colonizzazione dalla data dell’occupa- 
zione al 28-2-1939, Gn 4-3-1939, p.8; UAGn, 
"L’Acefer",op.cit.:56,59; Le Colonie. 19-10-1938; CE, 27-9-1938; 
MAE, La valorizzazione, p.294],
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cool but temperate climate; to the west was warmer undulating 
land with an average altitude of 1,750 m. In all it covered a 
total area of 285,000 ha, a quarter of it cultivable. Initial 
settlement was to start in the western part as it was judged to 
offer a better climate, and more abundant supplies of construc­
tion materials, particularly lime and limestone. It was sparse­
ly populated thus necessitating less expropriation of Ethio­
pians. Yet all the land was considered fertile. The luxurious 
vegetation and the variety of crops under cultivation, includ­
ing wheat, barley, oats, maize, tef, durrah, chick-peas, 
lentils, beans, peas, onions, garlic, as well as coffee and 
bananas, citrus fruit, castor and linseed oil, tobacco and 
cotton were evidence of immense productive potential. As the 
area was located close to both the AA-HHrSr road and the AA- 
Djibouti railway, communications were favourable. It was also 
within easy access to the nearby markets of Badassa and GaiHm- 
so, two centres that had been considerably developed after the 
occupation33.
GS, the vast south-westerly governorship, allotted 
for settlement to Italians from Veneto, had excellent agricul­
tural conditions. It included areas of rich cultivation yield­
ing all kinds of cereals as well as coffee and cotton. Mario 
dei Gaslini described it as "perhaps the most suitable in all 
IEA for numerous and gradual national settlement"3*, a view 
shared by the journalist, Poison Newman, who saw it as "the 
best region for settlement" where the soil was of "exceptional
33. CD IAO Hr 1847, Propriety terriera nel Cercer; Giambat­
tista Giannoccaro, "Prime tappe dell’Ente "Puglia d’Etiopia" in 
AOI", Africa Italiana. I, 1, (novembre 1938):25-26; "Import­
anza" :37-8.
3*. Dei Gaslini M. , "Colonizzazione del GS", RSAI. 11
(1937):182.
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quality and the climate most suitable for Europeans"35. And yet 
colonization in the GS area proceeded at a slow pace. This was 
largely because the territory was the last to be occupied 
militarily and was little known to the Italians despite the 
presence for several decades of the Consolata Mission who 
played a significant role in the occupation3*. There were few 
roads and it was far removed from the sea.
The situation was further compounded by ECVE’s 
internal organizational problems and political complications 
between Rome and AA. As a result the agency never set foot in 
GS37. Instead, two different forms of demographic enterprise 
emerged locally: De Rege Colonization Agency (EDR)3®, set up by 
the government of the GS, operated at Borft, about 10 km. from 
Jimma, on 2,000 ha. On the outskirts of Jimma along the road to 
Bonga, Jimma Agricultural Consortium (CAG)39, was set up by the
35. P. Newman (1938), p. 104.
3*. Del Boca, op.cit., Ill, pp.26-34.
37. Not only the agency failed to win the co-operation of 
the colonial authorities inside the Empire but its President 
Renzo Morigi, ex-secretary of the Fascist Party, had poor 
entrepreneurial skills and hardly any tangible programme. This 
was sufficient enough to allay the confidence of the agency’s 
financing institution, INFAIL. Cfr. Del Boca, op.cit., Ill, 
p.207. The Fascist media on the occasion of the President’s visit 
to Ethiopia continued trumpeting for a month with the news of him 
obtaining between 20-25,000 ha of land on Jimma-Bonga road, which 
was sufficient enough to set up the first 500 farms [Cfr. La 
Tribuna. 31-1-1940; Corriere Padano. 28-3-1940; L ’Azione Colonia­
le. 4-4-1940]. But Morigi’s report to the Presidential Council 
points out that his attempt to secure a meagre 4,000 ha around 
Jimma was frustrated by the local authorities: (Cfr. CD IAO 1918, 
Documenti e relazioni relative all ’ECVE: Verbale della seduta 
del Consiglio di Presidenza in data maggio 1941, p.9.
38. Gestione di Colonizzazione Thesaurus De Rege,
39. Comprensorio Del Consorzio Agricolo Di Gimma.
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local Fascist Party*0. These two agencies operated in a quite 
different framework from the other three regional bodies**. The 
areas they operated were acclaimed as "healthy, with abundant 
waters, extremely fertile with good topography and extensive 
irrigation potential"*2.
Contrary to official claims, the choice of demogra­
phic colonization centres was not preceded by an accurate and 
serious study because of inadequate financial, technical and 
personnel resources. The planners were lured by effortlessly 
growing vegetation rather than realistic edaphic and climatic 
assessment. Like ONC’s settlement centres, the soil of the 
areas was predominantly vertisol, which required management
The war stopped a number of agencies promoted by the 
Fascist Party in other parts. Two such were Arnaldo Mussolini 
at AsmSra and Azienda Agricola Adigrat in Tegray province [Cfr. 
Le Colonie. 18-3-1939; CM, 21-1-1939].
**. Even though a particular area predominated, the 
composition of EDR’s and CAG’s settlers had more a national 
rather than regional character. As its name suggests, the CAG 
was a co-operative to help those with limited technical and 
financial resources to develop their farms [Cfr. Berretta,
op.cit, pp.181-3].
*2. In the sources the two agencies are dealt with simul­
taneously and periodicals often confuse them. EDR was originally 
known as Cavallieri di Neghel li, an infantry unit led by
Thesaurus De Rege who died as war hero in May 1936 while fighting
at Malka Gulba, in GS. CAG was set up in April 1938 to man
Pattuglie Del Grano or, Wheat (Production) Task Force, a farm 
established by 30 demobilized Blackshirts in May 1937 with the 
view of promoting wheat cultivation [CD IAO 1822 RGGS UA, 
AttivitA agricola esistenti nel territorio del GGS, gennaio 1940, 
p. 2-3; For a detailed account of the development of EDR and its 
initial tormented life see: 1821, Esperienze della gestione di 
una agenzia di colonizzazione demografica, gennaio 1940; Gm 2919, 
Comprensorio di colonizzazione demografico De Rege in Gimma, n.d. 
See also: Gm GS 845, Brevi Notizie sul comprensorio "De Rege" - 
Gm, 1948; L ’Azione Coloniale. 30-11-1939; CE, 3-12-1939; GI, 27- 
11-1938; GP, 9-5-1940; I0M, 20-1-1940; II Mattino. 24-11-1939; 
II Messagero. 4-7-1939; PI, 23-6-1938; 24-11-1939]; La Tribuna,
23-12-1939; Villa and al., op.cit., pp. 235-6.
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skills of the type that contemporary technology could not
offer, and extensive use of labour**.
WagSra was relatively densely populated by the
AmhAras, who were dedicated agriculturalists and cattle breed­
ers^. So attached were these people to their lands, that even 
the tangible gains offered by road construction were unable to 
lure them forcing the authorities to recruit Sudanese labour­
ers. Public land in the area accounted for a few thousand 
hectares, scattered in plots of various sizes located at a 
considerable distance from each other**. Italian peasant settle­
ment in the area could not be effected without massive evacua­
tion of the existing owners from their land. Without such 
measures, settlements confined exclusively to the existing 
public domain would not be economically viable**. In addition, 
W&gcira was one of the strongholds of national resistance. At
the centre of ECPE's settlement, the presence of unhealthy
marshlands demanded extensive reclamation*^. Like with the case 
of ECRE, the settlement of EDR required massive displacement of 
the existing land-owners*8.
The settlement centres were scattered over a wide 
area. For the colonial administration in Ethiopia, who had the
,j. Interview with Mr Yaqob Edjamo, crop-physiologist and 
agronomist 21-5-1988; Giuseppe Rocchetti to the author, Firenze
17-5-1984.
**. The population, predominantly Christian with some 
Muslims and FHlashas, was estimated to be more than 35.000 at
about between 20-25 person per sqkm [Cfr. CD IAO 1111, p. 12;
this conflicts with the figure given by another source according 
to which the population was no more than between 15-20,000 with 
density of 7-10 per sqkm. See "Importanza", p.36].
*5. CD IAO 1111, p.11.
*6. Ibidem, p.13; CD IAO 1806, p.4.
*7. "I servizi sanitari", AAI. Ill, (1940) :783; CS, 27-1-
1940.
*8. CD IAO Gm 2919, pp.1-2; 1916, p.13.
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task of building the social and economic infrastructures and 
providing protection, this was a heavy burden on its already 
extremely tight human and financial resources**.
These factors were the focal points over which a 
major clash developed between the Duke of Aosta and the MAI. 
For the Duke of Aosta, peasant settlement scheme as an answer 
to Italy's superfluous labour force was a commendable enterpri­
se, but it was far too ambitious for the available finances. He 
saw capitalist initiative as the best option for initial 
development; with such a scheme the government would shoulder 
less responsibility and be in a position to direct its resour­
ces to more urgently needed areas; it would also allow a 
breathing space until complex problems of land tenure were 
studied and legally regulated, and give enough time to es­
tablish domainial lands and to draw up realistic plans. Yet the 
Duke of Aosta's appeal for a moratorium on demographic coloni­
zation was rejected by the MAI. Then he urged that, in line 
with the early plan, ShHwa be declared the first zone of 
colonization in view of forming around the capital of the 
Empire a belt of Italian population, and that the three agen­
cies, - Romagna, Puglia and Veneto — , should
concentrate their work in ShMwa where 
I'll be able to provide them further 
facilities, but for the future, unless 
instructed otherwise, I will restrict 
myself to the above criteria which, 
understandably, do not preclude small 
private initiatives in the agricultural 
fields at the periphery of the main urban 
centres of each governorship or commis­
sariat; but I repeat no dispersal of 
efforts and scattering of our farmers 
over different and remote regions*®.
*®. Villa and al. , op.cit., pp.225-6.
*®. Ibidem; CD IAO AOI 1936, Amedeo di Savoia to MAI., AA 
5-1-1938.
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The MAI acknowledged the merits of directing all
colonial activities to Sh&wa; yet it was by no means prepared
to countenance a major shift of policy on the grounds that:
the programmes of the demographic coloniz­
ation agencies of Romagna, Puglia and 
Veneto - wanted by the Duce and organised 
by this Ministry in collaboration with the 
National Party - are already in an ad­
vanced stage of elaboration and implemen­
tation as experts have already studied on 
the spot the possibility of cultivation 
and the settlement of the colons and the
respective zones have been so far allott­
ed; thus it seems impossible to turn back 
and concentrate the activities of the 
agencies in ShSwa. As to the political- 
military situation demanding the formation 
of a strong national nuclei in ShHwa, it 
should be borne in mind that this need 
equally exists in the other regions, 
which, in fact, have far better agricul­
tural and climatic conditions. And there­
fore it is important not to divert from 
the guidelines of march marked by the 
Duce, and in the meantime colonization in 
Sh&wa, as the GG, rightly proposes, should 
be stepped up at its fullest strength, 
within the framework of the general needs 
of the Empire. It seems that the most 
suitable ente for such an objective is ONC 
which is locally better equipped and whose 
activity at present is the subject of so 
warm commendation by H. E. the Head of the
r i ^
Government01.
On the whole, the Ministry’s position prevailed, but only after 
it had agreed to cut the size of the settlers of both the ECRE 
and ECPE, and defer indefinitely the activities of the ECVE5*.
51. CD IAO AOI 1936, Terruzzi to GG, Rm 10-1-1938.
5*. Ibidem, Amedeo di Savoia to MAI, AA 15-1-1938; Villa
and al., op.cit., p.253.
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OLD IDEAS IN NEW CLOTHING: STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS
In carrying out their mission, the colonization 
agencies were assisted by a substantial legacy of ideas and 
institutions. The classic point of reference in formulating 
their policies, in overall practice although not in detail, was 
the work of the colonization agencies in Libya. In this res­
pect, they were less of an innovation than an imitation of a 
number of mass settlement agencies operating in Libya. What 
made them different was their regional character and the nature 
of their finance. Other variations owed much to the different 
political and environmental settings in which they operated.
The most obvious sign of the close relationship 
between the Libyan colonization companies and those of the 
Empire was in their bureaucratic structures5*. The organization­
al pattern of each agency rested on the legal framework laid 
down by RDL 6-12-1937. The decree established, in addition to 
the office of a President, a Board of Directors, an Advisory 
Committee and a Board of Auditors, leaving to the bye laws of 
each agency the definition of their respective fields of 
action. The President was responsible for all the agency’s 
affairs and decided matters of ordinary administration5*. But 
supreme power was vested in the board of directors, known as 
Consiglio del Presidentet or the Presidential Council, in which 
were represented, in addition to the Ministries of AI, Finance 
and Interior, all the organizations that were concerned, 
directly or indirectly, with colonization and agricultural 
development55. The Council set the general guidelines of colon­
5*. For the Libyan experience see Segrfc, op.cit., pp.89-101.
5*. DIM 18-4-1939: Approvazione; IAO CD 1921, Incartamenti: 
Statuto giuridico e trattamento economico (hereafter Statuto 
giuridico); DM 10-1-1941.
55. In addition to the said ministries, these included: 
National Fascist Party, General Command of M.V.S.N., Commissariat 
For Internal Immigration and Colonization, CFA and CFLI and an
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ization, appointed higher officers, decided on budgetary 
matters and, whenever consulted by the President, expressed its 
views on specific issues. It operated from Rome headquarters5*. 
As a legislative body, the glaring shortcoming of the Council 
was the absence of representatives from the colonies themsel­
ves. This was rectified only in early 1940. Such failure to 
take into account the needs of the colonies was one of many 
stumbling blocks in the smooth development of the programmes.
The Advisory Committee resided in the area of the 
concession and as such it was meant to fulfil the shortcomings 
of the Council, based at a remote distance from the centre of 
colonization5^. The Advisory Committee was a consultative body 
of government officials and experts living in the colony. Its 
task was to aid the President on a wide range of issues related 
to colonization. Thus it was not a decision making body nor had 
it any power on budgetary matters58. The Board of Auditors, 
composed of three members, was responsible for the agency’s 
finances. At the end of each financial year, it presented the 
annual budget for the examination of the Council who, together
expert on matters of colonization.
5*. While the composition of the Advisory Committee remained 
constant in all the agencies, that of the Presidential Council 
varied. So we had 9 members for the ECRE, 11 for ECVE and 12 for 
ECPE in the Presidential Council and seven for all three in the 
Advisory Committee [Cfr. Atti e Documenti].
5*. Ibidem.
58. IAO CD 1921, Incartamenti, 1944, pp. 5-9. In this
incomplete document the opposition’s view is briefly described;
the MAI is challenged to explain clearly: the financial implica­
tions that the enti would have on the State treasury; excessive
bureaucratic presence in the Presidential Council and the reasons
for exclusion in other boards of institutions that are more
closely affected; on how the difficult issues of land shortage
and expropriation were going to be solved.
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with the report of the auditors, passed it on for MAI ap­
proval59.
The agency official most directly in touch with the 
day-to-day technical and administrative activities of the 
agency in the colony was the director, or direttore, or vice 
direttore tecnico, With the help of his immediate staff, he 
kept the President informed on the agency’s conduct and, 
whenever necessary, proposed to him a programme of action for 
the agency in its concession*®. The exceptions to these general 
rules discussed so far were EDR and CAG, who operated under the 
management of their local agricultural office with rules laid 
down by the Viceroy*1.
In the Presidential Council and advisers were merged 
various political, civil, military and labour organs. This 
demonstrates both the regime’s predilection for bureaucracy and 
its desperate attempt to involve the whole nation and divergent 
interests in the enterprise. Such a scheme was seen as a show­
case of the harmonious working of the corporative state. In 
practice, however, the relationship between different office 
holders and institutions towards the colonization agencies 
remained ill-defined and was often a source of serious fric­
tion. The president of ECPE, Giambattista Giannoccaro, ran the 
agency as if it were his own personal fief and delegated no 
authority**. Until his forcible removal from office, the direct-
59. CD IAO 1921, Incartamenti: Statuto dell’ECRE; DM 18-4-
1939.
*®. CD IAO 1921, Incartamenti: Ordinamento degli uffici;
Hr 1992, ECPE, Ordinamento tecnico amministrativo contabile, 
allegato b, n.d..
**. DGG 16-10-1939, no.987: Istituzione presso il GGS dellla 
gestione di colonizzazione <De Rege^ per la valorizzazione agraria, 
GU, IV/26, [Supl.], 19-10-1939; F0371/24635/J376/18/1, CG Gibbs 
to PSSFA, AA 14-12-1939; Villa and al., op.cit., pp.235-6.
**. CD IAO Hr 1992, Maugini, Appunti per l’Ing. Giannoccaro, 
Firenze 27-5-1940.
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or of ECRE was engaged in an acrimonious struggle with its 
President*3. The government of the GS had often to intervene to 
uphold the tottering authority of the management undermined by 
the continuous interference of the local Fascist Party offi­
cials in the administrative affairs of EDR**.
If the division of responsibility between officials 
was vague, there were a good many obligations and not all that 
degree of security for the settlers. The rules governing the 
conduct between the agencies and the colonists were fairly 
similar and, in substance, did not differ greatly from the 
guidelines followed by the ONC. Such similarities are identifi­
able in the rules relating to the selection of families, the 
treatment of the colons, the development and distribution of 
farms*5.
It was understood that the agencies were temporary 
institutions who undertook to develop the project on behalf of 
the State and who were expected to dissolve once their goals 
were attained. Yet the agencies took a qualified view of the 
ideal of an autonomous peasantry. The future picture they had 
was that of c l . co-operative community of farmers capable of 
managing their affairs through a form of Landowning Settlers 
Consortium. Then the agency’s role would be to assist them by 
providing managerial and technical know-how, credit facilities, 
marketing and processing services**.
*3. Incartamenti: ECRE 1938, Appunti per il Duce, 23-7-1939.
**. CD IAO GS 1821.
*5. Cfr. CD IAO 1937, MAI, Vari provvedimenti legislativi 
e governatoriali riguardanti le concessioni enti di coloniz­
zazione demografica e privati in AOI. Owing to the trade union 
disagreement with the original draft, the official approvement 
of the scheme took place only on February 1940 by the newly
formed Agricultural Council after laborious work and a number of 
modifications. Cfr. L’Azione Coloniale. 19-2-1940.
**. CD IAO 1937; Cerulli, op.cit. :72.
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Before assuming ownership, the Italian peasant 
remained tied to the agency by two contracts: salary and
redemptive. During the salary phase the peasant was employed as 
a wage labourer and a member of the workers* militia. He 
alternated communal work as defined by the agency with semi­
military duties. The salary was attractive^. It was supple­
mented by costs for accommodation, discomfort, and family 
allowance, including medical assistance, insurance fees, and 
Dopo Lavoro subscription. But a number of deductions at source 
and the high cost of living left very little in the pocket of 
the peasant^. Part of the deducted money was directly sent to 
his family in Italy. It was argued, however, that the prospect 
of becoming a landowner compensated for low wages, making the 
peasant’s salary more rewarding in the long-run.
The salary phase was a trial period and thought to 
be beneficial to both the agency and the settler. For the 
agency, it offered a breathing space to implement reclamation 
work and a housing programme. More importantly, it was a 
convenient way to assess the peasant’s credentials as a worker
6'. For more detailed duties imposed upon the settlers see 
[Carlo Giglio], "Da colono al proprietario in AOI con la coloniz- 
zazione demografica", REAI. 27, A, (Aprile 1939):401-5 (hereafter 
"Da colono al proprietario"). The salary was £.18 per diem for 
unskilled, £.20 for a semi-skilled and £.23 for skilled [Cfr. "Di 
alcuni problemi"]. ECPE paid slightly higher wages which was 
£.19,80 per diem for an unskilled, £.23,10 per diem for skilled and 
£.25,30 per diem for professional [Cfr. CD IAO Hr 1992, ECPE, 
Relazione ECPE, 20-11-1940].
N g* tJ&rc&iLck hlCtgCS comparable to those paid for others 
within IEA. The scale was not constant but that of 1939 was as
follows:
Unskilled £.30
Semi-skilled £.35
Skilled £.40
Unskilled Foremen £.40
Semi-skilled Foreman £.45
Skilled Foreman £.50
Chauffeurs & Motor Mechanics £.1200
[Cfr.F0371/23380/J575/296/l, CG Bird to PSSFA, AA 20-1-1939; Cl, 
15-1-1939.
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and potential landowner and to eliminate unsuitable candidates. 
For the peasant, it gave him the opportunity to acclimatize 
himself; should he decide to leave he lost nothing. If he chose 
to stay, he was joined by his family to start the period of 
redemption. But critics castigated the salary phase for the 
unnecessarily huge financial cost it entailed to the agency and 
the psychological trauma that the peasant had to endure without 
his family, making him work badly. They maintained better to 
settle the whole family at once^. For money starved agencies 
these economic arguments held great sway. In fact the two home­
grown agencies, EDR and CAG abolished the salary period al­
together, adopting the policies advocated by the critics7®.
At the beginning of the redemption phase the colon­
ist received a family farm as his own personal property and 
shouldered a number of responsibilities: he had to upkeep the 
premises and see that all farming implements and household 
goods were put at the exclusive use of the farm. In addition to 
his duty to execute the agency's orders, he had to keep the 
family labour unit intact. This meant that he had to prevent 
his sons from drifting into temporary high-paying construction 
jobs or stop his daughters from seeking work as domestics or 
worse in the city. It was particularly important that he 
groomed the eldest son as the natural leader and successor to 
the farm7*.
At the redemption phase, the existing agreements 
were replaced by contratto colonico, a labour code or a pact 
between the colonist and the agency regulating the conditions 
of rescheduling of debts before assuming a full title to the
"Da colono al proprietario" :402.
70. CC, 25-12-1939.
71. CD IA0 Hr 1992, Patto di ECPE; 1921, Incartamenti: 
Statuto dell'ECRE; DIM 18-4-1939; "Da colono al 
proprietario":405; Poison Newman (1938), p.102; Quaranta, 
op.cit., pp.49-50.
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ownership of the farm. In this respect, the redemption phase 
differed from the Libyan experience where it was preceded by 
between five and ten years of share-cropping. The new contract 
consisted, as detailed in an account book, libretto colonicot 
of three sections; in the introduction there is a summary
description of the farm and of its boundaries with the aid of
a small map; a record of live-stock, household goods and
farming equipment provided by the agency, with the services and 
other effects received in cash or in kind; finally, the debts 
and the credits accumulated over the years. The debts included 
the following expenses: housing and implements believed to be 
necessary by the administration to the settlement; deforesta­
tion and reclamation including machinery, tools, animals and 
seeds; improvements and extension to the farm; transfer of the 
peasant and his family from Italy; any additional financial
assistance, in cash or in kind. Added to this was a 5% interest 
charge^.
No definite time limit was set for the settler to 
discharge his debt. The only stipulation was that before 
freehold ownership of the land was granted the amortized cost 
had to be cleared. It was entertained that this would take less 
than half time the time (i.e. ten years) required in the Libyan 
situation where the settler had to contend with a more hostile 
environment^. In their efforts to force the settler to dis­
charge his debts, agencies like ECPE imposed a number of 
"production incentives". But in actual fact the agencies run 
the farms autocratically, controlling every phase of activity. 
The peasants had little say either in the disposal of their
CD IAO 1937, Schema di norme della convenzione per il 
finanziamento, allegato 2 (henceforth: Schema di norme); DIM 18- 
4-1939; Hr 1992, Patto di Colonizzazione, p.7; DGG 16-10-1939; 
Gm 2919; Gibbs to PSSFA, AA 14-12-1939; "Da colono al proprietar­
io" :402-5; Quaranta, op.cit., pp.49-50; Newman (1938), p.102.
[Carlo Giglio], "II finanziamento degli enti di coloniz­
zazione demografica in AOI", REAI. 27, 2 (febbraio 1939):156-7 
hereafter "II Finanziamento").
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labour or the expenditure of funds derived from it7*. Complaints 
by Maugini of wastage due to carelessness and lack of proper 
storage reinforce this point7^.
Theoretically, the subsidies were provided only for 
the trial period. Upon his admission to the farm, the colonist 
was obliged to pay the money back. But this was never the case 
because there was no year in which the gross income was greater 
than the annual subsidy. This was due partly to the agencies's 
failure to develop an adequate number of hectares as they had 
originally planned. As a result a considerable sum was spent in 
family allowances until the farm became fully productive and 
this ultimately served only to increase running costs of the 
farm. A typical case was ECPE, which provided its fourteen 
families with six hectares of reclaimed land. In 1939, the 
agency paid an allowances of £.169,611. Despite expansion of the 
cultivated area and improvement in the farming, in 1940 this 
increased to about £.180,000 . This was a financial embarrass­
ment for the agencies and an additional burden on their slim 
resources.
7*. As regards labour, ECPE’s labour code shows that the 
agency could resort to the peasant’s labour at any time. As 
regards disposal of the produce, the proceeds from the sale of 
this was divided into three parts: a fixed quota was put aside 
towards amortization credited with a 3% interest; 20% of the 
remaining was kept as reserve against the effects of freak years, 
generating 5% interest; the remainder was left at the settler’s 
disposal [Cfr. DIM 18-4-1939; CD IAO Hr 1992, Patto di coloniz- 
zazione, pp.8-9.
75. CD IAO Hr 1992, Situazione dell’ECPE al 31-12-1939, Rm
13-5-1940; Francesco Pierotti, Vita in Etiopia. 1940-41. (Rocca 
San Casciano: F. Cappelli, 1959), pp.36-8.
7^. CD IAO Hr 1992, ECPE: Bilancio consuntivo anno 1939 e 
bilancio preventivo per 1’anno 1940, Rm 13-5-1940, p.19.
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THE QUESTION OF FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS
The success of colonization largely depended on good 
financing and the question of the best way of doing it had been 
a source of controversy among experts since early days77. Unlike 
in Libya where the state was almost the sole investor in 
demographic colonization, the regime shared responsibility with 
other public or para-statal organizations. Each agency was 
given an advance of £.50,000,000 payable in six annual instal­
ments. The payments progressively decreased7®.
ECRE, owing to its connection with Mussolini receiv­
ed privileged treatment: it was directly financed by the state. 
ECPE’s quota was divided equally between the Banco di Napoli 
and the INFPS, which was involved in a similar programme in 
Libya. Each paid £.25,000,000. ECVE was supported by INFAIL. In 
addition, substantial sums were to be provided by the public 
administrative corporations of the provinces of origin, payable 
in six consecutive financial years. ECRE was allocated £.2,000,- 
000 from public institutions of Ravenna and Forli, ECPE 
£.5,000,000 and ECVE £.3,000,000 . Of the two home-grown agen­
cies, EDR had a budget of £.6,000,000 and CAG £.1,000,000 .
As agents of the state, the companies had legal 
standing and enjoyed tax exemption on any financial contribu­
tions made by welfare organizations, banks or acquired through 
bequests and donations. In areas of their operation, they had 
preferential rights to any new land incorporated into the
77. CD IAO 1921, Incartamenti, 1944, pp. 5-9; "II finan-
ziamento":154-6; RDL 5-9-1938, no.1607, GURI, no.241, 20-10-1938.
7®. The first year’s payment was £.20 million; for the 
remaining four years was: £.15 million, £.8 million, £.4 million 
and £.1 million [Cfr. Atti e Documenti].
79 Atti e Documenti; DIM 18-4-1939.
Of this £.750.000 was paid by GG and £.250.000 by the 
Bank as a loan [Cfr. Villa and al., op.cit., p.236].
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public domain, to the use of pasturage, and exploitation of 
natural resources. To minimize the cost of colonization, the 
agencies could combine farming with industrial and commercial 
activities. This enabled them to gain an exclusive monopoly 
over most resources in their area, such as cattle breeding, 
marketing and building contracts®1.
The money was given in the form of a loan, repayable 
within a 50 year period starting ten years after the formation 
of the agency. But no specific arrangements were provided as 
regards to securities and interest rates, issues that were of 
vital importance®2. Such shortcomings caused friction between 
ECPE and its creditors until accommodation was reached with the 
RDL of 5 September 1938 and the special convention of 6 October 
of the same year which brought substantial amendments to 
earlier arrangements. In the new agreements the interest rate 
was fixed at 5% and the period of repayment was reduced to 20 
years, with amortization starting in the sixth year®2.
As collateral, the creditors were given wide ranging 
special privileges. This involved rights to all kinds of state 
lands at the agency’s disposal, to works of improvements and 
agricultural developments accomplished in it, to live-stock and 
all types of assets including the eventual state contributions 
to land reclamation. The prerogative was to remain valid so 
long as the loan was not entirely settled. Any failure by the 
Agency to keep the agreement, even the payment of only one 
year’s mortgage, would dissolve the contract and lead to an
21. CD IAO Hr 1992, ECPE: Relazione, Bari di Etiopia 20-11- 
1940, p.9; 1921, ECRE, Relazione del Presidente, Rm 
7-2-1939, p.21; 11-1-1940, pp.13,32; 1792, Walter Caravelli E
Zampighi Luigi, Lineamenti dell’ECRE a norma del decreto 
costitutivo e dello statuto, Rm 10-10-1938.
®2. "II f inanziamento" : 155.
®3. RDL 5-9-1938, no. 1607; RDL 13-5-1940, no. 823: 
Modificazione dell’art. 7 del RDL dicembre 1937, no. 2314, 
costitutivo dell’ECVE, GUGS. V/34, 21-8-1940; GU, no. 166, 17- 
7-1940.
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immediate payment in full of both outstanding debt and inter­
ests®*. Support for the agency’s ability to meet the terms of 
the agreement was drawn from the findings of the Libyan ex­
perience where, it was alleged, the colonists, working in 
environmental conditions far less favourable than in Ethiopia, 
were able to pay their debts within 20 years. Yet some critics 
pointed out that this comparison overlooked a number of impor­
tant differences. In their view, in Ethiopia unlike in Libya, 
practically no institutions were available to verify the state 
of land ownership and the rules of its transaction. It was 
true, they argued, that the Ethiopian soil was much more 
fertile than in Libya; yet it was equally true that the colon­
ist had much less to fear in Libya than in Ethiopia in terms of 
competition from Ethiopian production and manpower. The critics 
focused mainly on the interest rate which in the context of the 
Ethiopian agricultural environment - virgin soil with every­
thing to be built from scratch - was excessive. With high 
interest rates, the cost of each farm increased and made the 
production cost too high against Ethiopian competition®®.
What was to be done? How could the situation be 
altered? Once again the old question of state subvention was 
debated. Originally, the agricultural council recommended to 
vest in one agency the task of financing all forms of agricul­
tural activities, mentioning the Institute of Mortgage Loan as 
an ideal choice. Basing itself on the Libyan experiment, it 
warned of the dangers and expenses of extensive state-sub­
sidized settlement®®. Even for the state interventionists, the 
less resort made to state coffers, the better; yet for them a 
total lack of state intervention was fraught with dangers. They 
asserted that demographic colonization was a symbol of great
®*. Schema di norme.
®®. "II f inanziamento" : 155,157.
®6. CD IAO 1775, Seduta, Rm 15-4-1937, pp. 11-9; 22-4-1937;
26-4-1937; Consulta, "Avvaloramento":1563-4.
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power overseas and the means to create a large Italian popula­
tion abroad. Because of this it had, in addition to economic, 
the highest political and social goals. Thus, if state subsidy 
from a strictly commercial standpoint was unremunerative, from 
the political point of view it was not unduly extravagant 
expenditure®^.
But as the cost of colonization became apparent, the 
agencies invariably complained of financial stringency and its 
limitation on their activities. They discovered the early 
optimistic estimate unit cost of settling a family, £.55,000-
70,000 per farm, was unrealistic. Where the most economical 
means were employed, such as extensive use of Ethiopian labour 
and inexpensive material, the cost of a farm amounted to 
between <£.120,000-140,000, excluding investment in infrastruc­
ture®®. A number of factors were blamed, including shortage of 
labour, rising wages, turbulent political conditions and the 
scarcity of building materials. ECRE estimated the minimum 
financial requirement for settling 1,000 families to be double 
of its actual grant®^ . The feeling was stronger with the agen­
cies that paid interest on the loan. Giannoccaro, the President 
of the ECPE, realized that, after interest deduction, the 
ECPE’s entire loan in real terms amounted to only £.34,000,000. 
As it appears in a sketchy memorandum for the ECPE’s board of 
directors, Giannoccaro regarded this as "too inadequate and 
absurd" to finance a programme on such a scale^. Costs Tflcgfrt
®*. The upholders of such a view called on the government 
to pay 3% of the interest due to the creditors and leave the 
remaining 2% to the agencies themselves [Cfr. "II finanziamen- 
to":158].
®®. CD IAO Gm 2919, p. 6.
®®. Fuzzi, Programme, p. 3.
One of the solutions suggested by ECPE was for the 
government’s intervention by paying about 4% of the interest. 
CD IAO Hr 1992, Relazione Ing. Giannoccaro al Consiglio della 
Presidenza, 24-3-1940, (henceforth: Relazione Giannoccaro); ECPE 
to Maugini, Situazione amministrativa contabile anno 1940, Rm
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decline as colonization proceeded, but serious doubts had 
already been cast on the practicality of the scheme.
PLANS VERSUS REALITY
Settlement agencies did not operate uniformly. Need 
to accommodate to local demands gave rise to administrative and 
organizational differences. The common factor was that, owing 
to financial constraints, the settlements were run on a tight 
budget and, as much as possible, using local resources; and 
owing to the unsettled military situation, strategic considera­
tions were given overriding importance in the pattern of house 
construction and farm organization.
The settlement plan of the ECRE was drafted by the 
agency’s future director - Ing. Savini, under explicit orders 
from Mussolini^. Savini began his work in the early part of 
1937 and in substance if not in detail, his settlement program­
me was identical to that of the ONC. He planned to settle 1,000 
families within a maximum period of six years; this meant that 
each year 10,000 ha would be put under cultivation and 200 
houses built. According to plan, the first 200 houses would be 
completed by the end of 1938^. Each family was to be given 50 
ha of land, divided into three sections: two ha would be used 
for artificial and natural pasturage for cattle which would 
play an important part in the development of the farms; the 
remaining land would be ploughed, with the exception of one ha 
for vegetable growing. The size of the farm was justified on 
the grounds that it responded to the needs of an increasing 
family demanding its further partition, and the tendency to
11-4-1940 (henceforth: Situazione amministrativa).
Detailed information on the plan is given by Fuzzi in 
his report to the meeting of the Presidential Council and so 
Cfr. CD IAO 1921, Fuzzi, Relazione, 7-1-1938; CD IAO 1806, p.6.
Fossa (1938), p.497; Diel, op.cit., p.70.
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rapid deterioration of tropical land under production requiring
crop rotation.
Initially the plan was to build isolated homesteads,
but for reasons of security this was abandoned. Instead Savini
designed a single storey house with three rooms and a kitchen
and an annexed courtyard enclosed by a solid wall. Four houses
were situated in the corners of their plot and joined together
by vast communal wall, forming a square with only one entrance.
The courtyard was to serve as a shelter for the colonist’s
livestock, forage and tools. As their original architect, Tito
Piccialuti, claimed the geographical set up of the houses with
their solid walls, in addition to facilitating the sharing of
communal services and relatively reducing the road network,
gave its inhabitants,
specially at night, once the gate was 
closed, a sense of total safety as if 
they were in a small but well protected 
fortress^.
ECRE began its operation in April 1938, seven months 
after schedule. Unlike other agencies, ECRE started from an 
advantageous position. It purchased four construction sites 
from the departing Asmara-Gondar highway construction agency, 
Ragazzi^*. All the sites were equipped with basic services and 
stone-built premises, and at one site there were well furnished 
houses for the management. Each site was to serve as a settle­
ment centre, each bearing district names similar to those of 
Romagna province. Eventually, work was started in only three 
of these. The main administrative and settlement headquarters
T. Piccialuti, "Progetto per la formazione di una 
legione di lavoratori agricoli per l’AOI", REAI, 26, 2, (febbraio 
1938):1999.
^ . G.B. Lusignani, "L’ECRE", L ’Autarchia Alimentare. 15-
12-1938, pp.36-7.
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was Romagna Centre located at Dabat, 70 km north of GondMr9®. 
The settlement was cut in two by Dib-Dibit river which served 
for irrigation.
Activities were centred to the west of the river. In 
addition to the administration and social amenities, there were 
stables and mechanical workshops; in a nearby irrigated garden 
all sorts of vegetables were grown. The remaining two districts 
were located at DHra, distant 50 and 40 km each from GondMr and 
bore the names of Lugo of Ethiopia (Lugo di Etiopia) and Cesena 
of Ethiopia (Cesena di Etiopia) respectively9®. The first group 
of colonists who disembarked at Meswa numbered 124 men, 300 
less than the original plan envisaged. They included, in 
addition to 10 agency officials and their assistants, 50 heads 
of settler families; the rest were workers with different 
skills, predominantly builders. In December 1938 and 1939 were 
added 65 and 340 individuals respectively, consisting exclusiv­
ely of technicians, artisans and craftsmen9^.
ECRE’s achievement was hailed as the pride of the 
Italian provincial schemes. But the reality challenged such 
claims. Even though the exact number of the workforce can only 
be approximated, by the end of 1940 there were about 450 people 
consisting of workers and day agricultural labourers, including
w. As the main motorway construction site Dabat had 
premises that could accommodate 600 people [Cfr. CD IAO 1921, 
ECRE, Relazione del Presidente, 7-2-1939, pp.3-4).
9®. CD IAO 1921, ECRE, Relazione del Presidente, 7-2-1939, 
p. 19; 11-1-1940, pp.13,16-7; L ’Azione Coloniale. 22-6-1939. As 
the names of the districts reflect the settlers’ origin, it seems 
that the first settlers were natives of the respective district 
of Lugo and Cesena. Among the two, Lugo was at advanced stage and 
work had started since early 1939. Contrary to the report of some 
sources [Cfr. Pankhurst, "Italian settlement":151, who quotes P. 
Monelli’s Mussolini: An intimate life. (London: 1953), p.19],
Predappio d*Etiopia, though planned very early to be set up in 
the memory of Mussolini’s birthplace, never came into light.
^ . They were mainly tractor drivers, farm mechanics, 
builders and carpenters [CD IAO 1921, Relazione, 7-2-1939, p. 
12; Fuzzi, Programma 1940, 7-2-1939, p.4].
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about 150 masons and 30 agency officials. The peasants ac­
counted to less than 100 and none of them were united with 
their families9®. Of these some were settled at Lugo, but the 
majority were concentrated at the main headquarters, while 
Cesena was occupied almost exclusively by workers99.
When assessing the agency’s work, the role of 
Ethiopian labour which the agency employed "on a generous 
scale" with a normal intake of between 500-1,000 day labourers 
must be taken into account. On the housing side, at the beginn­
ing of 1940, a total of about 60 houses were built including 
storage and stables. Of these about 40 were completed and 20 
were in progress199. The pictures are equally meagre if the 
developed land area was examined. In the first year 240 ha were 
reclaimed. Of these 110 ha were worked exclusively by Ethio­
pians. Land sown amounted only to 105.45 ha. For 1939 the 
agency set out a "realistic" programme and intended to put a 
minimum of 2,500 ha under cultivation. Eventually, the total 
reclaimed land area, including the previous year, amounted to 
1,013 ha and of these 873 ha were cultivated: 10 ha by Dabat 
Agricultural Office and 125 ha by Ethiopians on a share-cropp­
ing basis191. In 1940, the agency concentrated all its efforts on 
agricultural activities but it was able to sow a mere 1,250 
ha>«2.
Colonization agencies had an integral approach to 
their settlement programme. In this respect ECRE’s efforts to 
make its settlement self-sufficient could boast a number of
9®. CD IAO 1921, Ente Romagna d ’Etiopia: Situazione febbraio 
1940 (hereafter Situazione); 1793, Attilio Tomassini, ECRE: 
Promemoria, Rm 15-5-1944, p.2; 1792, op.cit., pp.3-4.
99. CD IAO 1921, ECRE, Relazione del Presidente, 11-1-1940, 
pp.17-8.
199. Situazione 1940; CD IAO 1792; Quaranta, op.cit., p.48.
101. CD IAO 1921, Relazione, 11-1-1940, pp.6-7.
19^. Ibidem, Fuzzi to Maugini, AA 16-1-1941.
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achievements. By the end of 1940, the settlement had its own 
clinic, a recreation centre and a post office. In addition to 
this there were: a wide range of agricultural machinery with 
spare parts and various implements; a well-stocked mechanical 
workshop, a carpentry shop, an electric generator, a brick 
furnace with annual production potential of a 500,000 pieces 
and two wells with a daily capacity of about 20,000 litres19®. 
Investment in cattle, albeit modest, was promising if the dif­
ficulties of purchasing them locally were taken into account19*. 
By the end of 1940 the animal stock was 429 consisting of 317 
head of oxen, 37 horses, 62 pigs and 13 goats in addition to 
about 1,000 poultry19®.
The key stumbling block for the ECRE’s activities 
was the perilous political climate and the regime of the land 
tenure, further compounded by internal administrative shortcom­
ings and lack of co-operation from both local and central 
governments. Owing to policy differences between Rome and AA, 
ECRE was forced to start its activities with a manpower cut to 
less than half the size of its original plan, from 400 settlers 
to 130. Colonists were waiting for five months as the agency’s
19®. The machinery consisted of tractors (14), mechanical 
sowers (18), threshers(3), reapers(2), binders(2), fodder 
press(l), trucks(5), harrows(23), ploughs(27), incubators(1) and 
a wide range of minor implements. [Situazione 1940]; Berretta, 
op.cit., pp.80-1. For a slightly different figures See Pankhurst, 
"Italian settlement":151].
19*. Despite the reported highly lucrative offer from the 
agency, the Ethiopians sold their best animal stock only when 
forced. [Cfr. CD IAO 1921, ECRE, Relazione del Presidente, Rm 
7-2-1939, pp.17-8; Rm 11-1-1940, pp.13-14; Programma 1940, pp.12-
3. Such difficulty was equally experienced by other agencies. 
[Cfr. Hr 1992, A. Maugini, Promemoria Per l’Ing. Giannoccaro, 
Firenze 27-9-1938].
19®. Owing to the difficulty of Italian poultry to adapt to 
high altitude (2400-2500 m), Italian fine quality chickens gave 
mediocre results, both in the field of pure and cross breeding. 
[Cfr. CD IAO 1921, ECRE, Relazione del Presidente, Rm 11-1-1940, 
p.13; Programma 1940, pp.13-4; Situazione 1940; Pini, L*Azione 
Coloniale. 22-6-1939.
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efforts to start in September 1938 were deferred twice; the 
first, because of the insistence by the Ministry of the Finance 
that demographic colonization would not constitute any burden 
to the State treasury; then by the long debate between the MAI 
and the colonial administration in the Empire, who demanded the 
delay of the agency’s activities until enough land was secured 
and the turbulent political climate of the area settled down. 
Further postponement was avoided only by the forceful interven­
tion of Mussolini who ordered an immediate start, notwithstand­
ing the realization that the economic consequences of such a 
move were damaging19®.
After a short burst of enthusiasm the saga of disap­
pointments began, confirming the fears of the colonial admini­
stration in AA. According to plan, the agency was to carry out 
its work in 50,000 ha of land that would be formed by conver­
sion of small domauvtflU holdings into large plots through the 
principles of expansion and amalgamation as laid down by 
Mazzocchi Alemanni. But the government of Amara, apprehensive 
of the political situation and under pressure from the central 
government, withdrew from its original commitment to provide 
the agency with 20,000 ha immediately, and 50,000 ha within a 
few years. In the first year the agency hoped to cultivate 
2,500 ha of land with expected yield of 20,000 ql which at the 
current market price of £.200 per ql, would have given the 
agency a revenue of £.4,000,000. Eventually the agency cul­
tivated only 105 ha from which it made a very modest revenue of 
£.53,128. 8$7 .
Difficulties in obtaining land were symptomatic of 
the turbulent political climate. W&g&ra, ECRE’s operational 
area, was a stronghold of national resistance19®. Dabat, ECRE’s
19®. CD IAO 1921, Fuzzi, Relazione, 7-2-1939, pp.6-10.
197. Ibidem, pp. 1-8; 14-5.
19®. On the operation of the patriotic movement in this area 
Cfr. GSrima THfMrra, Gondara baeashaw. (AAH949 E.C).
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centre, was as a garrison under siege. At one stage the centre 
was ransacked and supplies had to be provided by air. The 
worsening situation led the Governor, General Mezzetti, to 
establish a task force at Dabat. Each four houses were protect­
ed by a barbed wire fence, and heavy artillery and machine 
guns, manned by Italian peasant militia. Every Sunday the 
farmers received military training and exercise in pitched 
combat, the use of hand grenades and automatic weapons199. The 
fluid military situation frustrated the work of agricultural 
offices which were one of the oldest and had conspicuous 
presence in each major urban centres of the Amara governorship. 
As a result, the knowledge of the land tenure system of the 
area remained poor and the exchange of land slow.
In 1939, there was a remarkable improvement in 
political conditions largely due to a number of military 
offensives conducted by the new Governor, General Frusci, which 
led to the submission of a number of chiefs and allowed a 
degree of control over surrounding areas. However, the pos­
sibility of attaining total disarmament of the population and 
asserting effective control remained remote. And yet the Amara 
government took advantage of the lull to evacuate lands de­
stined for demographic colonization and promote share-cropping 
between Ethiopians and ECRE. In the process a combination of 
force and the local chiefs was used to convince the Ethiopians. 
Deceptively, the initiatives seemed to proceed smoothly119. But 
soon the government was in retreat when it became clear that 
the land exchange measures worsened the delicate political 
situation. In the end, the agency, out of its planned 50,000 ha 
of land, was able to obtain about 5,600 ha and of this only
4,000 ha were useful for demographic colonization111.
199. CS, 1-8-1939; Sbacchi, op.cit., p. 349.
119. CD IAO 1921, Fuzzi, Relazione, 11-1-1940, pp. 18-9. 
111. Programma, 19-1-1940, p. 2.
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The strategy of share-cropping with its twin purpose 
of peaceful penetration and solving the problem of land scarci­
ty, had modest success. Earlier, Ethiopian farmers agreeing to 
this form of contract were discouraged by the government’s 
imposition of cfsrat. This was done when no such obligation was 
imposed on other Ethiopian farmers. ECRE interpreted this as a 
deliberate policy meant to undermine its work. With the change 
of the Amara government at the end of 1939, these strictures 
were removed. But, despite the agency’s use of intensive 
political pressure, only 350 contracts were signed. Although 
the harvest was good, the land covered only 95 ha11®.
Scarcity of land was not the agency’s only problem. 
Since the early days, it experienced a leadership crisis that 
remained throughout its life span. The conflict between the 
General Director of the agency, Savini, and its President, 
Fuzzi, was so serious that Mussolini himself became worried by 
the publicity it generated. An urgent ad hoc committee led by 
the General Finance Inspector, Mola, attributed the conflict to 
a combination of personality and policy differences. Following 
the subsequent dismissal of Savini, the administration was 
restructured. But his departure left the agency with a leader­
ship crisis from which it never recovered11®.
The difficulties exposed ECRE to the mercy of 
competing political interests. For the Duke of Aosta, the 
situation offered an opportunity to fit the agency’s programmes 
within his own colonization paradigm. With its programmes badly 
trimmed and its strength weakened by the internal crisis, ECRE 
was left with little option but to succumb. The developments 
forced the agency to divert a significant part of its actions
11®. Ibidem.
11®. Savini was removed in August 1939 and, by the beginn­
ing of 1940, four directors were appointed and then left or were 
removed. CD IAO 1921, De Rubeis A., "Appunti per il Duce", 23- 
7-1939; Relazione del Presidente, Rm 7-2-1939, pp.13,29; 11-1- 
1940, pp.2-3; Timo' Mansueto, Rm 9-2-1943; CS, 1-8-1939.
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to other areas. In February 1938, it was given a once flouri­
shing farm confiscated from a Russian adventurer, Babitchev, in 
Sh3wa. Later in May 1938 and November 1939 two other farms were 
given, located in the Upper Awash Valley at TSfqi and at Tullo 
Bullu11*.
Having confined Ensign Babitchev to Rode Island the 
Italians confiscated his farm, as they did most other foreign 
businesses11®. The farm was located at Adda, within 50 km from 
AA, at an altitude of 1,800-1,900 m, protected by the surround­
ing YSrar mountains. As in the pre-Italian period, in post­
occupation Ethiopia, Adda was one of the most important modern 
agricultural centres. It is rich in water resources from the 
W&dScha river and a spring situated in the lower slopes of 
Yarar mountain ranges. Apart from the threat of malaria from 
the palustral zones and stagnant waters along the W&dScha 
river, it has a healthy climate. With the completion of reclam­
ation work and reorganization of the WadScha river by ONC, it 
was hoped that the area would be suitable for demographic 
colonization. And yet the scarcity of land forced the agency to 
confine the settlement only to the families of agricultural 
managers and technicians, not peasants11®.
119. Villa and al., op.cit., p.230; MAE, La valorizzazione, 
pp.269-70, 273; New Times and Ethiopia News. 1-7-1939.
11®. DGG 24-3-1938, no. 672, Espropriazione dell’Azienda 
Agricola appartenente al sig. Giovanni Babiceff sita nel 
territorio della Residenza di Adda, in GU, 111/10 [Supl.], 21-
5-1938; DGG 26-9-1938, no.319, IndennitA da corrispondere al 
sig. Giovanni Babiceff per 1 * espropriazione dell'Azienda Agricola 
sita nel territorio dell R. Residenza di Adda, in GU IV/1, 1-1- 
1939. The Commission assigned a compensation of £.400.000. 
Following the plot against Graziani, the Italians began a 
ruthless attack on foreign interests. Non-Italian business of any 
importance was compelled either to liquidate or to enlist Italian 
interests in partnership and most opted to pull out [Cfr. 
F0371/22020/J641/40/1, CG Bird to PSSFA, AA 4-1-1938].
11®. CD IAO 1921, ECRE, Relazione del Presidente, Rm 7-2- 
1939, pp.23-4; 11-1-1940, p.34.
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The farm extended over about 180 ha made up of four 
plots varying in size and intersected by other properties. Both 
dry and irrigated farming was used. Although limited to a mere 
20 ha, irrigated areas could be doubled through rational use of 
water resources. Cultivation took place using a mixture of 
share-cropping and direct management with contracted labour. 
The total labour force consisted of 120 peasants and their 
families who lived within the farm. Each family gave four days 
work to the farm in exchange for a ca.1,000 sqm irrigated plot, 
known as carta. Both forms of management involved part irriga­
tion and part dry farming. Under share-cropping, dry farming 
was made up of ca.15 ha and irrigated ca.10 ha, while under 
direct management they consisted of 10 ha each. Crops cul­
tivated in dry farms were cereals consisting mainly of tef, 
durrah, barley, wheat and chick-peas. In the irrigated farms 
under share-cropping were sweet potato and sugar cane, while on 
the plots directly manned the key crops were coffee, papaw, 
bananas and citrus fruits119.
Irrigation was shared with two other bordering 
groups: three days was allocated to the Oromo peasants of
nearby Debasso area, who tilled about 120 ha, and QSfiazmach 
TRsMmma, an owner of 40 ha farm. The Babitchev’s farm had a 
four days quota from both the river and the spring: 12 day-time 
hours were allocated to the farm and 12 night-time hours were 
used by the carta-holders118.
Despite its reliance on traditional techniques, the 
Babitchev farm had all the features of contemporary modern 
farms established in the second half of the twentieth century119. 
It was equipped with a considerable number of residential 
buildings made of a mixture of stone and ceqa, animal shelters,
117i
! 118
i
I 119.
Ibidem, 7-2-1939, pp.22-24; 11-1-1940, pp.21-3. 
Ibidem, 11-1-1940, p.23.
Pankhurst (1968), pp.208-9.
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and silos. It also had a water-mill on WSdMcha river1®9. Its 
great disadvantage was the presence of brigands and resistant 
fighters in the surrounding Yarar mountains. In fact the farm 
had been the theatre of a number of military operations. This, 
combined with two years neglect, had left it in a pitiful 
condition. When the ECRE took possession, the farm animals were 
reduced to only ten head of oxen, two donkeys and a she-mule; 
the activities of the carta-holders were restricted to their 
own individual plots1®1.
Soon after the take-over, the farm, renamed after 
one of Mussolini’s daughters Villa Anna Maria, was re-organized 
under the direction of C.M. Battaglia, a surveyor, and his 
assistant agriculturalist, Savorelli. Battaglia’s work was 
facilitated by the fact that he was also Vice Resident of YarSr 
district, a political office that gave him considerable weight 
in his dealings with Ethiopians. Battaglia had at his disposal 
14 Italian workers, composed of a market gardener, tractor 
driver, two agricultural workers, a store keeper, and eight 
road builders and labourers working under a superintendent on 
10 km long Villa Anna Maria-Bishoftu Road construction project. 
Later with the addition of an accountant, an agricultural tech­
nician, a botanist, a horticulturalist and a herdsman, the farm 
could boast a well-qualified, though modest, agricultural 
team1®®.
According to the plan, Anna Maria farm was to be a 
model estate and an excursion venue for the inhabitants of AA 
because of its picturesque landscape, medium altitude, abundant 
water resources, and location a few miles from the capital. The 
scheme envisaged a total restructuring of the farm to make cul­
12°. CD IAO 1921, ECRE, Relazione, Rm 7-2-1939, p.23; 11-1 
1940, pp.21-2.
121. Ibidem, 7-2-1939, p.24-5; 11-1-1940, pp.22,33,35.
12®. Ibidem, 7-2-1939, pp.24,26; 11-1-1940, pp.34-5; 19-1 
1940, pp.34-5.
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tivation more rational and surveillance easy. This demanded the 
removal of the carta-holders occupying the most fertile areas 
of the farm and the owners of the criss-crossing or adjoining 
tracts of lands, including Oromo peasants. Such measures would 
ensure that the farm was a compact and unbroken unit and had 
little competition for water resources12®. Other operations en­
tailed the organization of the plants in a row and terracing of 
the soil to make the plots easily accessible; the introduction 
of new domestic and imported plants and citrus fruits; the 
renewal of old plants; the extension of vegetable growing 
areas; the elimination of not easily marketable crops; finally, 
improvement of the irrigation system by a more rational use of 
available water resources12*.
To do this Battaglia relied on a handful of tractors 
manned by Italian personnel, and extensive use of Ethiopian 
labour. To counter eventual shortage of labour, he maintained 
the existing contractual arrangement between the farm and the 
carta-holders. Those carta-holders removed to make room for the 
farm were settled at its margins. In addition, an average of 75 
Ethiopians were employed as day labourers, cattle keepers, 
guardsmen, in water regulation, in the services of mill and 
gebbi. The size of the farm was gradually expanded to about 350 
ha through the usual practice of appropriation and confiscation 
of bordering lands. The measures sparked some revolts. In 
consequence, at the end of 1939 and the early part of 1940, the 
farm was the scene of a major military operation125. Even though 
the fighting caused grave damage to the farm, the revolt was
12®. Ibidem, 7-2-1939, p.9; 19-1-1940, pp. 33-4.
12*. Ibidem, 7-2-1939, pp.24-6.
125. Ibidem, 11-1-1940, pp.24-5,35.
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ruthlessly crushed. The agency was paid indemnity with which it 
was able to replenish its depleted livestock12®.
Improvement in the use of water was reached by 
either reducing the quota allocated to the Ethiopians or, 
according to the initial plan, removing them to other areas. 
The most important operation in the irrigated farms was the 
successful transplantation of a number of coffee and fruit 
trees; sugar cane plants and sweet potatoes were eliminated on 
the grounds of low market demand by the Italians and high water 
requirement. On the nursery side, ornamental plants both of 
local and foreign variety were extensively cultivated partly to 
meet the demand from AA inhabitants and the Town Hall129.
Actual progress, however, was slow. The 1938 annual 
report did not fail to point out the modest nature of the 
achievements. It blamed the unsettled political situation and 
the scarce resources of men and material, but at the same time 
emphasized the valuable lessons learnt. The statistics of 1939 
were not comforting. With the help of two tractors and exten­
sive use of local workforce, 20 ha had been reclaimed and 75 ha 
sown - 65 ha dry farming, the rest irrigated128. In 1940 the
total cultivated area amounted to 136 ha, with 26 ha irrigated 
and 110 ha dry farming129.
Upper Awash farms, of TSfqi and Tullo Bullu, were 
located along the AA-Jimma highway and within close range to 
Awash, one of Ethiopia’s principal rivers. This, combined with 
their high productive potential, made the two farms one of the
12®. Despite the preventive treatment by the Zooprophylactic 
Institute of AA, a 1939 epidemic killed most of the animals 
particularly oxen. The agency total livestock amounted to 86 
animals - 30 oxen, 16 cows, 6 calves, 16 goats, 10 donkeys, 7 
mules, 3 sheep and 2 horses [Ibidem, 11-1-1940, pp.11-2].
129. Ibidem, 11-1-1940, pp. 26,29-30; Fuzzi to Maugini, AA
16-1-1941, p.5.
128. Ibidem, Relazione, 11-1-1940, pp. 27-30.
129. Ibidem, Fuzzi to Maugini, AA 16-1-1941, pp. 5-6.
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most promising si£&£ for successful demographic colonization. 
In addition they were to serve as an experimental centre for 
the study of the agricultural potential of the region as well 
as water resources. Yet once again it proved difficult to 
obtain land. The residentes contacted were slow to act and only 
after long and laborious negotiations a total of ca.700 ha was 
obtained, approximately 350 ha at each place1®9. As most of it 
was virgin land, work proved difficult. Using 10 agricultural 
labourers, 6 tractor drivers with 5 Caterpillar tractors under 
the supervision of a hard-working agricultural expert, Giacomo 
Fiumana, 400 ha were reclaimed at Tullo Bullu. At T&fqi, 150 ha 
were sown with tdf (100 ha), chick-peas (40 ha) and nug (10 
ha). As the farm was experimental, emphasis was laid on the 
cultivation of different varieties of local and imported crops. 
Wheat, fodder, oil-seeds, vegetable and citrus fruit were 
cultivated on the remaining land1®1. In 1940, the cultivated 
areas were beyond target. Against 1,200 ha planned, 1,600 ha 
were reclaimed and 1,049 ha sown, but, contrary to early 
expectations, the average yield, as in most of ShSwa lands, was 
poor1®2. As in other farms, the agency combined farming with 
cattle raising. By 1940 it had a modest but promising animal 
population of 16 cows for breeding, 12 draft oxen, 4 bullocks,
139. The initial concession was at Busa, 24 km from the AA- 
Jimma highway but because of lack of accommodation and difficulty 
of getting supply, Tafqi was chosen where the agency’s personnel 
occupied part of the military garrison. The change entailed the 
evacuation of the Ethiopian owners from their rest lands at TSfqi 
to domainial lands at Busa. The process proved very slow. At 
Tullo Bullu the work started immediately and accommodation was 
not a problem as the agency purchased the road construction sites 
from Parisi company [Cfr. CD IAO 1921, Relazione, 7-2-1939, 
pp.11-2; 11-1-1940, pp.37-8,44.]
131. Ibidem, 1-1-1940, pp.39-43,45.
132. Ibidem, Fuzzi to Maugini, AA 16-1-1941, pp. 3-4.
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8 mules and 3 horses133.
ECPE fared no better. ECRE was credited with being 
the first regional demographic agency, but it was ECPE that 
first began actual settlement. Using funds advanced by the 
government of Har&r, it started work even before its legal 
constitution had been approved. In many respects, ECPE’s scheme 
was identical to that of ECRE and ONC, but differed in the 
pattern of house construction and organization. To its ad­
vantage, it had a relatively peaceful area with plentiful water 
and a sympathetic colonial administration. Its main problem was 
obtaining a sufficient indigenous workforce13*.
As no bank of information existed on the area’s 
agricultural potential, the agency set out a number of rules of 
thumb to maximize economic resources and keep risk to a mini­
mum. It planned to combine cereal farming on land directly 
manned by the agency with cattle husbandry135. To reduce labour 
costs and remedy its shortage, mechanical farming was to be do­
minant. Animal husbandry was to involve both draft and - to 
meet the increasing demand of the growing settler community - 
industrial animals. Maugini emphasized the need to resort to 
political pressure to overcome Ethiopian reluctance to sell 
animals13®. But as was so often the case, plan differed from 
practice. The agency showed little stock raising interest and 
its animal population amounted to only about 70 oxen and a few 
poultry and horses139.
133. Ibidem, pp.5-6; Fuzzi, Relazione, 11-1-1940, pp.24-36; 
11-1-1940, pp.32-6.
13*. As regards administrative structure see: Schema di
norme; Statuto giuridico.
135. CD IAO Hr 1992, Maugini, Promemoria, Firenze 27-9-1938.
13®. Ibidem, pp. 1-2.
139. Ibidem, ECPE, Bilancio consuntivo, p.24; Agostino
Volpi, EPE: Relazione, Bari d’Etiopia, 20-11-1940, pp.9-10.
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The agency planned to allot each settler family a 
large farms of 50 ha or more. But as a short term strategy, it 
allocated between 15 and 35 ha. On the remaining land the 
agency, using exclusively Ethiopian labour, carried out direct­
ly mechanical farming and cultivated crops of home and foreign 
variety. Emphasis was laid on lucrative industrial crops that 
could offset the financial cost of the project. After a while 
these plots were to be allotted to the settlers, while the 
agency explored and put new land under cultivation^®.
FIGURE VB. ECPE SETTLERS ON MILITARY TRAINING
"Di alcuni p r o b l e m i 1877-8.
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The decision to allocate plots ranging between 25 
and 35 ha hinged on a number of assumptions. On the produc­
tivity side, since Wacho Valley’s agricultural and livestock 
resources were immense, if intensively cultivated the plots 
would be highly remunerative. On the settler’s side, the farms 
were within the means and abilities of the colonist families. 
It was pointed out that in an average family of eight the 
maximum working members would be five. Such a family could not 
cultivate effectively a farm of 50 ha without the aid of 
Ethiopians. But owing to the scarcity of local labour and, 
above all, the desire to obtain as much land as possible, the 
settlers were not allowed to engage Ethiopians. The agency made 
allowance for the gradual enlargement of the settler’s plot 
either after a five year period when the rest of his farm had 
become fully productive, or a part of it could even be given to
the colonist’s eldest son when he was ready to farm on his
139own"’.
Another strategy was extensive use of share-cropping 
contracts with Ethiopians. This system, in addition to ensuring 
revenue, had political advantages as it was thought to favour 
peaceful penetration into areas where the Ethiopian population 
was dense1^ . Indeed, as indicated in land directly cultivated, 
the agency made a generous use of Ethiopian labour^. But in no 
place do its records attest that it practised any form of 
share-cropping.
Ibidem; Situazione amministrativa, p.2.
CD IAO Hr 1992, Maugini, Promemoria.
1^. No data exists on number of the Ethiopians employed by 
the agency but records for 1939 and 1940 indicate that wages 
paid in 1939, including board, amounted to £.97,434.25 and those 
for up to 30-11-1940 consisted in a total of £.54.411 (wages) and 
£.854 (board). Allowing that the pay consisted of official £.2 per 
diem, it can be concluded that in 1939 ca.130 and in 1940 ca.78 
Ethiopians were employed daily [Cfr. CD IAO Hr 1992, CD IAO ECPE, 
Bilancio, p.14; Ufficio Presidenza, Conto costi e redditi, Rm 11- 
4-1941].
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FIGURE VII. AN ECPE FAMILY AT WACHO (BARI OF ETHIOPIA).
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FIGURE VIII. GENERAL PLANIMETRY OF EDR.
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Construction of the colonists* dwellings proceeded 
hand in hand with the creation of the farms. But unlike ONC and 
ECRE, the houses were scattered along the road, in pairs with 
50 m between them. Facing these were another pair at a distance 
of 80-100 m, separated by a road. The initial plan was to build 
five room stone houses with a central passage, kitchen and a 
small oven: a lounge at the centre flanked at its right and 
left by two separate rooms plus storage. Eventually only two 
bedroom houses were built with a lounge and kitchen. Unlike 
both ONC and ECRE who built communal bakeries and wells, ECPE 
equipped each farm with a baking oven with an overhanging hen­
house and a well of its own, ostensibly to avoid bickering 
among the housewives. The farm’s set up, as a whole, was in­
tended to reduce inter-farm tracks and enhance close co-opera­
tion, and guarantee security*^. At the end of 1940, about 120 
houses were under construction, and only 27 were complete1^ . 
Their inadequacy in design and size soon became apparent. The 
oven with the overhanging hen-house made the rooms smoky, hot 
and filthy. There were not enough rooms to accommodate large 
families, and storage for food and tools was lacking^*.
But ECPE should be credited for at least having 
settled a few families. The first 105 settlers, who embarked on 
17 January 1938 from Brindisi, arrived at WScho on 2 February. 
They came from Foggia, Lecce, Taranto and Brindisi and the plan 
was that each settlement was to bear the name of these di­
stricts and to be inhabited by people of that area. More than 
a year later, in June 1939, they were joined by an additional 
99 settlers. The settlement was concentrated at WMcho and took
G. Giannoccaro, "Prime tappe", op.cit.:25-7; "L’ECPE", 
Italiani in Africa, supl. no. 7, Africa Italiana. 9-5-1939; Le 
Colonie. 7-5-1939; GP, 14-1-1939; MAE, La valorizzazione, pp.281-
4.
CD IAO Hr 1992, Volpi, EPE: Relazione, Bari d ’Etiopia, 
20-11-1940, p.3.
1^ . Ibidem, Situazione, p.2.
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the name of Bari di Ethiopia. Towards the end of 1940 it had a 
population of 276. About 80 were construction agency workers, 
others were employed by the agency as mechanics and tractor 
drivers. The rest were peasant settlers. Among these 14 were 
with their families composed of 74 children aged between one 
and eighteen years. In all, they were 104 individuals. There 
had been three deaths and two births among the settler famili­
es^.
These modest accomplishments were not matched on the 
farming side. In an attempt to overcome the prevailing uncer­
tainties, ECPE relied on diversified cultivation. With the 
exclusion of 1 ha that was to be occupied by ditches, wells and 
building, the remaining 24 ha were partitioned in 6 sections 
of 4 ha each [see Table IX]. Of these 5 sections were set aside 
for rotating cereal crop cultivation. The type of crop subject 
to rotation each year varied according to climatic conditions 
as well as the crop cycle. Of the remaining section, 2 ha were 
allocated for arboriculture and the other 2 ha for grassland. 
Out of 6,000 ha planned for cultivation in the first year, 
1,100 ha were reclaimed and 650 ha sown. In the following year, 
an additional 1,000 ha were reclaimed, but sowing remained 
confined to 200 ha. There was a substantial increase in land 
reclaimed in 1940, but land actually cultivated remained quite 
modest in size. Against 3,000 ha reclaimed, a mere ca.260 ha 
were sown, 103 ha by the 14 settler families and 157 by the 
agency itself*^.
EDR's scheme was to farm large plots removing its 
occupants to a nearby area, far enough away to avoid social
1,5. Giannoccaro, "Prime Tappe", op.cit; idem, "L'ECPE", 
op.cit.; Le Colonie. 21-11-1939; CI_, 24-1-1939; 21-6-1939. 25-
6-1939; II Messagero. 24-1-1939; PL, 3-4-1939. Accordingly they 
came from: Lecce (29), Bari (18), Taranto (18), Brindisi (17), 
Foggia (10). CD IAO Hr 1992, Volpi, Relazione, pp.1-3, 6; "Le 
prime due nascite a Bari d ’Etiopia", CM, 21-11-1939.
"Di alcuni problemi" : 1878.
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contact but close enough to guarantee a flow of labour supply. 
In this way the agency secured 2,500 ha. In the process 682 
Ethiopian families were dislocated against compensation to 
their property, part in cash and part in kind and 700 houses, 
and 2,730 animal shelters were destroyed. Each family was given 
an average of 1.02 ha of land and compensation of £.366.50, with 
a total payment amounting to £.250,000. They were settled within 
10 km from the farm1^ .
In the construction of the houses and organization 
of the farms, EDR followed ECPE, but the labour code was quite 
different from other regional agencies. Owing to financial 
considerations, it excluded the salaried period and the peasant 
started with the redemptive phase. Its housing programme en­
visaged two types: 35 two-roomed houses for small families and 
5 three-roomed houses for larger ones. Both had a kitchen and 
looked on to a vast porch. Some were isolated and others 
grouped in twos or threes, each within their own plot. Each 
group shared a communal oven and well^®.
By the end of 1940, EDR was able to settle 41 
families. Thirty came from Italy while the heads of the remain­
ing 11 were chosen from Jimma among the veterans of the Italo- 
Ethiopian war. Twenty five were from Bergamo, 5 from Abruzzi 
and the rest mostly from central Italy**9. EDR’s the major 
shortcoming was in developing adequate land for the settlers.
w . CD IAO Gm 2919, pp.1-2; 1916, p.13; Villa and al. ,
op.cit., p.236.
**8. Gm 2919, op.cit., pp.2-4.
**9. The regions involved included Alessandria, Catanzaro, 
Cuneo, Littoria, Parma, Reggio Emilia and Napoli. They came in 
two batches. The largest contingent arrived on 9-12-1939 and was 
162 strong. It included 120 children aged between one and half 
months and 10 years. The second group came in April 1940 [Cfr. 
Azione Coloniale. 23-11-1939; CC, 25-12-1939; "L'arrivo a Massaua 
dei coloni diretti nel Gimma", Corriere Eritreo Soortivo. 8-4- 
1940; Git 24-11-1939; IOM, 20-1-1940; II Mattino. 23-11-1939; 
30-3-1940; II P o p o Io di Sicilia. 12-12-1939; PR, 9-4-1940; La 
Tribuna. 12-12-1939].
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The agency targeted to provide each family with 35-40 ha. At 
the moment of settlement the family would receive 10 ha already 
reclaimed and ready for cultivation and the rest as a pasture 
and woodland. Actually, EDR developed a total of 120 ha - far 
short of its planned target*^ *.
CAG followed a quite different approach. Unlike EDR, 
it left the Ethiopians on part of their original land, as their 
labour, particularly in heavy duty jobs, was of vital impor­
tance*^ *. But like EDR, it introduced the settler and his family 
only after accommodation was ready and land sufficient enough 
to support them. Each settler received 5-6 ha of reclaimed land. 
Upon payment of a lump sum of between £, 10-15 as part of its 
amortization, the settler was transferred onto the land. The 
settler assumed the status of an ordinary concessionaire and, 
with regard to the anticipations received by the way of housing 
expenses and start-up capital, his relation with the CAG was 
like that of a debtor vis-a-vis his creditor. As a result, the 
settler shouldered all the responsibility of the farm, including 
management. There was no time limit for the discharging of debt, 
but he was expected to do so as soon as he could. In case of 
extraordinary works, the CAG rented the necessary equipment. In 
this way, at the end of 1940, the CAG was operating on 700 ha 
and had settled 14 families. The head families were selected 
locally, and each was provided with about 50 ha*^ .
The picture that emerges is that regional demogra­
phic colonization agencies* achievements in transplanting 
Italian rural life to rural Ethiopia were modest. The fruition
*50. CD IAO Gm 2919, p. 5; GS 1822, pp. 2-3; Cl, 23-11-1938; 
£E, 9-5-1940.
***. CD IAO GS 1822, pp.4-5; Villa and al., op.cit., p.236.
*5^. Ibidem, pp. 4-5; Azione Coloniale. 16-11-1939; Cl, 14- 
4-1940; GP, 9-5-1940; II Mattino. 24-11-1939; II Messagero. 17-
11-1939; La Pattuglia, 30-12-1939; PR, 17-4-1940.
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of the scheme was thwarted by a number of factors, some of them 
common to the Eritrean and Libyan experience. The agencies 
suffered from administrative confusion and managerial incom­
petence. The conduct of some agency officials bewildered the 
colonists. Giannoccaro was known for his dictatorial behaviour, 
avarice, and irresponsible conduct towards the peasants, as was 
also the case with De Rege’s authorities. As a whole, the 
leadership lacked clear vision and a sense of commitment*55.
Equally important was the meddling of local organiza­
tions, ranging from the Fascist Party to the trade union and 
colonial administration, into the internal administration of the 
agencies. Each group expressed conflicting views on the plight 
of the settlers and on their administrators. For some critics, 
the agencies* sole purpose was to provide "cushy" jobs for a few 
party and government officials, medical officers and agricul­
tural experts*5*. The agency officials naturally saw the set­
tlers* grievances in a rather different light. They believed 
that many peasants were simply fortune hunters who came to 
Africa lured by absurd promises made by irresponsible people, 
i.e. Party officials*55.
Close examination of the settlers* background 
suggests that the selection procedure was far from ideal. The 
official view of the peasant settler was a hard-working and 
large family man aged between 25 and 40, an ex-fighter with 
"robust physique, the Fascist spirit, and good character"*5*, or 
as the Minister of AI described:
simple and honest men attached to boun­
tiful turf by millennial racial instinct, 
people of resolute heart and loyal who
*55. CD IAO Hr 1992, Appunti per l*Ing. Giannoccaro, Firenze
27-5-1940, pp.1,7; GS 1821, op.cit..
*5*. Pierotti, op.cit., pp.36-38; Stonehewer-Bird to 
Halifax, AA 1-4-1939.
*55. CD IAO GS 1821.
*5*. Sunday Times. 23-1-1938.
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have rushed from the motherland to remote 
Africa and who in a Roman style bring 
fertility to those lands barren for 
centuries*57.
Few met such an idealistic description. A random 
survey of the settlers of EDR and ECPE reveals the presence of 
social misfits and troublemakers*5®. There were unskilled workers 
who jumped between jobs as miners, farm-labourers, and road 
workers, hoping to find in the Empire an easy life; pedlarB and 
craftsmen who lacked elementary agricultural skills; former 
soldiers turned university students; adventurers who came to 
the Empire to escape domestic unemployment and accumulate 
fortune before returning home. A few had a farming background 
but before they came to the Empire, they changed to non-farming 
employment. There were quinquagenarian men and women whose 
ability to be successful farmers was questionable*59.
An overview of the health of many belie repeated
claims of strict vetting. Out of 42 settlers repatriated to
Italy by the ECPE, 28 were for ill-health**9. A number of EDR 
settlers had tuberculosis and heart trouble***. Most of the
settlers were far removed from being the ideal Italian Mus­
solini depicted - ready to "Believe, Obey and Fight"**5. Many
*57. Pomilio, (ottobre 1939) :39; Le Colonie* 28-2-1939.
*5®. The technical officers were unequivocal in their 
complaints about these group. The case in point is Mr Giuseppe 
Brescia's family, described as "lacking any dignity, apathetic, 
indolent, and of poor moral" [CD IAO Hr 1992, Volpi, Relazione, 
20-11-1940, p.6].
*59. L'Azione Coloniale. 30-11-1939; El, 24-11-1939; CE, 3-
12-1939; CD IAO Hr 1992, Volpi, Relazione, 20-11-1940, pp.6-7.
**9. These included chronic bronchitis, dyspepsia, haemor­
rhoids, rheumatism, chronic fever, organic depletion [Cfr. CD IAO 
1992, Relazione Ing. Giannoccaro, 24-3-1940; Volpi, op.cit., 20- 
11-1940, pp.4,6].
161. GS 1821.
*62. GRA 45/41-5, Notiziario Radio [Supl.], 29-9-1937.
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were repatriated for indiscipline. On occasion troublesome 
families successfully exploited the competing authorities and 
ignored the agency's rule with impunity**3.
Excellent farmers were in the minority. All of them 
had a biblical vision of Africa where land and food were in 
abundance***. Disillusionment came with hard work, harsh clima­
te, privations of all kinds and squalid living conditions. The 
optimism and confidence which characterized their journey to 
Africa evaporated once they came in contact with reality - a 
sharp contrast to the fanfare that marked their trips and was 
glowingly reported by the media. It was routine before leaving 
as pioneers of the 'second Roman Empire' for the colonists to 
be lavishly entertained. Equipped with the khaki cotton uniform 
of the Fascist colonial militia and supplied with some farm 
necessities including seed grain they paraded chanting "Giovi- 
nezza" and at each stop on their journey were greeted by 
enthusiastic crowds meticulously organized by Party cadres and 
government officials**5. The glowing picture which the leadership 
painted, combined with the ease and speed of the Italian 
victory over Ethiopia, lent weight that these promises could be 
realized.
To some extent, the settler was cushioned from the 
full rigors of frontier life by the facilities and services 
provided for him. He paid no tax, and received free medical
**3. Out of 105 settlers of ECPE, 42 were repatriated, 12 
of them for indiscipline. CD IAO Hr 1992, Relazione Ing. Giannoc­
caro, 24-3-1940; Volpi, ibidem; GS 1821.
***. They migrated because they saw better prospects in the 
Empire. Their enthusiasm shines through in their interviews - 
obviously written for propaganda purposes [Cfr. El, 24-11-1939. 
Luxuriant growth of the first harvest prompts an elderly peasant 
to make a remark for a visiting Duke of Aosta: "It seems to me 
of being in the promised land. The potato is harvested three 
times. Even the most wretched grass has a height of no less than 
three metres" [Berretta, op.cit., p.182].
**5. Sunday Times. 23-1-1938. For the rest of the event see 
Chapter III, pp.-730-4.
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care. Yet the colonial life was also full of problems. There 
was the sluggish bureaucracy that distributed necessary tools 
and supplies only after long delays. Others found that the 
materials and livestock delivered inadequate or inappropriate. 
As in the case with the ECPE, food was insufficient and poor 
nutritionally, and accommodation depressing. The settler, 
particularly of good will, was demoralized by bad weather,
draught, and insects that plagued his crops. He lived in
constant fear of being attacked by Ethiopians***.
Already at the end of 1939, the problem of recruit­
ment had become acute**7. During this same period, the Italian 
authorities had begun to express doubts as to the viability of 
their colonization techniques. The achievements were mediocre 
but the costs were enormous. How much the agencies spent on 
their colonization projects during the years 1937-1941 is not 
known. But the Empire contributed only a small fraction of the 
expense. Out of a total budget of £.50,000,000 allocated to each 
of them, ECRE had spent more than £.35,000,000 and ECPE 
ca£. 29 ,000,00$® .
Hopes and speculations vastly exceeded actual 
results. The enterprise which had begun earlier in a mood of
optimism had lately become a more sober affair, beset by incer­
titude and anxieties. Demographic colonization was no more 
regarded as an effective way to solve Italy's population 
problem. The scheme was questioned, and in its place the 
capitalist methods, so strongly advocated by the Duke of Aosta, 
began to gain wider currency.
1W>. Reports are full of locust invasion and draught that 
brought in havoc in the settler's as well as the agency's con­
fidence. See Daily Telegraph. 21-2-1939;
**7. According to the agencies, the shortage was due to 
large settlements that took place at the Pontine Marshes and 
Libya. See Programma 1940, p.4.
168. CD IAO 1792, op.cit., p.l; 1793, pp.1-2; 1992, Bilancio 
patrimoniale, 30-12-1940; Sbacchi, op.cit., pp.442-6.
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TABLE X:- LAND ALLOCATED AND DEVELOPED BY DEMOGRAPHIC AGENCIES 
(in ha).
PLAIIED GRAITBD RECLAIMED CULTIVATED
AGBICY 1938 1939 I960 1961 1938 1939 I960*
ECRE 60,000 5,600 380 1,013 . 148® 1,227 2,431
ECPE 60,000 6,000 1,100 1,100 3,000 602 - 261
BDR 2,350 1,600 - - - - - 160
CAG 700 700 - - - - - 65
TOTAL 123,050 13,300 1,420 2,103 3,000 750 1,227 2,917
a. Inclusive of lands worked by the Ethiopians under share- 
cropping.
* No figures available for 1941.
Source:- CD IAO 1921, Fuzzi, Relazione del Presidente, Rm 7-2- 
1939, pp.5,25-9,48; Fuzzi to GAmDCL, Dabat 2-9-1940; Fuzzi to 
Maugini, AA 16-1-1941; Giannoccaro, L * ECPE. op.cit.:19; RGGS UA, 
Attivitfc svolta nei vari settori dalla costituzione dell'ufficio 
fino ad oggi, gennaio 1940, p.2; Villa and al.f op.cit., p.2.
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COMMERCIAL FARMING
THE POLICY IN ITS HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Commercial farming was introduced into the overall 
plan for Italian colonization of Ethiopia in response to the 
pressing needs of a sudden conquest of an Empire that was remote 
from the Motherland. The chief challenge was presented by the 
influx of Italian military and civilians, dramatically increas­
ing consumption demands. As locally available resources were 
quantitatively and qualitatively inadequate, goods and food­
stuffs had to be imported. This was economically unacceptable 
as it involved, among other expenses, enormous cost in transport 
and port duties.
Strategic considerations also called for a contin­
gency plan that would guarantee the Empire's survival in the 
event of internal uprising or major war implicating Italy. In 
case of external aggression significant contributions towards 
such an objective were expected from demographic colonization 
and "native agriculture". But an exclusive reliance on both 
these sectors was judged economically unwise. "Native farming" 
was thought to require rapid transformation in order to meet 
production targets, achievable only if age-old habits were 
discarded1. In the event of widespread internal insurgency, 
dependence on the "native" production was seen as a liability^. 
Equally, a great deal of time, finance and organization was 
needed before demographic colonization could be sufficiently 
establ ished3.
In the face of such shortcomings, the Italian 
government was prompted to pursue a policy of development based
*. CD IAO AOI 1854, p.2; ATdR 24/99, Relazione 6ull'autono- 
mia alimentare dell'impero: Appunti del De Benedictis, novembre 
1937.
Pier Buono, "L'impresa agricola privata nella coloniz- 
zazione dell'AOI", GAD, 13-11-1938; Cl, 11-9-1938.
3. CD IAO AOI 1990, pp.7-9; ATdR 24/100, pp.14-5.
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on commercialization of agriculture and encouragement of 
agrarian capitalism. The key objective was import substitution 
both in the colony and the metropolis. As Mussolini summed up, 
"in the battle for the attainment of autarky both the ter­
ritories of the metropolis and the Empire formed an inextricable 
unit". This was within the framework of Italy's view of the 
Empire as a natural extension of the metropolis'. In the light 
of this, commercial farms were expected to fulfil twin objec­
tives^ which Lessona summed up:
What must be clear from the start is the 
fact that the fundamental objective in
the economic field must be to secure the 
self-sufficiency of IEA in the shortest 
possible time end in the most comprehen­
sive forms that can be effected. Alongsi­
de with this but in as far as it does not 
conflict with the attainment of this 
primary objective, East Africa must
develop those trends of overseas trade 
predating our occupation and be able to 
produce raw materials that our country 
needs?.
The need to rely on this sector became even more 
compelling when Mussolini set the end of 1938 as the deadline 
after which any kind of metropolitan foodstuff subsidy to the
Empire would cease^. Since early 1936, there had been an under-
'. CE, 11-11-1938; CC, 25-11-1940; IC, 19-1-1940.
CD IAO AOI 1936, Promemoria per S.E. II Capo del 
Governo, Agricoltura e colonizzazione nel1*AOI, Rm, novembre 
1937; ATdR 24/99. Autarky was a theme recurrent throughout the 
occupation. Cfr. "La politica autarchica e le sue ripercussioni 
sui traffici commerciali", EX, (luglio 1938); "L*impero nel1 *eco- 
nomia di guerra", ibidem, (maggio 1940). "L’AOI nel quadro 
del 1 *autarchia nazionale", XL, (aprile 1940).
6. IAO CD 1854, pp. 1-2.
GRA 44/36-2, Mussolini to Graziani, Rm 13-4-1937; Rm 
30-7-1937. Mussolini's deadline originally set to 1-7-1938, later 
was brought towards the end of this same year. The immediate 
effect of the order was the rise of feverish activities that were 
largely disorganized and abortive. The most significant among 
these was the formation of a Civil Mobilization Committee and
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standing within the Italian colonial administration that such 
an objective was not beyond reach. An annual production of 
between 800,000 and 1,000,000 ql of foodstuff was calculated 
to be sufficient to free the Italian settlers and their local 
collaborators from dependence on imported food and on "native" 
production®. This assessment optimistically predicted that the 
commercial farms, aided by demographic colonization, would 
bring into cultivation ca.20,000 ha per year. With such a pace 
of development it was thought that autarky would be a reality 
within five year period^.
The development of commercial farming was compli­
cated by the struggle between the MC in Rome and the colonial 
administration in Ethiopia. The conflict was reflected in a 
wide range of issues concerning the type of farms that should 
be encouraged, the areas in which land should be granted and 
the mechanisms by which this should be accomplished. However, 
no well-defined position existed as policies and attitudes 
shifted with changes of personalities. In the early stages, 
specifically under the government of Graziani, the Ministry's 
enthusiasm for large-scale commercial farms was viewed inside 
the Empire with some apprehension. The main focus of the regime 
within Ethiopia was on the industrious small cultivator; its 
belief was that the Empire should be an open field of activity 
for all Italians and not for a privileged group, whether 
private capitalists or corporate bodies. Underlying such a 
position was the fear that the encroachment of large companies
Co-ordinated Supreme Defence Commission whose main task was to 
put the whole country on a war footing and requisition food­
stuffs; yet both these institutions existed only on paper. Cfr. 
ibidem, AA 20-5-1937.
®. Bird to Halifax, AA 1-4- 1939, p.7.
CD IAO 1774, G. Pini, AttivitA economica dei nazionali 
in AOI prima ed all'inizio della guerra, febbraio 1941, p.2. In 
fact, the Minister of Colonies, Terruzzi, claimed that 700.000 
ql would be produced in 1939. Cfr. Pomilio, (ottobre 1938):39.
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would lead in the long term to a de facto monopoly. The outcome 
would be the concentration of land and agricultural products in 
the hands of a few companies at the expense of the small scale 
investor and of the organic and healthy development of the 
Empire's agriculture*®.
The Ministry's argument rested on a realistic ap­
praisal of the socio-economic condition of the Empire. The most 
significant consideration was that, as a backward economy on 
the extreme periphery of the world capitalist system, the 
Empire needed a massive infusion of capital and infrastructure. 
But the economic resources at the command of the State were 
meagre and skilled personnel scarce. Therefore, its ability to 
carry out such enormous pioneering work was lamentably limit- 
ed». In the light of this, the Ministry found the expediency of 
partnership with big farms the only viable alternative. Under­
lying this belief was the view that, with sufficient backing in 
Italy, the companies should be able to invest enough capital in 
their holding, and furnish the necessary technical knowledge 
and managerial skills to ensure that the basis of agricultural 
development was properly laid*^ .
With this approach the Ministry aimed to use large 
companies as a time-buying strategy until the basic organiza­
tional and developmental infrastructures were laid down. But 
its position appeared rather baffling, as in the meantime it
*®. Villa and al. , op.cit., pp.221-2.
**. Del Boca, op.cit., Ill, pp.144-5.
**. CD IAO AOI 1936, DGACL (Lessona) to GG. Produzione di
frumento per fabbisogno AOI, Rm 12-10-1937, p. 5 (hereafter 
Lessona to GG, Produzione frumento). According to Lessona private 
initiative would bring three advantages to the economy: 1.
Ensures the transfer of sizeable agricultural machinery.
2. Enables the transfer of experienced and skilled farmers 
with their own equipment to start agricultural activity im­
mediately.
3. Furnishes useful experience in the relationship between 
commercial farms and local "native" farmers.
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reiterated its commitment to upholding the paramountcy of the 
social goals of colonization. Thus, according to the Ministry's 
plan a number of small and medium-sized private farms whose 
primary scope was to populate the land were to be promoted 
alongside large scale commercial farms. Families with adequate 
skills and capital were to be encouraged to take up farming*®. 
Close control by the government, it was thought, would ensure 
promotion of such mass settlement initiatives and curb the 
eventual concentration of land in the hands of a few commercial 
farms. The strategies used for such control were mainly careful 
processing of applications for land concessions and imposition 
of strict contractual agreements. As we will explore later in 
this chapter, such a system strengthened the hands of bureau­
cracy. It became impossible to get anything done without going 
to innumerable offices in the capital of the respective gover- 
norate who all referred the matter to their superior in Rome. 
From the point of anti-monopolistic control and promotion of 
genuine investors, the measures also proved inadequate.
As initially envisaged, commercial farms were to be 
confined to a few carefully selected areas unsuitable for 
settlement but economically viable. Viability was measured in 
terms of the presence of abundant labour and the potential for 
large returns for capital invested*'. But the plan was never 
translated into action and most commercial farms operated close 
to demographic colonization. In fact, the promoters of the 
scheme failed to see that from the start the plan was wrought 
with internal inconsistencies. The areas that were singled out 
included such scattered and remote regions as those surrounding 
AA to the Awash River basin in the south and south-west, from 
firdr Valley and the JeJega planes in HArHr in the south-east,
*®. Villa and al. , ibidem.
*'. CD IAO AOI 1936, Lessona to GG IA, Rm 9-6-1937.
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up to the planes of Qobbo and QorbAtta in the far north15. But 
more importantly, some of these areas were beyond the Italian 
authorities’ immediate political grip. Secondly, an abundance 
of vacant land did not necessarily mean that the land was 
conducive to commercial farming. In fact, as the Italians 
themselves discovered, labour tended to be extremely scarce, 
the climate unhealthy and communication difficult. In addition, 
despite their public pronouncements the political authorities 
in Rome and Ethiopia paid only lip-service to the policy and 
were more conspicuous in undermining than encouraging it. As we 
will see, the most glaring example was the allowance for a 
governor to issue certain concessions in his respective ter­
ritory1®. In some governorates this policy was pursued vigorous­
ly to the chagrin of the Viceroy’s government in AA who was 
often forced to intervene to correct excessive abuses1^.
ORGANIZATIONAL PATTERN
At the eve of Ethiopian Independence in 1941, there 
were farms of all dimensions and combinations differing in 
structure, organization and orientation. Towards early 1939 
these were divided into three categories1®.
A. There were small homestead farms developed by farmers 
with modest starting up capital. As in demographic colonization
15. Ibidem; ATdR 24/100, p. 17.
*®. CD IAO AOI 1936, Graziani to MC, AA 14-4-1937; Graziani 
to GGA0I, AA 9-5-1937; Lessona to Graziani, Rm 14-5-1937.
**. GRA 43/34-22, Graziani to Lessona, AA 2-11-1937; Lessona 
to Graziani, Rm 4-11-1937; CD IAO AOI 1936, GGAOI (Petretti) to 
MAI, AA 25-9-1937; GGAOI (Petretti) to GHr, AA 30-9-1937 
(hereafter Petretti to GHr); AOI 1924, Terrzzi to Duce, 27-4- 
1938 (hereafter Terruzzi to Mussolini).
*®. The division roughly reflected Lessona’s ideas as
developed in his master plan of 5-8-1936, where he envisaged 
four types of colonization [Cfr. Chap. II, pp.7d .
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these were largely composed of individuals entitled to the 
nation’s gratitude who, in a sense, were social casualties: war 
veterans, particularly the demobilized soldiers of the Ethiopi­
an campaign, fathers of large families and unemployed workers. 
Each farm ranged between 1 and 60 ha1®. Located at the outskirts 
of an urban centre, the farms had as their immediate objective 
the provision of fresh vegetables and fruits to urban popula­
tions and military garrisons. However, like demographic coloni­
zation their ultimate aim was mass settlement and because of 
this they were treated favourably. But unlike demographic 
colonization, the concessions were given directly to a head of 
a household and not to a purposely formed state-funded agency1®.
B. Medium—sized farms included three distinct forms of 
concessions:
1."Concessions directed towards agricultural 
development with or without obligation as to require peasant 
land settlement".
2. Agro—pastoral.
3. Forestry.
The first group were divided into two categories. One was 
oriented to mass land settlement. In this case the land was 
granted as either a concession transferable into a definite 
ownership upon the payment of, in toto or pro rata, the price 
of the land, or permanent concessions pending discharge of 
specific obligations. The size of the land ranged from 61 to 
500 ha and its price was assessed at market value; and so, 
unlike small scale commercial farming, the concessions were not 
subject to special treatment. But like small scale concessions, 
they were given to the head of a household. In the second 
category, the lowest holding was 500 ha and maximum 2,000 ha. 
Yet cases of 5,000 ha were not uncommon. An element common to
According to some sources they covered an area ca.1-15 
ha, while according to others they consisted of ca.1-50 ha.
MAE, La valorizzazione , p.210; La Stampa. 9-8-1940.
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this and other categories of concessions was that the land was 
not transferable into permanent ownership; they were leased for 
a 30 year period and renewable for a maximum of 99 years.
The holdings of the agro-pastoral concessions were 
of variable size with a maximum limit of 10,000 ha. The fore­
stry concessions included companies charged with either re­
forestation or exploitation of existing forestry resources and 
their by-products. As for size, re-forestation entailed an 
upper ceiling of 5,000 ha and for the first twenty years was 
rent-free. For the concessions connected with forestry ex­
ploitation, there were no clear conditions set on the size, the 
duration or lease. Both size and lease were computed on "the 
value of the wood and secondary products, putatively extract- 
able from the forest". Upon such evaluation also depended the 
time scale which, however, "will not in any event exceed twenty 
years period". Medium-sized farms originally were made up of 
those members of CFA who had as their mission imperial self- 
sufficiency in food-crops, particularly wheat. Non-members, for 
whom wheat was optional, engaged themselves in other crops 
assumed to be more lucrative and less risky. This development, 
combined with the continuous failure of wheat, forced CFA at a 
later stage to diversify production and involve themselves in 
industrial farming^1.
C. Large-scale concessions were to produce industrial crops 
such as cotton, sugar cane, indiarubber, coffee, tea, oil seeds 
and textile fibre, with a twofold target: to provide the raw 
material required by the metropolitan industries and to conquer 
the foreign market. Most of the farms were ad hoc creations, 
and some were subsidiaries of large metropolitan companies. The 
companies held concessions of variable sizes, with each holding 
extending between 500 and 30,000 ha. Practically, they were 
beyond the direct control of local authorities as they were 
directly accountable to the MAI. This arrangement was a frequent
21. MAE, La valorizzazione, p.210; II Messagero. 2-11-1937.
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cause of political friction between local authorities and 
companies.
Among large scale farms the most important were the 
Cotton Districts, controlled by Ente per il Cotone dell * Africa 
Italiana [ECAI]. This agency was established 7 January 1937 by 
the RDL with a capital of £.25,000,000 partly paid from the State 
Treasury and partly by the Istituto Cotonero Italiano [ICI], Its 
task was "to oversee the development, regulation and exploita­
tion of cotton in IEA". Within a year the agency set forth its 
programme, establishing a number of Cotton Districts each 
measuring on average one million hectares. The underlying 
concept of the organization of these Districts was to boost the 
production of cotton in preference to other cultivations^. Among 
other large companies worthy of consideration were SIMBA which 
operated in H&rSr governorate - mainly, As&lla, Fadis, Villa 
Baka - and SocietA Nuova Africa. These two companies employed 
considerable capital in both men and material^.
This threefold division, though inadequate, was con­
sidered to meet the existing administrative conditions and serve 
as point of reference for future concessions. But the Italians 
were not able to give theoretical and practical justification 
for such categorization.
For a more comprehensive discussion on Cotton Districts 
and biographical references see Chap. VII, pp.293-3ZZ.
MAE, La valorizzazione, p.210; Giovanni Pesce, "Di- 
sciplina giuridica delle concessioni agrarie: Gli obblighi e le 
facoltA del concessionario", L'Azione Coloniale. 7-7-1939 
(hereafter Pesce, "Disciplina giuridica"); Gennaro Mondaini, 
"Tradizione e innovazione nel1 *incipiente ordinamento fondiario 
del 1 *AOI", I Georgofi1i. VII, 7 (1941):121-2.
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TABLE XI:- CONCESSION AREAS (1941)2*.
TERRITORY
— > 
0-60
ACREAGE IN HECTARES 
61-500 501-2000 2000 >
/
%
TOTAL
SHAWA 550.5 3096 10110 4500 10256.5 10.9
HARAR 1185.7 2620 3600 40000 47405.7 28.4
ARSI 606 300 700 13000 14606 8.8
BALfi - - 4000 7500 11500 6.9
BAG2MDER 515 255 - - 770 0.5
WALL0 291 2134 2200 - 4625 2.8
KAFFA 270 3100 - 28000 31370 18.9
SIDAM0 72 760 - 35000 35832 21.5
TEGRAY* 152.2 571 1550.7 - 2273.9 1.3
WALLAGA - - - - - -
TOTAL 3642.4 12836 22160.7 128000 166639.1
* Figures available only for 1939.
Source: CD IAO Sc 1801; AOI Sc 1802; 1808, GAm UA, Relazione 
sulla colonizzazione e servizi agrari dell’Amara, Gn 
giugno 1940; Hr 1813, L'attuale organizzazione dei 
servizi del 1 *agricoltura nel governo del Hr all'inizio 
1940, n.d.; GS 1822, RGGS UA, AttivitA agricole 
esistenti nel territorio del GGS, gennaio 1940; 1984, 
Elenco delle aziende agricole e dei piccoli coloni di 
Asella, n.d..
Three censuses of 1938, 1939 and 1940 summarily deal 
with the status of commercial farms in each governorate^. But 
like any survey, these censu&sare limited in their range, chron­
ology, and consistency of data^. But the censuses are valuable for
* . The figures are elaborated by the author.
25. CD IAO 1808; GS 1822; Hr 1813; Sc 1802; Sc 1801.
2*. Owing to these limitations, it is not possible to give 
an exact picture of the annual rate of expansion in each 
province, the activities engaged or the amount of capital at the 
concessionaries* command.
- 2 0 2 -
CHAPTER VI COMMERCIAL FARMING
the fragmentary data they give. A remarkable common feature is 
the staggering growth of commercial farms and their steadily in­
creasing concentration in southern regions.
TABLE XII:- CONCESSIONAIRES ACCORDING TO THEIR FARM SIZE27
TERRITORY 0-60
--- > FARMS IN HECTARES
61-500 501-2000 2000
<---
> TOTAL %
SHAWA 19 15 10 1 45 20.1
HARAR 45 13 3 2 63 28.1
ARSI 15 1 1 2 19 8.5
BALE — — 3 2 5 2.2
BAGEMDER 23 2 — - 25 11.2
WALLO 13 12 2 — 27 12.1
KAFFA 7 10 — 1 18 8.0
SIDAMO 5 3 — 1 9 4.0
TEGRAY* 9 2 2 — 13 5.8
WALLAGA — —  — “  —
TOTAL 136 58 21 9 224 100
* Only 1939 figures are available.
Source: CD IAO Sc 1801; Sc 1802; AOI 1808; Hr 1813; GS 1822.
When considering the difficulties under which they 
operated, the pace of development was rapid, even if far below 
official expectations. Towards the end of the 1940s, there were 
approximately 224 farms holding about 166,639 ha. According to 
some sources, 50% of these were engaged in cattle-breeding, 38% 
in cereal production, 8% in industrial cash-crop and 4% in 
banana and coffee production2®. In terms of their size, about 
61% were made up of small farms which owned over 2% of the total 
land area. Medium-sized farms consisted of 35%, holding a total 
of 21% in terms of land area. The remaining 77% of the area
27. The figures are exclusive of Cotton Districts.
2®. The data do not clarify whether these figures are 
inclusive of the activities in the old colonies. Cfr. CC, 25-3- 
1940.
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belonged to large concessions which formed only 4% of the total 
farms. The combined holding of mass settlement oriented farms - 
small and medium first category - totalled 16,478.4 ha or 
about 10% of the total land under commercial farms. Thus most 
of the land was concentrated in the hands of large companies^. 
This reveals Rome's claim that monopolistic tendencies would be 
tightly controlled as a hollow pronouncement3®.
The census throws additional light on geographical 
aspects of commercial farming. Regional distribution showed 
that most farms were centred at HSrMr and ShMwa provinces. 
Despite their great agricultural potential, commercial inter­
est in Sidamo and KMffa developed late, whereas in Illubabor, 
WMll&ga and G&mu Gofa it was conspicuously absent. A number 
of reasons contributed to this. Primarily, the effective 
occupation of the regions took place comparatively late. 
Illubabor, WSllMga and GMmu Gofa were isolated by lack of 
communications, and Sidamo and K&ffa were the last to have a 
motorway to AA. Another deterrent was their distance from the 
port of Meswa, 1,600-2,000 km away. Even though the opening 
of the As&b-DHs6 road reduced such distance substantially, it 
still remained considerable (1,200-1,600 km). This weighed 
heavily on the transport costs of machinery, seed and other 
products, and encouraged many farmers to settle in agricul­
turally less favourable but otherwise more convenient areas^. 
The situation was aiding to make the two regions the field of 
monopolistic concessions which, unlike small farms, had 
resources to absorb these difficulties. Despite the predom­
inance of small and medium-sized farms, in H&rfir and ShMwa
M. See Table XI.
3®. Pomilio, "I problemi attuali dell'impero nel pensiero 
di Attilio Terruzzi", L*A1imentazione Italiana. (13-31/8-1938).
31. GS 1985, pp.1-2; GS 1822, pp.1-2.
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there was a relatively balanced presence of all forms of 
enterprises33.
TABLE XIII:- TRACTORS OWNED BY VARIOUS GROUPS IN IEA IN 1940
GOVERNORATB AGRICOLTDRAL
OFFICES
DEMOGRAPHIC COLONIZATION 
AGENCIES
COMMERCIAL FARMS TOTAL
TRACTORS
ONC ECRE ECPE EDR CAG No. OF No. OF
- - - — — — — 0VNER8 8 TRACTORS
mu 3 - 1* - - - 14 22 39
GS ii - - - 7 2 10 27 35
urn 38 - - 15 - - 14 71 12A
SHIVA A 4A 7 - - - 26 85 IA0
ERITREA 1 - - - - - 9 21 * 22
SOMALIA - - - - - 3 3AA 3AA
TOTAL 3* 44 21 15 7 8 2 76 570 70A
* Includes Tegray where two companies had 7 tractors.
** Tractors at its disposal are those same indicated under
EDR.
a Inclusive of Companies of Cotton District.
Source:- CD IA0 1800; Gm 2919; Hr 1813, p.8.
The geographical distribution of the farms re­
flected concern for economic viability and political condi­
tions of the regions. Almost all the concessions were situat­
ed along highway routes and in areas with relatively abundant 
water resources and at above 2,000 m sea level where there 
was little threat from malaria or endemic diseases. Economi­
cally, proximity to a highway meant easy access to markets 
was guaranteed and transport costs reduced; politically, an 
Italian presence along highways was thought to ensure their 
continuous functioning and, in an emergency, military assis­
tance could be easily provided.
32. See Tables XI-XII.
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TABLE XIV:- ANNUAL PRODUCTION AT A MEDIUM-SIZED FARM OF 
SCAGLIARINI ROBERTO & SONS
YEAR CULTIVATED AREAS PRODUCTION
(IN HA.) (IN QL.)
1938-39 150 1000
1939-40 350 3000
1940-41 300 300
Source:- CD IAO Documenti AOI, Concessione agricola "Scagl- 
iarini & Figli" - Ambo, Rm 8-3-1941. Scagliarini 
had 2 Lanz tractors of 45HP, 2 of 35HP and one 
Bali 11a tractor of 16HP and a substantial array of 
implements. Cfr. CD IAO AOI 1936, Macchine ed 
attrezzi agricoli per la lavorazione del terreno 
esistenti presso le aziende agricole costituite 
nella zona di Ambo, AA 11-4-1938; AOI 1800.
In Harar, Sidamo, Kciffa and Arsi, where more 
peaceful circumstances prevailed, farms were scattered over a 
relatively wide area. Where the political situation was 
precarious, they were concentrated in one or two areas: on 
the high plateau of Mount SHqalti, between 15-30 km from 
Gondar, in Bag^mder; Borum^da and Ciaffa, in Wallo; Maqal£ 
and Adwa, in Tegray33. In Shawa, they were restricted to the 
west and south-west along the AA-Jimma, AA-Harar motorways 
and along the belt of Awash River basin. The vast majority 
operated at Ambo where they represented 24% of the total 
farmers holding more than 50% of the total land area under 
commercial farming in the region. The dispersion showed 
inconsistencies in the government’s policy which, as we men­
tioned earlier, aimed to channel commercial farming to a few 
carefully selected areas that were unsuitable for mass set­
tlement3**.
33. CD IAO Am 600, pp.1-3; GS 1820, p.6; GS 1822, pp.5-14; 
Cl, 27-12-1938; Le Colonie. 14-12-1939.
3**. More importantly, the developments particularly in these 
regions had a historical significance that went beyond the period 
of occupation. In fact, it was largely in these same areas that 
the phenomena of commercial capitalism appeared in 1960s and 
1970s.
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TABLE XV:- YEARLY PRODUCTION AT MEDIUM-SIZED FARM OF 
BISACCHI UGO AT AMBO*
YEAR CULTIVATED PRODUCTION PRODUCTION COST DEFICIT 
AREA (IN<£.) (IN £.)** (IN £.)
1938-39 180 218,623 673,560 455,937
1939-40 425 738,195 1,363,571 625,376
1940-41 N.A. *** *** ****
TABLE XVI:- COST OF PRODUCTION AND REVENUE
YEAR 1938-1939 YBAR 1939-1940
TYPB OF
COST HA RBVEIUB EIPEISES I HA RBVBIUB EIPBISES 1
CAPITAL* 180 218,623 915,000 60.5 625 738,195 333,000 20.98
laboor 232,020 15.3 735,221 66.32
OPERATIOIAL 336,900 22.3 677,630 30.08
KAIAGEHEIT 29,260 1.9 61,566 2.62
TOTAL 180 218,623 1,513,160 625 738,195 1,587,217
* The a g r ic u l t u r a l year s t a r ts in  A p r i l 1 and ends March 31.
* *  The cost does not inc lude c a p i ta l investm ent. For more
detailed information see Table XVI.
*** The report states that the production was much lower than 
that of 1939-40 because of unexpected smut attack just before 
harvest.
**** The concessionaire claims that the deficit is higher than 
that of 1939-40 but does not give details.
*. This indicates capital investment.
Source: CD IAO Documenti AOI 1837, Azienda agricola Bisacchi
Ugo, Comprensorio di Ambo, n.d..
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The concessions were expected to develop primarily 
as enclaves, independent of traditional Ethiopian agricultural 
farming techniques. Indeed farms like those of SIMBA and, to a 
lesser degree a number of those belonging to CFA members, were 
highly mechanized. In addition to an extensive array of agri­
cultural implements, SIMBA had 30 tractors*5 and the 21 farmers 
of CFA had 85 tractors*5 between them. But according to a census 
carried out at the end of 1939, there was a total of ca.210 
tractors, and of 224 farmers only 65 had a tractor*7. Over 70% of 
the concessionaires, who had no modern agricultural machinery, 
relied totally or partially either on traditional methods of 
farming, i.e. use of animals*® or a few hired tractors*7, or were 
dependent upon government assistance^®.
What proportion of this land was actually developed 
at the end of 1940? With the exceptions of KSffa and Sidamo, 
information on other regions is incomplete. Neverthless, the 
answer depends on a number of factors, including age, size and 
location of the concession. As regards age, the majority of the
35. See Table XVIII.
*6. See Table XIX.
*7. See Table XIII.
*®. Some of the concessions operating under such a method 
produced exceptionally good yields, as was the case with the 
concession of De Zorzi in K&ffa where an average production of 
between 15-20 ql per ha was obtained. Cfr. CD IAO GS 1822, p.11.
*®. The government tractor hiring scheme was well organized 
only in HHrSr where the UA, in addition to a large variety of 
agricultural implements, possessed 38 tractors, 13 threshers and 
a fully equipped repair and maintenance workshop. In other 
regions, such facilities were uncommon at either private or 
governmental level [Cfr. CD IAO Hr 1813, pp.8-11; all. 1, GHrDCL 
IA, Norme per il noleggio di macchine agricole agli agricoltori; 
Le Colonie. 24-5-1938].
*®. This was particularly the case with small farmers around 
GondHr who had the initial ploughing work done gratis by the 
tractors of the UA [Cfr. CD IAO Ex AOI Am 600, p.6]
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concessions belonged to the land rush period of 1937 and 1938. 
From the end of 1938 onwards, there was a gradual but consider­
able decrease. Exceptions were Keif fa and Sidamo where there was 
a sustained interest in contrast to the restrained attitude of 
the earlier period. One of the most remarkable post-1938 phenom­
enon was the rapid growth of profit-oriented, large-sized farm­
ers at the expense of mass settlement oriented farms.
As regards areas developed, the fragmentary nature 
of the available data makes nation-wide assessment difficult.
But sources attest that there was not a single farmer who suc­
ceeded in cultivating all his holding. Even the achievements of 
the old and relatively well-equipped concessionaires was far 
from satisfactory. Table XIV shows the example of the farm of 
Scagliarini Roberto & Sons. The concessionaires belonged to CFA 
group and began work in early 1938, making use of modern machin­
ery. But out of 1,000 ha of highly fertile land at Ambo, they 
cultivated a mere 150 ha in the first year, 350 ha in the second 
year, which, in the third year, was reduced to 300 ha.
Of course, there were regional variations. In Shttwa 
and Hcirar, where the farms had been established for a longer 
period and, in case of H&rSr, under more peaceful circumstances, 
they were considerably developed. But the limited development by 
farmers of CFA in Whllo and those of Kftffa and Sidamo regions 
suggests there was no spectacular success both at individual or 
regional level. The six CFA members of W311o began their opera­
tion in early 1938 on 3,170 ha**. They had a sizeable stock of 
modern machinery and a variety of agricultural tools. Yet the 
total area cultivated at the end of 1940 amounted to about 1,500 
ha57. Regionally, in Sidamo and Kdffa provinces, of the total
71. In 1940 it had increased to 3,794 ha [Cfr. CD IAO Ex 
AOI AM 600, p.7; AOI 1808, p.18].
*2. CD IAO AOI 1808, p. 18.
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concession area of 67,202 ha belonging to the commercial farms, 
a paltry sum of 805 ha was developed**.
Similarly, the level of production was lamentable. 
With a few exceptions, in a good year the average yield of wheat 
totalled between 4-6 ql per ha. Each year the farmers had to 
contend with climatic hazards attendant upon any agricultural 
enterprise, and marauding insects. In 1939, crops at Harfir and 
Arsi uplands were considerably damaged by the combined assault 
of excessive rainfall, invasion of locusts and depredation of 
pests, in particular the larvae of the Noctaid moth**. In 1940, 
the harvest was so ridiculously poor that many qf the farmers 
did not even bother to it*5. Reduction in production
affected even coffee. This staple export crop had plummeted to 
its lowest level in 1938. In September 1937, its export to Italy 
was &tvzrtL'i curtailed. Exporting firms were allowed to send to 
the metropolis consignments equivalent to 30% of their exports 
to other countries. In 1931-4 inclusive, total export averaged 
17,000 tons per year. But at the end of 1936 export had prac­
tically stopped to the extent that a rich coffee-producing 
country had to import from Brazil. With the recovery of 1938, 
coffee export totalled 4,533 tons. Of this 1,360 tons (value 
£.9,620,000) went to Italy. But in 1939, production was reduced 
to 2,000 tons*5. The government undertook a number of special
**. CD IAO GS 1822, pp.5-14.
**. Gibbs to Halifax, AA 27-11-1939, p.3.
*5. CD IAO Documenti AOI, Concessione Scagliarini; AOI 1837, 
p. 6; AOI 1838, p. 5; AOI 1929, Pavirani to T. Testa, Aselle 4 
Novembre 1940; GS 1328, Antonio Ciccarone, Relazione sulla 
missione del dott. Ciccarone alle concessioni cerealicole del 
comprensorio di Aselle, AA 16-9-1940; EX AOI Sc 1329; E. Tischer 
to De Benedictis, Togonfc 3-11-1940.
*5. MCP De Palma 7/74, 9-5-43; Bird to Halifax AA 1-4-1939, 
p.9; Gibbs to Halifax, AA 27-11-1939, p.3.
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measures to boost production but the results remained limited^. 
Harar, where the government conducted a concerted campaign and 
where a number of European concessions existed before the oc­
cupation, provides the best illustrative example. In 1931, a 
total of 10,000 tons of coffee was produced. Production for the 
whole of 1935-7 amounted to 8,000 tons, reduced to about 3,000 
tons in 1938-9. One European plantation which, before the oc­
cupation, had an annual production of ca.7-8,000 ql, by 1937-8, 
had an output of only 2,000 qls and over 900 ql. by 1938-9^.
Low output was matched by soaring production costs 
which seriously shook the enthusiasm of many farmers^. The 
situation made their need to resort to state subsidy more acute. 
This was an embarrassment to the colonial administration, for 
the shortcomings of the farmers exposed the inadequacy of its 
control aimed to preventing the establishment of unprofitable 
farms.
STATE ASSISTANCE AND CONTROL
Recognizing that the growth of commercial farming 
was not possible without state intervention, the colonial 
government undertook a number of measures to ensure rapid but 
planned development, aided by a host of learned institutions 
within Italy. Assistance came through the formation of a 
network of agricultural offices and experimental stations and 
in the form of a variety of incentives. Control was exerted 
through a careful processing of applications for land and 
imposition of an agreed development programme. But the go­
vernment’s objectives were seriously limited by the combina-
hl. CD IAO Hr 1813, alleg. II, GHr DCL IA, Provvedimenti a 
favore degli indigeni coltivatori di caffd, Hr 27-4-1938; alleg. 
no. 9, UARGHr, no. 13357, Vivai di caffd, Hr 20-2-1940; MCP De 
Palma 7/74, 9-5-43, p.6.
CD IAO, Relazione sulla situazione caffearia Hararina 
alia fine della campagna 1937-1938, AA luglio 1938, pp.1,6.
See Tables XV and XVI.
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tion of inadequate official support, random and ill-defined 
directives and meagre financial commitment.
The agricultural institutions in Ethiopia provided 
technical assistance, propaganda and surveillance. But their 
achievements were far more limited than officialdom claimed. 
Their involvement began with the enactment of the decree of 
16 June 1936 which saw the creation in the Reale Academia 
D'Italia of a research centre, known as Study Centre, whose 
task was to:
a. Promote and carry out through its own missions1 scien­
tific research in IEA with the view tb supplying precise 
information necessary for development by the State and priva­
te companies.
b. Coordinate and set guidelines to all private initia­
tives that have similar objectives and capital to invest.
c. Examine requests and proposals that WOU.ll be submitted 
to itty the MC.
The Centre was jointly financed by the Reale 
Academia D ’Italia and the MC and had its headquarters in Rome 
with a branch in AA^ ®. The Director General of the MAI par­
ticipated in almost every activity that the Centre carried 
out in its Rome headquarters. The Centre despatched a number 
of exploratory missions which collected valuable scientific 
and agricultural information; but the findings offered no im­
mediate solution to the problems facing the farmers.
The Centre’s role was overtaken by the IACI of 
Florence which, alongside other para-statal as well as priv­
ate agencies, carried out useful investigations through 
specialized commissions. Founded in 1903, the Institute was 
one of the leading bodies for the study of tropical and sub­
tropical agriculture and served as a centre for the diffusion
50. MAE, L*avvaloramento, pp. 342-4. Among such missions 
that of Lake Tana, led by one of the founders of the Institute, 
Giotto Danieli, is of considerable academic importance in terms 
of seriousness and the wide range of topics covered.
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of colonial propaganda. Most of the technical directors, 
experts and supervisors of the colonies were trained there 
and its ex-students and staff carried out a number of valu­
able missions. The Director, Professor Armando Maugini, was 
also the Head of the Department of Agricultural Services of 
the MAI.
As it had in the older Italian colonies, the In­
stitute played a crucial role in the development and organi­
zation of the agricultural services inside the Empire5*. In 
each of the four governorates an agricultural department, 
Ispettorato Agrario, was set up with an experimental station. 
The Ispettorato was divided into seven units specializing in 
areas such as "native" agriculture, stock-raising, phytopa­
thology and plant-breeding as well as experimentation5*. For 
the commercial farms the most important unit was Land Recla­
mation and Agricultural Colonization Unit5*. This unit had the 
task of allocating land and overseeing development, assisting 
and controlling activities and providing fuel; in some in­
stances, but particularly where other units were not opera­
tional, it had an extremely wide remit. An important role was 
also played by the experimental stations, many of which 
carried out valuable research on local and foreign crops and 
animals. Most significant of these were those of M&lco in GS, 
AmarMsa in HfirMr, Gudhr and M&kanisa in Sh&wa, and Pirzio 
Biroli in Amara. The experimental work undertaken at these
51. Ibidem; ATdR 24/116, RD per 1 *ordinamento del RIA-AI: 
Relazione al Consiglio dei Ministri; 24/119, RD ordinamento dei 
servizi del 1 *agricoltura dell’AI.
5*. On the work of these institutions see agricultural 
departments* reports: CD IAO Sc 1801; Hr 1813; AOI 1808; GS 1819. 
At the later stage the Experimental Department became independent 
from the UA and the areas of its action widened [Cfr. RD 29-7- 
1938, no.2221 , Ordinamento dei servizi del 1 *agricoltura nell*AI, 
GU, 15-3-1939, n.63.]
53. Sezione Bonificamento e Colonizzazione Agricola.
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stations aimed to assist the farmers with new and lucrative 
crops5*. The law envisaged the extension of each unit to every 
district and sub-district; in the event, only in part of 
Hhrhr was this the case55.
The agricultural offices had wide ranging and de­
manding activities which often overshadowed their main tasks 
of technical assistance, propaganda and surveillance of 
commercial farms55. These extra duties extended from land to 
topographical and agricultural surveys of the soil which, in 
case of small and medium-sized farms, entailed parcelling out 
into plots of 60 and 500 ha and partitioning further into 
smaller units for the purpose of assessing the annual rent 
and operational capital; evaluation of a development plan 
with reference to irrigation, availability of drinking water, 
transport facilities, access to market, and labour supply; 
and land exchange plans, involving eventual compensation for 
and resettlement of displaced inhabitants and study and 
composition of charters of concessions, or disciplinary.
Despite their impressively elaborate appearance, 
the agricultural departments were largely underfunded, under­
manned and undermined. Considering that agriculture was the 
key area that the government wanted to promote and the life­
blood of the country, the budget devoted to agriculture was 
minute58. For example, H&rfir's annual budget amounted to
5*. Archival material on the experimental stations and their 
works is vast: cfr. CD IAO 1323; Ex AOI Hr 1325; Hr 1335; Gm 
1336; Sc 1337, 1338; AOI 1808; GS 1817 and Hr 3034.
55. RD 29-7-1938, no. 2221, GU, 15-3-1939.
55. CD IAO GS 1820, II Problema della colonizzazione 
capitalistica nei GS, gennaio 1940, p.6; Sc 1801, p.2.
57. CD IAO Sc 1801, p.2; GS 1820, pp.2-9.
58. According to a sexennial plan, the total fund earmarked 
for agricultural development amounted only to £.200,000,000 or 
1.8% of the total budget. This was almost 30% less than that 
allocated to defence (4.5%) and higher only than that allocated
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.1,100,000 while the minimum it needed to maintain its basic 
performance was £.2,000,000. But owing to the large presence 
of commercial farms in the territory, H8r&r received rela­
tively generous treatment*9. The same can be said as regards 
personnel, which at the end of 1940 consisted of about 150 
individuals*9. Of these only 50 had higher qualifications of 
any kind. Most of these were stationed in GS, which by 1940 
appears as the only governorate comparatively adequately 
equipped in terms of both number of departments and manpower, 
although still poor in financial resources^.
TABLE XVII:- AGRICULTURAL PERSONNEL IN 1940
GOYBRIORATB PROFSS S101AL SKILLED SSH1-SK1LLBD DISKILLED TOTAL
mu 9 13 1 3 26
G3 17 34 7 33 91
HARAS 14 11 1 - - 26
SHAVA 10 1 - 1 12
TOTAL 50 59 9 37 155
- Professional group include agronomists (31), graduates 
(16), planners (3).
- Skilled consist of mainly nursery (19), clerical workers 
(13), assistant agronomists (8), tractor drivers (8), sur- 
veyors(3), gardeners (2), mechanics (2), apicultural- 
ists(l), horticulturalists (1), carpenters (1), smith (1).
- Semi-skilled involves nursery assistants (9).
- unskilled include workmen (27), storekeepers (4), footmen 
(2), stablemen, (2), shepherd (1), messenger (1).
Source:- CD IAO Sc 1801; AOI 1808; Hr 1813; GS 1819.
to communication (0.5%) and mining (0.91%) [Cfr. ATdR 24/79, 
MAI, Piano sessennale delle opere e delle spese per l’AOI, Rra 
1937].
59. CD IAO Hr 1813, p.5.
M. See Table XVII.
M. CD IAO AOI 1808; GS 1819; Hr 1813; Sc 1801.
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Lack of manpower and finance was compounded by 
inadequacy or total lack of premises. With a few exceptions, 
in the early stages departments operated from temporary shel­
ters. Even as late as 1940 there were complaints of inade­
quate office space. Almost all the peripheral units func­
tioned either from a temporary harish or from a room shared 
with other government organizations**. To further aggravate 
smooth functioning, there was a network of overlapping poli­
tical and military jurisdictions and a relative lack of 
autonomy that "made interferences inevitable and harmonious 
and profitable co-operation often difficult"**. The overall 
perception that the concessionaires had about these agricul­
tural departments was negative. Most recurrent complaints 
directed against them were that they were dilatory and unsym­
pathetic to their enterprise. They were blamed particularly 
for supplying seeds that were inadequate or inappropriate or 
after long delays**.
The technical officers were not only numerically 
inadequate but they lacked specialized training. As most of 
their experience was gained in the field, they lacked time to 
absorb the growing amount of information about the agricul­
tural environment. Thus there was little wonder that even 
those devoted men among them did little to meet the expecta­
tions of most of the farmers. Reports talk of their enormous 
frustration with the rigors of frontier life. An early report 
by HSrar agricultural department contrasts the conducive 
agricultural environment of the governorship with the depres­
sed state of agricultural officers. On the one hand, there 
was one of the most peaceful regions ruled by a governorate
**. Ibidem Hr 1832, IAHr, Promemoria to Prof. Maugini, 12- 
9-1938; Hr 1813; Sc 1801.
*3. CD IAO Sc 1801, p. 2.
**. Ibidem, Concessione Scagliarini; AOI 1837, pp.4-5; AOI 
1838, p.5.
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interested in colonization and agricultural development. On 
the other, stood a relatively well-qualified but apathetic 
personnel, demoralized by the uncomfortable life-style. To 
further complicate matters, the Director was reportedly 
unpopular and ill-disposed towards the IACI and its graduates 
from where a substantial number of his staff came. The list 
of complaints from technicians were many. They included lack 
of accommodation and equipment, job dissatisfaction due to 
over-work, confusion in job boundary, favouritism, political 
interference. Reports attest how the work of these officers 
was hampered by lack of funds, the vast areas they had to 
cover, transport difficulties, a hostile indigenous popula­
tion, and an intractable bureaucracy. Owing to this, propa­
ganda and technical assistance remained largely limited to 
quick visits to experimental centres by concessionaires, or 
extension work by one of these over-worked technical offi­
cers, trying in a hurried visit to persuade the farmer to use 
improved farming techniques such as hoeing or growing a 
particular crop. However, in 1940, in some areas even such 
practices were reduced to the exchange of a few words during 
one of those sporadic contacts between the concessionaires 
and the technical officers**.
As regards incentives, these were provided in the 
form of subsidies which largely consisted of reduced agricul­
tural fuel, supply of seeds, free travel up to the port of 
destination for the personnel to be employed on the farms, 
free transport of equipment and machinery. For some crops, 
such as wheat, a guaranteed price was offered which the 
colonial authorities thought would provide an adequate profit 
margin. To encourage extensive cultivation of virgin lands, a 
land reclamation fund was set up consisting of £.250 per ha of
**. CD IAO 1832, Appunti relativi sull’IA di AAAsHrSm, 1938; 
RGGS UA, AttivitA svolta nei vari settori dal la costituzione 
dell'ufficio ad oggi, gennaio 1940, pp.3-4 (hereafter RGGS, 
AttivitA); GS 1820, p.6.
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land put under cultivation**. Farmers were also exempt from 
payment of 8srat to which all Ethiopian farmers were sub­
ject*^ . In addition, there were special aid packages of short 
term measures adopted on a nationwide or regional basis 
either by the central administration or by the respective 
governorate in special circumstances. These included assis­
tance in building a house, free access to a tractor, a spe­
cial subsidy in case of crop failure or loss due to climate 
or locust invasion**.
Most of the subsidies were obtained through a sus­
tained pressure that involved acrimonious dispute and long 
negotiations. This was particularly the case with the land 
reclamation fund and agricultural fuel*9. The Viceroy's go­
vernment in AA was impervious to the plight of the farmers 
who found themselves in the unusual position of having to
w. Lessona to GG, Produzione frumento; Lessona to CFA, 
Trasferimento in AOI di imprese di coltivazione, Rm 20-11-1937 
(hereafter Lessona to CFA, Trasferimento); GGAOI [Cerulli] to 
MAI DGACL, Concessioni provvisorie per le semine di cereali, AA 
25-3-1938 (hereafter Cerulli to MAI, Concessioni provvisorie); 
AOI 1936, Ugo Rossi and al. to Marcello Bonfondi [Segretario 
Federale di AA] , Promemoria, AA 30-3-1937 (hereafter Rossi to 
Bonfondi, Promemoria); AOI 1800; AOI 1936, Carburante agricolo 
e disciplina della sua distribuzione (hereafter AOI 1936, Car­
burante agricolo); Prezzo dei carburanti agricoli, DGG 23-7-1938, 
no.828, GU, 111/15, 1-7-1938; DGov 31-12-1938, no.206152, BUGA. 
IV/6, 15-31.3-1938; DGov Sc 13-2-1940 no.201, GUGS. V/25, 19-6- 
1940; Villa and al., op.cit., p.240.
*7. Bird to Halifax, AA 1-4-1939.
**. CD IAO Am 600, p.6; Le Colonie. 24-5-1938; Tribuna. 7- 
2-1940; GV, 7-4-1940; G. Piani, "Rassegna di alcune attivitA 
autarchiche del Hararino nel campo agrario", Autarchia Alimen- 
tare. (ottobre 1938):38.
*9. For the Government in AA, price reduction in agricul­
tural fuel entailed price increase in other sectors of the 
economy and tax exemption affected its revenue. Cfr. CD IAO AOI 
1839, p.19; Petretti to GHr; AOI 1926, Terruzzi to Mussolini.
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persuade the sympathetic MAI to intervene on their behalf7®.
AA suspected that the commercial farms wanted to capitalize 
upon the government's anxiety to increase agricultural output 
and put the blame for shortcomings in their performance 
largely on poor technical skill and managerial incompetence 
of the farmers. For the farmers such a view reinforced their 
own perceptions of the colonial authority’s unsympathetic 
attitude towards their painful situation arising largely from 
the tremendous lack of knowledge about the physical, social 
and economic conditions of the areas in which they operated.
Ambo's CFA group turned out to be the most voci­
ferous critics..As pioneers of wheat production, they ridi­
culed government's suggestion of speculative intentions; they 
pointed out that most of their problems were the outcome of 
broken promises and misleading information on the part of the 
colonial authority. In addition to severe lack of extension 
services, they pointed to unacceptably slow land allocation, 
supply of poor seeds, and unsafe political conditions. Quite 
rightly, they claimed that although wheat prices were guaran­
teed in advance, in fact they were paid less than they would
FIGURE VIIIC.
THE TWO CFA GROUPS‘SETTLEMENT 
CENTRES*.
a . mm  variFY area.
B. AVBOAFEA.
C. EASE AFEA.
Lancia.
btfattcs,
70. Ibidem AOI 1936, G. Pini to DSAE, Situazione primi 
concessionari, AA 19-12-1937 (hereafter Pini, Situazione); AOI 
1929, Appunto dettato dalla S.E. Testa, 13-3-1941.
| *. For details see pp.236-250.
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have received on the open market7^. But they were in no way
willing to face the rigours of international market and
Ethiopian competition.
The concessionaires do not ask for ei­
ther annual contribution nor any sort 
of bounties from the Government Gene­
ral. But only a guarantee to purchase 
[at agreed price] at harvest - a guar­
antee that is in no way denied for a 
much higher amount to firms engaged in 
road construction7^.
The colonial authority gave in to most of the 
pressures of the farmers’ lobby, and the differences were 
largely settled towards the end of 1939. Nevertheless the 
farms continued to experience a number of difficulties. One 
such problem was the absence of credit institutions that 
specialized in lending money at reasonable rates of interest 
for productive rather than commercial activities. Though its 
need was strongly emphasized by the Agricultural Council as 
early as 1937 and despite persistent requests by the farmers, 
the Agricultural Loan Bank never came into existence. As a 
result the farms suffered from shortage of capital. Those 
seriously affected were small and medium-sized farms most of 
whom were chronically undercapitalized and operated at a
n. Initially the agreement was to purchase a quintal of 
wheat for £.200 provided that the production unit was 8 ql. per 
ha. But this was modified after protracted wrangling that 
followed the failure by the farmers to produce the agreed target 
per ha.. The second agreement took into account a production 
level lower than 8 ql. per ha. and set graduation in purchasing 
price in such a way that it increased in parallel to the decrease 
of output. In this way, for example, a quintal of wheat produced 
at the scale of 4 ql. per ha was purchased for £.305. [Cfr. CD 
IAO AOI 1936, MAIIA (Lessona) to GGHrGnGm, Rm 25-10-1937; Lessona 
to CFA, Trasferimento; Rossi to Bonfondi, Promemoria; Cerulli to 
MAI, Concessioni provvisorie]. At about this same period the cost 
of a quintal of wheat in AA was £.326, in Jimma £.398; while the 
cost per quintal of wheat flour amounted to £.383 in AA, £.302 
in Hr, £.353 in Gondar and £.355 in Jimma. Cfr. CD IAO AOI 1936, 
GGAOI DSAE (Graziani) to MAI, AA 3-11-1937.
77. Rossi to Bonfondi, Promemoria.
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loss^. After a number of unfulfilled promises to meet the 
repeated pleas by the farmers for credit institutions, only 
towards the end of 1940 the government seemed determined to 
create co-operatives and set up an agency that would facili­
tate their financing. In addition, it was thought that this 
same agency would take over the allocation of land in order 
to free the would-be applicant from undue bureaucratic de­
lays^.
MECHANISMS OF CONTROL: MEASURES, EFFECTS AND TRENDS
Delays in land allocation were largely caused by 
the government's desire to control each phase of agrarian 
development and transfer of land so that the Ethiopian cul­
tivator was not sacrificed for the speculator, nor the genu­
ine investor with capital discouraged from using surplus 
land. The antidote was sought in careful processing of ap- 
Pl ications and the imposition of a demanding contractual 
agreement. However, both mechanisms proved neither efficient 
nor practical. The effect was rather to antagonize many bona 
fide applicants. Archival material reveals denunciations, and 
sometimes even violent disputes, between the colonial admini­
stration and commercial farmers, most of whom had been en­
ticed to the Empire by the government's own propaganda machi­
ne. They were indignant about the way the colonial admini-
/J. Ibidem AOI 1848, Gustato Fonti to GHr, Concessione 
Agricola Foschini G. Ravioli - Bisidimo (Hr), Hr 2-12-1940; AOI 
1837, op.cit.; "Cose e case dei produttori", CE, 24-6-1939.
Equally CFA's plan to set up a Consortium or Assisten- 
tial Agency to small and medium-sized farmers was not put into 
operation. Cfr. Consulta, "Avvaloramento":1571; Rossi to 
Bonfondi, Promemoria; Pini, Considerazioni su11'attivitA agricola 
in AOI: Credito agrario, n.d (hereafter Pini, Considerazioni); 
L'Azione Coloniale. 23-3-1939; 7-12-1939; Le Colonie, 2-3-1939; 
CC, 25-3-1939; II Piccolo. 6-2-1939; "Per lo sviluppo dell'agr- 
icoltura nel GS", Rivista delle Colonie Italiane, 19-5-1938; La 
Stampa. 13-6-1939; Villa and al., op.cit., pp.254-5.
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stration tempered their enterprise while the latter viewed 
their behaviour as undisciplined and embarrassing^.
The procedure for obtaining land was complex and 
subject to much administrative and political confusion. Re­
gardless of the type of the concession or authorizing body, 
for all but a very few party officials and large influential 
commercial farms, acquisition of land took a long time and 
involved lengthy bureaucratic procedures:
The applicant has to wait from a mini­
mum of six months to a year from the 
moment he presents his application un­
til he gets the possession of the land, 
naturally, under a simple temporary 
permit, and this without considering 
the time that he had spent in the se­
lection of the land itself. Faced with 
such a situation many of them are dis­
couraged and, as a rule, they give up; 
only those whose financial resources 
would allow them to live in the capital 
destined for the agricultural enterpri­
se endure. Would so much be necessary 
for carrying out the measures necessary 
for the handing over of the conces­
sions? In so far the system currently 
followed stood, "yesM .^
Three bodies were empowered to process an application depend­
ing on the amount of capital to be invested: the Agricultural 
Council, CFA and local governments. Farms with a capital in 
excess of £.100,000 applied directly to the Agricultural Coun 
cil who made a preliminary investigation as to whether the 
concessionaire had sufficient capital and tested technology 
at its command, and examined the feasibility of the scheme. 
The criterion was to allocate land on the basis of £.1,000 per
Pini, Situazione; Rossi to Bonfondi, Promemoria; A. de 
Rubeis, Promemoria per S. E. il SottoSegretario: Semine di
frumento da parte degli agricoltori organizzati dal la CFA, Rm 
12-5-1938.
Ibidem GS 1820, p. 2; K. Gandar Dower, Abyssinian 
Patchwork. (London: 1949), p.235; G. L. Steer, Sealed and
Delivered. (London: 1942), p.196.
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ha, the maximum size of the holding to be 500 ha^. But this 
rule was not always followed and, as we saw earlier, many 
companies were given holdings as large as 30,000 ha or more^.
The Council's obvious weakness was its negligible 
knowledge of the Empire. Most data was gained through reading 
secondary sources or flying visits undertaken in one of the 
"scouting missions"^. In official circles, the Council was 
viewed as an anachronistic institution dominated by internal 
strife and self-interest. A high party official frankly re­
marked:
Why is it that rather than residing in 
Rome and making decisions for a country 
that is unknown and between 4,000 and
5,000 km away it cannot be constituted 
in IEA itself. Indeed, matters are ex­
ecuted in a chaotic way8®.
Owing to remote control of the Council, the final endorsement
of concessions rested on the central administration in AA.
From here, the applications were passed on to the appropriate
governor. However, AA showed but fleeting interest in the
orders from Rome:
Sometimes the Ministry (of the Colon­
ies) had to wait in vain for months in 
order to get a reply on some specific 
cases. Sometimes repeatedly sent ur­
gent messages were allowed to fall into 
a vacuum81.
77. This limit applied even when the capital was above
£.500,000.
*8. Ibidem AOI 1982, DGC, Domande di concessioni agricole 
in Etiopia, Rm Ottobre 1938; Quaranta, op.cit., p.73;
7^. SPDR 87/w-r/l-LA, Davide Fossa to Osvaldo Sebastiani,
AA 10-9-1937; Lantini to Petretti, p.3.
8®. SPDR 44/242-r/39, Farinacci to Mussolini, Cremona 25-
12-1938.
81. SPDR 87/w-r/l-LA, Lessona to Fossa, Rm 16-9-1937.
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In their assessment of applications the governor­
ships took into consideration the availability of domainial 
land and the feasibility of the programme, a process involv­
ing many. This is how one CFA official described the bureau­
cratic entanglement preceding any land grant:
The destination of a specific agricul­
tural land for colonization involves 
not only the direct interest of Direc­
torate of Economic Affairs and through 
it the Agricultural Inspectorate ..., 
but also that of Directorate of Politi­
cal Affairs concerning the ascertaining 
of whether there are or are not native 
interests to be safeguarded; that of 
the Ministry of Finance, with regard to 
the expenses involving surveying and 
diagramming of the land; that of the 
Quarter Master General with regard to 
the execution of preliminary supplies 
needed for the setting up of the farm; 
and again that of the Command of the 
Armed Forces for matters regarding the 
precautionary safety measures connected 
with the isolated life of the metropo­
litan in an environment that is not yet 
totally peaceful®*.
As close examination of some unsuccessful applic­
ations reveals, there were no nationally valid criteria for 
which an application was rejected or accepted. Each gover- 
norate acted according to its own set of rules. In HHr&r, the 
key determinant was the size of the holding, whereas in Amara 
the location mattered most. So while in HSrSr most of the 
applications were refused because they exceeded the maximum 
ceiling permitted, in Amara the main ground was the unsuit­
ability of the site®*. Some made the acceptance conditional
®*. Pini, Considerazioni, p.4.
®*. Ibidem AOI 1982. The GAm, whose main concern was 
security, held a position that the concessions should be close 
to communications, markets and water supplies and be confined 
to the territories of WSLllo YSjju, GondSr and Lake Tana. In HBr&r 
where the key problem was population density, security was not 
an issue.
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upon the applicant's prior execution of a particular task, 
such as an inspection of the site®*.
When the capital invested was less than £.100,000, 
the application was made through CFA whcc£, as a fascist trade 
union organization, played an important role in the develop­
ment of IEA agriculture®*. But such an organization with po­
werful vested interests and strong ideological allegiances 
may not have given an independent and unbiased assessment to 
an applicant.
Finally, each governorate was empowered to grant 
small concessions, mainly in the vicinity of urban centres, 
for kitchen gardens®®. However, no guidelines were set speci­
fying either the size of land to be granted by these gover- 
norates or the department empowered to do so. Lack of clarity 
in the latter case led to a number of abuses and interdepart­
mental struggles over claims to the administration of conces­
sions®7. . Equal ly , failure to set a ceiling encouraged some 
governors to take a cautious view whereas it induced others 
to a broad interpretation. The administration in AA kept a 
close watch on the governorships’ dealings and the behaviour
®*. In a number of cases such conditions proved effective 
in putting off applicants lacking seriousness. This was the case 
with 42 applicants to Agricultural Council who withdrew when 
summoned to inspect the site. Cfr. Ibidem AOI 1982, p.5; GS 1820, 
p. 3.
®5. Ibidem AOI 1982.
®®. Ibidem AOI 1936, Graziani to DGAOI, AA 14-4-1937; 
Graziani to GAAAmGnGmMgHr, AA 9-5-1937; Lessona to the IA, Rm 
14-5-1937.
®7. Typical example was HarSr where the struggle between 
Land Office (Ufficio Terriero) and the Directorate of Coloniz­
ation (DCL), presided by ex lieutenant colonel of artillery, 
Malvani on one hand, and the Agricultural Inspectorate, chaired 
by Giovanni Piani, on the other, had developed into serious 
conflict. Cfr. Ibidem AOI 1802, Piani to De Benedictis, Hr 12- 
7-1939; De Benedictis to Maugini, [AA] 1-8-1939.
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of liberal governors caused frequent friction8®. From the 
central administration’s point of view, such approach not 
only did become the source of a tacit, albeit unintentional, 
encouragement for the creation of isolated and scattered 
farms that were unable to stand on their own feet but also a 
burdensome addition to the works of the governorates that 
were hard-pressed by slack financial resources and manpower 
shortfall. As such it undermined the colonial administrat­
ion’s much cherished initial plan to concentrate commercial 
enterprise in a few selected areas in order to avoid disper­
sion of farms and minimize cost®9.
In the absence of clear guidelines, the governora­
tes pursued a tortuous method that largely destroyed initia­
tives and discouraged enterprise. For the applicants it was a 
source of uncertainty and confusion, and several of them 
repatriated disgruntled and bankrupt9®. The practices follow­
ed, normally, involved:
a) - Technical advice from the Land Office.
b) - Planimetric survey of the land.
c) - Verification of the domainiality of the land.
d) - Verification of the candidate’s good moral, civil and 
political conduct as well as:
e) - proof of his technical skill and,
f) - financial fitness.
g) - Compilation of the charter of concession.
h) - Examination and endorsement by the governorate9*.
The verification of (d), (e), and (f) depended on 
information supplied from Italy, taking several months. In
®®. Ibidem AOI 1936, Petretti to MAI, AA 25-9-1937; Lessona 
to GG, Rm 11-11-1937. It refers to the GGS who, broadly inter­
preting the clause, had began to grant plots that in the 
Viceroy’s eyes were not small; cfr. also Pini, Considerazioni.
®9. Ibidem AOI 1936, Graziani to GG, AA 8-4-1937; Petretti 
to GHr; AOI 1854, p.6.
90. Ibidem GS 1820, p.2; FO 371/22021/2376/40/1, CG (D.F.S. 
Filliter) to Lord Perth, Naples 7-6-1938; Bird to Halifax, AA 
1-4-1939.
91. CD IAO Sc 1801, p.2; GS 1820, p.2.
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addition, the completion of stages (a), (b), and (c) para­
lysed work for months. Contributing to the delay was severe 
lack of equipment, personnel and finance. The scattered loca­
tion of lands requested further compounded the problem. The 
administration was of the view that it had to think carefully 
before taking any initiative because it could not afford to 
keep a technician in a far away place for many days each time 
there was an application for a concession, which in many 
cases was not followed up by the applicant. The situation was 
further worsened by uncertainties surrounding the definition 
of a public domain and lack of clear guidance for the com­
position of contracts. The decision on domainiality of a 
particular piece of land was often left to the discretion of 
the district or subdistrict officer, who behaved arbitrarily. 
Lands that one officer, defying all evidence to the contrary, 
declared private property at later inspection proved to be­
long to nobody. Equally, fresh surveys had to be conducted 
and work in progress halted when lands acknowledged by an­
other officer as public domain were subsequently challenged 
by their Ethiopian owners9*.
The composition of the agricultural contracts was 
a technical officers’s nightmare as it required shuttling 
between the battery of government offices in the colony and 
liaising with superiors in Italy. Until the end of 1939, no 
guidelines existed and the agricultural officer had to depend 
upon his common sense. This was a taxing task for a number of 
the contracts had to be rewritten several times to the satis­
faction of the political authorities who refused endorsement 
until a particular clause, e.g. supply of manpower, was in­
cluded or removed. "Different personalities held different 
views" and much time elapsed before a final draft was thrash­
ed out9*.
9*. Ibidem GS 1820, p.4.
9*. Ibidem, pp. 3-4; Pini, Considerazioni.
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As mentioned earlier, the contracts had two ob­
jectives: to discourage land speculation and the anarchic 
competition of adventurers;AnJ-fc ensure rapid development by 
setting out clearly the rights and duties of each concession­
aire. In the final analysis what these contracts reveal is 
the colonial administration's underlying lack of confidence 
in pure economic motives to provide sufficient incentive to 
concessionaires to develop the land properly. Detailed prohi­
bitions and sanctions corroborate this view. For example, the 
farmer was specifically forbidden forming partnership with 
Ethiopians, or lease to them his land in part or toto, with­
out prior approval by the administration. These practices 
would have encouraged bold speculators. Such restrictions 
were intended to prevent a repetition of the problems of 
Eritrean colonization9*. They also show that the administra­
tion thought the spontaneous behaviour of the Italian set­
tlers was not necessarily compatible with the aims of the 
State9®.
Built within each contract were two key elements 
whose main objective was to ensure quick development of the 
land: annual rent and developmental clauses. Continuous pos­
session of the concession depended upon the discharge of an 
annual rent. This was computed on the basis of the produc­
tivity and the geographical location of the land, bearing two 
facts in mind - that of minimizing the need for supervision, 
on one hand, and encouraging the rapid development of the 
concession, on the other. The underlying philosophy behind 
rent charge was that it would serve both as a stimulus to the 
concessionaire to engage himself in the development of the 
farm motivated by the need to find the necessary revenue that
9*. See Chap. I, pp. 20-5.
9*. "Notiziario agricolo commerciale AOI", AC, XXXII, 1 
(gennaio 1938):44; Azione Coloniale. 20-7-1939; Le Colonie. 11-
7-1939.
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would enable him to discharge his rental obligation, and as a 
curb onarush on land. Reasonable annual rent was thought to 
discourage land profiteering and to allow the concessionaire 
considerable saving to invest on the concession9*. But despite 
such intentions, in fact the authorities imposed only a nomi­
nal annual rent ranging from £.5 to £.25 per ha. With few ex­
ceptions, most of the concessionaires did not pay even this 
modest amount. The government itself waived the first quin­
quennium's rent for those cultivating virgin land. By so 
doing, the administration deprived itself of what it thought 
as a potentially effective means of control97.
Though varying according to size and organization 
of the farms, the contracts specified the envisaged land 
improvement model. Broadly speaking this model was of two 
types - those designed for profit-oriented medium-sized and 
large scale companies and settlement-oriented farms, includ­
ing medium-sized of the first category. As stated earlier, 
the first type of concessions were granted on a 30 year lea­
se, automatically renewable for 90-99 years. Such longevity 
was a stimulus to the big investor. In the settlement-orient­
ed concessions it was the opportunity of ownership that would 
attract emigrants to IEA. After a trial period, the conces­
sionaire was given the option to purchase as a private pro­
perty^ .
Development was built around five or ten year 
plans in which were specified the improvements that should 
take place as well as the system of cultivation - whether it 
had to be cash crop or animal breeding or a combination of
w. CD IAO AOI 1936, Lessona to GG IA, Disciplinari di 
concessioni di terreni per uso agricolo, Rm 27-7-1937; Petretti 
to GHr; Hr 18A7; Consulta, "Avvaloramento":1570-1; Pesce, 
"Discipline giuridica".
97. CD IAO Hr 18A7, p. 2.
9®. M A E ,  L a  v a l o r i z z a z i o n e , p . 2 1 0 .
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the two. For settlement-oriented concessions, a five year 
schedule was fixed: within three months of the contract the
concessionaires should take up the farm; within six months, 
delimit the boundary; within a year, start development work; 
by the first year 20%, third year 50%, and fifth year 100% of 
the agreed programme had to be implemented". Concessions 
whose holdings were below 50 ha had a considerably reduced 
timetable. As a rule the total development had to take place 
within two years from the date of the concession1". In profit- 
oriented concessions, the concessionaire had to develop at 
least one third of the farm within the first quinquennium of 
the concession. The whole programme had to be completed with­
in ten years1®1. The required improvements consisted in clear­
ing land of stones, breaking up the soil, planting hedges, 
digging wells, and planting trees. The concessions were to be 
periodically visited by agricultural officers who were to 
draw up progress reports that would be validated by joint 
meetings between the officials of the administration and
". DGovSc 17-7-1939, no.145: Col quale viene accordata al 
sign. Tedeschi dott. Aldo una concessione agricola, GU, IV/29,
8-11-1939.
10°. DGovSc 9-3-1939, no.223: Concessione accordata al sign. 
Marini Antonio di un lotto di terreno sito in locality Uriel per 
sfruttamento agricolo, £U, IV/15, 2-8-1939; DGovSc 10-3-1939, no. 
224: Concessione accordata al sign. Liri Clemente di un lotto di 
terreno sito sulla destra della strada AA-Moggio, per sfruttamen­
to agricolo", GU, IV/15, 2-8-1939; no.225: Concessione, a scopo 
agricolo, di un lotto sito nei pressi della strada AA-Gm al sign. 
Carlo Cataldo", GU, IV/24, 4-10-1939; 19-9-1939, no.264:
Concessione agricola ai sigg. Barbieri Orlando e Peta Francesco, 
GUGS, 9-3-1940; 1-6-1940, no. 88: Concessione al sig. Pettini 
Cosimo per la durata di anni nove di un lotto di terreno, GUGS. 
V/25, 19-6-1940.
101. CD IAO Hr 1813, where three types of charters are 
provided with another fourth temporarily employed until 1939 as 
annex; Disciplinare tipo per concessione agricola, in GS 1822; 
Disciplinare, in Sc 1801. Material on forestry concessions is 
vast: cfr. DGG 23-11-1939, no. 1774, GUGS. V/7, 14-2-1940.
Extensive material is provided in the Bibliography. For material 
on cotton relating to Cotton Districts see Chap VII, pp. Z93-322.
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representatives of the farmers. The farmers were allowed to 
use extensive Ethiopian labour by the way of salary or share- 
cropping, compartecipazione, or other forms of contracts to 
be ratified by the political authorities1".
Common to both types of concession was the requi­
rement that the concessionaire had to man the concession per­
sonally and build his principal residence on the site. This 
was not so much to bind individuals permanently to the soil 
as to assure direct modern farming of the land and combat 
abuse by those concessionaires who intended to live in the 
metropolis "on the rent of or subsidies coming from their 
concessions"1®1. But the post-1939 contracts made such require­
ments compulsory only to settlement-oriented concessions 
whose holders had to cultivate them together with their fami­
ly1®*. Political expediency demanded that the holders of prof­
it-oriented concessions be only required to reside in IEA and 
man the farm either personally or employing "a well qualified 
manager"1®1. Doubtless such a policy shift was in response to
102. The agricultural contracts or charters, known as 
Disciplinare, took a certain consistency only towards the end 
of 1939 and since then, if not in details, in their general 
principle, they were identical in almost all governorates. A 
point of significance is that some of them put a special clause 
forcing the concessionaire to dedicate a certain percentage of 
his land to farming a particular crop or breeding a specific 
animal suitable to the area, i.e. coffee or sheep in HHrar and 
GS regions. The researcher is not able to find a facsimile for 
large scale concessions except for Cotton Districts and Forestry 
related companies. Equally no copy of charter for the concessions 
operating in the Amara Governorate area is available.
^  Pesce, "Disciplina giuridica".
10*. The exceptions were medium-sized first category farmers 
who, like profit-oriented concessionaires, were allowed to reside 
only in IEA and, in exceptional cases, employ a skilled technical 
director.
!®5. DGG 22-4-1939, no. 373: Concessione Agricolo-Pastorale 
nella zona di MencherrA (lago Ascianghi) accordata a S.E. Rodolfo 
Graziani marchese di Neghelli", GU, IV/16, 9-8-1939; Pesce,
op.cit. .
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the inroads of a powerful interest group that had already 
become part of rural scene. A brief look at the applicants 
throws a sufficient light at this background.
To begin with, there was an impressive number of 
applicants. During the early period of the occupation, re­
quests were mostly for small and medium-sized concessions. At 
the end of 1938, 231 requests were made to the Agricultural 
Council of which 126 were approved and CFA received 1171®8. 
Even though this figure hardly supports the description of "a 
numerous army of applicants”, requests were considerable1®^, 
the vast majority directed to the governorate of ShBwa and 
HhrHr. Unfortunately, lack of clear data for both of these 
areas does not allow us to construct a nationwide trend. The 
Amara and GS governorates received 652 and 200 applications 
respectively. Out of these 81 were accepted in Amara and less 
than 30 in GS1®8. It is impossible to attribute the high drop­
out rate simply to bureaucratic red-tape, as some technical 
officers suggest1®®. Many applicants may have been speculators 
deterred by uncertainty of profits11®.
Even among those settlers who took up concessions, 
those who possessed the inclination, expertise, capital and 
labour to make a success of their venture seem few and far 
between. The official imagery of these men as motivated by a 
passion for farming, rather than sheer economic incentives, 
and who found in the Empire a territory for developing their 
talents, needs qualification. Like at any frontier, the con­
cessionaires were an atomistic group which included people 
with different skills, resources and motivations. There were
106 b CD IAO AOI 1982.
107. Ibidem AOI 1801, p.2.
108 # Ibidem Am 600, p.2; GS 1820, p.l;
109 # Ibidem Am 600, pp.2-3; AOI 1808, pp.
110. Ibidem GS 1820, p.l.
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some lively and colourful characters: adventurers "searching 
for a rapid fortune by grabbing whatever comes into their 
hands"111; high-ranking government officials and their protdgds 
with no farming experience111; individuals who wanted to join 
in the race for the legendary wealth of the Empire118; and 
lapsed Fascists ordered to make "atonement" in Africa11®. From 
the perspective of promoting agricultural development, this 
motley could only be viewed as marginal.
The colonial authorities forced several farmers to 
relinquish their concessions on the grounds of "lack of tech­
nical fitness and financial resources". In Amara, 15 such 
cases were reported by the end of 1939 and 22 in the middle 
of 1940118. By the beginning of 1940, 11 instances appear in 
the list of concessionaires of the GS118. With these the ad­
ministration dealt severely. But it was powerless in cases
111. Lessona (1958), pp.273-4; Villa and al., op.cit.,
pp.273-4; £1, 4-9-1938; Fossa, "Sane Norme", op.cit..
111. Among this group the most prominent were: Graziani
himself who had, in addition to 500 ha in Juba (Somalia), 500 
ha at Menchere near Lake Ashanghd [cfr. CD IAO AOI 1936, UAEr, 
Promemoria VI (1938); DGG 22-4-1939, no.373]; Nerio Poggi who
came to Eritrea with three lorries and two years later, with
another partner, owned 1,150 ha engaging himself in all sorts
of speculations [A. Del Boca, "Tre generazioni di uomini per
domare un oceano di sabbia", La Settimana Illustrata. 21-8-1956]. 
Cfr. also Masotti, op.cit., pp.103 where he mentions of a settler
who boasts his friendship with Mussolini and had as a mission to 
keep other colons trigger happy and not let them return to Italy.
118. Del Boca, op.cit., Ill, pp.211; Villa and al. , op.cit.,
p.206.
1J®. Typical example was former Party official of Somalia, 
Marcello Serrazanetti, who was rehabilitated by setting up an 
agricultural concern in Jimma. Tullio Mussolini had a farm of 
600 ha near Dire Dawa, with a mission to remind the Italians of 
the rural origin of the Duce*s family [cfr. Del Boca, ibidem,
p.211] .
115. CD IAO Am 600, p.3; AOI 1808, p.14.
116. Ibidem AOI 1984; GS 1822, pp.6-14.
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related to people with influence and connection within the 
State or Party11^, although such people did not directly man 
their concession. They lived in AA or Italy cashing in on the 
proceeds from their farms worked by Ethiopians118.
It can be concluded that scrutiny of the applica­
tions, despite the exasperatingly long time it took, was not 
as vigorous as the authorities claimed and the applicants* 
motives were not always genuine. The colonial authorities 
were outraged at being taken advantage of. Expressing such 
anger, the Duke of Aosta made it unmistakeably clear that 
land be granted only to "authentic" farmers. On 5 January 
1938 he circulated a letter to governors and military offi­
cials, as well as MAI, demanding that
land grants should not, I repeat should 
not, be considered as a reward that can 
be given to individuals who, notwith­
standing their great service [to the 
country], do not possess the necessary 
requirements of technical and financial 
fitness to develop it. Unless we are 
firm on this point we will be heading 
for a chain of more or less covert con­
cessions, i.e. land speculations: this 
must be stopped by all possible means.
So, the order of the day is this: land 
should be given to the farmers11®.
However, nothing would be more erroneous than to 
conclude that all concessionaires were mere speculators. Ac­
cording to the authorities these formed a tiny minority. The 
majority were "honest and upstanding individuals" who strug­
gled as best they could to turn their land into a thriving 
concern. The enormous gamble that some concessionaires took
ASMAI/III, Archivio Segreto, 2a Guerra Mondiale, Pacco 
IV, Generale Mezzetti to Terruzzi, 13-8-1938 (hereafter cited 
as ASMAI AS, Mezzetti to Terruzzi); Masotti, op.cit., pp.102-3.
118. These included people such as Graziani, Volpi and 
Temistocle Testa, the Prefect of Fiume and the owner of SIMBA.
n ®. C D  I A O  A O I  1 9 3 6 ,  A m e d e o  t o  M A I ,  A A  5 - 1 - 1 9 3 8 ;  V i l l a  a n d
a l . ,  o p . c i t . ,  p . 2 2 5 .
- 2 3 4 -
C H A P T E R  V I C O M M E R C I A L  F A R M I N G
in massive investment to develop their farm partially sup­
ports this claim. But despite eulogistic reports by techni­
cians, the internal correspondence of some successful farms 
reveals serious managerial and administrative shortcomings. 
One such case was that of SIMBA which operated three large 
concessions in Arsi and Harar12®. The company had an enormous 
investment in machinery and wheat production at its Arsi farm 
in 1939 amounted to almost one third of the entire contribu­
tion made by the settler section. Yet the company was blamed 
for poor and unrealistic planning and bad management121. A 
secret report of 1940 gives a verdict on what officialdom 
described as one of the most successful commercial farms:
As regards the personnel I can describe 
the situation I found at AsMlla as sim­
ply tragic: extreme staff shortage, 
total I«iU*l-not-care-less attitude among 
the workforce and complete lack of any 
sort of attachment to the company by 
all... One thing which I had already 
denounced to the Director is that in my 
estimate there is 30% inefficiency by 
farm inspectors - brave men as far as 
one wishes but capable only to run a 
family kitchen garden. In terms of ad­
ministrative efficiency, we are below 
zero and of this one becomes aware of 
only when assessing the amount of mate­
rial employed. The vast majority of the 
workforce is mediocre, machine breaker, 
indifferent and apathetic122.
120. See Table XVIII.
121. CD IAO AOI 1929, Maugini to Testa, Rm 18-5-1940.
122. Ibidem, M. Pavirani to Testa, Aselle 7-6-1940.
-235-
C H A P T E R  V I  C O M M E R C I A L  F A R M I N G
TABLE XVIII:- SIMBA CONCESSIONS
PLACE YEAR OF IUKBER OF AREAS 6RAITED AREAS CULTIVATED
COICESSIOI TRACTORS (II HA) (II HA)
DIRBCTLY SHARBCROPP116
TEIAITS OVIER
FADIS 1938 30* 10,000 616 356
ASALLA 1938 11,831 9000 --
BAKA 1938 30,000 250 2800 1500
* The tractor number involved for the entire three conces­
sions was 30, mainly of foreign make. In addition the 
Company had a variety of implements of all kinds includ­
ing lorries, sowing machines and a thresher.
Source:- CD IAO 1929 SIMBA, Appunto dettato dall'Ecc. Testa, 
13 marzo 1941; 1800; "Vita dell’Impero: Possenti 
macchine al lavoro", GV, 7-4-1940.
EFFECTS OF LAND ALLOCATION POLICY: THE CASE OF CFA FARMERS
The frustrating difficulties of commercial farming 
were nowhere more evident than in the case of CFA^, the first 
pioneers of commercial farming, resembling the white settlers 
in Kenya. At the end of 1936, several CFA farmers, consisting 
of both agricultural technicians and entrepreneurs, were 
given by the then MC and their own trade union organization 
the task of exploring possible areas of rapid agricultural 
enterprise, and told to report on "the impressions and con­
siderations gained during their research"^. Nine of the men 
were pressurized by the MAI to cut short their tour and enga­
ge in wheat production. They were joined later at the end of
For additional information on the background of the 
group see Pier Buono (1938), op.cit., pp.397-8. The same article 
in LfAzione Coloniale. 17-11-1938.
1M. See Chap. Ill p. ; ATdR 24/103, p.l; Tito Pestellini, 
"I territori dell*impero e la loro valorizzazione agraria", X 
Georgofi1i. Ill, 3 (1937):340-60: MAE, avvaloramento, pp.345-6; 
Quaranta, op.cit., pp.51-2.
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1937 by another 21 entrepreneurs and their entourage of 114 
personnel consisting of farm assistants and skilled technici­
ans. This group brought with them substantial agricultural 
material. In addition to 1,000 ql of implements, there were 
53 high-powered tractors with ploughs, sowing and harvesting 
machines, 40 motor vehicles consisting of workshop vans, 
small trucks and motor cars. An account given by one of the 
second group sums up the initiative:
Towards the end of 1937, the CFA, in 
agreement with the MAI, held several 
meetings with various farmers of Upper 
Italy in Rome at its headquarters of 
Palazzo Margherita in the presence of 
representatives from the Ministry and 
the Fascist Party. The meeting has the 
scope of convincing the invited farmers 
to undertake in IEA and with their own 
means the cultivation of the land. Dur­
ing the session a five year (1938-39- 
40-41-42) contract for cereal farming 
was presented on behalf of the Armed 
Forces of the GG of AA, where a minimum 
price was set up and all related condi­
tions agreed such as a pledge on the 
part of the Armed Forces to anticipate 
and supply fuel and oil at the foot of 
the farm for a fixed price and collect 
the produce from the mouth of the ma­
chine inside the concession itself as 
well as to advance, in addition to the 
fuel and oil, also all the seed needed.
In one of these meetings, some farmers, 
including myself, asked to go first to 
Africa to the site of the concession in 
order to assess the soil and then be in 
a position to provide the most appro­
priate equipment. The tendency was then 
to do everything at once and no time 
was given to do what instead turned out 
to be of maximum importance. As a re­
sult few went with suitable equipments.
The formal promise of the eventual 
transfer of the concession into owner­
ship and the quinquennial contracts for 
the farming of cereals were to delude 
all the farmers into starting, without
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any delay, and at once take up the life
of a pioneer in IEA^.
The first group settled in the immediate surround­
ings of AA before they were accommodated at Addis Al&m, 50 km 
west along the motorway leading to Naqamti. On this same 
route 125 km away at Ambo, part of the second group operated. 
Of the remaining, one was settled at Wfinji, in Shciwa and the 
rest were stationed at Ciaffa and Borumdda near DHsd, in 
W811o. Despite some differences, the vicissitudes of both 
groups were very similar126.
Soon after their arrival an agreement was struck 
between the first group and the Intendenza Militare, a Quar­
ter Master General branch entrusted with the promotion of 
grain production directly or through military commands sta­
tioned in Shciwa. The agreements in essence were those men­
tioned by Valducci. The farmers were to operate in the areas 
of Moggio and Ambo where the government at the initial stage 
would grant to each of them at least 500 ha of free land and 
modern agricultural machinery. It also pledged to advance 
seeds and purchase the entire produce at a fixed price. It 
soon proved that the government's pledge was untenable. As 
usual the main stumbling block was to find lands of public 
domain with extensive and unbroken holdings. Such miscalcula­
tions called for modification of the original plan in the 
scheme that came to be known as zone of influence. The term 
was not meant to have any political connotation but only 
agricultural reference. In order to maximize cultivation, the 
military chiefs were urged to arrange special agreements 
between the Italian farmers and the Ethiopians in lands under
15. CD IAO AOI 1938, Vincenzo Valducci to Maugini, Firenze 10-
1-1942, p.l; "Notiziario agricolo commerciale AOI", AC, XXXII, 
1 (gennaio 1938), p.44.
126. L ' A z i o n e  C o l o n i a l e . 7 - 1 2 - 1 9 3 9 ;  C M ,  1 7 - 1 1 - 1 9 3 8 .
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their respective control. The order set out the type of lands
implicated and the modalities of the operations.
The lands should not have to be exclu­
sively public lands ... but also vacant 
private property whose owners declare 
not to be in a position to cultivate it 
... Consequently, the agricultural ac­
tivity stemming therefrom, cannot take 
place on vast organic plots, but desul­
torily departing from one centre of ex­
pansion, in all lands that can be found 
in the aforementioned conditions127.
The farmers were grouped in four zones that formed 
their residential and operational headquarters. The division 
closely met the agricultural conditions of the respective 
territories. A system that came to be universally known as 
compartecipazione, a bizarre form of share—cropping, develo­
ped which had its justification in tradition. A variety of 
contracts were signed in the presence of the Italian authori­
ties and local chiefs. In each, the share of produce depended 
on the contributions afforded by the contracting parties. As 
a rule, the Ethiopian farmer provided land and carried out 
all manual work in the field that was to be ploughed by the 
Italian using modern agricultural equipment. In addition, the 
Italian advanced the seed and, in some cases, threshed the 
harvest128.
127 Graziani, Incremento Culture, AA 11-5-1937, p.l.
128. The contracts can be summed up in four different forms 
after the deduction of the amount of seed provided by the 
concessionaire from the total produce:
THE AMOUNT SHARED
BY THE CONCESSIONAIRE WORK INPUT CASES
a. 2/3 All the nechanical fork
(froi threshing to ploighing). Boidi.
b. 2/5 All less ploighing. Gentile, Borgino, Sanartino.
c. \ As in b less sipply of seeds. Boidi, Gentile, Borgino.
d. H Sipply of seeds and threshing. Raisi.
e. ]( Threshing. Boidi.
-239-
C H A P T E R  V I C O M M E R C I A L  F A R M I N G
The scheme evoked the old idea of economic part­
nership whereby Ethiopian labour and land, on one hand, and 
the capital, expertise and management of the Italian, on the 
other, entered into a working relationship. Of course, the 
Ethiopian remained in the role of adjunct to the Italian, 
assisting and not really controlling production. Reportedly a 
large number of contracts were signed involving an area of
20,000 ha. Of these only 8,000 ha were actually cultivated 
and 12,000 ql of seeds distributed by the Italians and, as a 
result, an increased production was obtained. Pini, a repre­
sentative of CFA, enthusiastically describes these develop­
ments and their future implications:
To it owed the peaceful and spontaneous 
emergence of very many share-cropping 
contracts between the metropolitan con­
cessionaires and the natives (who were 
involved individually) sanctioned as a 
guarantee by the local chiefs. It gave 
rise to extensive distribution of seeds 
by our farmers and set in motion frien­
dly relations which, while, on one 
hand, permitted the whites, lonesome in 
treacherous territories, maximum freed­
om of movement and action to promote 
farming activities, on the other, gave 
hope to effective assertion of favour-
Cfr. CD IAO AOI 1930, Promemoria Per il Vice Re, n.d. [1938]. 
This contract was later modified at the S&bbcLta meeting that 
took place on 7-12-1937 for the reasons that will be discussed 
in the following pages and took the form indicated in Table 
XX. Mechanical threshing was considered as "an indispensable 
means for rational and full utilization of the produce in 
which was spent so much work and sacrifices’1, but it was not 
made compulsory. And yet many Italian farmers, lured by the 
revenues that this offered, forced against their will many of 
the peasants, including even those outside of zone of influen­
ce, to use their machinery despite the official instruction 
that this should be done only through the propaganda and 
persuasive work. The metropolitan farmers* action stirred a 
lot of discontent among the peasants and, as we will see, was 
one of the causes for the intervention of the government 
authorities and the modification of the original contracts 
[Cfr. Ibidem, Petretti [Vice GG] to DSAP, Contratto con agri- 
coltori nazionali, AA 27-11-1937, p.3].
— 240—
C H A P T E R  V I C O M M E R C I A L  F A R M I N G
able relations between native labour 
and Italian capital and management129.
This was a view shared by political circles in 
both Rome and the Empire, where the experiment was watched 
with particular interest. For them too it seemed to offer a 
classic example of co-operation of Italian capital and mana­
gement with Ethiopian land and labour. The short term bene­
ficial effects of such collaboration were not only the size­
able increase in production that was thought to bring the 
ideal of imperial self-sufficiency within reach, but also a 
valuable insight into the agricultural resources of the coun­
try and an opportunity to test the new machinery. It also had 
political and psychological bearing beyond crude economic 
considerations. It meant a symbolic presence for the state in 
remote and hostile rural areas. At the same time, the use of 
mechanical tools would enhance the prestige of the Italian 
farmer in the face of the Ethiopian familiar only with 'rudi­
mentary methods' of farming. The scheme also aimed to gradu­
ally free land from the Ethiopians for colonization and secu­
re a flow of labour into the farms of the Italian settlers128. 
The authorities were led to believe that such a task, though 
cumbersome, was by no means difficult to achieve. With in­
centives, such as a salary, Ethiopians eventually would be 
convinced to relinquish their land and work under Italian 
guidance121.
Initially, the experiment seemed promising. As
Pini described,
The initiative moved, until the period 
of harvest, to the mutual satisfaction
129. Pini, Situazione, p.l.
128. CD IAO 1936, Lessona to GG, Concessioni di terreno ed 
uti1izzazione degli indigeni che vi esercitano 1 *agricoltura, 
Rm 17-9-1937 (hereafter Lessona to GG, Concessioni); L*Azione 
Coloniale. 17-11-1938; Villa and al., op.cit., p.223; MAE, La 
valorizzazione, pp.271-2.
121. Lessona to GG, Concessioni.
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of the parties: for a multitude of the 
natives who never dedicated themselves 
with much intensity to the field works 
served as stimulus and encouragement; 
the peaceful work of penetration car­
ried out by the nationals was of such 
efficacy that it induced even armed 
groups to give in and set to work; hun­
dreds of hectares that were never put 
under production were cultivated122.
But the drawbacks became conspicuous close to harvest. All 
manner of claimants came out of hiding and a wave of disputes 
was set off as to rights to share of the crop. The authorit­
ies believed that only abolition of share-cropping system 
would prevent a serious political backlash. Once again Pini, 
in a graphic description of the plight of CFA farmers, prov­
ides insight into some of the causes:
With the approach of harvest operati­
ons, numerous meddlers, pseudo-land­
owners, who have hardly any evidence to 
substantiate their hereditary rights, 
contemptible even by the same local 
chiefs, priests, posed to transform an 
ecclesiastical right to the tithe into 
claims of ownership, have in the later 
days swelled the rank of the claimants 
and sought to instigate the masses of 
peaceful share-cropping farmers hoping 
to find a safe play in the current pol­
itical circumstances in view of driving 
away these pioneering concessionaires 
whose activities have so far contribut­
ed, and continue to be of further ava­
il, to the increase of production by 
the natives122.
Pini's account gives only a partial picture of 
events that unfolded in what one district officer lamented as 
a "highly undesirable state of things"129. The account was
122. Pini, Considerazioni.
122. Pini, Situazione, p. 2.
129. Cerulli to MAI, Concessioni provvisorie; Villa and al. , 
op.cit., p.223.
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criticized by Graziani for its "inaccuracies and exaggera­
tions"135. Poor understanding by the Italians of the complexit­
ies of Ethiopian land tenure systems, which allow multiple 
claimants to one piece of land, was the primary cause of 
breakdown of the initiative138. Added to this was the ambiguity 
that the concept of zone of influence entailed. For many of 
the concessionaires, the concept opened not only a fertile 
field for economic activity but also gave them effective con­
trol over Ethiopians in their zone of influence. As Graziani 
pointed out the "farmers often behaved towards the natives in 
a thoughtless or bullying manner"137. A number of contracts 
were exacted by use of sheer force, in clear defiance of the 
government's order that
It is necessary that land should be 
occupied only after a free consensus 
was reached with the owners to whom may 
be given in exchange either a rent or a 
share of the produce within the limits 
to be agreed by the parties138.
This situation was further aggravated by the li­
cense granted to each farmer to have an armed police patrol 
to protect his farm and the right to collect tributes from 
the Ethiopians on behalf of the government in his zones of 
influence. Owing to such extra-economic powers, those acquir­
ing farms ended up as imperium in imperioi they punished 
reluctant elements in the population and nominated new vil­
lage chiefs, sometimes removing even those appointed by the 
central authority. Others engaged themselves in illicit spe­
culative activities and signed numerous agreements promising
135. CD IAO AOI 1936, Graziani to MAI. Concessionari 
agricoli del CFA, AA 28-12-1937 (hereafter cited as Graziani, 
Concessionari).
138. See ChapterII, pp.34--S0'
137. Graziani, Concessionari.
138. Graziani, Incremento culture.
-243-
C H A P T E R  V I C O M M E R C I A L  F A R M I N G
exorbitant rent knowing very well that they had neither the 
financial resources nor technical capability. Instances where 
the concessionaire lived in a nearby city from where orders 
were passed to the Ethiopian farmers to cultivate the land 
were not unknown139, reminiscent of the feudal lords of the 
ancien regime.
Other contributing factors to the setback of the 
initiative, mentioned by Pini himself, were less of the Ital­
ian farmers own making. Tractors promised by the government 
either arrived too late or were not strong enough to cope 
with the terrain. Largely owing to this, many of the farmers 
were unable to maintain their part of the agreement and farm­
ing was carried out by Ethiopians using traditional methods. 
Problems were further compounded by the modest yield of newly 
introduced crops of the Italian variety for which the Ethio­
pians held the Italians to be largely responsible. Because of 
this, the Ethiopians strongly objected to sharing their pro­
duce, unmoved by the barrage of threats and abuses by the 
Italian farmers. Endless disputes and conflicts supplanted 
the initial phase of friendly co-operation. Some Italians 
received arrest warrants charging breach of contract, mal­
practice and gross-misconduct against the Ethiopians. Some 
farmers were attacked by a gang armed with spears, knives and 
staves198. Their sense as a master race in the eyes of the 
Ethiopians and prospects for a more solid co-operation in 
years ahead were soon shattered.
139. This is a case mentioned by Sbacchi which the present 
researcher is not able to substantiate from the sources at 
disposal. Cfr. Sbacchi, op.cit., pp.370-2.
198. Pini, Situazione, pp. 2-3; Pini, Promemoria. AA 2-6- 
1938. Pini points out that the Ethiopians owned 6,770 ql to CFA 
members and interprets it as being an "irreparable loss of the 
produce with significant economic damage for the concessionaires 
and the development in the minds of the native the belief that 
he could get away with impunity from the obligation that he had 
freely taken, which was ratified by the government, and ap­
propriate for himself what rightfully belongs to the White".
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The situation was tense, and the sub-district 
officers feared that unless swiftly addressed, discontented 
Ethiopians would turn to the nationalist cause, providing the 
patriotic movement with a greater flow of recruits. It was 
against this background that, on 7 December 1937, a meeting 
was convened by the then AA governorate at S&bbMta, about 25 
km from AA at AA-Jimma motorway. It was attended by the farm­
ers and the local officers from the respective zone of in­
fluence. In the major review that followed the controversial 
zone of influence with all the attributes attendant upon the 
term, including police force and tax collection, was abolish­
ed191. With one exception, the existing share-cropping con­
tracts either were revoked or modified. The Italian farmers 
were persuaded to settle for a share from the preceding ye­
ar's harvest that was drastically "reduced to a bare mini­
mum". Yet even this was strongly resisted by a substantial 
number of Ethiopians, with the authorities either conniving 
with their resistance or impotent to intervene192.
Two brothers, Sostene and Carlo Boidi, were ex­
empted. Unlike their fellow-countrymen, the Boidi Brothers 
had earned a high standing among the Ethiopians with the 
result that they commanded the respect even of hard-line 
Fascists. The key to their success was their business ethics,
191. CD IAO AOI 1930, Amedeo di Savoia to GG Commando Forze 
Armate Per Intendenza AOI, Contratti con agricoltori nazi.onali, 
AA 28-1-1938. In this letter not only he declares the term zone 
of influence abolished but also removes all extra-economic 
activities that were attributed to the farmers; mechanical 
threshing becomes optional to Ethiopian farmers even though the 
respective political authorities were called to give support for 
the publicity work of the farmers among the Ethiopians for its 
use. Villa and al., op.cit., p.223.
192. On 23-2-1938, the government ordered to compute the 
quantity owned by the Ethiopians and settle it promptly; yet as 
it appears from Pini's complaints [Ibidem, Pini, Promemoria, AA
2-6-1938] no action was taken by early June 1938.
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entirely alien to Fascist thinking: they combined thrift and 
hard work with respect for local tradition and friendly tre­
atment of the Ethiopians. By a communique of 19 April 1938, 
their activities were officially sanctioned. This document 
defined their areas of operation and set out in great detail 
the different type of share-cropping contracts they were 
allowed to establish. Their work went ahead smoothly, and 
within a few years they were able to conclude 3,000 contracts 
covering an area of more than 2,000 ha193.
Even though the government pursued the policy of 
"avoiding, as a matter of general principle, share-cropping 
contracts with the Ethiopians" and grant land for direct 
cultivation, it was not able to devise a better method of 
handling the problem of land and labour shortages. Later a 
modified version of share-cropping was introduced in ShMwa. 
Despite the Ethiopians* resistance to its restoration, the 
contracts of the Boidi brothers with the local population 
remained the proto-type for this new scheme199.
However, the sudden policy shift outraged most of 
the "pioneer column", who denounced it as betrayal and cowar­
dliness. In their view the government was simply capitulating 
"to the most puerile complaints by Ethiopian intriguers" and 
to malevolent advice from fellow countrymen "who never even 
deigned to follow closely the life of their farms". They 
pointed out the political dangers in allowing the Ethiopians 
to win an "outstanding concession"195. Indeed, the government’s
193. Cerulli to MAI, Concessioni provvisorie; Idem to GGS
and Commando Settore Occidentale [Amb6], Contratti di compar-
tecipazione con gli indigeni, AA 19-4-1938; Idem to MAI,
Contratti di compartecipazione con gli indigeni, AA 22-6-1938;
GRA 43/34-26, Renato Trevisani [Delegato centrale per l’AOI della 
CFI] , Relazione sulla missione svolta in AOI, aprile-maggio 1938,
p.37. Villa and al.,, op.cit., p.240.
199. Cerulli to MAI, Concessioni provvisorie.
195. P i n i ,  S i t u a z i o n e ,  p p .  2 - 3 .
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action had serious moral and material repercussions upon the 
farmers. A memorandum written on 13 May 1938 gives a brief 
but clear picture of their feeling when it graphically de­
scribes their situation as
too mortifying for it reduced to total­
ly absolute inertia and economic pas­
sivity those very ones who were the 
first and most courageous agricultural 
entrepreneurs to reach the colony and 
sacrifice their time, health and capi­
tal with the sole hope of developing 
the conquered land. Mortifying and equ­
ally humiliating because it established 
conditions of inferiority, that were 
less than dignifying, vis-A-vis the 
natives, who took every care not to 
maintain their (freely assumed) commit­
ments towards the concessionaires who 
found themselves powerless and without 
any prestige**®.
Turned from the confident Empire builders of a 
year ago to rather desperate and cantankerous entrepreneurs, 
the farmers became an economic drain. Political authorities 
were deluged by letters from CFA headquarters crying for "an 
authoritative intervention before the first initiative of 
colonization was irreparably compromised"**^. The CFA officials 
castigated the government’s behaviour in AA towards "their 
patient work of penetration" as lethargic at its best and 
hostile at its worst**®. The government in AA insisted any 
action would only create disturbances without having the 
desired effect. Orders from Rome combined with internal pres­
sure led the colonial administration to agree to a "package
CD IAO AOI 1936, Promemoria: situazione dei conces­
sionari del I Gruppo, 13-5-1938, 2-3. The document deals with
the whole range of problems encountered by the first and second 
CFA groups.
**^. Pini, Situazione, p.A.
**®. I b i d e m ,  p . 3 .
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deal" with the
intent of helping the national farmers 
who, in the first year of their activi­
ty, for a number of complex circumstan­
ces were unable to obtain just remu­
neration from their work1*9.
In light of this, early agreements were substantially review­
ed. Payment for seeds due at the end of 1937 was frozen; fuel 
repayment was suspended up to February 19A0 and amortization 
of the agricultural machinery, originally expected to be over 
by the end of 1939, was made to start by early 19A01®9.
According to the agreement reached between CFA and 
MAI, 21 farmers of the second CFA group were to be provided 
with 1,000 ha each in Ambo and Dasd. It was mistakenly belie­
ved that in these areas there was at least 15,000-16,000 ha 
of public land1®1. The available land was of poor quality and 
attempts to direct their activities towards more fertile 
zones were frustrated by absence of land free from Ethiopian 
claims. The Ethiopians were reluctant to move off the land 
even where exchange was arranged. Lack of security, combined 
with high fuel and labour costs, made the life of the farmers 
even more uncomfortable1®^. Two repatriated, the rest pressed 
for the revision of the existing agreements and were able to 
win a number of concessions. The guaranteed price of wheat 
was brought from £.200 per ql for an average yield of 8 ql per 
ha to £.305 per ha whenever the production unit per ha was A 
ql. The price decreased in proportion to the increase of
**9. Cerulli to MAI, Concessioni provvisorie.
*®9. Ibidem.
*®*. CD IAO AOI 1936, Muzzaini [President of CFA], to MAI 
IA, Rm 28-9-1937; Produzione; CFA accordi; Lessona to CFA, Tras- 
ferimento.
*®*. Rossi to Bonf ondi, Promemoria.
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yield per ha. In addition, there was a land reclamation fund 
of £.250 for each hectare reclaimed .
TABLE XIX:- LAND HOLDINGS AND TRACTORS OF CFA (1940)
COICBSSIOIAIRE PLACE DATE OF 
COICBSSIOV
IUKBER OF 
TRACTORS
ARBAS OF 
COVCESSIOV 
(II HA)
I
(II
HA)
BROs. S. i C. BOIDI ADDIS ALAH 1937 11 900 5.49
BO&GIIIO CARLO ADDIS ALAH 1937 3 320 1.95
GEITILE FRAICESCO ADDIS ALAH 1937 2 350 2.14
NORELLO ORAZIO ADDIS ALAH 1937 4 320 4.88
V. & G. RAI8I ADDIS ALAH 1937 5 430 1.95
SCOTTO ERIESTO ADDIS ALAH 1937 4 260 2.62
B18ACCHI 0G0 AHBO 1938 5 1450 1.58
BUSOTTI PASQUALB AKBO 1938 3 680 8.85
GREPPI GIUSEPPE AHBO 1938 5 840 4.15
IOTTI E. k C. AHBO 1938 3 750 5.17
KADBLLA BBIIAKIIO AHBO 1038 5 1400 4.57
MATT 10 LI CESARE VAIJI 1938 3 700 8.55
RADDI k OSTI QUIITILLIAIO AHBO 1938 3 650 3.97
3CAGLIARIII ROBERTO AHBO 1938 5 1500 9.16
TOSCHI L. k BROs. AHBO 1938 2 490 2.99
VALDUCCI YIICEIZO AHBO 1938 4 1450 8.85
ATTI RIZIO DA8* 1938 290 1.77
BAGIOLI k ROBBRTO RUGA BASE 1938 2 664 4.05
KARTIII GIVO DAS* 1938 500 3.05
PAVIA GIUSEPPB DAS* 1938 2 1100 6.72
RAHPOLLA DAS* 1938 140 6.72
ROGGERO BEIIAKIIO DAS* 1938 4 1100 0.85
TOTAL 85 15684
* Figure not available
Source: CD IAO AOI 1808; AOI 1802;; Sc 1801; Hr 1813, p.21.
As Table XIX shows, in early 1940 the farmers" 
plight had slightly improved but the areas they were forming 
were of far more modest size than they had been originally
1^ . Cerulli to MAI, Concessioni provvisorie; Promemoria: 
Avviamento alle imprese agricole dei concessionari del II gruppo,
13-5-1938; Am 600; Villa and al. , op.cit., pp.240-1; Sbacchi, 
op.cit., pp.380-3.
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promised. Rather than contributing to imperial self-suffici­
ency in food-stuffs, the concessionaires remained totally 
dependent on state subvention. None succeeded in cultivating 
their concession. Out of about 4,000 ha in Dftsd, only about 
1,500 ha were farmed. Of the six farmers, two had not com­
menced farming. The situation was by no means different in 
Shhwa, as the cases of Scagliarini & Sons and A. Bisacchi 
show1^ .
These two CFA cases illustrate the disappointment 
common to many "land hunters* and the colonial administra­
tion’s incompetence and lack of direction. Their enterprise, 
which had begun in a mood of determined optimism, had become 
a more sober affair, beset by doubts and anxieties. Yet CFA’s
experience was not an isolated case, but the reality for many
155concessionaires1,1,1.
THE ORGANIZATION OF LABOUR
The viability of commercial farming largely depen­
ded on the ability to tap and exploit cheap indigenous labo­
ur. As an official of MAI stated:
It is clear that it is futile to grant 
land for agricultural purposes unless 
it is possible to secure for the enter­
prises the labour at the scale required
and at the most favourable terms of 
salary^.
Contrary to all expectations, labour recruitment 
proved far from easy and throughout the occupation the com­
panies experienced a serious labour shortage. Aware that lab­
our was a critical factor for the success of the settlers’
lM. See Tables XIV and XV.
l55. CD IAO Sc 1328; Sc 1329.
Ibidem AOI 1926, Angelo de Rubeis Promemoria per S.E. 
il Sottosegretario: Mano d ’opera indigena per le aziende agrarie 
nelle nuove terre dell*impero, Rm 12-5-1938.
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infant agriculture, the Agricultural Council had earlier
called on the government to devise proper ways and means to
settle the issue. It wrote that
rejecting a priori, for obvious reas­
ons, any idea of compulsory labour by 
the natives, it is necessary to think 
of pursuing a policy that allows an 
influx into the white farms of numerous 
natives disposed to work for a low sa­
lary, in the same style practised in 
all Tropical African countries, which 
is indispensable to putting the enter­
prises on an economic footing. These 
problems cannot be solved without the 
continued good office of competent or­
gans of the colonial administration and 
a comprehensive understanding of the 
needs of colonization^^.
Similar pleas were made by the concessionaires 
themselves. Much to the dismay of the interventionists, the 
colonial administration’s response was cool at its best and 
inefficient at its worst. At a theoretical level, a number of 
measures had been worked out since early days to counter the 
problem, but in practice, they failed. The consternation of 
the concessionaires increased. For the majority of the set­
tlers, the use of constraint was the only effective method 
for overcoming the ’inertia* of the Ethiopians. But the go­
vernment was concerned about the political implications such 
a policy of forced labour might cause, and was reluctant to 
openly sanction compulsory recruitment as the farmers demand­
ed. It equally understood that unless a conscious effort was 
made to meet the demands of the struggling settler farms, its 
vital interest would be seriously compromised. A statement by 
Nasi, the governor of H&r&r, sets out the government’s dilem­
ma :
It is necessary for the agricultural 
concessionaires to bear in mind that 
the government cannot and will not deal 
with the ’black slave trade* in order
Consulta, "Avvaloramento":1571.
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to supply the native labour they requi­
re. Indeedi the government can and must 
help in every possible way in the re­
cruitment of labour required by private 
farms. But this and 'the slave trade*, 
which is being demanded, are poles ap­
art158.
Although labour proved an intractable problem, it 
was resolved to some degree, in connivance with the admini­
stration, by pressures and brutalities that had all the cha­
racteristics of forced labour elsewhere in colonial Africa. 
This makes the declarations of the Italian authorities aga­
inst such measures appear hollow. At the time of Nasi’s pro­
nouncement, two dominant patterns had emerged as the standard 
forms of statutory exchange of labour: waged, or salariato 
and share-cropping, or compartecipazione. Both were widely 
used with the tacit endorsement, and at times open encourage­
ment, of the colonial administration. The two systems were 
modelled on labour codes prevailing in other Italian coloni­
es, especially Somalia and Eritrea.
Waged labour was recruited by Ethiopian chiefs 
who, as in other parts of colonial Africa, were also the main 
instruments for raising forced labour for public road works, 
military and para-military services, and the cultivation of 
certain cash crops*59. In substance if not in detail, the pat­
tern of recruitment was identical throughout the Empire.
After a relatively careful census of the population, each 
chief was responsible for supplying a specified number of
158. G. Nasi, II Mio Credo. Raccolta di circolari del 
generate Nasi edita dal governo dello Sc. n.d. (1939), in Luigi 
Goglia and Fabio Grassi, II colonialismo italiano da Adua all 
'imnero. (Rm: Laterza & Figli Spa 1981), p.395.
159. CD IAO GS 1820, p. 10.; AOI 1929 SocietA A. SIMBA, Norme 
per la mano d*opera aziendale (henceforth Simba, Norme). Labour 
problems relating to Cotton Districts are extensively discussed 
in Chap VltJ pp •
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workers from the able-bodied, including women and children*8®, 
under his control. The amount of labour to be provided fluc­
tuated, with its peaks at high agricultural season when its 
shortage was most intensely felt*8*.
However, as the chiefs and their subjects tried to 
resist the companies' wishes, labour recruitment proved ex­
tremely difficult. Initially, companies like SIMBA used the 
pre-Italian Amhara governors who successfully delivered the 
required labour, imposing on recalcitrants severe physical 
and pecuniary penalties - measures described in the company's 
records as "effective ascendancy over the subdued people".
But with the emergence of the police force and the policy of 
de-abyssinization, most of these governors were stripped of 
their traditional power, and, replaced by warrant chiefs. 
Cases in which the latter were elected by their tribes on the 
proposal of company officials were not uncommon; but several 
of these chiefs lacked roots in tradition and, as a result, 
were often rejected by the population, making their efficien­
cy in obtaining the required labour very low.
Data on chiefs openly conniving with their sub­
jects against the company are extremely rare*8*, but, as a 
rule, gaining whole-hearted support from the chiefs needed 
long negotiations involving hard-work, great energy and addi­
tional financial inducements on top of a token monthly pay­
lt)0. Use of child labour was widespread and was widely 
reported. Thus Mrs Fanin, one of the Fascist admirers among the 
British aristocracy, states that during her visit in 1938 she 
saw "quite a number of children employed with the road gangs" 
[F0371/22030/310]. The Italians justified the employment of 
children on educational grounds [GRA 44/36-1 Archimede Mischi 
to GG, Autonomia nel camno alimentare. Moggio 15-5-1937].
*8*. Ibidem AOI 1848, pp.4-5; Pier Buono, op.cit..
*82. A typical case is that of the local cadis at SIMBA's 
farms who, unlike the Amara leaders, refused to use force against 
their co-religionists unwilling to work for SIMBA [Cfr. Simba 
1929, Norme].
-253-
CHAPTER VI COMMERCIAL FARMING
ment as part of their service1^3. But resort also was made to 
punitive measures, coercing the chiefs into active collabora­
tion with the company officials. A typical example was SIMBA, 
which abolished the chiefs' monthly salary and introduced a 
remunerative system that was proportional to the size of 
workforce supplied. The system began to prove successful. But 
even then the companies continued to be confronted with the 
oroblem of a reluctant and generally inadequate workforce.
Vi ^ 11-to-do peasants were often able to avoid any work by 
paying their way off to the chiefs3^. The recruits induced to 
work had to be organized into labour gangs - squadra di lavo- 
ratori - and closely supervised, often by armed guards. Oth­
erwise they simply stopped work or fled3*3.
The Ethiopian chief was only an auxiliary instru­
ment. The real power rested in the residente and commissario 
who were the direct contact between the company and the chi­
efs. Any power the chiefs had was delegated from these offi­
cers. The success in labour recruitment, to a certain degree, 
was very much a matter of how committed these officers were 
to the 'civilizing mission'3**. Some officers did their best in 
collaborating with the management of the companies by talking 
to the chiefs and encouraging them to be loyal agents; ex­
plaining the significance of a particular crop to the metro­
politan economy; and punishing and dismissing incompetent and 
unco-operative chiefs. But such measures offered no lasting 
remedy to the problem: puppet chiefs proved themselves to be 
in no better a position than their predecessors and, as a
3*3. Ibidem; CD IAO 1929, SIMBA: Generalita' e programmi di 
massima, 27-2-1942.
3**. Simba, Norme.
3*5. Arrigo Chiuderi, "L* agricoltura indigena nel GS ed i
mezzi per farla progredire", AC, XXXVI, 10 (1942):272; Masotti,
op.cit., pp.138-9; See also Chap. VI, pp.
166. Ibidem, GS 1820, p.9.
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result, they, in turn, succumbed to the same fate of dismis­
sal and punishment3*^.
In several areas the companies were allowed to 
recruit their own labour and, as far as this ran smoothly, 
the administration saw no reason to intervene. But the policy 
gave rise to ample abuses. Where the labour needs of strug­
gling farms became acute, forced labour became an inevitable 
option. Thus SIMBA, for example, in its Villa Baka concession 
organized the inhabitants of the surrounding villages into 
eight 100-strong labour gangs who provided their service by 
turns3**. Each day before the start of work, the company check­
ed each worker on a register. The absentees were immediately 
reported to the local police who searched out truants. At the 
beginning of the week, each worker was given a ticket on 
which each evening a company official recorded the quantity 
and the quality of work done. A ticket had to be completed 
within a week, and those failing to do so were required to 
work the following week; otherwise no payment was made3*^.
The labour gang or ’ticket’ system worked with 
some satisfaction, but at the expense of the peasants' own 
subsistence farming. The situation called for the interven­
tion of the central administration who, recognizing the dang­
er of unrest, sought to offer the Ethiopians some protection.
At the end of 1938, the Viceroy's government demanded the 
companies to disengage and send home all peasants during the 
sowing and harvesting season33®. This measure had a devastating 
effect on the companies as they experienced a marked redu­
ction in the supply of labour at a peak period of their ac­
3*3. Simba, Norme.
3*®. Later modifications set the number at 120, while the 
term was shortened from eight to six weeks [Cfr. SIMBA, Norme]. 
In GS it lasted a month [Cfr. Chiuderi, op.cit.].
3*®. CD I AO AOI 1929, Pagamento mano d* opera.
Chiuderi, loco.cit..
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tivities. A compromise of sorts was reached whereby various 
residences of the region combined forces to supply a labour 
quota by turns. Although the system interfered less in Ethio­
pian subsistence farmingy as a remedy for labour shortage it 
proved inadequate. Despite strict security, most of the work­
force just melted away in the course of the journey. Those 
reaching the destination were subjected to a tough regime. 
Even then it was possible for incidents similar to those 
described by one officer in relation to the labour gang of 
Jubdo mines in WallSga to occur:
If by any chance a leopard or any night 
animal had a nasty idea of strolling 
around close to their camps, it offered 
the best opportunity for total confus­
ion whereby everybody returned to his 
homeland, where under normal circumsta­
nces a visit by a leopard would have 
hardly raised much emotion once they 
were locked inside their dwellings. In 
such a case it became necessary to 
start the recruitment afresh amid gene­
ral annoyance - in the first place that 
of the r e s i d e n t .
As the Italians were quite aware, one of the reas­
ons for resistance was the realization by the Ethiopians of 
unprecedented opportunities opened for them by rival interest 
groups pleading for their labour*^. Therefore, as one agricul­
tural technician complained, the Ethiopians were reluctant to
Masotti, op.cit., pp.138-9. Assessing the severity used 
Masotti wrote that "I have to confess that I would never have 
liked to be the residente of Jubdo where a Genovese colleague 
only with his notorious harshness succeeded to keep them 
together".
Such awareness is also highlighted by Renato Trevisa- 
ni, an official of CFI: "Despite all this (= attempt to control 
wages of the natives), the natives are already well aware that 
their services represent much sought merchandise, as stands to 
demonstrate it the fact that the success or failure of an 
employer’s business depends on the profit margin that the native 
considers to be worth for his work" [GRA 43/34-26, Renato 
Trevisani, op.cit., p.40].
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work in farms unless offered what he described as ’absurd 
wages equivalent to those they earned from the construction 
and building companies"373. But owing to the need to render 
their enterprise profitable and keep their produce competi­
tive in the international market, the farms were not in a 
position to compete with current market wages37*.
Wages in road-building ran from £.4 to £.6 per diem, 
and construction workers in AA, HMrSr and other urban centres 
earned £.7 per diem and those with greater skills from £.10 to 
£.2$5 . In contrast, cn agricultural labourer’s wages ranged 
from £.1 to a maximum of £.3 per diem depending on age, sex, 
conditions of work and, in a few cases, climate. The normal 
pay was £.3 for men, £.2.50 for women and £.2, £.0.50, and £.1 
for children depending on performance and type of work37^. The 
payment of these wages in lire provided little inducement377 .
As a result agriculture, alongside the mining industry, was 
left at the mercy of an unreliable Ethiopian workforce which 
knew that its labour was a much sought after asset. The ef­
fects were as devastating as in the early period of occupa­
tion when
many natives have abandoned the Euro­
pean estates; to make them stay the 
others have been obliged to increase 
agricultural wages; where coffee is
173. CD IA0 AOI GS 1820, pp.9-10.
37*. Fossa (1938), pp. 238-9,253; M. Rava, "Diairo di un 
secondo viaggio nell’ovest Etiopico”, CDV, (1939):135,153-4; F. 
Santagata, L*Harar. (Milano:1940), p.208; N. Bonfatti, "Tutela 
razziale del lavoro in AOI", REAI. XXVI, (1938):1407.
175. Pankhurst, (1972):62-5.
37*>. CD I AO AOI 1929 SIMBA, Pagamento mano d* opera; 1848,
pp.4-5. Most common way of payment was part in kind and part in
cash. Items paid were barley, durrah, cat, firewood or dergo -
food ration [Cfr. Santagata, op.cit., p.210; GRA 43/36-26,
Trevisani, op.cit, pp.40-1].
377. GRA 46/41-19, Cusmano, op.cit., pp. 24-31; 43/34-26,
Trevisani, op.cit., pp.64-72.
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collected from wild plants many natives 
who until last year were not paid, or 
else received very small wages and ra­
rely, have also abandoned the old cof­
fee work or have demanded a higher wa­
ge. In the small independent farms the 
natives have in some cases preferred to 
leave the coffee for building work whe­
re more favourable opportunities are 
offered37®.
The intense competition for labour resulted in 
considerable friction between various groups of Italian em­
ployers, notably between the farmers and the construction 
companies. The government was pressed to standardize wages 
throughout the country and as result a number of decrees were 
enacted to this effect. But the government possessed neither 
the political will nor the ability to carry out its decisions 
effectively379. Orders prohibiting the employment of Ethiopians 
for non-agricultural work in the vicinity of concessions were 
also unsuccessful in arresting "the exodus from the fields"3®®.
Although attractive in many ways, share-cropping 
too did not prove to be a lasting solution. The system took 
two forms depending on whether the land was domainial or 
under private ownership. In domatnU*.l lands, the Ethiopian 
resident was considered as a tenant and the concessionaire as 
a landlord. In such circumstances, share-cropping took the 
form of labour rent whereby, for the privilege of living on
Prinzi, op.cit.:1716.
379. Salary standardization was initially attempted by the 
GGS immediately after the occupation invoking severe penalties 
against the transgressors of both the salary limit as well as 
payment in thalers; yet this as well as the efforts of other 
governorates failed to attain their objectives [Cfr. GU, 11, 
184, p.283, GUGS. I, 51, (1937), p.69; I, (1937), p.223; BUGA. 
II, (1937), pp. 521-2 who introduced the law with the explicit 
view of penalizing "employers* abuses and unjustifiable cornering 
of labour].
3®®. Santagata, op.cit., pp. 210-1; GRA 43/34-26, Trevisani, 
op.cit, pp.39-40; CD IAO misc. 1038, p.18.
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the settler's estate and receiving land for the cultivation 
of foodstuff, the Ethiopian paid a labour rent to the Italian 
landlord. As a rule, the small and medium-sized concessions 
tended to settle the Ethiopians at the periphery of their 
farms, forming villages or isolated homesteads that served as 
reservoirs of labour383. The practice on large farms was to 
allocate land in lieu of wages, and the Ethiopian tenant 
either appropriated the entire produce for himself or shared 
it with the concessionaire according to a pre-agreed clause. 
The tenant was obliged to supply his own and his family's 
labour, freely in the first case, or against some nominal 
payment in cash or in kind or both in the second3®3. Abuses by 
the concessionaires were common, as in W&llo where government 
officials and individuals with influence and connection 
demanded 40% of the produce without making any financial 
contribution to the production process3®3.
The share-cropping system was quite deliberately 
and consciously fostered by the government which encouraged 
the Italian farmers to keep Ethiopian cultivators within 
their concessions3®*. The contract aimed to bind the Ethiopians
181. The need for a native reserve, known as Villagio in- 
digenot modelled on that of Kenya and South Africa was advocated 
by many Italians. The Duke of Aosta, under whose regime racially 
segregated development policy was introduced, saw the advantages 
of dividing the entire country along racial and ethnic lines, 
further expounding it [Cfr. CD IAO Misc. 1038, pp.2-5; AOI 1936, 
Graziani to MAI, concessioni terriere; ATdR 24/104, G. R. 
Giglioli, Rapporto al MAI in relazione al viaggio nell'Unione 
del Sud Africa, Firenze 5-8-1937, p.31; Prinzi, op.cit.:1718-9; 
Villa and al., op.cit., pp.214-5].
3®3. Santagata, op.cit.; GRA AOI 1936, Concessionionari.
3®3. Pini , Considerazioni .
3®*. Most post-1939 concession charters contain a clause on 
the following model: "The concessionaire should stipulate with 
the native personnel within the concession area salary or share- 
cropping contracts . . . and should be clear that they [the 
natives] cannot be displaced without the approval of the local 
political authorities and for reasons of well-proven incapacity
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to the land ot the company where they were 'gainfully* em­
ployed by establishing them in what was euphemistically de­
scribed as cultivating settlements.
An interesting ramification of this was the emer­
gence of labour colonies. The companies were unwilling to 
accept delays or shortfalls in production on their farms; to 
prevent such an eventuality, particularly where the local 
workforce was scant, labour was imported from elsewhere. This 
experiment, chiefly employed by the SIA Arussi in its ex-Bel­
gian concession3®3, directed by Jacopo Gasparini, the former 
governor of Eritrea whose name was associated with the TH— 
shnay State Cotton Farm, was gradually gaining ground3®®. After 
a number of unsuccessful attempts to solve the labour prob­
lem, SIA Arussi brought in HhrMrg6 nhftanas who had been 
confined to penal colonies3®7. Later on the Sidamo migrants 
from surrounding areas joined them. The scheme aimed to ga­
ther each ethnic group into villages with its own chiefs, 
religious institutions and water supply. After agreement was
and indiscipline on the part of the [native] cultivators or the 
inability of the farm to effectively absorb their manpower" [CD 
IAO Sc 1801]. For the other governorships cfr. Ibidem Hr 1812, 
allegati nos.4,5,6; GS 1822, Disciplinare Tipo per Concessione 
Agricola".
3®3. Formed in 1913 and known as Soci6t6 Beige des plantations
d'Aby8sinie, the Belgian concession was one of the largest modern
concessions predating the Italian occupation. Largely based on 
dry farming, it extended over 2,000 ha. Although coffee was the 
main cash crop, a variety of fruits were grown. At the time of 
occupation it had an estimated labour force of 2,000 and 
ca.1,700,000 coffee plants [Cfr. ASMAI 54/22, L ’attivitA 
economica del Belgio e le aziende agricole nell'Etiopia sud 
orientale, AA n.d. [4-2-1927]; Fernando Santagata, "II sistema 
economico degli Arussi", REAI. 27, 9, (Settembre 1939):1078-9; 
Cerulli (1943):74-5].
3®®. See above Chap I, pp. n~s.
3®7. The Italian officials claimed that they settled them 
on humanitarian grounds as they needed urgent accommodation owing 
to the fact that, following the advent of the Italian conquest, 
their Somali subjects refused to work for them.
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reached with the chiefs, a series of share-cropping contracts 
were established: the Ethiopian settler was given a piece of 
land for his own use with seeds and agricultural tools, and 
entitled to keep a few poultry and cattle. He was also prov­
ided with a hut, cash loans, medical assistance and a well 
for irrigation. In return he worked the "ompany's land at a 
rate which varied according to the yield produced or inputs 
provided by the parties. Sources available fail to give deta­
ils as to the magnitude of this programme. Yet we know that 
SIA Arussi, by about 1940, had settled two groups of Shawan 
Amharas from the JeJega areas. On the whole, this was con­
sidered one of the best long-term strategies to overcome 
labour shortages, particularly in areas where large companies 
operated. Yet the system was in its infancy when the war of 
restoration of independence broke out, and it would be spec­
ulative to contemplate whether it could have offered a last­
ing remedy38®. But a similar experiment in Somalia, where such 
a system was extensively used and for a long period, gave 
poor results. On the other hand, we know that there was al­
ready marked reluctance on the part of free Ethiopians to 
leave their homes and subsistence farming to work, virtually 
as slaves, for foreign masters3®9.
Where land was under private ownership, the Ethio­
pian landlord allotted a certain percentage of his land to 
cultivate an industrial crop of interest to the company who 
purchased the produce at an agreed price39®. The most common 
procedure was to divide the harvest on the basis of input 
provided by the Italian concessionaire393 . Whenever possible,
3*®. Cerulli (1943) :74.
3®9. j.aO misc. 1038, p. 13; see also Chap. VII, pp. 5^ 0-^.
39®. CD IAO 1929, Rapporti fra la societA e gli agricoltori 
proprietari (hereafter Simba, Rapporti); Santagata, op.cit.,
p.210.
191. See Table XX.
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the pre-existing tenancy arrangements were maintained. In 
such cases the landlord, i.e. a gxiJt-holder, was the signato­
ry who, however, listed his tenants who continued to pay him 
their customary duties393.
Share-cropping contracts were notarized by local 
authorities in the presence of the chiefs. They had to be 
fully explained to the Ethiopian and signed by both parties. 
The size of plots varied from 1$ to 3 ha, and the cultivator 
worked, in theory at any rate, if not always in practice, 
under the supervision of the concessionaire who distributed 
seeds and sponsored research393.
As we saw earlier, ideally, the share-cropping 
system was a partnership between the Italian entrepreneur, 
and the Ethiopian farmer and avowedly served a double pur­
pose: to uplift the material welfare of the Ethiopian by or­
ganizing rationally his agricultural enterprise and to provi­
de the concessionaire with a secure source of production. Yet 
in practice, it was a mechanism to incorporate the Ethiopian 
population into the world market at an arbitrary level of 
remuneration. In the process, the Ethiopian peasant not only 
became the basis of exploitation, rooted in traditional eco­
nomic structure, but also surrendered his independence to 
become the servant of business interests. A relatively in­
dependent community passed into the control of a remote fi­
nancial magnate. Share-cropping was attractive to the Itali­
ans for its functional versatility: primarily, it could claim 
roots deep in tradition and local agricultural practices39*; in 
addition to coping with labour deficiency, it aided to expand
393. SIMBA, Rapporti.
393. CD IAO AOI 1929, SIMBA: Rapporti esistenti fra la
society ed i coloni.
39*. See above Chap. ; CD IAO 794; Sc 3025. For other
regions no study exists.
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production keeping costs far below the market level. Finally, 
it helped to maintain the racial prestige of the Italian 
concessionaire as the manager and supervisor of the farm 
while the Ethiopian carried out all the demeaning work393.
Originally, share-cropping system was intended as 
a stop-gap until Ethiopians were forced onto the labour mar­
ket and the land problem was definitely settled. Instead it 
was becoming a permanent feature of the rural economy, and 
gradually tcok over from salaried labour39®. Reports attest 
that, with :he exception of ShBwa, in many of the governor­
ships share-cropping was the backbone of the activities of 
many concessions. In SIMBA*s case, for example, of 970 ha of 
its Fadis Farm, 354 ha were share-cropped; equally out of 
total 5,724.85 ha at Villa Baka, 5,403.85 ha was conducted 
under the same system in which 1,030 Ethiopian tenants and 
owners were engaged397.
The Ethiopians* response to the programme was on 
the whole unenthusiastic. At SIMBA*s farm of Villa Baka, for 
example, the indigenous population reacted adversely while 
the Amh&ras surprisingly showed a remarkable degree of co­
operation. As former lords and, understandably, Italians* key 
political adversaries, the Amh&ras had much to gain by co­
operating with the new overlords. To overcome the resistance 
of the Ethiopians, political pressure was blended with puni­
tive measures and economic incentives. Intense propaganda 
activity was carried out by the agricultural technicians who 
employed, as SIMBA*s report points out, "at once patience, 
adequate rewards" and physical punishment — this later action
393 . Sbacchi , op.cit., p. 367.
39®. Most post-1939 concession charters encourage the 
concessionaire to share-cropping contracts. Cfr. CD IAO GS 1822; 
Hr 1812, 1813; Sc 1801.
397 . Ibidem AOI 1929, pp. 13-4; Bodini to DG Soc. An. SIMBA, 
AA 10-1-1941; Relazione su Fadis al 31-12-1940. As we will see 
in Chap VI the Cotton Districts almost entirely depended on it.
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described by the company with the genteel expression of "fine 
exemplary measures"39®. Recalcitrant individuals were penalized 
and those co-operating rewarded. Thus the Amh&ras who co­
operated with SIMBA were allowed to maintain their former 
status of landlords or gultHRas399. It was claimed that where 
their co-operation was successfully enlisted, the activities 
of chiefs and notables proved most effective. In such cases, 
some companies, such as SIMBA, strengthened their position by 
restoring, in agreement with the political authorities, part 
of their former powers with a view of enhancing their author­
ity over their subjects.
Resistance took various expressions. Often little 
or no care was given to the company's unprofitable crop. Un­
prof itabiM^ gave rise to the most common phenomenon - moon­
lighting whereby the Ethiopians misappropriated the crop by 
night to transact it for a remunerative price at unofficial 
market:
Cases of joint land management with the 
natives are not rare. But the system has 
not been brilliant. Where he was not 
closely supervised and well-integrated, 
the native tended often to breach the 
trust laid upon him as an associate by 
ably stealing the common produce3®®.
Insufficient resources, combined with the problems of operat­
ing in an often inaccessible and vast area, made effective 
control difficult. Yet the concessionaires, in their drive to 
control production and fight fraud, continuously improved 
their methods of surveillance, devising new and more strin­
gent measures.
39®. Ibidem, Generality, p. 16.
399. CD IAO 1929, SIMBA. Agricoltura indigena.
3®®. Giovanni Piani, "L* agricoltura indigena nel Governo 
dell'Harar ed i mezzi per farla progredire", AC, XXXIII, 7 
(1939):408.
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TABLE XX:- SHARE-CROPPING CONTRACTS BETWEEN ITALIANS AND ETHIOPIANS201
S E X X E E J R  E 'J T H X
TYPB OF 
COITRACT
UPOT SBARB 
OP PRODUCE
11 POT SHARB 
OP PRODUCE
CAPITAL LABOUR CAPITAL LABOUR
1. 6 HARROWS 
6 SICKLES
PLOUGHIIG 
THRESH 11G
MX LARD
SBBDS
SOWIIG 
OTHERS *
561
2. 2 HARROWS 
6 SICKLBS
PLOUGH IH G 
THRESHI1G
331 LAID
SBBDS
SOWIIG
OTHERS*
671
3. 2 HARROWS 
6 SICKLBS
THRESHIIG 171 LAID
SBBDS
PLOUGHIIG
SOWIIG
OTHERS*
631
2 HARROWS 
6 SICKLBS
51 LAID
SEEDS
PLOUGHIIG 
SOWIIG 
THRESHIIG 
OTHBRS *
951
5. SBBDS 8EBDS WITH 
221 IITEREST
LAID
SBBDS
PLOUGHIIG
SOWIIG
THRESHIIG
OTHBRS*
1001 
LBSS SEEDS 
AID IITEREST
* I t  includes m anuring, harrow ing , weeding, h a rv e s tin g , b in d in g  
and tra n s p o rt in g  to  the th re s h in g  f lo o r .
Source: C e r u l l i  to  MAI, C o n tr a t t i  d i com partec ipazione.
A ty p ic a l case was the  system fo llo w ed  by SIMBA a t  
i t s  V i l l a  Baka Farm where i t  fo s te re d  the prod uction  o f crops 
th a t  had l i t t l e  lo c a l consumption. In  a d d it io n , i t  se t up an 
ad hoc Commission, composed o f members re p re s e n tin g  the  in te ­
re s ts  o f both c o n tra c tin g  p a r t ie s .  E th io p ia n  in te re s ts  were 
represented  by two c h ie fs  and the  company by a v a lu a to r  and
201. Note th a t  the  % share o f produce depended on in p u t 
l e v e l .
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registrar. Before the harvest period, the Commission toured 
each farm, assessed the total produce and the company's share 
and recorded them in two copies - one for the Ethiopian and one 
for the company - bearing the signatures of each member of the 
Commission. When depositing at the company's storage, the 
Ethiopian took with him his copy and was issued with a receipt. 
The company kept a register where all payments and evaluations 
were carefully recorded2®2. Most of the crop was paid for in 
kind, with the exception of coffee and cat for which payment 
was usually in cash - in the region of £.1 if the plant was ir­
rigated and £.0.50 if dry.
The Ethiopian could challenge the Commission's judge­
ment by appealing directly to the company administration. But 
once the assessment was accepted, any failure to comply broug­
ht serious penalties. In the cases of coffee and cat, the 
normal procedure was to seize the crop and confiscate an 
equivalent amount to the monies due. Despite the company's boast 
of efficiency in production control and elimination of fraud, 
this system was the source of interminable disputes and subject 
of many amendments2®2. Rome was wary of its long-term repercus­
sions. In a letter written to the Director General of the 
Company, Mario Dini, Maugini's verdict was:
The company's task should not be confined 
to exaction. This certainly is one of the 
worst solutions and it will not be too 
long before the consequences manifest 
themselves2®*.
The picture that emerges is that, contrary to the 
expectations of the colonial authorities, the policy of achiev­
ing self-sufficiency through commercial farms was a disastrous 
failure. Rather than contributing to economic self-sufficiency,
2®2. SIMBA, Rapporti.
2®2. Ibidem.
2®*. CD IAO 1929, Maugini to Mario Dini, Firenze 28-1-19A0.
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the farms remained a drain on the slender resources of the 
State who had to ensure their survival through generous subsidy 
and fiscal concessions2®2. As both the cultivated areas and the 
yield gradually decreased, initial enthusiasm subsided. In 
1940, an estimated area of about 20,000 ha was cultivated with 
a mere production of circa 130,000 ql. The estimate for 1941 
was lower than this but 200,000 ql were expected2®®. But the 
optimism faded away when climatic change ruined most of the 
crop.
In official circles, the reason for failure was 
sought in the conventional explanation of the distrust of 
Italian capital to move into a new environment, particularly 
at a time of turbulent international conditions compounded by 
uncertain local markets. There is little doubt that these were 
significant contributing factors. But they were not the sole 
reasons. The policies for commercial farming rested on grandly 
conceived but impracticable ideas2®7. They were not preceded by 
any feasibility study nor did they seem to have balanced the 
impact that various interests might have during implementation. 
Their pace of development was determined by the interplay of 
three major forces: the technical knowledge of the farmers,
availability of land and labour.
Despite eulogistic reports in the contemporary 
media, the settlers showed a low level of experience and 
technical expertise. Attempts to find land free from Ethiopian 
claims had little success. The continuous intervention of the 
political authorities, aided by a package of coercive measures, 
never succeeded in remedying the chronic labour shortage. The 
situation was further compounded by the lack of a coherent set 
of policies, administrative disorganization, personality
2®2. Del Boca, op.cit., Ill, p. 212.
206. CD IAO 1774; Villa and al., op.cit., p.252.
2®7. Villa and al. , op.cit., pp. 221-2.
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clashes, bureaucratic entanglement and inadequacy of economic 
and manpower resources. Under the best of circumstances, the 
Italians would have had to be patient as the official agricul­
tural development strategy matured. But the brief period of the 
occupation simply was not long enough for their plans to come 
to fruition.
In spite of this failure, the government did not 
relinquish its commitment to settler farming. Yet a major reas­
sessment of the government's policy resulted in a positive, 
though timid, gesture of encouraging Ethiopian farming as a way 
of maintaining revenue in view of achieving agricultural self- 
sufficiency and bolstering the fiscal base of the colonial state 
and subsidizing the survival of the settler farming.
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TABLE XXI:- COMMERCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CONCESSION IN 1941MB
CONCESSION AREAS
GOVERNORATE NO. OF COMPANIES GRANTED CULTIVATED UNCULTI
VATED
AMARA 107 4,162 2,300 1,862
GS 112 21,381 6,500 14,881
HARAR 124 65,878 11,700 54,178
SHAWA 229 33,194 15,600 1,794
ERITREA 126 23,343 12,000 11,343
SOMALIA 129 28,780 25,500 3,280
TOTAL 829 176,737 73,600 103,137
TABLE XXII: SETTLER AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND ANNUAL CONSUMP­
TION NEEDS AS IN 1941.
TYPE1 Dim 68 Him SHAVA beitiea SOHALIA TOTAL
P10SUCTI0I
AIIQAL
IEE9
BALA1CE
WEAT 15*000 2,000 25,000 28,000 5,000 - 70,000 1,010,000 -1,009,930
TEF 3,000 100 400 4,500 5,000 — 13,000 979,500 -966,500
BARLEY 2,500 — 2,000 3,000 5,000 — 11,000 305,650 -294,650
DURRAH — 2,800 C.,000 3,000 8,000 — 17,000 735,000 -718,000
CORN 50 50 5/XX) 12,000 150 70,000 90,000 506,000 -416,000
OIL SEEDS 
COFFE
150 — 4,200 6,000 1,050 6,000 17,000 493,400 -476,400
— 6,500 26,375 -19,875
DRY VEGETABLE 100 200 50 1,250 200 — 1,700 466,000 -464,300
POTATO & FRUIT0 500 2,300 2,000 810 2,000 500,000 507,600 193,000 *014,600
COTTON FIBRE — 3,300 150 800 500 7,000 11,750 * *
CASTOR FRUIT — 100 5,000 100 — 1,000 6,200 * *
POULTRY 500 500 500 2,000 5,300 200 9,000 3,060,000 -3,051,000
BEEF 25 10 10 10 25 — 80 154,566 -154,486
PORK 150 50 200 800 300 — 1,500 6,840 -5,340
LAMB 80 20 50 50 100 100 400 253,450 -253,050
—  Figure Ltton.
*. No figure available.
A. Measurement unit: Cereal in ql and Animal in number.
B. Estimated at 2,619,000 plants and 0,25 kg per plant.
C. Total fruit 502,110 ql of which: GS (100), Hhrhr (1,000),
Shawa (10), Eritrea (1,000), Somalia (500,000).
Source: CD IAO AOI 1774.
*BB. The data belongs to a CFA official, Pini, and, compared 
with those supplied by the Agricultural offices [See Table XII], 
are considerably inflated.
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THE DIMENSIONS OF CHANGE
Until demographic and commercial colonization efforts 
patently failed and the first flush of Fascist enthusiasm died 
away, modernization of indigenous agriculture was a mythology 
included in the speeches of higher authorities for propaganda 
purpose. Vague thoughts of uplifting the peasantry, at least in 
view of preventing the spectre of ’’social problems", were not 
absent. They were expressed by a few "visionaries’ in the proper 
political garb of the Fascist administration, and were accepted 
as indispensable declarations showing that all views were being 
considered.
The paramount concern of the Italians was to obtain 
enough land for their own settlers. Although the Italian autho­
rities avowedly claimed to respect "legitimate" Ethiopian land 
claims, the issue of reconciling the imperatives of the 
metropolitan colonization with the interests of the Ethiopians 
remained unresolved^. Colonization dictated that settlement be 
directed to areas where climatic conditions, the cost of man­
power, and the security of capital were most favourable to 
making the enterprise profitable and large scale production 
feasible. But these were also areas that were densely populated 
and the settlers had to compete for agricultural resources with 
the Ethiopians who were almost exclusively dependent on land for 
their subsistence.
For the Italian authorities, dealing with indigenous 
agriculture entailed many complicated economic and political 
factors to which there were no clear cut solutions: massive dis­
placement of the Ethiopians from the areas destined for settler 
agriculture might incite rebellion and open warfare, or cause 
migration to the urban centres where they might form a socially 
and politically restless proletariat. On the other hand, the 
Ethiopians* labour was essential to develop the colonists’
Brotto, op.cit., p.24.
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farms2. Also the Ethiopians, by their sheer numbers, were 
regarded as a large market for metropolitan goods and their 
produce was gradually perceived as indispensable in achieving 
the goal of Imperial self-sufficiency in foodstuffs. But as the
Ethiopians were believed to have far fewer wants and could
therefore sell at a much cheaper price than the Italian 
settlers, there was also a constant fear that competition from 
their low cost produce might undermine any progress on the set­
tlers' farms5.
Nevertheless, the Italians maintained that the 
occupation of Ethiopia delivered the Ethiopian peasantry from 
bondage and backwardness. Such a view was echoed by the chief 
intellectual architect of Italian colonization in Ethiopia, 
Maugini:
A new era of peace and state of well-being is 
opened to the masses of IEA as many of the
present miseries that these people are ex­
periencing will be once and for all eliminat­
ed*.
From the official point of view, the list of such 
miseries included archaic farming methods, absence of well- 
developed markets, and rudimentary socio-economic infrastruc­
ture which acted as bottlenecks to improving the peasant eco­
nomy5. But it was in the land tenure system as manifested in the 
g£bbar system that the Italians saw the chief constraints 
paralysing Ethiopian agriculture:
the gabbar, a tax-paying peasant, subject to 
the tyrannical rule of an Amhara landlord, 
with no title to land which belonged to the 
Emperor or his feudal lords or churches,
• GT, 9-3-1939; G. Mondaini, " I problemi del Lavoro 
nel1'Impero", REAI. (maggio 1937):748-9.
5. Giglio (1939), pp.53-8; "Rapporti":1561-5.
*. Maugini, "Primi Orizzonti":20
5. Ibidem; G. Pistolese, "Problemi del 1'impero", El, 
(Luglio 1938).
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burdened by tithe imposed by law and exor­
bitant taxes imposed by the lesser chiefs, 
robbed by raiders, compelled to maintain in 
his house the soldiers of the Emperor and 
those of the provincial governors, does not 
obviously feel any incentive to improve and 
increase production, nor, even if willing, 
will be in a position to carry out any initia­
tives in this respect; on the other hand, nor 
does such initiative come from the temporary 
gult-holders or, call them whatever you like, 
feudal-lords who, not having the security of 
permanent tenure, have no other interest than 
maximum possible exploitation, in collabora­
tion with the wretched population^.
THE CHALLENGES OF RESTRUCTURING THE GABBAR SYSTEM
The reform of the gult system was interpreted as 
necessary for the creation of an economic environment conducive 
to healthy agricultural development, for gult was seen as the 
basis of Ethiopia's under-development and a source of exploita­
tion of peasant production by the former rulers. Condemnation 
of gult system had been a lurid theme in Italian propaganda 
leading up to the invasion, and was thought of as a valuable 
political weapon to drive a wedge between classes within 
Ethiopia. In areas where draconian measures were pursued, its 
abolition led to an indiscriminate declaration of all gult 
tenures as public domain. Stiff resistance followed, forcing 
the Italians towards 1939 to distinguish between gult of 
lordship or gult di signoria and hereditary gult or diritto 
terriero. The first was recognized as public domain and the 
second as private property7.
ASMAI, B-245, Italo Papini, La produzione dell'impero, 
p.29. This view of proven inaccuracy, though amply refuted by, 
and contradictory to, the Italians* own findings, remained part 
of official orthodoxy. Cfr. Chap. II, _p.5^£et sequ.
7. CD IAO ASMAI 15.
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The Italians congratulated themselves that with the 
abolition of gult system they erased the exploitation 
characteristic of rural life that had formed the basis of the 
Abyssinian Empire. However, needless to say, such claims did 
not square with reality. Their policy towards gult tenures was 
dictated more by political considerations and the need to 
expand public domain for colonization purpose than genuine 
concern for agricultural development .
Under Graziani (1936-1937), conversion of gult into 
state domain was implemented, particularly in regions recently 
conquered by the Abyssinians, as part of the so called de- 
abyssinization or de-Hmh&rization policy. By stripping the 
Amharas and their allies of their wealth and depriving them of 
their economic life line, he planned to accelerate 'pacific­
ation' and Italian domination over the territory. In his view, 
successful elimination of the Amharas from their position of 
power would enhance Italy's colonial prestige as a master race 
in the eyes of the Abyssinian's former subjects, such as the 
"Gal la" and other ethnic groups®.
On the other hand, loyal chiefs, both of AmhHra and 
other ethnic groups, were allowed to keep their gult and the 
privileges associated with it intact, or were given tracts of 
public domain from where they continued to levy tributes as in 
former times. Some chiefs, like Ras H&ylu, who was made a com­
mander of the Order of the Colonial Star for the part he played 
in the 'pacification' process, tried to appropriate whatever 
they could lay their hands on, sometimes using false claims. In 
places like Kftmbata, the indigenous leaders who were quick to 
confiscate, with the tacit approval of Italian authorities, the
B. GRA 38/33-3, Graziani to MC, 20-1-1937; Graziani to 
Commissariati Regionali Dembidollo and Irgalem, 17-1-1937.
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gult of some rebel AmhHra rulers, were forced to reinstate them 
once the latter submitted9.
The exemption of church gult lands from state domain 
most belies Italian claims to have abolished gult tenures. 
Since the beginning of invasion, the Italians understood the 
need for the church's cooperation in order to secure control of 
the country. The church was also viewed as a stronghold of 
Ethiopian nationalism. Using various methods, including ter­
roristic tactics, the indiscriminate massacre of leading 
religious personalities, the total dismantling of the admini­
strative structure and severance with the outside link, the 
Italians succeeded in manipulating and weakening the EOC. But 
a modus vivendi was reached only when the Italians agreed to 
suspend for a decennium the law transforming the church gult 
properties into public domain in return for the church's co­
operation^. Graziani, who saw church property as the only valid 
"powerful weapon to bend the church to our will", explained to 
Mussolini:
Given the great significance of the issue 
and taking into account that in the final 
analysis the transformation of gult into 
public domain boils down to a question of 
pure formality and that the influence of 
the church in this country is of much 
greater relevance, the best policy is to 
postpone for a period of ten years the 
nationalization of gult properties and 
leave to the church the total disposal.
... This will have an immediate effect in
9. GRA 40/33-5, Bocca to GGAOI AA 27-7-1937; Capo Gabinet- 
to to Belly, AA 24-7-1937; Lessona to GG, AA 19-12-1937; Ibidem 
40/33-9, Graziani to GG, AA 7-10-1937; Moreno to GG, Gm 18-10- 
1937.
1®. GRA 46/41—15, Autocefalia della Chiesa Copta Abissina, 
p.52. This document, consisting of 74 pages, contains most of 
Graziani's correspondence with Rome concerning the EOC. The 
writer finds the tactics and intrigues used to sever EOC links 
with the Alexandrian See as the most revealing because it 
contradicts most of commonly-held view particularly as it relates 
to the conduct of the metropolitan, AbunM Qdrlos.
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allaying the mind of the clergy and win­
ning its support, thus sparing the govern­
ment from any financial cost. As a result 
[our] principle remains uncompromised 
while the task of pacification will be 
made much easier^.
Of course, there were also economic considerations 
that presented the maintenance of status quo of EOC lands as a 
wise alternative, a point supported by a case study conducted 
by a dynamic and liberal commissario of the Commissariat of 
Bishoftu, Attilio Scaglione. Scaglione, who carried out a 
survey of 98 churches with a religious population of 1,311 and 
owning 1,137.75 gasha or ca.45,480 ha, warned that any aboli­
tion of EOC lands would bring unbearable costs to the state 
treasury12.
The Italian decision to allow loyal gult-holders to 
maintain former privileges made their policy unpopular. But 
gri evances over the arbitrary method in which the gult was 
transformed into public domain and massive evacuation of the 
original occupants to accommodate the settlers, combined with 
gratuitous harsh treatment by the government officials and the 
colonists, made most of the settlement areas highly combustifct€„ 
Rather than searching for lands that were indisputably gultt 
the general procedure was to occupy a colonizable land on the 
assumption that it was gult and then invite any claimants to 
ownership to substantiate their claims. It was a procedure that 
gave rise to ample abuse. The Ethiopians had to present docu­
ments from the previous Ethiopian regime's land registry, or 
other records such as receipts for tax payments, all of which 
were not easy to procure. The situation helped only the "land 
hunters" who, on the advice of the authorities roamed from one 
governorship to another in search of domainial lands, and
11. Ibid., pp.53-4.
12. CD IAO 791, pp.I-X.
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"picked the first green valley that befell to their eyes"13.
Contrary to the Italian claims, the public domains, 
where settlements took place, were not merely wastelands, lands 
with no other master than the state, or uncultivated lands 
whose occupation would have inconvenienced no one1*. Even the 
gult belonging to rebels and their sympathizers or royal 
families were not lands empty of people. They were lands 
occupied by peasantry who for generations had ensured their 
productivity. Official claims that evacuation was peaceful is 
belied by the confidential correspondence13. Referring specifi­
cally to HarSr where "colonization was being carried out in 
vast areas by expropriating the natives from their lands and 
deporting them somewhere else", and comparing it with the 
earlier misguided land policy of Eritrea, the Secretary of 
Italian Africa, Terruzzi, warned Mussolini of widespread and 
simmering discontent that, unless remedied quickly, would 
inevitably open the floodgate of " an eternal cycle of violen-
Mondaini (1941):115; Villa and al. , op.cit., p.226; 
Pini, Considerazioni; Terruzzi to Mussolini, Rm 27-4- 1938.
**. Such claims were even made by General Guglielmo Nasi, 
the Governor of HarSr, where such massive displacement took 
place. Comparing Italy’s 'generous and progressive* land alienat­
ion policy with the precedents of his misconceived Abyssinian 
conquest, he wrote: "The key principle followed by the Italian 
government [in land alienation] was - unlike the Amhara con­
querors who expropriated cultivated lands - to occupy and develop 
uncultivated lands". Cfr. Nasi, "L*opera":18.
13. Mondaini, op.cit. :115.
13. "From various parts but particularly from H8r&r, to 
which, because of major tranquillity that the region enjoys, 
applications are directed, concerns are being expressed to me
against the way the present colonization is carried out, i.e. in 
vast areas expropriating the natives of their lands and deporting
them somewhere else. Undoubtedly such a method can cause serious 
political repercussions. The revolt of Bahta Hagos in 1894 in 
Eritrea was caused exactly by the contemporary mistaken land 
policy and even currently one of the major charges directed 
against us by the rebels - by both AmhHra and Gal la - is that of
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Nor was the discontent confined to the cultivators 
of gult lands. As we saw earlier, evacuation also affected 
private owners adjacent to gult lands to which, despite safegu­
ards, their plots were amalgamated to make the fragmented 
colonizable lands economically viable. In exchange the owners 
were given lands elsewhere in areas that were assumed to be of 
little or no relevance for settlement.
The Italians were aware that land confiscation was 
a highly delicate matter to the Ethiopians who, immaterial of 
their ethnic origin and whether the land was gult or rest, felt 
very strongly about their possessions17. The Italians boasted 
that in most cases the Ethiopians were compensated fairly and 
that lands appropriated for colonization were few and far 
between. Strictly speaking it is true that the Ethiopians 
received compensation. But the two parties had totally dif­
ferent concepts of land values and usage, and therefore what 
counted as a "fair" price for the Italians was not so to the 
Ethiopians. Nor were the Ethiopians consulted on the price. The 
owners were summoned and told how much their land was worth 
after the land was surveyed, often by unqualified people. 
Theoretically, the Ethiopians could refuse to move without 
adequate compensation. But an interview with an individual, 
whose land at Bishoftu was appropriated in this way, reveals 
that the Ethiopians were likely to lose their land whether they 
agreed to it or not. Thus, most accepted the decision as a fait 
accompli. But the payments were slow. Thus, in AA between 1937- 
8 property worth about £.10,000,000 was confiscated for coloni­
zation and new urban planning, but less than £.2,000,000 was 
paid18.
expropriating for the white colonization their lands to which 
the natives, immaterial of their race, feel a particular attach­
ment". Terruzzi to Mussolini, Rm 27-4-1938.
17. Terruzzi to Mussolini.-
1B. Sbacchi (1975), p.403.
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The Ethiopians were paid much less than the market
value for their land. In AA, for example, land taken from
Ethiopians was parcelled out into small plots and sold at
between 15% and 60% higher than the price of compensation. The
precise scale of such confiscations is not easy to establish.
Yet cases suggest that the Italians, particularly at an early
stage, did not hesitate to take any land thought essential for
the viability of settler farms. By the end of 1939, lands given
in this way to the settlers totalled 186,000 ha, not including
lands made public domain but not yet allocated10.
The Cusmano and Corvo Commission in its secret
report to the Duke of Aosta deplored the displacement policy as
politically dangerous and exploitative:
Expropriation even when effected following 
the criteria of generously rewarding the 
owners will result in transforming the 
mass of best peasants, as is the case 
particularly with the Gal la, into a mob of 
have-nots, who, ultimately by force majeu- 
re, will end up by dedicating themselves 
to banditry. . . . One should not forget that 
the bonds that tie a native are very few.
...What will one expect then when they are 
removed from fields which they cultivated 
for centuries and which represent for 
them, together with their herds, an in­
tegral part of their life?30.
At least until 1939 the final decision on the status
of gult and its transformation into domainial land rested on 
the exclusive judgement of often unqualified local authorities,
who often behaved arbitrarily, aided by local chiefs. The
latter were open to extortion, and cases where land concession 
was bartered with the colonists for influence and speculative 
purposes at the expense of the peasantry were not uncommon31.
l. Mondaini (1941):368; La costruzione dell'Impero. 
(Milano: Mondadori, 1939), vol. I, p.208. See p.SC.
30. Cusmano and Corvo Report, pp. 11-2.
31. Masotti, op.cit., p. 102.
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Most officers not only often ignored or condoned such practice 
but themselves issued many illegal permits often in connivance 
with the local Fascist Party or the colonization office. 
General Mezzetti, the Governor of Amara, attributed the rebel­
lion of his governorship largely to such unauthorized dealings:
What is most serious and which is a particular 
cause of the disorder is that abusive seizures 
have been carried out by the higher represen­
tatives of the local Fascists as well as a 
member of the Fascist Federation of GondSr.
The latter has occupied the vast planes of 
Grado - without any knowledge of the Governor 
at GondSr - and there he had set up a farm 
where 17 metropolitan workers are employed and 
has built a plant worth about £.250,000...A 
vast region that was demarcated as domainial 
and where also are settled a number of colon­
ists, happened to be the property of our loyal 
leader who has at his disposal a very skilled 
lawyer and he is set about to assert his 
rights bv legal means. I hope to come to terms 
with him .
Like Governor Mezzetti, officers sympathetic to the 
Ethiopians felt incompetent to protect them against sharks or 
influential colonists who illegally seized large tracts of 
land. One such case was that of a certain official who had a 
vast concession on the outskirts of DMsd. He taxed the peasan­
try heavily and pocketed all the revenue, including the tithe 
due to the state. The peasants reported this to the local 
residente each time, carrying, in accordance with Ethiopian 
tradition, a pair of yokes on their shoulder as a symbol of 
their oppression. A tense relationship developed between the 
colonist and the residente whose authority was curtailed by the 
fact that the abusive concessionaire boasted a special relat­
ionship with Mussolini^.
ASMAI AS, Mezzetti to Terruzzi; Del Boca, op.cit, III,
p p . 1 9 8 - 9 .
M a s o t t i ,  o p . c i t . ,  p . 1 0 2 - 3 .
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In other instances, different residentes pursued 
policies that were glaringly contradictory. Thus, for example, 
where one residente declared all his sub-district gult land, 
the neighbouring officer claimed that the land under his 
jurisdiction was prevalently rest. On other occasions, the 
distinction between gult and rest lands was merely technical, 
which the officers agreed to ignore in the overriding interests 
of colonization. The agricultural office of the GS gave a 
typical example. To the south west of Jimma, 500 ha located 5 
km from the centre of the city was acknowledged as private 
property, and yet the inhabitants were removed and the land 
confiscated; equally land lying at 6 km south of Jimma was 
recognized as domanial and subsequently dispossessed, even 
though the presence of tukuls and thriving coffee plants 
suggested otherwise2*.
These arbitrary land policies had the cumulative 
effect of alienating most of the Ethiopian population, includ­
ing those who were reportedly indifferent or sympathetic to the 
Italian invasion25. In Amara areas opposition was led by the 
middle ranking nobility who took to arms and, with land aliena­
tion as the rallying cry, commanded wide popular support, and 
succeeded in confining the Italian presence to a few garrisoned 
urban centres^. With the exception of Shdwa, armed resistance in
2*. CD I AO GS 1820, p.4.
25. Pankhurst, "Economic V e r d i c t 81. For further informa­
tion see above .p.6*3.
2^. GRA AO/33-5, Graziani to Ministro Africa, AA A-12-1937 
where he reports that the rebels mentioned land alienation as one 
the motives in their plea for the defection of Has HBylu: "Who 
will not be offended and whose heart will not boil with rage when 
seeing that his country is oppressed, his rest and property is 
confiscated". Similar message was sent to the Gojjamese people 
by Shawan patriots: "You know that it [=Italy] had betrayed the 
Ethiopian people for having summoned to the capital [=AA] all the 
notables and elders from all regions it told them: "You will have 
no rest, no property, no cattle, no children. From now onwards 
everything belongs to me" [Cfr. GRA 36/31-12, Zeude Asfaw, Blatta 
Tacle, Mesfin Silesci to Notabili ed Anziani del Gojjam, 22-10-
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settlement areas was sporadic and, as in Arsi, easily crushed. 
But the general condition in the countryside was a state of 
simmering rebellion and mounting discontent, while the cost of 
promoting the misguided policies drained the treasury.
Towards 1939 the government restrained from random­
ly creating domainial lands. Unless political and economic 
realities dictated otherwise, only lands that were indisputably 
gult would be transformed into public domain.
Earlier the government had re-imposed 'dsrat, which 
had been abolished ostensibly as a humanitarian gesture - to 
show the Ethiopians that the Italian government was a benevol­
ent father who, unlike the exiled Ethiopian regime, did not 
intend to burden them with heavy taxes. But in reality, the 
government lacked human and economic resources to collect it. 
Asrat, imposed on the existing Ethiopian principle - on pro­
ducts of the soil - and from which the Italian farmers were 
exempt for a decennium, was paid in kind. This was a clear 
departure from the policy of Emperor Haile Sellassie who, as we 
saw earlier, favoured payment in cash^. Although a systematic 
fiscal system was not yet fully developed, the new taxes were 
neither less burdensome nor less complex than those they super­
seded^ ®. The sudden imposition of traditional taxes on agricul­
ture resulted in a refusal to produce more crops than was 
necessary for personal consumption. This caused serious food 
shortage, particularly of wheat especially in the early 1938^9.
1937].
See Chap. II, p..5£.
In addition to Msrat, there was tax on livestock, house, 
income; taxes on servants, improvements, consumption of 
electricity and even taxes on taxes in order to defray the cost 
of collection.
Bird to Halifax, AA 1-4-1939; Asrat for the year 
totalled only to 30,000 ql [Cfr. GRA 43/34-26, Trevisani, 
op.cit., p.51].
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These policies make the declarations of the Itali­
ans void. Rather than creating an environment conducive to the 
development of Ethiopian agriculture, their handling of gult 
system had the effect of intensifying rural tension.
DEMOGRAPHIC VILLAGES
A number of incentives were offered to integrate 
Ethiopians into the new agricultural system and programmes 
created intended as propaganda and to increase local produc­
tion. Any increase in the productivity of indigenous agricul­
ture would decrease the financial burdens of Italy and bring 
the Empire towards self-sufficiency. The Ethiopian farmers who 
were selected to take part in these programmes were eligible 
for land, subsidies and tax advantages. As a rule, ploughing 
and threshing was done mechanically by the government, who also 
provided seeds^.
There were two main types of settlements: the first 
directed to the accommodation of liberated slaves; the second 
to provide a work-force for settler agriculture. The work-force 
consisted of former cisSfia, who were displaced by the Italian 
colonists, and the former landlords, the AmhSra n8 ft arias of the 
south, released from confinement following the Duke of Aosta's 
policy of "clemency and attraction"^. The exact number of 
villages constructed by the Italians is uncertain, but it was 
not more than a dozen. Ideally, these villages were supposed to 
parallel the settlements for the metropolitan colonists. Each 
Ethiopian settler was given a small plot, a farmhouse, an ox, 
and tools and supplies. A centre equipped with a school, a 
market place, a caf£ and a health centre completed the picture.
Piani, "L*agricoltura indigena" :408; CD IAO Ex AOI 1097, 
GGAOI IA, Relazione sul1’attivitA svolta dall'IA durante il 1939 
in AOI, AA Gennaio 1940; msc.1038, p.13.
31 F0371/22021/J1214/40/1, CG Bird to PSSFA, AA 16-2-1938.
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The farms were expected to grow indigenous grains, with an 
emphasis on wheat33.
The settlement of former slaves was in the territory 
of Soddo residency, in the Lake Camo zone along the road from 
Dal 16 to Soddo, which used to be the heart of the greatest 
slave markets of the region 50 km from Tembaro, Boloso and 
SorM33. The land belonged to a well-known Abyssinian slave 
merchant, Fitawurari Wubsh&t, who was killed for his trade in 
human traffic. The village was known as Villaggio Vittorio 
Bottego, in memory of a ruthless explorer who lost his life at 
Dago-Roba, WallHga, in one of his mi 1itary-cum-scientific 
expeditions organized by the Italian government and La Society 
Geografica Italiana^. By 1938, 70 families had been settled in 
well located and watered 400 ha. There was a plan to expand the 
scheme in case the size proved insufficient to the settlers* 
needs. The experiment was aimed to solve the problem of train­
ing liberated slaves and teaching them to become useful members 
of the community35.
Other Ethiopian settlements were scattered everywhe­
re and largely consisted of AmhSras released from various 
internment centres. HSrSr Governorate had four3^. At its Babi- 
le*s Amh&ra Settlement Centre, 60 families were settled, almost 
all of them deported from Jejega area to supplement SIA*s 
labour shortage. Several hundred released from Danan&l con­
centration camp were resettled with the government providing
32
33
1.
36
set up 
op.cit
Quaranta, op.cit., p.31.
F0371/22021/J2728/40/1, Lord Perth to Viscount Halifax,
Rome, 9-7-1938.
Del Boca, op.cit., I, pp.746-9.
Perth to Halifax, Rm 9-7-1938; Quaranta, op.cit., pp.30-
They were located at Jejega, Sir6, AsMlla and Goba and 
during 1938 and 1939 agricultural campaigns [Cfr. Piani, 
: 408.
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them with lands, animals, £.1,000 to build a hut, and seeds. 
SIMBA resettled 120 destitute Amhara families from Ancobar in one 
of its Arsi farms under the same terms that SIA employeH . In GS 
a number of AmhSras held in Filtu concentration camp were 
settled in domainial lands, giving one-fourth of their crops to 
the government®0. 682 families displaced by EDR were accom­
modated within 10 km distance from the agency's settlement 
area; on average each family was provided with 1.023 ha and 
£.250 as compensation for their lost property and start-up 
capital. Two settlements were at Gudar and MHkanisa at the 
outskirts of AA®°.
By the time of the restoration of independence, the 
programme of demographic villages had not gone beyond the 
drawing board. Yet the Italians claimed that in the case of the 
ex-slaves settlement in Soddo, the results so far achieved were 
encouraging*0. With the exception of the Native Settlement 
Centres at M&kanisa and Gud3r, many of which were planned in each 
governorate, the rest were not centrally planned. They were 
isolated undertakings by the respective governorate to overcome 
local problems. What is more, the true purpose of their es­
tablishment was to serve either simply as a cheap labour depot 
for the nearby colonist settler farms, or as a penal colony for 
political suspects, or both as was the case at M&kanisa Fartt . 
In case of the former slave settlement, it had an additional 
social function. As one technician remarked, it aimed to bring
J'. Sbacchi , op.cit., p.272.
3®. Ibidem, p.271.
®°. IAC, Main Features of Italy's Action in Ethiopia 1936- 
1941. plate LX; Sbacchi, op.cit., p.272.
*°. Quaranta, op.cit., p.31; Perth to Halifax, 9-7-1938.
**. Sbacchi, op.cit., p.272.
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into the productive system those “agriculturally inactive" 
sections of the population*®.
With the exception of the ex-slave settlement of 
Soddo and the Makanisa Farm which provide the best data, infor­
mation on the demographic villages is scanty. Villaggio Vit­
torio Bottego* s settlement was used as a show case. A letter 
published from Jimma emphasized that the village was proof that 
Italy's commitment to the abolition of slavery was not mere 
"humanitarian rhetoric"*®. The correspondent admitted that the 
Italian
civilization, based as it is upon a solid 
historical and social tradition, has no need 
of being wrapped in sentimentalism in order to 
be generous towards the vanquished and the 
weak. Populations which had never before 
understood that work is a human law from which 
no one is exempt, are now beginning to realize 
the civil necessity of individual work. The 
success of the first Village of Liberty proves 
it in a very clear manner**.
The Italians insisted that the initiative had more 
than publicity value. It was one of the many strategies employ­
ed by the government to ease the problems created as a result 
of the proclamation ordering the abolition of slavery, issued 
simultaneously with the first advance of Italian troops*®. Among 
the hundreds of thousands of slaves liberated as a result, many 
were left with no means of subsistence and, in the eyes of the 
Italians, the initiative of GS governorate was being followed 
elsewhere.
But the slaves showed little enthusiasm, which tech­
nicians attributed as owing to indolence born of age-long
*®. Gennaro Pistolese, "Le attivitfc agricole del 1 * AOI" . El. 
(Febbraio 1939).
*®. GI_, 3-7-1938; Perth to Halifax, Rm 9-7-1938.
**. Perth to Halifax, Rm 9-7-1938.
*®. Ibid. .
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servitude. The district officers combined physical punishments 
and persuasion in their attempt to overcome this and foster a 
sense of independence*0.
The MMkanisa Farm consisted of about 32 plots, where 
an equal number of families were accommodated. The farm had a 
demonstrative and trial camp. The Ethiopian settlers were 
almost exclusively the cisMfia families that were forcibly 
dislodged to make room for the Italian settlers of the nearby 
pilot demographic colonization farm consisting of Milizia della 
Prima Centuria Agricola^.
These experiments were in their infancy. However, 
contrary to the authorities’ claim, the results were not always 
encouraging. In places like Sir6 (HSrMr), for example, the 
programme was a disastrous failure*0.
AGRICULTURAL CAMPAIGNS
Among the institutions that closely affected the in­
digenous agricultural system were the agricultural offices es­
tablished 1937-38. Each agricultural office had a department 
dedicated to native agriculture, with the task of studying 
indigenous farming and the application of measures whose 
purpose would be the increase of Ethiopian agricultural output. 
Some of these were equipped with research stations dealing with 
plant physiology and pathology and had their own model farms, 
where indigenous and foreign varieties of crops, such as 
Mentana and Kenya B1, were grown. Samples of local crops were 
sent for testing in the laboratories of the RIA-AI in Flo-
*®. Ibid; Quaranta, op.cit., p.31.
*7. Known also as Prima Centuria Agricola di Pre-coloniz- 
zazione [Cfr. Chap. IV, p./^ /,n.^ J; CD IAO Ex AOI 1097.
*°. Piani, op.cit. :408.
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rence”.
The offices used various techniques whose stated, 
purpose was the expansion of Ethiopian production. Open air 
schools in agriculture and visits to orientation farms were 
organized^. Where there was a public press, articles of par­
ticular interest to peasants were published^. In the long term, 
the campaigns aimed at raising agricultural output and lifting 
the standard of life of the rural peasantry. In the short term, 
the chief concern was to produce food-crops needed for the 
continuously growing Italian population. Key difficulties were 
in the field of experimental research and organization of 
production.
Research demanded prior collection of data on the 
existing crops of the area, their relevance to the economy of 
the Empire, their ability to adapt to various seasonal condi­
tions and resistance to parasite attack; in addition appropria­
te soil and altitude, and exact time for sowing had to be 
established. Once the type of crop to be promoted was iden­
tified, the technicians decided on the category of farmers to 
be targeted. As a matter of principle, the choice of crop for 
the Ethiopians had to preclude any potential or actual risk of 
competition, or interference, with metropolitan production. The 
way in which the decision to promote wheat production was
,v. Quaranta, op.cit., p.29.
Giovanni Piani, "AttivitA Autarchiche nel Hararino", 
L’Autarchia Alimentare. (giugno 1938); IQM. 5-4-1939; II Piccolo. 
19-4-1940.
Glancing at articles published in the local weekly Ya- 
q€sar Mangest Malektana and the periodical YA—Roma Berhan one finds 
articles such as:"Ferti1ize the fields"; "Noxious insects to 
agriculture";" The locusts"; "From the moment of harvest think 
of sowing wheat"; "How you should improve the food of your 
cattle"; "Report in time the appearance of locusts"; "Plant 
trees"; "Increase the cultivable area of your land"; "Prize 
competition for winning native farmers"; "The family gardens"; 
"Roads, Commercial Development and Agricultural Machinery "[Cfr.
CD IAO Sc 1801; Ex AOI 1097].
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reached in the governorate of the GS illustrates this point. 
Wheat formed a respectable, though minor, part of the local 
diet. As in the rest of Ethiopia, its cultivation started from 
an altitude as low as 1,700 m above sea level and went up to 
3,000 m; it was most productive between 2,200-2,400 m. The 
Italian settlers in GS were numerically few and most of them 
were settled under 2,000 m, an altitude below the ideal condi­
tions for wheat production. Under such circumstances an appeal 
to indigenous agriculture was the most appropriate option^. 
Most of the Ethiopians of the area were skilled farmers. What 
was more, the climatic and soil condition of the territory 
allowed the Italian settlers to dedicate themselves more 
profitably to other crops, such as coffee,tobacco, oil-seeds,
vegetables and fruits, that cculd offer a much higher profit
• 53 margmJJ.
However, despite careful planning the risk from 
Ethiopian competition was not always avoidable. This was the 
case when Jimma market became saturated in 1938 with what the 
technicians called "useless potatoes produced and sold for a 
ridiculous price" by Ethiopians. Although a minor episode, for 
15 days it shook the confidence of the colonists, unable to 
sell their own produce. Commenting on the case, one agricul­
tural officer remarked, it was a frivolous event but "suf­
ficient as a symptom of a situation which will not fail to 
manifest itself in a more decisive manner in the future"^.
Arrigo Chiuderi, "Alcune considerazioni su una campagna 
granaria nel GS", I Georgofili. VII, 7 (1941):117; for the rest 
of the territories this same rule applies Cfr. Raffaele Ciferri, 
"Frumenti e granicoltura indigena in Etiopia", VI, 5 (1939):233- 
242; Guglielmo Mazzoni, "Prima impostazione del problema dei 
frumenti nelle terre alte dell*AOI", VII, 7 (1941):99-105; CD IAO 
RGGS UA, AttivitA, op.cit., pp.6-7.
Chiuderi, op.cit.:119.
M. CD IAO GS 1820, p.13.
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FIGURE IX. PLANNED AGRICULTURAL TOOLS.
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Organizationally, agricultural campaigns were the 
result of the co-ordinated efforts of political pressure and 
technical assistance on the one hand, and the co-operation of 
the Ethiopians and their chiefs, on the other. The success 
partly depended on the harmonious working of all these groups. 
The political authorities in their respective governorate 
issucu awards and guaranteed the purchase of the crop at 
harvest. All chiefs and local farmers were summoned to par­
ticipate. With the aid of the technicians from the agricultural 
office, the residente or the commissario gathered the chiefs 
and the farmers under his jurisdiction; he explained the 
government’s plan to increase production and communicated the 
facilities provided by the government to the farmers for this 
purpose.
The facilities varied according to the circumstances 
and the needs of the farmers, but, as a rule, destitute peas­
ants were furnished with seeds from the government granary with 
the obligation to refund it at harvest; most of these consisted 
of 'Asrat collected earlier from the peasantrj? ; for those appli 
cants with lands inadequate to their working capacity, domaini- 
al lands were made available on a temporary basis; agricultural 
tools, such as improved harrows and ploughs, were distributed 
freely. Areas showing the best results were provided with 
threshing machines, an item much appreciated by the Ethiopians. 
The technicians of the agricultural office provided assistance 
throughout sowing, cultivation and harvest^. The peasants could 
choose the plot to be reserved for the crop and in this they 
demonstrated, as a rule, considerable ability and skill. 
Financial incentives and medals were distributed by the tech-
M. Ibidem; Chiuderi, op.cit.:118; G.B. Lusignani [Capo 
dell’UAAm], "Iniziative cerealicole dell’UAAm", L * Autarchia 
A1imentare. (giugno 1938), p.37; Le Colonie. 28-6-1938; "Inizi­
ative agricole nel territorio di Borana e Hararino" , El., (luglio 
1938); CE, 25-8-1939.
56. C E ,  2 8 - 6 - 1 9 3 8 ;  I I  P i c c o l o . 1 - 7 - 1 9 3 8 ;  [ 1 3 - 1 4 ] - 8 - 1 9 3 8 .
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nicians as prizes for the most successful farmers and chiefs. 
In Amara area, such awards were reserved for wheat production, 
in Shciwa for wheat and kitchen garden and, in HarSr, for coffee. 
The amount of prizes was betwreen £.400-1,000 and was given to a 
single farmer or village^.
The local chiefs had the task of distribution of 
seeds and surveillance of the farmers’ plots during sowing and 
harvest; any abuses on the part of the peasantry was reported 
by them to the authorities. As a reward, the chiefs were given 
the right to collect a certain percentage, normally between 2- 
3%, of the produce from farmers under their jurisdiction, 
assessed in cash. In Amara, clhiefs of successful districts were 
paid substantial cash, between £.500-1,000 per persoH .
Participation of peasants in the campaigns took 
place through a written agreement by the chief or the farmer 
which stipulated the quantity that each subscriber agreed to 
sow or have sown. Those failing to sow the seeds taken from the 
government or the quantity specified in the written declaration 
were fine d«.
In some areas agricultural campaigns started as 
early as mid-1937, their origin closely linked with Mussolini’s
5'. CD IAO EX AOI Gn; 1600; "Concorsi a premio per la 
coltivazione del grano e delle patate agli agricoltori indigeni", 
Decreto Reggente il Governo [DRegG], 21-6-1937, BUGA, II/3-4, 
maggio-giugno 1937; "Concoirsi a premio da assegnarsi agli 
agricoltori indigeni che avranno ottenuto nel prossimo raccolto 
una maggiore produzione unitaria di grano ed altri cereali", no.
46, BUGA. 111/15, 1-10-1938; "Concorsi a premio tra i coltivatori
indigeni residenti nei territori del Governatorato di AA, nei
Commandi Settori di Ambo’, Debra Brehan e del Commissariato di
Governo di Adama", DGG. 25-5-1938, no. 651, GU, 111/15, 1-8-1938;
CD IAO Hr 1813, GHrDCLIA, Provvedimenti a favore degli indigeni,
op.cit.; L ’Azione Coloniale. 21-6-1938; 1-9-1938; Le Colonie. 11-
11-1938; 31-4-1939; TOM, 20-9-1938; La Stampa. 11-8-1938; Bird
to Halifax, AA 1-4-1939; F0371/23380/J4710/296/1, ACG Gibbs to
PSSFA, AA 1-11-1939.
58. DRegG 21-6-1937; DGtG. 25-5-1938, GU, 111/15, 1-8-1938.
Chiuderi, op.cit. :18.
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demand that the Empire should reach economic autarky by mid- 
1938. With some exceptions, the technicians’ reports suggest 
that participation was relatively widespread; yet the outcome 
of the campaigns did not always match the expectation of the 
planners.
Friction between interventionist political authorit­
ies, particularly the Fascist Party members, and self-opiniona­
ted technical officers was a constant problem. During the early 
campaigns, the agricultural office, consulted only indirectly, 
gave lukewarm support. Ac other times the campaign suffered 
from inadequate preparation by technicians, as was the case 
with the 1939 campaign in GS: seeds were insufficient; proper 
storage was lacking and sacks scarce. At other times the tech­
nicians failed to carry out properly their auxiliary support, 
such as setting up orientation farms, supply of simple farm 
machinery and selected seeds. In areas like the Amara gover­
norate where Italian hegemony was not fully asserted, the 
campaign was arrested by lack of co-operation by, or straight 
hostility from, the chiefs, and the distribution of seeds and 
technical assistance remained impossible88. Propaganda was also 
drastically curtailed by fuel restriction that came into force 
as an austerity measure in September 193981.
For the technicians, each campaign provided them 
with experience that allowed them to improve their subsequent 
action on the basis of lessons learnt. But their efforts were 
hampered by shortage of funds, the vast areas they had to 
cover, and language barriers which made conversing with the 
peasantry - who were by nature unresponsive to change - dif­
ficult. It was little wcnder even those devoted men did not 
have much effect on existing agricultural practices. Their 
reports dwell also at length on the many technical mistakes 
that undermined the confidence of the Ethiopian farmers in
12. CE, 28-8-1938; Lusignani, op.cit..
61. CD IAO Ex AOI 1097.
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them. They pointed to the introduction of new varieties of 
seeds which, distributed after hasty trials, showed poor 
resistance to parasites; this was the case with mentanaf
cappelli and other Italian varieties that were widely used, 
particularly in ShSwa and H&rSr. In 1939 - year of violent rains -
they were completely destroyed by smut82.
Perhaps even more demoralizing was the technicians’ 
continuous battle against bad weather, draught, marauding
insects, and locusts. In 1939, the locusts destroyed many 
thriving fields in Wallaga, and north west areas of the GS 
territory; there were environmental limitations, the overcoming 
of which demanded extended time and long acquaintance with the 
area. They pointed out insufficient atmospheric precipitations 
that arrested the full development and maturation of the winter 
crops and prevented spring sowing82.
’COMMERCIALIZING PEASANT AGRICULTURE*: THE CASE OF COTTON
Attempts to develop an integrated Roman world 
economy led to the policy of dividing the Empire into sectors, 
to be granted to Italian concessionaires who would have the 
right to buy and market certain items of Ethiopian produce. The 
scheme was planned to cover every aspect of the Empire’s 
agricultural life. Owing to the abrupt and sudden end of the 
occupation, none of the schemes were translated into action 
except that for cotton production.
Given the significance of cotton to the Italian 
metropolitan industry, great attention was given to the pos-
w. "Problemi fitopatologici del 1 *impero:Osservazioni ed
orientamenti", I Georgofi1i. VI, 5 (1939):554; Ettore Castellani, 
"Ruggini e granicoltura nei1’Africa tropicale montana", ibid., 
VII, 8 (1942):127.
83. Chiuderi, op.cit. : 118; CE, 3-2-1939; Cl, 24-8-1938;
CM. 17-12-1938; "I cereali della zona di Macalld", IJ_, (dicembre 
1938); Le Colonie. 23-12-1938; Lusignani, op.cit..
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sibility of growing cotton. Even though cotton was grown in 
Southern Italy, Eritrea and Somalia, the needs of Italian 
industry were not met8*. The policy of self-sufficiency follow­
ing international trade sanctions led to a rapid increase in 
domestic production matched with a small rise in the colonies, 
as appears from Table XXIV. The cotton produced in Italy and 
the colonies amounted to just of the total needs of the
domestic industry. With the sharp decrease in supply (Table 
XXIII), the sanctions exposed the vulnerability of dependence 
on foreign imports. It was estimated that Italy needed to 
cultivate a minimum of 900,000 ha producing an average of 525 
kg of raw cotton per ha82.
It is against such increasing domestic economic 
pressure that expansion of cotton production in the Empire has 
to be assessed. Increased dependence on export and the crisis 
that followed the sanction, led to the Royal Decree of 7 
January 1937, which saw the creation of a government concern 
ECAI, an affiliate of the ICI88, itself an association of all 
the Italian cotton industrialists for co-ordination of cotton 
production. The agency had a capital of £.25,000,000; of this
8*. Bird to Halifax, AA 1-4-1939. What had been done in 
Eritrea was very little, while in Somaliland there were flourish­
ing cotton plantations in the restricted regions watered by the 
Juba river along the banks of the Wabi ShibMld, where two crops
were taken annually, planting taking place in April-June and 
again in September-October. There was a government owned ginnery
at Vittorio d'Africa, a few miles inland from Merca.
82. Guido Mangano, "La politica del cotone", I Georgofili. 
VI, 5 (1939):270; "La cotonicultura in Etiopia", AC, XXXI, 5
(maggio 1937):202.
88. The task of the Institute with regard to cotton was:-
1. Information gathering.
2. Market regulation.
3. Manufacturing regulation.
4. Co-ordination of raw cotton supply.
5. Enforcement of liquidation of bankrupt firms, 
establishing new ones, and arbitration of labour dispute [See 
Quaranta, op.cit., p.59].
- 2 9 4 -
CHAPTER VII IMPROVING ETHIOPIAN PEASANT AGRICULTURE ?
half was contributed by the State and half by the ICI. The 
agency’s publicly stated goal was " to develop, regulate and 
expand cotton farming in Italian Africa", including Libya87. As 
expanded later such a task involved:-
a) To research the cotton resources of the Empire and 
lay out schemes of development.
b) To regulate all cotton production in the 
Empire, administer and co-ordinate sales.
c) To advise the concessionaires.
d) Promote the production, plant protection, provision 
of insecticides and disease control88.
Once approved by MAI, the decisions of the agency had statutory 
power and were binding upon all those engaged in activities 
related to the agency’s field of action. The agency was run by 
a Board of Directors, consisting of a President and ten other 
members appointed by the joint decree of MAI and the Ministry 
of Finance.
An overview of the composition of the Board reflects 
the presence of interlocking interests of which the agency was 
an expression. Two of the members were nominated by MAI, three 
by the ICI; the rest were representatives from the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, Ministry of Corporations, GG of both 
IEA and Libya and Textile Products Corporations; each of these 
appointed one member. The Board was headed by Angelo de Rubeis, 
the Director General of Colonization and Labour of MAI; Guido 
Mangano, a specialist in cotonicu1ture, acted as its General 
Manager. Despite such an impressive composition, as a decision 
making body the Board excluded among others the indigenous 
representatives whose presence was vital to the successful 
cultivation of cotton. This was the weakest point of the scheme.
87. Guido Mangano, "Programma di massima di attivita’ 
dell’ECAI", AC, (Settembre 1938):414.
88. Ibidem.
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The agency operated under the joint supervision of 
the MAI and the Ministry of Finance and had Rome as its head­
quarters, making the agency an organizationally amorphous body 
with no independent existence of its own. Inside the colonies 
its presence was limited to a few experimental stations at 
Alamata, Adama and Abala. The results achieved in these three 
stations were insignificant. Only in the Abala they were 
fruitful88. For important decisions the agency largely depended 
on the reports of ad hoc commissions carried out during their 
short but expensive trips to the colonies. The commissions 
charged exorbitant consultancy fees and, as a result, were 
disliked by the colonial administration78.
TABLE XXIII:- ITALY’S COTTON IMPORT, 1929-1938.
YEAR USA INDIA EGYPT OTHERS TOTAL
1929 1.662.369 480.539 239.763 62.110 2.444.831
1930 1.328.439 478.845 185.437 54.675 2.047.396
1931 1.047.009 365.024 215.717 76.907 1.704.657
1932 1.465.651 146.068 230.652 50.630 1.902.001
1933 1.649.526 263.132 255.367 29.739 2.197.764
1934 1.153.101 320.276 335.446 64.192 1.874.015
1935 868.975 264.351 290.974 62.835 1.487.335
1936 735.123 68.372 138.226 71.869 1.014.040
1937 982.847 177.079 299.207 205.102 1.664.235
1938 951.509 136.196 263.520 210.497 1.570.722
Source: Guido Mangano, "La politica del cotone", X 
Georgofi1i. VI, 5 (1939):268.
88. Villa and al. , op.cit., p.249; CD IAO AOI 1830, Pesarini 
Alfredo to Maugini, Relazione distretti Gobbo-Uoldia, e Leqemti, 
n.d. , p.3; 1826, Achille Pajella, Brevi notizie ed osservazioni 
sul Distretto Cotoniero del Lago Margerita, Rm 1-3-1943, p.10.
78. GRA 46/41-19, Cusmano and Corvo to Amedeo d ’Aosta, AA
4-6-1938.
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TABLE XXIV:- COTTON PRODUCTION IN THE METROPOLIS AND COLONIES.
YEAR ITALY COLONIES TOTAL
1932 2.600 11.000 13.600
1933 9.500 9.000 18.500
1934 8.000 10.000 18.000
1935 18.600 10.400 29.000
1936 38.600 6.000 44.600
1937 42.000 6.000 48.000
1938 82.000 6.400 98.400
Source: Guido Mangano, op.cit:270.
After preliminary studies, the government was raced 
with two options: that of setting up large scale irrigated
farming along the lines used at Gezira, in Sudan, TdsdnSy in 
Eritrea and Lower Juba, in Somalia; or rely on mobilizing 
existing indigenous farming through propaganda and assistance, 
as was the case in some African colonies, such as Uganda and 
Congo and, to a small degree, Eritrea and Somalia. From the 
government’s point of view, the first method was unremunerative; 
it required extensive work involving building dams and canaliza­
tion, and clearing and levelling of lands. The government 
therefore favoured the second alternative as the best paying 
method71.
Once the technicalities on method of exploitation 
were over, affairs began to operate on two major problems. How 
to organize the production geographical ly, whom to give its
management? The first issue was settled with the creation of 
Cotton Districts in 1938. As set out in the RD of January 1938, 
these were areas mapped out as specially favourable for cotton 
growing and within which the administration, through the ECAI,
71. CD IAO 1106, IAO, Rapporto schematico sulle attivitA 
cotonicole svolte dall’Italia in Etiopia, Firenze 11-8-1949, 
pp.1-2; Paolo Vicinelli, "L’Istituto del "Distretto Cotoniero" 
nell'AOI", AC, (novembre 1938):34; MAE, L ’avvaloramento, p.392.
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aimed
to increase, in preference to other crops, 
cotton production, using the free co-oper­
ation of the native populations, unders­
tanding that the production of food-crops 
and animal breeding, indispensable to the 
life of these same populations, is respec­
ted72.
The authority of creating such Cotton Districts 
rested with the MAI who also had the task of granting conces­
sions. It also defined the boundaries, approved the contracts 
and granted special privileges to the concessionaires. The 
colonial administration, on the other hand, issued rules con­
cerning cotton farming and measures regulating import of seeds 
and protecting them from insects and other diseases, while the 
daily control in situ rested with the agricultural offices and 
the local administration73. Within four months, three Cotton 
Districts were created - Qobbo, Awash Valley and Matamma Donghur. 
In December of the same year those of Soddo, and NdqSmti were 
added. By 1940, a total of nine Cotton Districts haoL been 
map-p^ J, out as suitable for cotton farming, including those 
already existing in the two old colonies, TciscLnSy in Eritrea, 
and Juba in Somalia7*.
72. RD 7-1-1938, no.443: Istituzione di distretti cotonieri 
nei1 *AOI, GURI. 10-5-1938; see the same in GU 111/13, 1-7-1938.
73. Ibidem.
7*. The Cotton Districts were scattered throughout the 
Empire. They were located in the following areas (See the 
attached Map under Figure X):
1. Qobbo Cotton District, centred on Alamata, a town 
situated 370 miles north of AA, on the main highway to Asmara 
in Eritrea, with an area of about 9,000 sqkm (Cfr. DM 16-5-1938: 
Istituzione del Distretto Cotoniero di (IDC) Cobb6. GU. 111/17, 
1-9-1938).
2. Awash Valley Cotton District, along the Awash river, 
centred on the town of Adama, situated some 65 miles south-east 
of AA on the Djibouti railway at 5,600 feet above sea level, 
with an area of 10,000 sqkm (Cfr. DM 16-5-1938: IDC Auash, 
Ibidem).
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As to the second problem, the government was to take 
the commercial farms in partnership, planning to give the 
organization and management of each Cotton District to private 
companies. But the government was torn between the needs of 
safeguarding its authority over the conduct of the enterprise 
and that of guaranteeing the profitability of the scheme. kjlth CL 
bad bargain the commercial farms might acquire too much power 
and end up being an imperium in imperio. Equally, too much
3. Matamma Dongur Cotton District, located at about 2,500 
feet above sea level, along the Sudan frontier to the west of 
Gondar, centred on Matamma, with an area 14,000 sqkm (Cfr. DM 
16-5-1938: IDC Metemma-Dongur, Ibidem).
4. Lake Tana Cotton District, in various localities around 
Lake Tana, centred on Gorgora, 42 miles away from Gondar, with 
an area of 14,000 sqkm.
5. [L]Naqamti Cotton District, along the Sudan Frontier in 
the Wallaga province, centred on Sayo, with an area of 17,000 sqkm 
(Cfr. DM 1-12-1938: IDC Lechenti la cui organi zzazione e la 
gestione vengono affidate alia ICAI, GU, IV/12, 16-6-1939.).
6. Soddo Cotton District, situated at 6,900 feet above sea 
level at 190 miles from AA centred on Lake Camo, 40 miles away 
from Soddo at 4,200 feet, with an area of 32,000 sqkm (Cfr. DM 
1-12-1938: IDC Soddu la cui organizzazione e la gestione vengono 
affidate alia ICAI, Ibidem).
7. Baro Cotton District, along the Baro river, centred on 
Gambdla, with an area 40,000 sqkm and was run by Compagnia 
Cotoniera del Baro, a subsidiary concern of the Cotetio.
Bako-Burgi Cotton District, at the south-west of Soddo, 
never became operational [CD IAO 1106, p.3]. The cotton produc­
tion in the old colonies, Eritrea and Somalia, were restructured 
along the lines of the new policy. TasanHy State Farm became 
TSsSnHy Cotton District and was given to S.I.A.; while in Somalia 
there was Lower Juba Cotton District run by S.A. I.C.E.S.. Cfr.
DM 1-12-1938: IDC Basso Giuba, GU, IV/4, 16-2-1939; GURI. no.105, 
10-5-1938; BULMAI. no.6, giugno 1938; Bird to Halifax, AA 1-4- 
1939; "Notiziario agricolo commerciale AOI", AC, (marzo
1938):235; Paolo Vicinelli, op.cit.:41-3; Villa and al. , op.cit., 
pp.246-7; Quaranta, op.cit., pp.62-3; MAE, op.cit., I, pp.393- 
7; G. Edward Nicholson, " A general survey of cotton production 
in Ethiopia and Eritrea", The Empire Cotton Growing Review. 
XXXII, 1 (1955):5,10-4.
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stringency on the part of the government was bound to generate 
little interest in the scheme. It was an understandable fear of 
reconciling wider national objectives with limited commercial 
interests. The government saw as the most important factors in 
this regard the period and the size of the concession as well 
as the financial incentives. The result was that a compromise 
was struck. The concessions would operate for a limited period. 
Thus each Cotton District was granted for only 25 years, with 
an option for a further 25 years extension. The government had 
the right to terminate the concession earlier if it considered 
the management unsatisfactory for political or economic reas­
ons. In case of early termination, the companies would retain 
the ownership of their industrial plants and the accessories as 
well as the land they stood on, together with the eventual 
cotton stock and other mobile property. But clauses empowering 
the government to purchase them at a price assessed by a three 
body commission composed of representatives of the Governor 
General, the ECAI and the company concerned, show the govern­
ment’s anxiety to safeguard its own position73.
As regards the size of the concessions, the govern­
ment made sure that the Cotton Districts were extensive enough 
to make the scheme an attractive enterprise. Districts were 
scattered all over the Empire, on average stretching over half 
a million hectares of land78. Theoretically, the granting of a 
concession to a company did not entail any ownership of land, 
except for that allotted for its processing plants and ex­
perimental fields, and the building of administrative and 
residential centres. The government upheld its right to carry
out public and reclamation works, as well as granting of lands
to third parties77. Equally, the existing rights of the Ethio-
75. "RD 7-1-1938, no. 443".
78. CD IAO 1106, p.3.
77. These rights are clearly stated in a clause in article
7 of the contracts.
!
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pian cultivators and the methods of land transaction were not 
to be affected. And yet the companies successfully asserted 
their claims to state lands within their districts to which 
they had preferential rights. Included among these were lands 
where Ethiopian rights were "partial". Otherwise, what the 
company really had within each Cotton District was an exclusive 
right of exploitation consisting in commercial monopoly over 
trade of cotton produced by the Ethiopians to the exclusion of 
other competitors. Except in a few cases, even the settlers’ 
farms, willing to cultivate cotton within such districts, were 
no exception to this rule7®; these cultivated cotton only after 
having obtained clearance from the company beforehand, and 
strictly abiUftJby the rules prevailing inside each district7®.
In its bid to attract private capital the government 
pursued an open door policy. Any company with proven financial 
and managerial ability and technical knowledge was welcomed. 
Undertakings were made to create conditions that would ensure 
the long-term profitability of cotton production8®. As an 
additional incentive, the government offered extensive economic 
inducements without being too stringent on what the companies
'B. As it appears from the article 7 of the contracts, a
special arrangement was to be made for the agricultural farms 
whose work within a particular Cotton District predates that of 
the concessionaire company.
7®. Vicinelli, op.cit. :37.
80. Angelo de Rubeis summed up the measures to be adopted
to this effect inside the Cotton Districts. Accordingly, the
government would:
1. involve largest possible number of cotton outgrowers.
2. enforce measures necessary to promote cotton production.
3. establish a fair purchasing price.
A. create conditions and infrastructure that would make cotton 
production more attractive.
5. ensure that the administrative personnel, residente and
commissario, are knowledgeable in economic and political matters
[Cfr. CD IAO AOI 1936, Angelo de Rubeis, "Promemoria per S.E. il
Sottosegretario : Produzione cotoniera a mezzo degli indigeni", 
Rm 12-5-1938].
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should do81 and a ten year clemency period during which the com­
panies as well as their subsidiaries were exempt from all taxes 
except for a token payment of registration and commission 
fees87.
Despite such favourable terms, the metropolitan 
capital remained unimpressed. Only two companies showed inter­
est: ICAI and Cotetio. Both of them were of recent foundation, 
thus with limited operational experience. Cotetio was formed in 
July 1936 by the Italian industrialists through ICI and had a 
capital of £.14,000,000 which, by 1940, was raised to
51. The bounties granted by the administration consisted 
mainly in:
a) promoting cotton production among the Ethiopians through 
the state machine; purchasing raw cotton, regulating the local 
markets and ensuring stable labour.
b) remittance of inputs up to their destination.
c) granting gratuitously lands required for administration, 
plants and residence.
d) facilitating foreign exchange for the purchase of inputs 
(such as seeds, machinery) from overseas.
e) providing and maintaining feed roads.
f) granting fiscal exemptions as contemplated by the law.
g) concession of favourable freight tariffs on railway, 
motorway and waterway transport.
h) grant of all facilities that in future would aim to benefit 
new concessionaires of cotton districts.
87. The main fiscal concessions were:
a) exemption from direct income tax on industrial revenues.
b) exemption from taxes on lands and buildings.
c) reduction of commission fees to quarter of the normal 
rate.
d) exemption from customs duties on seed imported seeds, 
agricultural machinery and vehicles as well as their spare parts.
e) exemption from stamp duty and exchange, administrative 
fees connected with the concession including contracts related 
to building constructions, supplies and insurance and all acts 
proving the fusion and increase of capital. Cfr." RD 7-1-1938, 
N. 443: Istituzione di distretti cotonieri nell'AOI", GU, 111/13, 
1-7-1938; "DIM 18-5-1938: Distretti cotonieri, agevolazioni in 
materia fiscale e doganale", ibidem., 111/18, 16-9-1938; "DIM 1-
12-1939: esenzioni e riduzioni fiscali a favore dell'ICAI", 
ibidem., IV/13, 1-7-1939; "DM 31-5-1940: Concessione al la Cotetio 
di alcune esenzioni e riduzioni fiscali e doganali sui tributi 
coloniali", ibidem., V/35, 31-8-1940.
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^.50,000,000. ICAI was formed in 1938 by Milanese industrial­
ists. Its capital was £.1,000,000. Both companies operated from 
Milanese headquarters. NaqSmti and Soddo Cotton Districts were 
granted to ICAI83, while Cotetio retained a monopoly over the 
rest®*. How much of their capital these two companies trans­
ferred to their respective concessions is unknown. But what 
records make clear is that they functioned on a shoestring 
budget and their technical know-how proved inadequate. Owing to 
such financial limitations, ICAI was forced to give up its 
N&q&mti concession to Cotetio, who thus exercised anear monopoly 
of cotton production8®.
The obligations laid upon the concessionaires were 
minimal and vague88. One clear example is clause (d) of article 
2 which demanded the companies to obtain "as much production as 
is possible to procure within the first two years through 
intense propaganda”. Even the description of the Cotton Di­
stricts defined as areas destined for cotton production "in 
preference to other crops, ... provided that the production of 
staple food-crops and animal husbandry” required to the life of 
the Ethiopian population is maintained, lent itself to differ­
ing interpretations. The decree did not specify how such 
requirements were to be assessed; equally, it said nothing 
about the nature of these same requirements: was it exclusively 
for consumption or extended also for sale?
Ambiguities such as these were the source of oc­
casional conflicts. A typical example was the campaigns con-
83. DM 1-12-1938: IDC Soddu; DM 1-12-1938: IDC Lechenti.
8*. DM 16-5-1938: IDC Cobb6; DM 16-5-1938: IDC Auash; DM 16-
5-1938: IDC Metemma-Dongur.
8®. DM 31-5-1940: Revoca della concessione del distretto 
cotoniero di Leqemti alia ICAI e passaggio dello stesso alia 
Cotetio, GUGS. V/35 (Supl.), 31-8-1940.
88. The obligations were standard as were the inducements. 
In addition to their respective Charters, see also CD IAO 1106,
p. 2.
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ducted by Cotetio in 1938 which led to a showdown between the 
company and the authorities in AA. On balance the relationship 
between the companies and the district political officers, 
though not always idyllic, was good, sustained by racial 
sentiments and a deep sense of "civilizing mission". But the 
situation with the higher authorities, particularly the regime 
in AA, was quite different. Perhaps resentful of being excluded 
from negotiations in the metropolitan capital between the MAI 
and the companies, from the outset AA displayed a fleeting 
interest in the Cotton Districts, further exacerbated by an 
ill-defined relationship between the companies and the colonial 
administration within the IEA.
The 1938 campaign revealed that the companies* 
commercial interests did not necessarily tally with national 
objectives. The companies* main aim was to secure within a 
short time part of its operating revenue and recuperate invest­
ment on processing plants. By broadly interpreting the am­
biguous clauses, Cotetio not only had forced many peasants to 
cultivate cotton at the expense of staple food production but 
also ventured into areas where the possibilities of cotton 
farming were reportedly poor. The government feared that 
ventures into unpromising lands would undermine Ethiopian 
farmers* confidence in the scheme. It also viewed overemphasis 
4 on cotton as compromising its efforts towards ensuring self- 
sufficiency in the production of food-stuffs. The Duke of Aosta 
protested against the company’s conduct, but was rebuffed as 
unwarrantly interfering into the company’s internal affairs. 
The dispute was settled only after an appeal to the MAI who 
empowered the colonial administration to set the target of 
food-crop production in each Cotton District®7.
Ostensibly, the Cotton Districts were not under the 
direct management of the concessionaire company. Such a role
8'. Villa and al., op.cit., p.247; Cerulli (1943):67; 
Article 2(c) of IDC of Soddo and LaqHmti.
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belonged to the Ethiopian farmers. The company was to provide 
them with extension services, advance cash and food—stuffs. 
These were deducted from the cotton price at sale when paying 
the growers. The farmers were expected to continue to live as 
they had in the past, the only difference being that in addi­
tion to growing the usual cereals and cattle herding, they were 
now "encouraged" to undertake cotton farming as well and sell 
the crop to the company at a mutually agreed price. Such an 
undertaking relied much on the willingness and capacity of the 
indigenous population to participate in the scheme®®.
The Italian authorities did not doubt that such co­
operation would materialize. Given the many obvious advantages 
that the scheme offered, they expected the Ethiopian would 
welcome it. The enterprise was not something super-imposed from 
outside, because the social system to which the Ethiopian 
farmer was accustomed remained undisturbed. He cultivated 
cotton on his own property using family labour. What was more, 
cotton cultivation was an ancient practice and had considerable 
importance in the country’s social and economic life. Accounts 
on the eve of Italian occupation reveal that cotton was the 
most popular of commodities on sale in AA market®^. Of course, 
most of this cotton was reportedly poor quality, consisting of 
either spontaneously grown wild plants, or plants cultivated, 
rather carelessly, by families in a little patch within their 
compound walls or intercropped. Nevertheless, being exclusively 
rain grown, it had the advantage in that it required no capital 
outlay or technical innovation. It was on this cotton that an 
old and widespread family-based local cotton craft industry 
thrived. Such acquaintanceship with the crop was invaluable, 
and the Italian administration understandably thought the
®®. Villa and al. , op.cit., p.247; Quaranta, op.cit., p.60; 
CD IAO 1106, p.2.
®*. Ladislao Farago, Abvssinia on the eve. (London: Wymann 
& Sons, 1935), p.44; Raffaele di Lauro, "Panorama politico- 
economico dei GS", REAI. 26, 7 (luglio 1937):1084.
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promotion of cotton for export was building upon a locally 
produced commodity. More importantly, the guaranteed price, 
combined with intense propaganda, was thought to convince the 
Ethiopian farmer that by growing cotton he was making a good 
financial investment with opportunities to raise his standard 
of living9**.
But contrary to the authorities* optimistic fore­
casts, the picture that emerges from the few existing authori­
tative reports was that of strong Ethiopian resistance, rudely 
shattering Italian expectations. Resistance was by no means co­
ordinated and uniform, but widespread and consistent enough to 
be the most crippling constraint on both the expansion of 
cotton and the enthusiasm of the concessionaire companies9*.
Administratively, each Cotton District was divided 
by the Companies into blocks of various sizes, known as zona. 
In each zona two forms of cotton cultivation were followed. 
Private fields consisting of a number of small plots set aside 
by each tax-payer and cultivated exclusively by family labour. 
In most cases this land belonged to the cultivator and in a few 
cases it involved state land given to landless peasants. The 
fields were scattered and their supervision was administra­
tively exacting. Collective fields consisted of either state 
lands granted to the company’s use or suitable plot chosen by 
the peasants themselves. Most of these fields were strategical­
ly located in a few selected areas and employed unpaid communal 
labour extracted from surrounding villages. These two types of 
fields within a block ranged from a handful to over one thous­
and. At Dugunfc block in Soddo Cotton District for example, 
private fields only numbered 900. On the other hand, some 
collective farms had the potential of engaging more than 1,000
Quaranta, op.cit., pp.59-60; CD IAO 1826, pp.3-4; 1830, 
p.4; Chiuderi (1942):6; CD IAO 1106, p.2.
91. CD IAO 1106, p.4.
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day labourers, as was the case with 600 ha Motoarato field at 
Bonaya, NMqamti Cotton District92.
The technical and administrative control and the 
agricultural efficiency of these was vested in the block 
inspector (capo zona) who was responsible to the district chief 
(capo distretto). The block inspector had extremely tight 
schedule: he had to help and, above all, control the Ethiopian 
farmers - a hard and demanding task. This involved a regular 
tour to the private fields instructing the Ethiopian farmer to 
farm well, informing him about the sowing programme, keeping 
him up to date with his work, purchasing cotton by weighing it 
and paying cultivators. He maintained constant contact with 
Ethiopian chiefs upon whose "politics of collaboration" he 
depended for supply of labour to collective fields which ab­
sorbed most of his daily energies. He ran a small meteorolo­
gical observatory from where he despatched the monthly data to 
District headquarters. In the execution of such tasks he was 
aided by his assistants who supervised part of the crops. In 
each Cotton District there were a handful of civil and mechani­
cal engineers for the construction of buildings, technicians 
for the manning of machinery and, in Soddo District, an ad­
ministrator who was in charge of a plethora of tasks ranging 
from accounting, workshop and carpentry, to construction and 
correspondence with the headquarters in AA. In a well staffed 
Cotton District like that of Soddo, the personnel was between 
10 and 15 strong. But it was the block inspector and district 
chiefs who were responsible for the agricultural efficiency of 
the project. Their actions were backed by the local political 
authorities who criss-crossed the districts during key periods 
in the agricultural calendar to enforce cotton growing93.
Legally, the district chiefs should t a v e a t  least 
one field inspector for each 1,000 ha and one Ethiopian chief
92. CD IAO 1826, pp.3-4; 1830, p.4; Chiuderi (1942) :273.
93. CD IAO 1826, p.2.
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for every 300 ha under cultivation^. But in practice this was 
often not the case. Instances where field inspectors were in 
charge of as many as 1,500 ha were common^. The issue, however, 
was not only that of inadequacy of personnel, but also the 
level of energy and competence of those working. As appears 
from a secret report by Alfredo Pesarini, a man with twenty 
years experience in cotton fields in Egypt, lack of job satis­
faction combined with poor wages and bad working conditions 
meant the technical officers showed little enthusiasm for their 
work and many anxiously awaited the termination of the con­
tract, when they would be repatriated or engaged in more 
lucrative activities within the Empire^6. Management came and 
went on average within a year. Such a rapid turnover of offi­
cials threatened the continuity of carefully studied program-
A clause in article 2 of the contracts asserts that ’’the 
district chief employed by the company must have at his disposal 
for the purpose of supervision of, and propaganda amid, the 
natives at least one assistant per 1,000 ha, and one native chief 
cultivator per 300 ha, that are effectively farmed".
95. CD IAO A01 1826, p.5.
The list of salaries available is only for the Soddo 
Cotton District personnel whose monthly, is given as follows:- 
Chief District £.6,000
Administrator £.5,000
Assistant Chief District £.3,300
Capo Zona £.3,000
Assistant capo zona £.2,000-2,500
Mechanic £.1,500-2,000
Carpenter £.1,500-2,500
Builder £.1,500-2,000
Driver £.1,500
Each month £.300 from the workers’, between £.500-£.550 from the 
personnel of the district headquarters and £.800 from the tech­
nicians’s salaries was deducted to cover meals' cost. The company 
paid the full wages of the workers* servants, and part of that 
of the personnel while the technicians paid for their own. With 
the exclusion of the technicians posted in AA, for the rest of 
the personnel the employment was on a yearly basis [Cfr. CD IAO 
AOI 1826, pp.9-10].
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mes®^ . This situation was further aggravated by the fact that 
generally they did not speak the local language and no sys­
tematic approach to cotton cultivation had been worked out. 
Work continued in an ad hoc and haphazard fashion®®.
This, however, does not mean that cotton production 
was left to chance. On the contrary, the companies conducted 
"cotton campaigns" in their Cotton districts. As a pamphlet 
issued in Amharic by Cotetio in June 1938®® reveals, the cam­
paigns were orders instructing the peasantry on production 
techniques and conservation. This involved proper ploughing, 
row planting, proper care and maintenance, weeding and picking 
as well as selling exclusively to the company. The peasants 
were ordered to use only new seeds distributed by the company 
and to destroy local ones1®®. The district chiefs saw that such 
orders were translated into action. Directives were passed to 
the block officers who allocated the minimum amount of land 
that each field inspector should aim to get cultivated in his 
block*®*.
Given the limited resources at their disposal, the 
block officers found the quota unrealistic. Those who attempted 
to meet the target at any cost met disastrous consequences. A 
typical case was the collective camp of Motoarato of Bonaya, in 
Laqamti Cotton District where in 1940, against expert advice to 
limit cultivation to 200 ha, agreement was made with tractor 
drivers to cultivate 600 ha. The avaricious contractors plough-
®*. Ibidem 1826, pp.9-10; 1830, pp.3-4.
®®. Ibidem 1830, pp. 3-6.
®®. See Appendix II.
*®®. CD IAO A0I 1936, Cotetio, Norme elementari per la 
coltura del cotone [Balteycpeya west yatet kumpaneya, Tet
lamazratenna 1 Mma 1 qMm y8tadanaggMg& yMmasMrSt hegg] , AA, 
n.d.(date given in pencil indicates June 1938). See Appendix://.
*®*. CD IAO 1826, p.5; "La produzione del cotone nell’Impe- 
ro", IC, 15-4-1939.
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ed through the night but with such carelessness and haste that 
the seeds failed to germinate. The incident only served to 
undermine the confidence of the labourers in the technical 
experts. When instructed to sow the field again, 400 labourers, 
whom the authorities had recruited with difficulty, vanished. 
Convincing them to return proved an impossible task1®2.
The peasants were reluctant to produce the goods 
required by the companies. What becomes clear from the tech­
nicians' reports is that such resistance was not open or or­
ganized but subtle, local, day-to-day and passive, similar to 
peasants’ reactions elsewhere in colonial Africa or in American 
slave plantations1®3. An official from Soddo Cotton District com­
plained that the peasants expressed great enthusiasm for each 
proposition put by the company, but they signed agreements 
without having the slightest intention of carrying them out. 
During their inspections, the field officers discovered that 
only the worst land was allocated to cotton or, where there was 
no continuous weekly inspection by the company officials, no 
care was given to cotton fields. The large number of private 
fields existing in any one block, the need for a continuous 
presence in collective fields and the variety of tasks to be 
performed in any one day by the field inspectors, made any 
attempt at rigorous inspection almost impossible1®*.
Confronted with such difficulties, the companies 
shifted their emphasis from reliance on private fields to 
collective fields. Administratively, the strategy seemed to 
offer better control of the production of cotton and labour. 
But for its opponents, this method was only a tool of 'lazy' 
technicians who wanted to sacrifice productivity to administra­
tive expediency, surrendering to the Ethiopians' demands. They
102. CD IAO 1830, p.5.
*®3. Documents speak that "open coposition was not uncommon" 
but do not describe the nature of it [Cfr. CD IAO 1106, p.4].
*®*. Ibidem 1826, pp. 2-3.
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pointed out that the collective fields had unfailingly proved 
to be unproductive largely because the Ethiopians reserved the 
best lands for their own f ood-crops1®5. In practice, the shift 
from private to collective fields neither eased the administra­
tive problems nor improved production efficiency, but aggrava­
ted existing difficulties.
Collective fields seemed to offer more satisfactory 
use of labour, which was unpaid and easily recruited. But in 
practice passive resistance left the companies impotent, depen­
dent on the co-operation of the chiefs. Yet not all chiefs were 
willing to collaborate and the State had to make frequent 
recourse to the use of force. Some chiefs were replaced and 
others fined. In some places stringent measures were adopted 
allocating to each chief a labour quota proportional to the 
number of people under his jurisdiction. But, despite their 
spurious claims to authority, even willing chiefs found dif­
ficulty in persuading the people they 'ruled' to work in 
collective fields. Sometimes the labour force they despatched 
was far below the requirements of the company. In the case of 
Motoarato Camp in NBqamti, the chiefs were able to supply only 
460 workers per day against 1,000 stipulated. Once in the 
fields, this same labour proved recalcitrant and used every 
pretext to avoid work or to suddenly disappear and walk back 
home1®®. Reading through the available data one often comes 
across laments like this officer:
To cultivate a very modest acreage enormous 
effort was put. The chiefs promised manpower 
and totally failed to despatch it. Each labou­
rer sought to work the minimum possible; 
labour was not the same every day and because 
of this, for example, after one has ultimately 
succeeded in convincing the labourers that the 
seed should not be planted deeper than one or 
two centimetres, the following day most of
1U\ Ibidem 1830, p.7; CD IAO 1106, p.4.
106. Ibidem, p.5; 1826, p.7.
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them do not turn up and so everything has to
be explained afresh to the newcomer107.
As with all agricultural undertakings, demand for 
labour fluctuated seasonally according to the area. At peak 
season, cotton in areas like NHqSmti and Baro Cotton Districts 
demanded a large workforce and competed for scarce manpower. 
Near Baro Cotton District, Jubdo had a well-established mining 
industry belonging to Italian national Alberto Prasso, which 
had become the property of the Italian government after his 
death in the Naqamti massacre108. Like the Cotton Districts, 
these mines depended on corvd^ labour whose recruitment was 
identical to that of the Cotton Districts in collective farms. 
Every two months each Residenza provided a certain number of 
people who were forced to work in the mines in exchange for 
very small pay and equally small tax exemption. The pay was 
normally in kind, such as food; contrary to what some sources 
allege, cash payment was an exception100.
The chiefs who recruited labour were not beyond 
reproach. As in collective cotton farms, it was largely the 
financially underprivileged who ended up in the mines while the 
well to do often gained exemption by illicit means. Earlier the 
companies were dismayed when they discovered that most of their 
recruits happened to be, as one official described it, the old, 
crippled and half-blind. A medical test was introduced whereby 
each labourer underwent a relatively rigorous examination. 
Escorted by a dozen uniformed officers, the workforce trekked 
on foot to the work-place. Despite strict security, many 
absconded during the journey110. Those who reached the mines were 
subjected to an extremely tough regime of control and, like in
107 e Ibidem 1826, pp.3-6; 1830, p.7.
108 b Masotti , op.cit., p.137.
1091 Ibidem, p.138.
no. Ibidem, pp.138-9.
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Somalia, the measures adopted against the would-be-dodgers was 
so brutal as to be "indistinguishable from slavery"111.
Mining was not the only competitor for labour. The 
demand from public work such as road-building, settlers’ farms 
and subsistence agriculture was equally acute. As labour became 
increasingly difficult to obtain tension developed and the 
Government in AA had to intervene. In W&llSga Cotton District 
an additional clause had to be incorporated cautioning the 
company not to upset the local labour market112. In Soddo the 
intervention was aimed to protect subsistence agriculture and 
balance labour demands between the company and public work. 
Resistance in this District had often strained the fragile 
relationship between the Residente and company officials. The 
block inspector at Umbo, Achille Pajella, gives an illuminating 
example. The Ethiopians were given order by the Residente to 
repair a road. To evade work in the collective cotton farms, 
the peasants presented the Residente*s order to the company, 
demanding 10-20 days absence. As it was an order from the 
political authority the block inspector had no option except to 
let them go. Afterwards the peasants informed the Residente 
that they were prevented by the company’s technician from 
carrying out the road repair and went to attend to their own 
plots. When he realized that the work was not completed within 
the scheduled time, the Residente wrote angry letters of 
complaints demanding the company to discharge the Ethiopians 
immediately so that they could attend to road repairs. The
121. Ibidem; Margery Perham to the Editors, The Times. 7-7-
1948.
112. DM 31-1-1940: IDC Uollega", GUGS, V/29, 17-7-1940 where 
in art. 2 clause (b) is incorporated demanding the company "not 
to divert, for the purpose of cotton farming, the manpower 
necessary to new cultivations which the administration of the IEA 
wishes to expand in the areas of the Cotton District, to the 
existing cultivations within and which the administration wants 
to increase and to the mineral enterprises which are already 
operating in the District or will be set up inside the District 
or its bordering zones"; see also Chiuderi (1941):272-3.
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Residente was not convinced by the company's explanation, and 
in order to avoid misunderstandings the latter had to resort to 
actions such as taking the Residente around the cotton camps 
where there were no workers and then to road site where there 
were no workers either. Both the company and the government had 
to give in to the peasants. An agreement stipulated between the 
company and the district chiefs and sanctioned by the Residente 
and Commissario, timetabled six working days per week - three 
to cotton cultivation, and three to the peasant’s own work113.
Why was the peasantry so unresponsive to incentives 
to involve it in cotton production? and what were the reasons 
for cotton fields to be unattractive. In the collective fields, 
the workers were provided with food while at work to spare the 
need to work on their own fields. But the work was carried out 
under duress and without pay. Moreover, as one technician quite 
perceptively lamented, the cotton field "does not belong to the 
peasant and so he does not care about it"11*.
The official explanation for the peasant resistance 
was a conventional stereotyping of naturally idle and thrift­
less Ethiopian peasantry with a deep-seated uneconomic attitude 
and apathy to change113. One official of the Soddo Cotton Di­
strict wrote:
The W&llamo has the treacherous character of 
a person who tries to evade in any possible 
way any form of imposition. He obeyed his 
Abyssinian master for he commanded him with 
whips, an instrument which we Italians do not 
feel at ease to use. To each proposal of work 
he always replies affirmatively but he rarely 
or never keeps his word. He prefers the pleas­
ant idleness to the hard work of cotton alter­
nating the sitting under the shade of a tree
113. CD IAO AO I 1826, pp. 7-8.
n*. Ibidem 1830, p.7; CD IAO 1106, p.4.
115. CD IAO 1106, p.4.
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while looking after his cattle with a little
care to his small plot11®.
But rather than lazy and apathetic, the peasants 
appear hard-working and calculating. When they were searched 
out in their villages, they were not caught sitting idle, 
feasting or drinking but attending to their own food produc­
tion117. It is a colonial bias to equate hard-working and pro­
gressive peasantry with those working to the interest of the 
settlers. In this respect the Italian official thinking was no 
exception.
The peasantry was acutely aware of the disadvantages 
associated with cultivating cotton. Firstly, cotton was primar­
ily an export crop, vulnerable to the bewildering fluctuations 
of the world market and lacking the flexibility characteristic 
of subsistence crops. It could at no time be used as part of 
the diet. It was planted during the long rains and harvested in 
December-January. These were critical months for the subsis­
tence crops in which manpower was already severely stretched. 
Unlike cotton, these serve as staple food in domestic consump­
tion. Their surplus could be exchanged for items such as salt 
and clothing, and, in years of disastrously low yield, could be 
held back as means of famine relief118. Cotton cultivation
competed with these well tried and flexible subsistence crops 
and could not be done without necessarily disrupting their
production or cutting back labour from them. Moreover, unlike
the local variety, the cotton distributed by the Italians
showed minimum resistance to parasite, extreme susceptibility
n®. Ibidem 1826, pp.4-5.
117. Ibidem, p.8.
118. John Tosh, "Lango agriculture during the early colonial 
period: land and labour in a cash-crop economy", JAS. XIX, 3 
(1978):428; Megan Vaughan, "Food production and family labour 
in Southern Malawi: The Shire Highlands and Upper Shire Valley 
in the early colonial period", JAS. XXIII, 3 (1982):362-3.
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to changes in weather conditions, and needed abundant rains110.
This made the crop extremely unreliable.
Secondly, cotton was labour intensive and all crops
had to be sown afresh each time on laboriously prepared ground.
Before harvest, the cotton plants demanded periodic thinning
and weeding - time consuming jobs120. By contrast, subsistence
crops were lets demanding of labour, except perhaps at harvest
time. Under the circumstances the peasants were not prepared to
compromise their own best plots or waste their labour in order
to maintain an unpredictable government imposed export crop.
So, like African growers elsewhere, the Ethiopian peasantry
continued to insist on allocating the best possible lands for
their staple food crops121.
Added to these drawbacks was the lack of economic
incentives for cotton production. The price paid for cotton
never fully compensated for the loss of labour which otherwise
would have gone into food production. The price of foodstuffs
had risen tremendously since the conquest and the Ethiopians
had began to earn high revenue from it. Thus
when the company (ICAI) put before the natives 
that cotton was a profitable crop they did not 
find the idea very convincing, for they easily 
infer that the profit that can be made from 
one and the same plot used for cultivating 
cotton or corn, the earning from the first one 
is very modest. In fact from 2,000 sqm of 
cotton field is harvested on average 40 kg of 
cotton from which by selling to the company
110. CD IAO AO I 1826, pp. 1-2.
120. CD IAO 1106, p.4.
121. A. 0. Anjorin, "European attempts to develop cotton
cultivation in West Africa, 1850-1910", Odti: University of Ife 
Journal of African Studies. Ill, 1 (1960):13; Henry Slater,
"Land, labour and capital in Natal: The Natal Land and Colonisa­
tion Company, 1860-1948", JAS, XVI, 2 (1975), pp.257-83; Tosh, 
op.cit.:425-7; Robin Palmer, "Working conditions and worker 
responses on Nyasaland tea estates, 1930-1953", JAS. 27
(1986):109-11; 116-8; Thomas Bassett, "The development of cotton 
in northern Ivory Coast, 1910-1965", JAS. 29 (1988):272-4.
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could make only £.80, whereas the cultivation 
of corn in this same plot could earn about 150 
kg which in 1940 was sold at the Soddo market 
for £. 140122.
For cotton to be attractive to the peasant in any
significant way, it had to be equally, if not more, profitable
than food crops. But the political authorities, to protect the
companies from a capricious world market to which cotton was
subjected, adopted from the outset the policy of keeping the
price paid to the Ethiopian pedant ridiculously low122.
Such a price should start from the premises 
that cotton should be produced at a very low 
cost so that it would offset the heavy transp­
ort and freight expenses and provide the 
metropolitan industry with fine raw cotton at 
economic price. Therefore, the native should 
be paid little for his cotton particularly at 
the early stage since the native can never 
understand any later price less than what he 
earlier enjoyed^2*.
In Soddo, where ICAI purchased fine quality cotton 
for £.2 per kg, the same quantity of low quality cotton of 
local variety was sold for over £.10 in the local market123. As 
a producer of fine quality cotton the peasant could have 
obtained a higher price, but the monopoly by the companies 
prevented previous free market practices.
122. CD IAO AOI 1826, p. 5.
123. CD IAO 1106, p.5.
12*. CD IAO AOI 1936, Angelo de Rubeis, "Promemoria Per S.E. 
II Sottosegretario: Produzione cotoniera a mezzo degli indigeni", 
Rm 12-5-1938.
123. CD IAO AOI 1826, p. 9. This same author suggests that
ICAI intended to reduce the price further on the grounds that in
the Belgian Congo the cotton was purchased for 60-70 cents per 
kg. But he does not support such a view; according to him, at the 
beginning cotton should be paid £.4-5 pe* kg. and then be reduced 
very gradually to the current price once the cultivation becomes 
extensive and the native gets accustomed to it and discovers its 
economic importance.
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fflGURI X- COTTON GROWING DISTRICTS.
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The most tangible effect was a sudden revival of 
local ’black markets' and an outbreak of cotton theft "whereby 
the farmer harvested cotton at night and hid it in order to 
sell it in one of the remote markets"^. The political authorit­
ies seemed to be aware from the start of the obstacles facing 
export cotton from a well-established local industry. In order 
to export cotton, the local market must be saturated. To do so 
a clause in the charter of the companies demanded the companies 
to leave at the disposal of the Ethiopians cotton "sufficient 
enough to the customarily made local craft"222. Whether the 
companies complied with this obligation is uncertain. But the 
existence of such a parallel market formed a formidable chal­
lenge to the monopolistic tendencies of the companies and 
became the haven for those dissatisfied with their merciless 
exploitation. Theft was widely reported, especially in the 
private fields. Anybody caught was subjected to harsh punish­
ment .
As efforts to eradicate petty theft proved ineffec­
tive, the political authorities concentrated their fight mainly 
against more serious cases. As the case of Soddo Cotton Di­
strict reveals this involved:
Whenever the theft was discovered, it was 
reported to the Residenza who ordered the 
arrest of the culprit; but the fact is it 
was not possible to arrest so many thous­
ands of the natives and so the tendency 
was to eradicate the fraud by executing 
those who committed serious theft while 
inflicting corporal punishment for lesser 
thefts228.
126 Ibidem.
222. Article. 2(d) of RD 7-1-1936. no.443. This condition is
incorporated in Article 4(c) or 5(c) of the contract of each
cotton district.
128. CD IAO AOI 1826, p.9.
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Despite the severity of the measures, the political authorities 
were incapable of totally eradicating cotton theft. Nor did the 
package of coercive measures help the companies to overcome the 
chronic labour shortage or improve the level of production22^. 
Plans with forced resettlements in scarcely populated area came 
to an abrupt halt whep the malcontent of those resettled inten­
sified. Most of them inhabited previously much more fertile, 
and healthy areas of the Ethiopian highlands and were reluctant 
to move out220.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the companies 
carried out three campaigns. When compared to the size of the 
territory covered by the Cotton Districts, the results achieved 
were modest232. Progress was made only in Adama, Alamata and, 
above all, Soddo where the companies succeeded in setting up 
experimental fields, laboratories, and ginneries. Some of the 
premises and ginneries were found to be still in a good state 
in 1955232. The type of cotton grown was American Upland consist­
ing of several varieties - Acala, Delfos, Stoneville 5, Cliett, 
Bagley, Rogers 3, Cocker Wilt 100, Lankart Watson. Towards the 
end of occupation, U4 strains from Barberton Experimental 
Station was introduced. The best results were obtained only 
with varieties Acala and U4. Yields ranged between 150 and 200 
lb of lint per acre. In some sections of Soddo district, where 
the best results were obtained, there were reports of 750 lb. 
per acre with Acala variety233 .
The "insistent and paternal advice" with which the 
authorities intervened made cotton production unpopular. Yet 
unpopular or not the Cotton Districts, like the agricultural
129 # CD IAO 1106, p.4.
130 # Villa and al., op.cit., p.249.
I32. CD IAO 1106, p.5. See Table XXV.
132 p Nicholson, op.cit., pp.10-12.
133 # Ibidem; CD IAO 1106, p.4.
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offices, laid down many infrastructures. With them began the 
transformation of rural life, for cotton companies and agricul­
tural offices’ campaigns brought into rural areas for the first 
time agricultural experts and administrators. Numerous studies 
of the land and soils were undertaken and in some areas tech­
nological changes were promoted. For example, the use of new 
varieties of cotton and cereal crops, much improved agricultur­
al tools, such as ploughs and other implements, were intro­
duced. Even though they remained at the initial stage, a co­
ordinated attempt was being made to introduce the Ethiopian 
peasantry to growing cash crops. The very fact that the cotton 
companies and agricultural offices tried to make use of tradi­
tional social and economic units of production was better than 
a plantation agriculture where the labourer worked far from 
home.
At the end of the occupation, only TasMneiy sur­
vived23^, but cotton remained one of the important crops grown in 
a number of other Districts233. Finally, the work of the cotton 
companies and agricultural offices attempted to contribute to 
what was a very marked feature of European colonialism, i.e. 
the preservation of the pre-colonial social and even economic 
structures while at the same time trying to promote the produc­
tion of large surpluses for the world market.
The expressed view of the cotton companies was that 
of raising the welfare level of the peasantry without involving 
any serious disruption to the existing agricultural structure.
1J. Ibidem: 14. According to this report, in 1955 Tasclnay 
Cotton District comprised 40,000 acres. Of these, 10,000 acres 
were cultivated by 2,000 share-croppers consisting of about 6,000 
individuals.
233. Ibidem: 10-4; Awash Valley became one of the key cotton 
plantation centres after 1960 [Cfr. Maknun Gamaledin Ashami, 
op.cit.]. The most conspicuous legacy, however, was the spinning 
and weaving mill of Dir£ Dawa set up by Society Cotoniere 
Meridionali which still is the country’s most important cotton 
manufacturing plant [Cfr. CD IAO 1106, p.6].
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But in practice it became increasingly clear that the primary 
purpose of the scheme was to forcibly milk the rural agricul­
tural and labour surplus in order to meet pressing metropolitan 
domestic needs. The scheme was largely formulated in the 
interest of the metropolitan textile industry at the expense of 
the indigenous population. Thus government’s commitment to 
uplift the standard of life for the indigenous population had 
little substance but much rhetoric.
TABLE XXV:- COTTON PRODUCTION IN 1938-39 CAMPAIGN
PLACE CULTIVATED PRODUCTION PRODUCTION
AREAS (HA) RAW (QL) GINNED (QL)
AW AS 9 834 260 —
GAMBELA 10 30
NAQAMTI 80 40 100
QOBBO 550 320 “■ *
SODDO 1,100 1,800
TANA 60 30 600
TASANAY 1,800 4,225 1,450
SOMALIA 6,184 15,121 5,041
TABLE XXVI:- SCALE OF UNGINNED COTTON PRODUCTION, 1938-1941
YEAR CULTIVATED PRODUCTION
AREAS (HA) (QL)
1938-9 2,534 2,156
1939-40 6,740 7,070
1940-1 7,100 10,000
Source: "Notiziario agrario commerciale", AC. 
(novembre 1940):483.
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We have examined in some detail the nature, scope 
and dynamics of Italian land use policy in Ethiopia during the 
brief period of occupation. The policies, though devised as 
responses to pressures from the metropolitan’s combined demands 
for a social outlet for its surplus population, reliable source 
of agricultural raw materials, and the need to consolidate the 
Empire as economically self-supporting, were far from being 
carefully integrated programmes demanded by later planning 
techniques. Yet they did maintain some continuity with Italian 
colonial tradition as manifested in its other colonies, both in 
terms of problems they addressed and the methods by which they 
attempted to tackle them. Emerging from this was the develop­
ment of similar institutional frameworks which, in turn, were 
shaped by the presence of the same personalities.
As in Libya, the key criterion of Italian agricul­
tural policy remained the ’demographic myth*, with its stress 
on settlement. This was the cornerstone of Italian imperial 
policy, and constituted its distinctive feature vis-A-vis that 
of other colonial powers. In contrast to Libya, Ethiopia 
contained much more fertile land so it seemed that the conquest 
would make this dream real. Alongside these schemes, a bewilder­
ing variety of interests had to be accommodated, giving rise to 
a number of initiatives, differing in their orientation and 
methodology. These were individually justified by the diversity 
of climate and geo-ethnographic conditions, as well as economic 
factors in the various territories in which they operated.
Mussolini’s vision of conquering Ethiopia to settle 
millions of Italians and solve Italy’s economic problems was 
an attractive idea. It contributed considerably to the populari­
ty of the Fascist regime. But once the country had been 
conquered the regime neither had clear ideas on how to implement 
this vision nor the necessary means and proper personnel. 
Despite his ministers* propaganda informing the Italians that 
the Duce personally guided everyday the course of imperial
CONCLUSION
policy, in fact once the heroic deeds of conquest were over, he 
showed little interest in the development of Ethiopia. The 
popular exuberance of the Italians themselves also subsided once 
the excitement of easy victory was over.
The settlement of large numbers of Italian peasant 
families - the main economic argument to justify the conquest 
- proved unworkable. On April 27, 1940, less than a fortnight 
before Mussolini's entry into the European war, the then 
Minister of Italian Africa, Terruzzi, indicated that 3,550 
families were settled on 113,760 ha of land. But it appears 
from other sources these were much inflated figures. The 
peasants actually transferred numbered no more than 400 and of 
these about 150 were joined by their families - a very far cry 
from the often proclaimed millions. Despite the tremendous 
publicity, by the end of 1939 the recruitment of peasant 
families willing to move to Ethiopia had become an arduous task.
As an outlet for emigration, Ethiopia was a total 
failure. In 1939, the total Italian population of IEA numbered 
about 130,000, of which about 60,000 were settled in Ethiopia. 
Yet the Italian population of New York was still ten times more 
than that of the entire Italian Empire. But the trend was that 
Italians "were returning to Italy rather than coming out to the 
Empire"2.
The dream of the Empire as a land of opportunity 
also evaporated as the prospects of employment became poor, and 
many experienced extreme poverty, housing shortage and spirall­
ing living costs. At the end of 1936, there had been 146,000 
Italian workers. By June 1939, this number dropped to 23,000. 
During this same year the number of Italian unemployed in AA 
alone was estimated to be between 6-7,000. Many lived in great 
squalor in a camp on the outskirts of the town, often begging
2. F0371/23380/J1776/296/1, Bird to Halifax, AA 1-4-1939].
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Ethiopians for food - thus making the so called "racial prestige 
policy" a mockery3.
TABLE X X V I I I T A L I A N  POPULATION IN ETHIOPIA(1940)
PLACE MALE FEMALE TOTAL
AA 26,952
ADWA 200 30 230
XMBO - - 4,500
DERfi DAWA 3,370 174 3,542
GONDAR - - 2,000
HXRXR 3,018 436 3,453
JIMMA 12,544 626 13,170
MAQAL2 92 43 105
KORAM 97 12 109
SODDO 170 3 173
YAVfiLLO 57 5 62
TOTAL 19,605 1,329 54,296
Source:- II Pooolo Fascista. 25-2-1939; GI_, 25-2-1939;
"Quadro demografico di Gimma", CI_» 2-3-1940.
Despite the claims made for it, colonization did
little or nothing to help solve Italy’s pressing social
problems. At best, perhaps the foundation of the Empire served 
as a comforting way to distract the Italian people from the 
reality of economic depression and dictatorship that surrounded 
them. For the handful of settlers the coup de grace came with the 
collapse of Italian rule in 1941 with which they lost their 
raison d'etre. Following the Anglo-Italian agreement effected in 
the midst of World War II, they were repatriated to Italy to
start a new life3. With their return to a war-stricken homeland
l. F0371/24635/J467/18/1, ACG Gibbs to PSSFA, AA 28-12-
1939.
3. ECRE survived until 1946 in Eritrea where some of its 
members operated four farms at the outskirts of Asmara "bid . 
their time in view of making the life of the occupying enemy 
difficult". But soon it was exposed as "the nest of Fascism",
-325-
CONCLUSION
the dream of Italian demographic settlement definitely faded, 
a "myth" that had besieged the minds of a section of its most 
influential intellectual and political elite since the early 
days of independence.
Another premise on which the conquest of Ethiopia 
was justified was the commercial advantages and the profitable 
source of raw materials it was thought the country would 
provide. Italy’s imports from her colonies in 1938 were little 
more than 2% of her total imports and she had spent ten times 
as much on administering the Empire as the total volume of trade 
with it. Quite apart from the continuing military expense, which 
was kept secret, the cost of organizing and exploiting the 
Empire was over a thousand million lire in hard currency each 
year. This was more than one-tenth of the total foreign reserves 
available in 1938 and 1939*. For some Fascists this was an 
investment which would prove rewarding in the end. But for the 
Minister of Foreign Trade, Felice Guarnieri, such a rate of 
expenditure for more than a few years could not be afforded by 
the Italian State3.
Far from being self-sufficient as Mussolini had 
ordered, Ethiopia had to import most of the food for her Italian 
expatriates and industrial equipment. Italy exported to her East 
African Empire in 1938 goods to the value of over 
£.2,000,000,000, nearly twenty times as much as she received. 
Thus far from solving Italy's economic problems - apart perhaps 
from providing a secure market for some Italian products, such
and, contrary to the plan, its members "lived miserably, despised 
and hated by the anti-fascists and members of Free Italy or 
Libera Italia, closely watched and harried by the British 
Intelligence and the Eritrean Police Force and in constant fear 
of being interned at any moment the enemy wishes or believes it 
appropriate" [Cfr. CD IAO 1921, Tim6 Mansueto, AttivitA dell’Ente 
Romagna, Rm 9-2-1943].
*. Guarnieri Felice, Battaglie economiche tra Le due grandi 
guerre. (Milano: Granzanti 1953), vol.2, p.404.
K Guarnieri, op. cit., p.198.
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as textiles - it only aggravated them. Rather than strengthening 
national self-sufficiency and assisting Italy’s balance of 
payments, the Empire, according to Guarnieri*s own statement, 
was swallowing Italy itself3. The diversion of goods to Ethiopia 
that might have been sold elsewhere for foreign exchange and the 
use of ships more profitably employed on transatlantic routes 
made the deficit even worse. So exasperating was the whole 
economic condition that, whereas Italians had counted on 
abundant supplies of coffee from the Empire, 1938 saw the 
beginning of a serious coffee shortage in Italy.
Underlying such poor achievement was bad planning 
which can be understood by the speedy conquest that astonished 
not only the Italians but the entire world. The MC in Rome was 
unprepared for the many pressures coming from different quarters 
- largely unleashed by the multi-media Fascist propaganda 
machine: the unemployed of the immediate post-depression era
searching for work and land to cultivate; the social adventurers 
with their strong desire to see with their own eyes the mythical 
lands; demobilized masses of military recruits urgently needing 
settlement; a strong business lobby wanting to expand its 
enterprise; strategic and economic considerations calling for 
the Empire’s self-sufficiency. The temptation was also great to 
show international opinion, hostile to the conquest, that Italy 
was on top of events and its initiation of developmental ac­
tivities .
These multitudinous pressures were so overwhelming 
that any suggestions to delay action until the country was 
effectively pacified and the land tenure system was carefully 
studied, was felt to be an unaffordable luxury. The inevitable 
outcome of such pressures was the emergence of an unco-ordinated 
and chaotic agricultural policy. Overnight the MC in Rome had 
to improvise a bold programme of development, but which in 
practice was little more than a collection of projects lacking
6. Macksmith (1976), p.121.
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coherence and realism. Its inherent flaw was the tremendous lack 
of knowledge about the physical, social and economic conditions 
that prevailed in Ethiopia. There was a lack of hard facts for 
realistic prognoses and plans. The men who devised the program­
mes, did so on knowledge acquired either during a brief flying 
visit or by reading often unsubstantiated accounts. The 
programmes seemed deceptively easy to implement, yet in practice 
proved far from workable.
The first to realize their unworkability were the 
authorities in Ethiopia who had the task of translating the 
programmes into action. With their badly paid, numerically 
insufficient and qualitatively poor personnel, they were bur­
dened with the uneasy task of accommodating a wide range of 
conflicting metropolitan interests following the conquest: they 
had to provide the Empire with a solid organizational and 
administrative structure in a land that was not totally 
pacified; they had to provide assistance, hospitality, military 
escort and means of transport to the representatives of agencies 
or group*of farmers who came to choose land for their prospec­
tive farms. The cost of the settlements' protection, the 
construction of roads linking each centre, and the erection of 
schools and hospitals and other social amenities, was an in­
tolerable burden on the authorities' shoestring budget.
This situation was further complicated by the multi­
ple, and largely hostile, 'traditional* local interests which 
the administration had to keep reasonably satisfied. Overbur­
dened by the enormity of such responsibilities within the 
country, the administration in Ethiopia repeatedly called on 
Rome to slow down, and if possible to halt, the agricultural 
programmes until such time that a comprehensive and realistic 
policy was worked out. But Rome was not in a position to fully 
grasp the situation in the colony. The colonial administration 
in Ethiopia thought Rome's plans had been conceived in the 
peaceful confines of the ivory tower of the MAI by arm-chair
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intellectuals, and offered only lukewarm support. The immediate 
bearing this had on colonization was to slow down its progress.
The centre of contention was understandably land. 
The first objective of the Italian administration was to 
constitute a group of domainial lands, under the jurisdiction 
of the state. The bulk of these lands was owned by rebels or 
active political exiles in addition to lands belonging to the 
Ethiopian state and the royal family. Lands seized in this way 
had various destinations: they were allocated to the settlers 
or kept for future needs of colonization or redistributed to 
Ethiopian allies or given in exchange to those Ethiopians 
displaced to make room for Italian settlers.
To accommodate the new settlers, the colonial ad­
ministration in Ethiopia had to pursue policies that were 
largely drafted in Rome and which were also in clear contradic­
tion to Rome’s own avowedly stated policy of respecting the 
’legitimate* land interests of the Ethiopians. These were often 
moved off their lands to make room for new Italian farms. Even 
though the Ethiopians were given other lands in exchange, the 
land was normally relinquished reluctantly and under severe 
pressure. Nor was the process fast enough to satisfy the land 
rush that immediately followed occupation. Initially, the 
Italian regime was led to believe that it had physical power to 
repress any Ethiopian resistance to land alienation but as the 
economic costs of doing so became increasingly unacceptable, it 
proceeded fairly cautiously. The slow pace angered the "land 
hunters" and led to violent disputes with the colonial ad­
ministration.
The immediate impact of such a scarcity of land was 
the emergence of settlement enclaves, scattered and remote from 
each other. Dispersion in time and space made the sharing of 
experiences difficult and brought greater expense for the 
settler and intolerable cost for the government at a time when 
its overstretched human and material resources were desperately 
needed elsewhere. Attempts to create unified zones of coloniz­
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ation that were contiguous to each other, by means of a gradual 
elimination of interpolating Ethiopian properties through pur­
chase, exchange and other pressures resulted in further aliena­
tion of the Ethiopians, who charged the government with robbing 
them of their lands to benefit the white settlers.
Scarcity of land and hasty selection had led some 
demographic colonization agencies to settle in areas that were 
unhealthy, of high political risk or with no possibility of 
expansion. Both the ECRE and ONC had to divert most of their 
operation to other areas on political grounds and for lack of 
free land to expand. In both cases, the cost to the agencies 
as well as to the central administration was enormous.
Demographic colonization was also undermined by its 
own internal weakness. The agencies were directed by remote 
bodies. In most cases, the leadership proved poor and incom­
petent. The farms were run autocratically and the peasants had 
little say in the expenditure of funds derived from their 
labour. The overwhelming majority of the colonists failed to 
possess those precious qualities and sentiment of racial presti­
ge, social and economic responsibility, physical and technical 
fitness that constituted the ideal for their selection. Their 
behaviour stultified the workings of the "racial prestige 
policy", forcing the government to have recourse to legal 
measures. And the economic resources were inadequate, so the 
demographic colonization was forced to function on a shoestring 
budget. The production, based on cereal crops, was threatened 
by competition from the Ethiopians, who, notwithstanding the 
statutory restrictions, nevertheless produced at much lower 
cost.
The trends within commercial farming were no more 
encouraging. With the exception of a few large companies, the 
commercial farms were reluctant to move their capital to 
Ethiopia. This can be attributed to the natural mistrust that 
these business interests had towards a new environment where 
the technical and economic potential was still unexplored, the
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climatic conditions unknown, the security of capital uncertain 
and profits only in very long-term. N o t t h i s  general 
reluctance, a number of companies or private entrepreneurs 
ventured, lured by attractive appearances: an agreeable climate, 
vegetation growing effortlessly with no or minimal irrigation, 
food crop prices that permitted fantastic profits even with the 
smallest yields, and above all, very cheap manpower. However, 
the enthusiasm even of those ’outstanding and honest farmers* 
was soon dampened once the stark reality of the enterprise 
revealed itself in all of its severity and the enormous 
difficulties that they had to contend with became apparent: a 
government that lacked coherent policies; an intractable and 
amorphous bureaucracy which allocated land at an exasperatingly 
slow pace; an unsafe political environment; scarce and costly 
manpower. Most of their efforts were also frustrated by bad 
weather, drought and continuous battle with marauding insects, 
against which their technical skill offered little remedy. 
Despite media reports to the contrary, archival materials 
clearly reveal the low level of experience and technical 
expertise of those men who found themselves located in a region 
totally new to them. The cumulative effect was dismal results 
and high operational costs that at the beginning of 1940 left 
most of the farms in a lamentable state. For their survival they 
depended upon a generous subsidy from the government on whose 
anxiety to bolster production they capitalized.
One of the most notable legacies of Italian agricul­
tural policy was the introduction of racial competition and 
conflict over land and production. In the colonization zones, 
Ethiopians were under severe pressures to move off their lands 
to make room for Italian farmers. A host of mechanisms that 
gained their justification in often mistaken interpretation of 
local agrarian customs and traditions, were employed to 
perpetuate this harmful policy. Only complicated political and 
economic considerations prevented wholesale deportations from 
the colonization zones. Despite its obvious limitations,
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Ethiopian production helped relieve the tax burden on the 
Italians. Ethiopians were needed in the countryside as, without 
their labour, the colonists* farms were doomed to bankruptcy.
As labour became an intractable problem, the key 
issue remained not the terms on which the Ethiopians would be 
driven off their lands but how they would be permitted to 
settle. The government's policy quite deliberately and con­
sciously aimed to force them into a system of integration with 
the settlers’ farms through a variety of schemes such as share- 
cropping contracts, whereby Ethiopians were offered land in 
return for labour. And yet the Italians feared the challenges 
posed by the competition of Ethiopian farms whose success they 
felt would undermine the development of settler farming. By 1940 
it had become clear that the two economies could not co-exist. 
The suggestion was made to extend the racial segregation policy 
to agriculture, whereby Ethiopians would be allowed to farm only 
within their own ’reserved* zone - land marginal to settler 
agriculture. This policy went against claims that the Italians 
attempted to upgrade the life style of the Ethiopian population.
Certainly the Italians introduced modern agricultural 
techniques and offered technical advice to stimulate indigenous 
agricultural production. And yet these were only timid gestures 
meant largely to guarantee their own position by distributing 
a few crumbs. As its racial policy as well as a draft document 
on "zone of colonization" show, the Italian regime, like the 
rest of the European colonial powers, had little intention of 
granting genuine economic advancement to the Ethiopians. Of 
course, as it was dependent on their labour, the regime planned 
to integrate them into its own scheme of ’development*. 
Otherwise, Ethiopians benefitted from the Italian colonization 
only after independence. Any economic benefit that may have 
accrued to the Ethiopians during the occupation resulted from 
accident and not design.
However, the real achievements during the period 
under consideration have to be seen in a perspective that incor­
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porates some notion of the underdevelopment of the country 
before the occupation. When considered against this background 
and with full account taken of the shortage of trained agricul­
turalists and the short timespan and intractable political, 
social and economic climate in which the regime operated, the 
transformation of the agricultural economy, particularly in 
areas solidly controlled by the regime, was not insignificant. 
Whatever their motives, and notwithstanding the brutalities they 
committed, the Italians had laid down developmental infrastruc­
tures and initiated agricultural policies that had the effect 
of vigorously forcing Ethiopia into greater participation in the 
world capitalist system. They had done much to dismantle 
Ethiopian traditional structures and replace them with what they 
considered to be more modern institutions conducive to exploit­
ing the country’s rich agricultural potential.
Perhaps one of the most important of such changes 
was the curbing of the power of the traditional elites who 
vetoed most of Haile Sellassie’s earlier attempts at land 
reform: once powerful regional armies and their commanders were 
either eliminated or made effectively powerless because of their 
collaboration; the church had been weakened. Most significant­
ly, more than 4,000 miles of all weather roads were built which 
linked the main regions of the Empire as never before. These 
roads can be used for the agricultural exploitation of the 
peripheral areas and marketing of the produce. The monetization 
of the economy was stimulated by the encouragement of the 
production of cash crops to satisfy the needs of soldiers and 
settler families. A limited consumer society emerged, par­
ticularly among those who collaborated with the Italians in 
commerce and government. These accomplishments greatly stren­
gthened the restored regime which reinstated most of the 
agricultural changes that the Fascist regime introduced and made 
reforms that further eroded the power of the regional lords.
Considerable pioneering work was carried out in the 
field of agriculture. The Italians were the first to put forward
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an outline development plan which made provision for surveys, 
research as well as actual development work. Perhaps even today 
it would be difficult in Ethiopia to mention any major project, 
whether still under discussion or already implemented, which had 
not been investigated, sometimes in a fair amount of detail, 
during the period of occupation.
We know little concerning the extent to which the 
post-independence planning in agriculture was inspired by the 
Italian experience. And yet although the Italian initiatives 
were halted in mid-stream, their ideas and the debates they 
gsnerated had some influence in the long term. Of the many other 
Italian colonial developmental initiatives which have a place 
in the history of Ethiopian agriculture, commercial farming is 
worth mentioning. Retrospectively, the picture that emerges is 
that the policy and practice of achieving self-sufficiency 
through commercial farms within a short period did not material­
ize. Yet it will be interesting to study its impact on the 
subsequent economic policies pursued by Imperial Ethiopia in the 
1960s and 1970s, as those very ideas and notions of development 
based on commercialization of agriculture and encouragement of 
agrarian capitalism (import substitution policies) became the 
cornerstone of the country’s development policies.
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APPENDIX n: COTTON CAMPAIGN
ETHIOPIAN COTTON COMPANY*
ADDIS ABABA
BASIC COTTON FARMING RULES
To sow cotton prepare the soil over which no cotton plants 
have been before.
Sow after the first rains so that the land be ready to receive 
the seed and this can germinate quickly.
Make with plough as many furrows as possible each distant from 
the other two steps. Put the seed in small holes at the bottom 
of each furrow within a few distance from each other. Put only 
four grains in each hole and immediately cover them with soil.
So while you are passing with plough, your son can follow you 
depositing it inside the ground; four grains in each separated 
by a small step and cover them with soil using his feet.
The seed is expensive and difficult to get and yields a very 
good cotton. Thus take care not to misuse it.
Do not sell it and, [if you do], you will be punished.
If anyone asks you to have some, do not give it. Your friend can
take it from us.
The seed yields ten times more than the cotton you already 
have in your plot.
Remember that for a land with 100 steps length and 100 steps 
width you need six qunna seeds.
Destroy all old plants of cotton of previous years. It is bad 
and may harbour diseases that can kill even the good plants that 
you obtain from our seed stock.
When the plants are as high as two hands leave only two in
each hole and destroy the rest.
Use hoe to work the land and prevent grass from growing. Grass 
infested cotton-field gives bad and small yield.
Do not be hasty to harvest the cotton, nor should you wait 
until it falls down on the ground: both early and fallen cotton 
will fetch you low price.
Amharic original attached.
APPENDIX
As it can be stained by smoke, do not store the cotton that 
you picked up in a tukul where there is too much smoke; nor 
store it on the floor as it can get dirty.
As dirty cotton that is adulterated with leaves, straw, pebbles 
and soil will fetch for you low price, try to bring to us im­
mediately after you picked it.
Do not mix the cotton produced using our seeds with the old 
cotton you have in your plot. We will notice it easily and 
tender reduced price accordingly.
Be aware that the cotton you produced can be sold to nobody 
but us. Nor can you keep it at home for yourself.
We will purchase your cotton for a fair price as fixed by the 
government.
We will also give you clean cotton sufficient enough for the 
needs of your family.
Once the cotton is picked up, pull out all cotton plants and 
burn them. For the following year you will be provided with far 
improved seeds.
You will sow this in a different land in the same manner that 
you have been instructed before.
ETHIOPIAN COTTON COMPANY
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